Sophisticated Minds Research Articles

Are we smart enough to remember how smart animals are?

Some theoretical perspectives suggest people overestimate animals' mental capacities (anthropomorphism), while others suggest the reverse (mind-denial). However, studies have generally not employed objective criteria against which the accuracy or appropriateness of people's judgments about animals can be tested. We employed memory paradigms, in which judgments are clearly right or wrong, in nine experiments (eight preregistered; n = 3,162). When tested shortly after exposure, meat-eaters' memory about companion animals (e.g., dogs) but not food animals (e.g., pigs) showed an anthropomorphic bias: they remembered more information consistent with animals having versus lacking a mind (Experiments 1-4). Vegetarians' and vegans' memory, on the other hand, consistently showed an anthropomorphic bias regarding food and companion animals alike (Experiments 5 and 6). When tested a week after exposure, both those who eat meat and those who do not showed signs of shifting toward a mind-denying bias (Experiments 2, 3, and 6). These biases had important consequences for beliefs about animal minds. Inducing mind-denying memory biases caused participants to see animals as possessing less sophisticated minds (Experiments 7-9). The work demonstrates that memories concerning animals' minds can depart predictably from reality and that such departures can contribute to biased evaluations of their mental capacities. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Perceiving People With Physical Disabilities as Overcoming Adversity Warps Mind Perception.

Across six studies, we tested how people with physical disabilities were ascribed mental faculties. People with physical disabilities were seen as more capable of mental agency (e.g., thinking), but not more capable of experience (e.g., pain), compared to nondisabled people (Study 1). People with physical disabilities were also seen as more capable of supernatural mental agency (e.g., seeing the future, reading minds; Study 2). Believing that people with physical disabilities were more mentally agentic than nondisabled people was unrelated to Beliefs in a Just World (Study 3) but was related to beliefs about hardship (Study 4). Narratives of overcoming adversity, common in portrayals of the disabled community, increased the perceived mental sophistication of people with physical disabilities (Study 5). Finally, hardship narratives also affected helping behavior toward people with physical disabilities (Study 6). Thus, hardship stories surrounding individuals with disabilities may contribute to beliefs that they have particularly sophisticated minds.

Happy = Human: A Feeling of Belonging Modulates the “Expression-to-Mind” Effect

Past research has demonstrated a link between facial expressions and mind perception, yet why expressions, especially happy expressions, influence mind attribution remains unclear. Conducting four studies, we addressed this issue. In Study 1, we investigated whether the valence or behavioral intention (i.e., approach or avoidance) implied by different emotions affected the minds ascribed to expressers. Happy (positive valence and approach intention) targets were ascribed more sophisticated minds than were targets displaying neutral, angry (negative-approach), or fearful (negative-avoidance) expressions, suggesting emotional valence was relevant to mind attribution but apparent behavioral intentions were not. We replicated this effect using both Black and White targets (Study 2) and another face database (Study 3). In Study 4, we conducted path analyses to examine attractiveness and expectations of social acceptance as potential mediators of the effect. Our findings suggest that signals of social acceptance are crucial to the effect emotional expressions have on mind perception.

Perceiving Sophisticated Minds Influences Perceptual Individuation.

In six studies, we investigated how ascribing humanlike versus animallike minds to targets influences how easily targets are individuated. Across the studies, participants learned to discriminate among a variety of "aliens" (actually Greebles). Our initial study showed that participants' ability to learn to individuate targets was related to beliefs that targets had sophisticated minds. Investigating the directionality of this relationship, we found that learning to better recognize the targets did not affect perceptions of mind (Study 2). However, when targets were described as having sophisticated humanlike (relative to simplistic animallike) mental faculties, perceivers indicated more motivation to individuate (Study 3) and were more successful individuating them (Studies 4 and 5). Finally, we showed that increased self-similarity mediated the relationship between targets' mental sophistication and perceivers' motivation to individuate (Study 6). These findings indicate ascribing sophisticated mental faculties to others has implications for how we individuate them.

Identity and Self-Knowledge

Self, person, and identity are among the concepts most central to the way humans think about themselves and others. It is often natural in biology to use such concepts; it seems sensible to say, for example, that the job of the immune system is to attack the non-self, but sometimes it attacks the self. But does it make sense to borrow these concepts? Don’t they only pertain to persons, beings with sophisticated minds, and perhaps even souls? I argue that if we focus on the every-day concepts of self and identity, and set aside loftier concepts found in religion, philosophy, and psychology that are applicable, at most, to humans, we can see that self and identity can be sensibly applied widely in biology. Part of a special issue, Ontologies of Living Beings, guest-edited by A. M. Ferner and Thomas Pradeu

Dualism, panpsychism, and the bioethical status of brainless embryos

Summary We draw upon David Chalmers (1996) and Galen Strawson's (2006) defense of the pervasiveness of experience and wed it to Peter Unger's (2006) immaterialist solution to the Problem of the Thinking Many. The idea is that the soul's thoughts depend upon physical composites that though, pace panpsychism, are themselves are unable to think, still contribute to a thinking soul whenever they exist. And they will exist wherever a living organism is found. We think the result is more plausible than either dualism or panpsychism taken by themselves, both of which we still hope to show are more compelling than most will initially think. We will proceed by first stating an argument in favor of dualism. We agree with Unger that the most compelling argument for dualism follows from the considerable troubles that can be advanced against materialism on the basis of the metaphysical Problem of the Thinking Many. Our conception of ourselves, our self-knowledge, our freedom, and our bioethics would appear in great trouble if there were overlapping thinkers, each composed of a good part of the brain that belongs to the others. The absurdity of such an abundance of thinkers enough reason to doubt that materialism is true. In addition to the absurdity of countless thinkers, a consequence is that we will lack what Unger believes is the power to be a genuine chooser. Philosophers sympathetic to libertarian free will are likely to be bothered by the threat to genuine choosing that Unger diagnoses. And even those who are not bothered, perhaps because they are of a compatibilist stripe, will likely count it as a strike against materialism that it brings with it the absurdity of uncompensated suffering at levels they never earlier expected. We then defend dualism against its two major criticisms: the neurological dependence of thought and the problem of interactionism. Next, we explore the appeal of panpsychism's critique of consciousness as emergent. We borrow a transformed version of that idea that has the result that there are far more experiences than recognized by the typical materialist or dualist. We then conclude with why this is not morally problematic. Once the morally relevant sense of potential is recognized, an abundance of minimally-minded organisms is no more morally problematic than the fact that typical materialists allow that some insects may have minimal minds. Incidentally, the final part of our paper on potentiality should be of interest as well to both those dye-in-the-wool-panpsychics who are unmoved by our marriage of their view with dualism and those orthodox materialist readers who are uninterested in making use of any aspect of panpsychism or dualism. So unreconstructed panpsychics can still help themselves to our moral conclusions about the moral significance of the potential of some minimal minds to become sophisticated minds. Likewise, even those readers who do not take panpsychism or dualism or their combination seriously, may still find compelling our arguments about the morally relevant type of potential.

Psychology Unified: From Folk Psychology to Radical Enactivism

A properly radical enactivism—one that eschews the idea that all mentality is necessarily contentful and representational—has better prospects of unifying psychology than does traditional cognitivism. This paper offers a five-step argument in support of this claim. The first section advances the view that a principled way of characterizing psychology's subject matter is what is required if it is to be regarded as a special science. In this light, section two examines why and how cognitivism continues to be regarded as the best potential unifier for the discipline. But the third section exposes a serious problem about the scope of cognitivism that occurs because it ascribes properties to basic minds that only belong to more sophisticated minds built atop them. In a nutshell, the root problem is that cognitivism relies on folk psychological models of mental states when it assumes that all mentality is contentful. Although this gives cognitivism its intuitive appeal, it also makes it too limited to provide a general model of the mind. Radical enactivism's way of understanding mentality as embodied activity, it is argued, avoids this and provides a more appropriate means of understanding basic forms of mentality. Against the charge that radical enactivism is also limited in scope, the final section argues that it is inclusive enough to allow for and recognize the emergence of language-based folk psychological modes of mentality, thus making it the superior potential unifier for psychology.

Why the Modern Intellectual Cannot Attain the Truth?

AbstractThe body-soul duality has confused some of the most sophisticated minds since antiquity. The spiritual masters of all traditions claim that the soul, too, has organs. Let us look at what Western philosophy calls the mind-body problem. Neuroscientists claim the mind-brain duality is true; the mind is to the soul what the brain is to the body. The mind is a “spiritual” brain distinct from the biological brain. To understand how they interact, we will look at computer technology as an analogy. Intelligence itself is part of the software, but it cannot perform its function without its information processor, i.e. the hardware. The intelligence is the software whereas the brain is the hardware. Furthermore, in both cases, the former is non-material whereas the latter is material.Perhaps the two most fascinating scientific discoveries in the last few years are the following. First, the biological heart, which was viewed for centuries as being nothing more than a pump, is actually a great deal more - it is an intelligent organ. Secondly, there is a duality in the heart as well: in addition to the biological heart, there is also a spiritual heart. But the mystery goes much deeper than that and, if it had been understood properly in the modern period, would not have given birth to so many “isms.” The history of Western thought is full of false prophets who claim to lead humankind out of darkness. Is it not amazing how some of the most educated and intelligent people can become completely foolish when it comes to religion? People who can design highly complex integrated circuits can still fail to understand the simple teachings of religious scriptures.This article deals with the major philosophical and spiritual implications of the new insights brought to us by science on a much larger scale than anticipated by those who explored them.

Clinical Management of Shock

This concentrated little monograph contains the distillate of what students, emergency medicine physicians, and primary care physicians should know about the pathophysiology and management of shock. The first two chapters (84 pages) are of the most interest to surgeons as they contain a well-organized, cleanly written, didactic presentation of physiologic changes and measurements that are of clinical significance in understanding and treating shock. There is a refreshing clarity and logic in the way the authors have developed their theme. They start with physiologic changes in shock and then develop the expected alterations in the measurement of cardiovascular functions. The authors then make a logical step to the various derivatives based on these measurements. This clarifies rather than obfuscates the problem, which is such a common error in so much of the current literature. It requires a sophisticated mind to simplify a complex subject. Marginal summary notes make for quick reference

Jonathan Edwards Addresses Some "Modern Critics" of Original Sin

Previous articleNext article No AccessJonathan Edwards Addresses Some "Modern Critics" of Original SinClyde A. HolbrookClyde A. Holbrook Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Religion Volume 63, Number 3Jul., 1983 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/487032 Views: 5Total views on this site Copyright 1983 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

De Dry Bones in De Valley

DE DRY BONES IN DE VALLEY A sermon by Rev. Robert Parker Rumley as reported by Orville Knight Smith and published in AsheviUe, N. C, 1896 The Rev. Robert Parker Rumley, a Negro preacher, achieved fame in western North Carolina for his sermon "De Dry Bones in de Valley"—a sermon he is reported to have preached exclusive to all others in his later active years. Large crowds, both black and white, gathered to hear him, some journeying great distances for the occasion . With its prophecy of resurrection and redemption and its strong poetic phrasing, the Biblical passage ( Ezekiel 37: 1-10) on which the sermon is based has had wide appeal to both the primitive and sophisticated mind. Especially popular with Negro preachers and audiences in both sermon and spiritual, it was also the stimulus for literary endeavors —North Georgia poet Byron Herbert Reece's "Ballad of the Bones", T. S. Eliot's "Ash-Wednesday", James Weldon Johnsons seventh sermon in GOD'S TROMBONES owe inspiration to the suggestive power of this passage. Evidence that Thomas Wolfe knew of Rev. Rumley s sermon, or recollections of it, appears in THE WEB AND THE ROCK in the speech of the Negro, Dick Prosser. Howsomever, as Uncle Remus might say, early collectors of Negro folklore seem to have ignored their sermons, and more recent collectors have not supplied a printed version of "De Dry Bones in de Valley" which must have been in the repertoire of many old-fashioned preachers. Of Orville Knight Smith's printed version only three copies are known to be available. In the days before tape recorders, reporting speech, especially long sermons, was a difficult and painstaking process, depending perhaps on both short hand and memory. Even so, and with its heavy use of dialect spellings, Smith's version seems to be a rendering of reasonable accuracy. Certainly one reason for his reporting and subsequent printing of "De Dry Bones in de Valley" was the popularity of Rev. Rumley and his sermon. Dean Cadle deserves credit for calling attention to the printed pamphlet of Rev. Rumley 's sermon and information about the passage from Ezekiel. I take gweat pleasure dis ebenin in lookin' upon such an intelligent gaderin' ob peoples who hab come out to heah me deliber my famous sermon on "De Dry Bones in de Valley." Many ob you hab come to AsheviUe foah de benefit ob yoah health an' to breave dis fine air, beefsteak, fresh buttermilk an' eggs. I spose my name is known 27 all ober dis country an' I 'spose de ?G country too. Ebery great man must make his way. Well, if my name must go to de topmost roun' ob de ladder ob fame I will go an' take no back out, either. If I'm gwine to become a gweat man I can't help it. Now I want you bredern an' sistem to bear wid me while I read a part ob de thirty-sebenth chaptah ob Ezekwell. I don't mean only you white brederen but my cullud brederen too. I will deliberate dis ebenin' on dese dry bones what I hab read 'bout, an' you will fin' my tex' in de fouth vus' ob de thirty- sebenth chaptah ob Ezekwell. "O, ye dry bones, heah de wud ob de Laud." Now brederen, I will preeface my sermon dis ebenin' wid an introduction 'bout God's chosing peoples, de Israelites, dese Jews what am scattered eberywhere 'round 'bout us selling dere wares. Dese am de peoples what de prophets say wen' down into Egypt, an' were kep' in bondage an' den aftah foah hunred an' fifty yeahs dere became an exceeding gweat ahmy ob dem an' dey were led up unto de Ian' ob Caanyan. Now I wan' to tell you dis ere Ian' ob Caanyan am a Ian' what flowed wid milk an' honey. I don' mean dat dis means jess what I says, but I mean it were a Ian' where dere was lots of money or I mean it was a Ian' where it was a Ian' where you could make lots ob money, an' where dere was lots ob luxurious grass for...

Thomas Cradock and the Chesapeake Golden Age

HE quality and ethical precepts of colonial Chesapeake culture have invited a variety of interpretations. Most historians have agreed with Carl Bridenbaugh that the region produced of intellect, not intellectuals, or with Daniel Boorstin, who wrote that among Virginians there was no place for a literary class.' On the other hand, Richard Beale Davis recently concluded that about I720 to I789, [the region contained] ... a strong expression of discriminating and widely-held taste in the arts, as high a proportion of literate well-educated men as existed anywhere in the colonies, frequent written and oral discourses on religious doctrine and application, a creativity in belles-lettres, and a dynamic and reasoned political expression springing from scores of thoughtful and sophisticated minds.2 Led by such men as Louis B. Wright and J. A. Leo Lemay, the editing and publication of a number of new primary sources3 have reinforced Davis's conclusion not

Aeschylus in Sicily

Time has done almost its worst with the cultural and social history of Western Greece in the period from Hieron's succession in 478 to the death of Aeschylus in 456. It has left us no complete work by any Western Greek author; and for a chronicler of the period it has been able to do nothing better than a Diodorus Siculus. As a result, most of those details in the picture that are not missing are obscure. Close observation is fruitless, except only at one or two points where there still falls the brilliant but fugitive light of a Pindaric ode. Even so, if we step far enough back, a general composition emerges about which, I believe, there will not be much disagreement.This was a precocious culture, largely called into being by artificial means, and hence short-lived. But while it lived it anticipated in many ways the culture and the problems of Old Greece a generation and more later. Here already was at least one city-state swollen to outsize proportions, with a fluid population for which the moral and social patterns of the close-knit archaic community must inevitably have been losing their meaning. Here already was that violent confrontation of old and new, tradition and free inquiry, which is more familiar to us from the Athens of the late fifth century, from the time of Euripides, Socrates and Aristophanes. There is a religious background of essentially rather primitive mortuary beliefs—that whole region, of course, is the demesne of the Two Goddesses—though these beliefs themselves are taking on new and far from primitive shapes in the minds of the Pythagoreans and their associates. In abrupt contrast to them stand the utterly modern and sophisticated minds of the native Epicharmus and the immigrant Xenophanes; and half-way between there is a Sicilian who embodies in one man the contradictions of the epoch: Empedocles, poet and scientist, author (to the consternation of the learned in modern times) both of the Περὶ Φύσεως and of the Καθαρμοί. The same time, in Syracuse, sees the beginnings of a school of rhetoric—rhetoric, carrying in itself all those fearsome questions as to the relation between the word and the thing, between beauty and truth, which were to perplex Plato well into the fourth century.

DESIGNED FOR TEACHING

Statics is one of the basic subjects of which physicists, mathematicians, engineers — and above all, just people — should have a good understanding. It is introduced early in the school curriculum, yet experiments on the composition and resolution of forces often appeal only to sophisticated minds with a flair for abstraction. Strings and pulleys relate to neither the theoretical concept of force on the one hand, nor to real‐life situations on the other. Moreover, strings preclude forces that ‘push’ as well as ‘pull’.

Gerrard Winstanley and the Early Quakers

Considerable mystery has long surrounded the antecedents of the Society of Friends. George Fox, an unlettered country lad, has been pictured as having gathered the Society after receiving, through a series of direct revelations, a full-blown message of redemption. Quaker historians have sought to confirm this portrayal by emphasizing that it was “in communion with his deepest self” that he made his “great spiritual discovery,” and that it came to him from no outward source. This explanation seemed rather naive to the more sophisticated mind of Rufus M. Jones, and he set himself to the task of uncovering the actual source from which Fox's religious thinking was derived. His two volumes—Studies in Mystical Religion and Spiritual Reformers in the 16th and 17th Centuries —are sufficient testimony of the thoroughness and scholarship with which he tackled the problem. Nevertheless, after long and careful investigation, he felt obliged to confess that nothing more positive could be affirmed than that the possible influences in Fox's environment, for the most part, “worked upon him in subconscious ways, as an atmosphere and climate of his spirit, rather than a clearly conceived body of truth.” This conclusion was tenable so long as Fox was regarded as the founder of the Quakers. It now seems evident, however, by his own admissions, that he was not the founder but simply joined a sect already in existence. This fact necessitates an attempt to identify the group with which Fox became affiliated.

The Biophysics of Space and Time

In studying various possible physico-chemical interpretations of biological phenomena we arrived by a systematical development of what we have called “Mathematical Biophysics” at the interpretation of even such complex phenomena, as those involved in learning, Gestalt-discrimination and Gestalt-transposition. Yet, in spite of the apparent progress made along this newly trodden road, a sophisticated mind may feel that we are advancing into a peculiar “cul-de-sac.” Indeed we are discussing possible physico-chemical mechanisms underlying the discrimination, recognition and constancy-properties of various spatial forms. Yet we have not touched at all the much more fundamental question, which logically precedes all the above, namely, what can be the physicochemical interpretation of the general and primordial fact that we perceive those forms as spatial? Can we conceive any physicochemical model at all, which would illustrate how and why we experience everything as being in space?