Soeharto's New Research Articles

Karakter Kebijakan Luar Negeri Indonesia

This paper describes the background of the foreign policy used by Indonesia during the Soekarno era as a new country in the international world. Where this matter is also a factor that affects how the implementation of Indonesia's foreign policy in the future. As for the matter in this case, namely, when Sukarno and Hatta were proclaimed Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945, which was considered to be the beginning of the Indonesian revolution. After independence, various kinds of implementation of Indonesia's foreign policy were welcomed and fully supported by its people. However, in the course of history, due to the elitism of the Soeharto era, Indonesia's foreign policy has also been elitism. Almost all policies were carried out and centralized by Suharto, so that Indonesia's foreign policy was unstructured and not well distributed among related institutions. Changes in the political system in the reform era since the fall of President Soeharto created opportunities to reform Indonesia's foreign policy. This paper is intended to examine the crises and challenges of Indonesia's foreign policy before and after Soeharto's New Order. This paper will also explain that since the fall of Soeharto, Indonesian diplomacy has played a substantive role in facing challenges in the social, economic and political fields that threaten the

State Relations, Media, and the Power of Civil Society after the fall of The New Order Regime in Indonesia

The role of civil society power in the history of reform in Indonesia cannot be underestimated because the economic crisis did not solely cause the fall of Suharto's New Order regime. Still, the role of civil society forces was very large and well consolidated. This study used qualitative research. The theory used is the theory of power relations. The results of the study found that in the era of Soeharto's New Order, the relationship between the state and civil society was still not seen to play its role; it can even be said that the existence of civil society was very weak and weakened by the regime, although at the end of the New Order, civil society was well consolidated which eventually gave birth to the reform movement and was able to overthrow Suharto's regime. The results also found that, after the reformation in Indonesia, the civil society movement experienced a golden age at the beginning of the reform because the position of civil society was quite strong and well consolidated in overseeing the course of the democratic system. However, in recent years civil society movements have stagnated and even seem weakened because they are in the circle of power.

From Evangelization to Worship Restrictions: The Changing Characteristics of Threat Perception between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia

ABSTRACT This article is an examination of the sense of mutual threat felt by both Muslims and Christians in Indonesia from the colonial period to the reformasi era (following the collapse of the Soeharto regime in 1998), which has provoked tensions and stained the country’s motto of Unity in Diversity or Bhinneka Tunggal Ika. Adopting a historical-comparative methodology, it uses threat perception, restriction of worship and concepts of democracy to explain the dynamic relationship between Muslims and Christians, from their initial encounter to the present day. The study finds that Muslims have perceived evangelization in colonial times and Christianization missions under the Soeharto New Order as a threat, while to Christians the Muslim vision of establishing an Islamic state and the rise of radicalism at the end of the New Order have been perceived as a threat. It argues that, in the reformasi era, threat perception has continued and intensified into religious intolerance followed by worship restrictions, and shows that political dynamics significantly affect the quality of Indonesian Muslim–Christian relations.

DEMOCRATIC CAPITALIZATION, LOCAL ACTORS, AND POLITICAL PATRONAGE NETWORKS

This paper explains the conspiracy and involvement boss mine (coal) in several provincial elections (regents and governors) in South Kalimantan. As is known, the political landscape of post Soeharto New Order government that gave birth to democracy and radical change in the institutions of power, namely from the centralized power-authoritarian system to a democratic system of government has spawned a democratic transition which was prolonged until today. In the midst of a prolonged transition to democracy at this time, the arena of democracy has been hijacked and the stage of political and economic power has been controlled by entrepreneurs or local and national capitalist power by doing pesekongkolan between candidates authorities or local authorities that one of them through the local election process. The businessmen are involved as a supplier of funds to the local authorities candidate to win as a form of money politics and transactional politics. In some cases the local elections in South Kalimantan, such as the election of the regent and the governor, political practice is utilized with clarity and has already become a political culture that is structured within massive post-New Order government. Therefore, democracy is being woken up in Indonesia after the New Order.

Indonesian Technocracy in Transition: A Preliminary Analysis The Politics of Technocracy in Southeast Asia

(ProQuest: ... denotes non-US-ASCII text omitted.)At a time when Indonesia is seen as a success story, with its economy growing at 5.9% on average in the post-global financial crisis years of 2009 to 2012 and performing better than its neighbor economies of Malaysia (with its economic growth of 4.1% a year in 2009-12), the Philippines (4.8%), and Thailand (3.0%), it is easy to forget that less than a decade ago many people wondered and worried whether Indonesia would turn into a Yugoslavia, in danger of breaking up owing to ethnic and religious tensions, or a Pakistan, subject to periodic military intervention and the rising jihadist threat, or a Philippines, democratic but with insurgencies simmering in the provinces and a weak and stagnant economy.Nothing of this sort has happened. Instead, and most remarkably, a politics of eco- nomic growth has returned, but under conditions that are different from the politics of economic development pursued by Soeharto under the New Order.The politics of economic growth is politics that transforms political issues of redis- tribution into problems of output and attempts to neutralize social conflict in favor of a consensus on growth, thus creating a virtuous cycle of political stability which leads to economic development which leads to the rising living standard which in turn leads to further political stability. Under Soeharto, this politics provided the ideological legitima- tion to his authoritarian state, while also delivering on its promise to improve the living standards of a substantial majority of the Indonesian people, helping to create a sizeable Indonesian middle class. In this context, technocrats emerged as major allies of Soeharto, working closely with the President on all economic policy issues.The new politics of economic growth works differently under the current decen- tralized democracy, and technocrats also now work under conditions different from Soeharto's New Order. The salience of this politics of economic growth was underscored in the reelection of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2009 as President. Public support for the incumbent President and his Democratic Party nicely correlated with public percep- tion of Indonesia's economic performance. Thanks in part to the global financial crisis that pushed down fuel prices, for which the President took credit, Yudhoyono was reelected overwhelmingly in the first round voting with technocrat Budiono as his run- ning mate. The resurgence of the politics of economic growth in Indonesia and with it the comeback of technocrats as a force (though as vulnerable as the technocrats in Soeharto's time, but in a different way) in Indonesian politics can be seen in the prestige and authority that former Minister of Finance Sri Mulyani Indrawati enjoys even after she was sent off to the International Monetary Fund.What made technocrats effective as economic policy-makers under Soeharto? What conditions have enabled technocrats to be effective under the current democratic system? Who are they in the first place? The answers to these questions illuminate the important but nevertheless fraught position occupied by technocrats in Indonesia's changing polit- ical structure and processes of economic policy-making.The Making of Indonesian TechnocracyTechnocracy in Indonesia emerged and developed in the 1960s and 1970s in tandem with the rise and consolidation of Soeharto's authoritarian developmental state. Soeharto fashioned his New Order regime with the state as his power base and the army as its backbone. The regime was centralized, militarized, and authoritarian. Army officers dominated the military and occupied strategic positions in the civilian arm of the state as district chiefs, provincial governors, directors-general, and ministers in the name of dual functions. State power was repeatedly impressed upon regime enemies-com- munists, separatists in East Timor, Aceh, and Papua (Irian Jaya), criminals, labor activists, journalists, and Islamists. …

Democratizing Foreign-Policy Making in Indonesia and the Democratization of ASEAN: A Role Theory Analysis

AbstractWith the resignation of President Soeharto in 1998 and subsequent democratization, Indonesia's foreign policy underwent major changes. More stakeholders than under Soeharto's New Order regime are now participating in foreign-policy making. The country seemed to make democracy promotion a hallmark of its foreign policy, especially under the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014). This raises the questions of whether and, if so, to what extent Indonesian democratization changed the country's established foreign-policy role conceptions and how much impact Indonesia's democratization had on the democratization of regional governance. The paper seeks to answer these questions by developing a theoretical framework based on a constructivist version of role theory. On the basis of speeches held by Indonesian political leaders in the United Nations General Assembly and major domestic foreign-policy pronouncements, it documents changes in Indonesia's foreign-policy role concepts. It shows that, indeed, in theEra Reformasi, democracy became a major component in the country's foreign-policy role concept, although many elements of the role concept such as development orientation, Third Worldism, peace orientation, and a mediator's role remained constant. However, the litmus test for a democracy-oriented foreign policy, that is, the democratization of regional governance in Southeast Asia, remains ambiguous, and concrete policy initiatives often declaratory.

Critical Perspective on Language Teaching to Establish Indonesian Society that Have Critical Language Awareness

This paper aims to provide an alternative paradigm of language teaching which is expected to form the students to have a critical language awareness. Indonesian society is still dealing with the dominance of various public discourse that does not enlighten the public. After consuming the dominant discourse generated by Soeharto's New Order regime within 32 years, the people of Indonesia are still faced with many viewpoints tend not to enlighten are produced by the mass media editors, genders activists, political elites, advertising producers, and religious leaders. People are increasingly confused and even frustrated at not being able to understand well the various public discourse. There are no rights and obligations in generating and interpreting public discourse. Consumers are especially disadvantaged in the various public communications. This condition should be the concern of education, particularly language teaching. Students should be taught critical perspective from an early age so that they are sensitive to the use of language that seem innocent, but actually oppressive. Unfortunately, the conditions that have not been addressed properly by the designer of Indonesian language teaching (ILT). ILT in the curriculum 1984, 1994, and 2006 using a communicative approach that aims to achieve the student's ability to communicate through four language skills: listening, speaking, reading, and writing. The ILT is still not able to produce students or people who have a critical language awareness, as a condition to form a civil society. Students are no longer sensitive to the details in respect of the use of language in communication: effectiveness, politeness, ideology, and power. Therefore, there must be a paradigm shift in language teaching, the prioritization of critical perspectives in developing the language curriculum to achieve emancipation. It is suitable for a nation-state that had experienced a very long colonization by other nations, in this case, Indonesia. The spirit of this emancipation can be tracked on the Frankfurt school of sociology, systemic functional linguistics, and critical linguistics or critical discourse studies. Since the beginning of the student should be introduced and naturalized to the role and function of language as a semiotic instrument in shaping human culture.

How Not to Act like a Woman: Gender Ideology and Humor in West Java, Indonesia

In West Java, Indonesia, hosts of hajat (life-cycle event celebrations) hire performing arts troupes to provide entertainment. In addition to typical music and dance acts, one troupe—the Rawit Group—presents a comedy skit called lawakan . This article analyzes one such skit from 1999—just after the fall of President Soeharto's New Order government. The centerpiece of the skit is a parody of two performing traditions that feature professional female entertainers: pop Sunda (diatonic pop songs in Sundanese language) and wayang golek (rod puppet theatre with accompaniment that includes virtuosic female singing). In both traditions, female performers routinely exaggerate their feminine attributes. This female entertainer, however, is portrayed by a man in comically unconvincing drag. Hilarity ensues as the other comedians urge the drag performer to conform to New Order feminine ideals of appearance and behavior, but s/he confounds them at every turn. In the process, the three men reinforce traditional Sundanese understandings of how the illusion of femininity is actively created through visual means (e.g., artifices of dress) and sonic elements (e.g., singing and speaking styles), and conventions of movement. In the process, they challenge New Order gender policies and point the way toward a return to tried and true Sundanese ideologies of gender.

Indonesia in 2008: Democratic Consolidation in Soeharto´ s Shadow

Indonesia's political and socio-economic developments in 2008 were marked by two contradictory trends. On the one hand, the process of democratic consolidation continued, with Indonesia further strengthening its political institutions, making progress in its anti-corruption drive and generally maintaining healthy economic growth. Indeed, with very low levels of political and communal violence, Indonesia in 2008 appeared like a bulwark of stability in the Southeast Asian region, as Thailand was crippled by incessant mass demonstrations and the Philippines saw the Mindanao insurgency escalating once again. However, Indonesia's democratic consolidation was also challenged by a very divergent phenomenon: that is, the increasing proliferation of some form of nostalgia for the effectiveness of Soeharto's New Order, which had ruled the country with an iron fist between 1966 and 1998. Significantly, the year 2008 not only witnessed Soeharto's death after a long struggle with illness and the post-authoritarian judiciary, but also the tenth anniversary of the democratic regime change. Using both occasions to reflect on Soeharto's achievements, many Indonesians concluded that his regime had been superior to the existing polity in several important aspects, particularly health services, prices of basic goods and security. This sentiment was also reflected in the names that emerged as contenders for the 2009 presidential elections: several of Soeharto's former generals threw their hat into the ring, trying to profit from the growing sympathy for New Order policies. This chapter aims to take account of both developments: the remarkable stabilization of Indonesian democracy and the latent support in society for Soeharto's authoritative and tough leadership. Accordingly, it will discuss events,

Beyond Bandung: developmental nationalism and (multi)cultural nationalism in Indonesia

This article argues that the Indonesian case is characterised by at least two important variations on the thesis of a transition from developmental to cultural nationalism. First, the transition took place with the establishment in 1966 of Soeharto's New Order, much earlier than in most other countries, and was associated less with neoliberal policies than with a pronounced capitalist bias which could be combined either with statist or economically liberal policies. Second, the variants of cultural nationalism that have been most openly adopted by Indonesia's postcolonial state have been multicultural rather than exclusionary in orientation. The article provides an overview of the transition from developmental to (multi)cultural nationalism in Indonesia in the mid-1960s. These changes are highly visible in the Indonesian context because each successive political regime has defined its identity in large measure by its particular nationalism. Since the Indonesian state has historically been the main site for power struggles within the political elite, the changes over time in nationalist ideology reflect quite closely the changing political and economic fortunes of particular elements within this elite. They also indicate how elites are trying to define their relations to other groups in Indonesian society, and how they are adapting to constraints imposed, and opportunities presented, by a changing national and global political economy.

INDONESIAN MILITARY REFORM: More Than a Human Rights Issue

Military reform in Indonesia is an ongoing but long-term process. The armed forces are making remarkable progress in transforming itself into its new role in a vigorous democratic society.2 Since the resignation of President Soeharto in May 1998 the armed forces establishment has implemented important reforms to bring about this transformation.3 While the military is still the most powerful element of Indonesian society, it is no longer the monolithic arbiter of political power in Indonesia that it was for the three decades of Soeharto's New Order.

Democratic Transition and Political Development in Post‑ Soeharto Indonesia

This article analyses the prospects for, and possible challenges to democracy and constitutional liberalism in Indonesia. A retreat or a diversion from this goal could be disastrous, economically and politically. The Asian financial crisis highlighted fundamental elements of the Indonesian system that needed to be changed. Religious, ethnic, regional and socio-economic tensions that engulf Indonesia today are the result of authoritarian governance under Soeharto's New Order. Democratic governance alone can correct that anomaly. Indonesia's transition to democracy at the moment is messy but democratization is a long, necessary and complex struggle.

Local Issues and Changes: The Post‑ New Order Situation in Rural Lombok

The last few years in Indonesia have seen many changes occurring as a result of unprecedented events — a financial crisis in 1997, the downfall of Soeharto's New Order in 1998, the instability of several governments 1998-2001, all amidst religious, economic, and ethnic disturbances and violence in many areas in Indonesia. At the same time laws of decentralization and regional autonomy provide new processes incorporating a democratic response and reaction to Soeharto's New Order. This paper explores local issues concerning the consequences of recent changes in Indonesia for village people in eastern Indonesia, Issues include access to health procurement for village people who have recently experienced the financial crisis, the downfall of the New Order government, structural changes in the administration of internal affairs, regional autonomy, and the reassertion of cultural and regional associations.

Socio‑Economic Change and Rural Entrepreneurs in Pre‑Crisis East Java, Indonesia: Case Study of a Madurese Upland Community

This paper examines the roles and economic strategies of rural entrepreneurs in a Madurese community in East Java, Indonesia. The incorporation of rural communities into the regional economy through commercial sugarcane production provided opportunities for entrepreneurs to expand their enterprises. They diversified their economic activities through their investment strategies and social networking. They dominated the local economy through their attempts to monopolize the resources provided by state agencies and brokers at the supra-local level. The entrepreneurs served as catalysts in the process of economic diversification, which sees a shift from subsistence agriculture to cash cropping. That had caused labour redundancy. The monopolization of job brokerage by village entrepreneurs, mediating between increasingly redundant manpower and external (international) labour markets, provided a new avenue for economic diversification and capital accumulation. The 1970s economic boom in Indonesia, fuelled by state oil income, was accompanied by agricultural modernization and infrastructure development in the rural areas of Java. Earlier studies have documented that relatively well-off farming families, members of which held office as local village administrators, reaped disproportionately large shares of state benefits in the form of credits, subsidies, and agricultural inputs (Husken 1979, 1989, 1996; Husken and White 1989; Hart 1986; Maurer 1996, p. 114). Former president Soeharto's New Order government (1965-98) sought the political support of the rural elite and

Laskar Jihad and the Political Position of Conservative Islam in Indonesia

Introduction The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States have focused unprecedented attention on militant Muslim groups across the world and prompted strategists and commentators alike to scour the globe for possible targets in the Bush Administration's war against terrorism. In the case of Indonesia, considerable coverage has been devoted to the militant conservative Muslim group, Laskar Jihad, and allegations of links between this organization and Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network. Laskar Jihad is a Java-based paramilitary group which, since April 2000, has intervened on behalf of local Muslims in the vicious fighting between Christians and Muslims in Maluku, which is estimated to have claimed more than 9,000 lives. (1) Laskar Jihad leaders have repeatedly expressed their intent to eradicate Christians from Ambon island (Maluku's political and economic hub) and have used murder and terror in their efforts to achieve these ends. (2) In November 2001, the group carried out its oft-stated threat to enter a conflict between Christians and Muslim populations in the region of Poso, Sulawesi, provoking a rapid escalation in the level of violence. In an interview with the New York Times on 7 January 2002, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defence, Paul Wolfowitz, drew attention to the dangers of ungoverned regions within certain countries which had become havens for terrorists. Wolfowitz chose to illustrate his point with reference to Maluku and central Sulawesi, two areas ravaged by communal violence where Muslims, not outside Indonesia, have come in and exacerbated that situation -- a clear reference to the armed interventions of Laskar Jihad. This article examines what can be ascertained about the political position of conservative Islam in Indonesia from the emergence and activities of the Laskar Jihad. As President George Bush and bin Laden, in different ways, project a polarizing vision of a world unequivocally divided into friendly and hostile forces, how should we view Indonesia? Do groups such as Laskar Jihad have the capacity to make a difference to whose side, or which list, or axis Indonesia finds itself on? Subsequent to a brief examination of the context in which Laskar Jihad emerged, the article focuses on the activities of the group in Maluku in eastern Indonesia since April 2000. Laskar Jihad's intervention in this region provided the justification for its creation, and has been its primary zone of operation. As such, it provides useful indicators as to the possible impact on central Sulawesi, and Indonesia as a whole, of the Laskar Jihad's recent intervention in Poso. It also offers substantial evidence for the central contention of this article: that what Laskar Jihad reveals about conservative Islam in Indonesia is the fundamental weaknesses in its political position and its lack of support among the largest Muslim population in the world. Laskar Jihad: The Context Laskar Jihad was established in the early months of 2000 at a time when political gains made by conservative modernist Muslim groups during the final years of Soeharto's New Order were in danger of being overturned. Conservative modernist organizations, such as DDII (Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication) and its offshoot KISDI (Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World), which spent the first two decades of the New Order set in lonely and dangerous opposition to the regime's pro-Western, secular outlook, had been co-opted by Soeharto as he sought to establish new sources of support outside the senior ranks of the armed forces from the late 1980s onwards. (3) This co-optation saw the Muslim hardliners attacking Soeharto's opponents in return for state patronage and new freedom to carry out their activities, which included undermining more moderate Muslim rivals. (4) It broadly coincided with Soeharto's elevation of a socalled Green (the colour symbolizing Islam) tendency within the TNI (the Indonesian armed forces) -- officers distinguished less by personal piety than by willingness to use Islam as a political tool. …

De la reformasi à la restauration ? Quand le passé sert à relire le présent

François Raillon The coming to power of Soekarno's daughter, Megawati, in July 2001, marked a new stage in Indonesia's era of reformation. A two-pronged process occurred : while Soekarnoism was mobilized as an ideology meant to help maintain the country's unity and independence, elements of Soeharto's New Order were brought back to power to restore stability. Associates of the former president and authoritarian ways that recalled his regime were reestablished, among them a freer hand was given to the military. This double restoration taking place under Megawati's auspices has been an attempt to overcome what is felt as a multidimensional crisis of a troubled nation, at the same time reining in reformation. The author explores discrepancies between political discourse and practice, and examines Megawati's behavior as well as responses of public opinion to it, as reported by the Indonesian press.

Capitalism, Oligarchic Power and the State in Indonesia

[The Asian economic crisis that began in Thailand in mid-1997 precipitated a chain of events that eventually led to the downfall of Indonesia's Soeharto — one of the last of the great Cold-War-era dictators. The end of Soeharto's 32-year rule in 1998 signalled the close of a major chapter in the recent history of Indonesia, as the framework for organising economic and political power that he had carefully crafted proved unsustainable in his absence. The heavily controlled state corporatist system soon unravelled, as the once powerful business conglomerates that had prospered also crashed under the weight of payments on gargantuan loans. It is not yet dear whether it is possible for some of these conglomerates to launch a successful comeback on the basis of new alliances and arrangements, as Indonesia slowly, and painfully, attempts to emerge from crisis. The country's existing political and economic system is being contested from various quarters, although the salient social forces involved are largely confined to those cultivated under Soeharto's New Order, and therefore exclude those, like labour and the peasantry, which were already marginalised., The Asian economic crisis that began in Thailand in mid-1997 precipitated a chain of events that eventually led to the downfall of Indonesia's Soeharto — one of the last of the great Cold-War-era dictators. The end of Soeharto's 32-year rule in 1998 signalled the close of a major chapter in the recent history of Indonesia, as the framework for organising economic and political power that he had carefully crafted proved unsustainable in his absence. The heavily controlled state corporatist system soon unravelled, as the once powerful business conglomerates that had prospered also crashed under the weight of payments on gargantuan loans. It is not yet dear whether it is possible for some of these conglomerates to launch a successful comeback on the basis of new alliances and arrangements, as Indonesia slowly, and painfully, attempts to emerge from crisis. The country's existing political and economic system is being contested from various quarters, although the salient social forces involved are largely confined to those cultivated under Soeharto's New Order, and therefore exclude those, like labour and the peasantry, which were already marginalised.]

Contest-ing Culture: Sundanese Wayang Golek Purwa Competitions in New Order Indonesia

Government efforts to monitor, regulate, and control the art of wayang dramatically increased during Soeharto's New Order regime (1966-1998). State-sponsored wayang competitions, as well as the aesthetic categories used for evaluating performers, became important sites for merging wayang performance with the goals of the state. Government-sanctioned performance standards were at odds with popular practice, however, which tended to emphasize entertainment, innovation, and communication with audiences.

Indonesia´s Foreign Policy under Abdurrahman Wahid: Radical or Status Quo State?$^{1}$

When Abdurrahman Wahid first came to power in Indonesia there was some alarm over the direction of Indonesia's foreign policy. However, the reality is that Abdurrahman's foreign policy has been more orthodox than some of his earlier rhetoric might have indicated. Indonesia needs the developed world as a source of funding to revive its economy. In terms of foreign diplomacy, Indonesia has successfully gained reassurances from the international community of its territorial integrity. ASEAN also remains central to Jakarta's foreign policy outlook. The issue of East Tim or is still a crucial sticking point between Indonesia and a number of Western countries. The United States, in particular, is reluctant to push Indonesia too far as it is believed that the Abdurrahman presidency is the least desirable alternative in domestic and foreign policy terms. Introduction Since the fall of Soeharto in May 1998, the East Timor crisis of 1999, and the emergence of Abdurrahman Wahid (or Gus Dur) as Indonesian President, there has been much press and diplomatic corps speculation about the likely direction of Indonesia's foreign policy. In particular, there has been an expressed concern that Indonesia is turning away from the West, after the bitterness over East Timor, and seeking to forge a common front with some of the leading nations in Asia. This has become known in the popular media as Gus Dur's card -- whatever this might mean. Since assuming office, President Abdurrahman Wahid has made a number of statements about the direction of Indonesia's foreign policy. With any leader -- and with Gus Dur in particular -- it might be imprudent to take all of these statements at face value. It is necessary to try to determine what is personality-driven -- that is to say what is driven by the person of the President -- and what is institutionally-driven. Although Soeharto's New Order is now part of history, it is important to examine some of the main themes of Indonesia's foreign policy in the not too distant past as this will shed some light on recent events. While it is true that Indonesia under President Abdurrahman may be looking to lessen its dependence on the West, what is seen as a break with Soeharto's supposed pro-Western stance tends to accentuate differences that may not exist in reality. Indicative of the literature that assumes that Soeharto was completely pro-Western, or even a Western lackey, is the fairly recent article by Noam Chomsky entitled, Indonesia, the Master Card in Washington's Hand. [2] This kind of statement tends to obscure the fact that Indonesia is a decidedly non-aligned state with aspirations to Third World leadership. Links with the West, which had held economic and diplomatic value for Soeharto's New Order, were only part of the equation. Strengthening ties with other developing countries is not unique to the current In donesian administration. Therefore, Abdurrahman's activism in the Third World -- with regard to trying to forge greater links with China and India, or recent noises about a visit to Iraq -- must be seen in that light. Another scholar has remarked that: Indonesia is now seeking to play 'the Asia card' in its relations with the West. In other words, it's back to the days of Sukarno's Indonesia of the 1960s. Who said, the future doesn't resemble the past. [3] It is the contention of this article that President Abdurrahman Wahid's foreign policy is more continuous with that of the Soeharto administration than this sort of quotation would seem to suggest. Indonesia wishes to continue to play its part as a good international citizen, and it is too early to predict emerging radicalism in Indonesia's foreign policy. The core concerns remain, including a stable international order; the desire for an enhanced reputation; the need to have strong relations with the neighbouring ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) states; the need for support from the global community for its existing borders (notably with regard to Aceh and Papua); the need for funding from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the wider international community; and the need for trade and investment, principally from the developed world. …

Indonesia´s Role in ASEAN: The End of Leadership?

Introduction This article will examine Indonesia's role within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the light of the ongoing political and economic crisis that has afflicted Indonesia. To examine the role Indonesia seeks to play in ASEAN, it is important to examine Indonesia's foreign policy context, including a brief history of its involvement with ASEAN. A more detailed account will then be given of recent developments within ASEAN, including the forest fire problem, the financial crisis, membership enlargement, and the emerging debate over the traditional non-interference principle. Some comment on the recent Sixth ASEAN Leaders Meeting in Hanoi is also necessary. The article will conclude with some commentary on the implications of recent political and economic problems for Indonesia's status and role within ASEAN, together with some cautious forecasting. It is important to note that ASEAN's great success was to achieve security by preventing the Balkanization of Southeast Asia. Whether ASEAN can go beyond this achievement remains an open question. The recent currency crisis has had some profound implications for the Asian region. Indonesia has been affected greatly by political and economic crisis. Its capacity to play a role in the wider region has come into question following events surrounding the leadership succession in May 1998. This has come at a time when ASEAN is regarded by many observers as being irrelevant to the troubles in the region, of which Indonesia's crisis is a large factor. While Indonesia's domestic problems have left it unable to lead ASEAN at present, Soeharto's departure has coincided with a series of open public criticisms by ASEAN leaders of other fellow members. To understand Indonesia's future role in ASEAN, a series of questions must be examined: Will Indonesia continue to enforce non-interference in the post-Soeharto era? Or will the Habibie administration favour Thailand's proposed flexible engagement whereby comments on member states' internal affairs becomes permissible? Will ASEAN flag in its ability to undertake political and economic initiatives now that Indonesia's foreign affairs capability is significantly reduced? Have recent events in Southeast Asia strained bilateral relations between Indonesia and its neighbours to the extent that ASEAN will now become less cohesive? The answers to these questions are difficult to know in entirety; however, certain trends can be seen emerging. Most crucial of all, and a question that nobody can answer, is the future stability of Indonesia as a state, given its importance to the Southeast Asian region. Indonesia's Foreign Policy Context Soon after Indonesia's independence, Vice-President Mohammad Hatta characterized its foreign policy as free and active (bebas aktif), a guideline that continues to this day. Essentially, this implied nonalignment and equidistance between the superpowers. Non-alignment became the core of Soeharto's foreign policy, which was part of Indonesia's opposition to the colonial nations and fear of neo-colonialization through international trade and commerce. Soeharto's emergence as leader in 1966 marked a change in foreign policy, but not in its underlying assumptions about the role that Indonesia should play in the region. Soekarno and Soeharto espoused the same notion of regional and global influence but sought their goals in different ways. Indonesia's policy-makers maintain a belief that it should play a wider regional, and ultimately global, role. However, Soeharto's New Order made some important changes to foreign policy outcomes. Broadly speaking, Soeharto established three spheres of influence. The first was the West, primarily for trade, investment and assistance links. Soeharto's initial concern was to improve Indonesia's economic prospects; aid, trade and investment from the developed world was the only way to achieve this. The second sphere of influence was within the developing world, primarily within the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). …