Small Group Health Insurance Research Articles

How does health spending among demographic groups compare to Affordable Care Act premium regulations?

AbstractThe Affordable Care Act (ACA) substantially altered regulations in the nongroup and small group health insurance markets and those markets continue to receive significant policy attention. To understand how those markets have functioned in recent years and how they would be impacted by policy changes, we estimated enrollment and spending by age and sex using claims data covering enrollment in ACA risk‐adjusted plans in 2017–2019 and compared spending to a federal default age‐rating curve for premiums. Our results suggest that women aged 55–64 helped stabilize the nongroup market through high enrollment and relatively low spending. Men enrolled in the marketplace also subsidized other nongroup enrollees but to a lesser extent than expected. In fact, men aged25–50 enrolled in nongroup plans spent 18% more than their counterparts enrolled through a small employer. These unique spending patterns have interesting policy implications, including that lowering the Medicare eligibility age would likely increase premiums in the nongroup market.

Incorporating Prescription Drugs Into Affordable Care Act Risk Adjustment.

The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act reformed the individual and small group health insurance markets and established a risk adjustment program to create a level playing field for competition. A new set of predictive models for measuring enrollee risk across plans was developed for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act-reformed markets, referred to as the Department of Health and Human Services Hierarchical Condition Category (HHS-HCC) models. Beginning in 2018, selected prescription drug classes were added to the models as risk markers. We describe the motivations, concerns, methodology, and results of adding prescription drug utilization to the HHS-HCC models. Separate HHS-HCC models are estimated by enrollee age and plan actuarial value. We defined and added 10 prescription drug classes, called RXCs, to the HHS-HCC adult models. Using selected RXCs alongside demographic and diagnostic indicators yielded modest overall improvement in HHS-HCC models' predictive power. Also, adding RXCs captures the higher costs of enrollees taking certain expensive pharmaceuticals and allows imputation of diagnoses for enrollees utilizing a drug but lacking the associated diagnosis. Including selected drugs in risk adjustment improved the models' predictive power. In addition, inclusion of selected drugs may discourage insurers from using formulary and drug benefit design to avoid enrollment of patients taking high-cost drugs, such as for HIV, multiple sclerosis, and rheumatoid arthritis, and improve access for enrollees taking these drugs. Adding RXCs also may improve plan risk measurement for plans with less complete diagnosis reporting.

A Comparison of Health Risk and Costs Across Private Insurance Markets.

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) established new parameters for the individual and small group health insurance markets starting in 2014. We study these 2 reformed markets by comparing health risk and costs to the more mature large employer market. For 2017, claims data for all enrollees in PPACA-compliant individual and small group market plans as well as claims data from a sample of large employer market enrollees. Risk scores and total (unadjusted and risk-adjusted) per-member-per-month (PMPM) allowed charges. Differences across markets in enrollment duration, age, and geographic distribution are addressed. The analysis is descriptive. Compared with large employer market enrollees, health risk was 3% lower among PPACA small group market enrollees and 20% higher among PPACA individual market enrollees. After adjusting for differences in health risk, enrollees in the PPACA individual market had 27% lower PMPM allowed charges than enrollees in the large employer market and enrollees in the PPACA small group market had 12% lower PMPM allowed charges than enrollees in the large employer market. On average, the PPACA individual market enrolls sicker individuals than the 2 group markets. But this does not translate to higher health costs; in fact, enrollees in the PPACA individual market accumulate lower allowed charges than enrollees in the large employer market. Lower-income enrollees particularly accumulate lower allowed charges. Narrower networks and increased enrollee cost-sharing among individual market plans, though they may reduce the value of coverage, likely significantly reduce allowed charges.

Analysis of State Insurance Coverage for Nonpharmacologic Treatment of Low Back Pain as Recommended by the American College of Physicians Guidelines.

BackgroundIn 2017, the American College of Physicians (ACP) released guidelines encouraging nonpharmacologic treatment of chronic low back pain (LBP). These guidelines recommended utilization of treatments including multidisciplinary rehabilitation, acupuncture, mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR), tai chi, yoga, progressive relaxation, biofeedback, cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), and spinal manipulation.ObjectiveWe aimed to determine status of insurance coverage status for multiple nonpharmacological pain therapies based on the 2017 Essential Health Benefits (EHB) benchmark plans across all states.MethodsThe 2017 EHB benchmark plans represent the minimum benefits required in all new policies in the individual and small group health insurance markets and were reviewed for coverage of treatments for LBP recommended by the ACP guidelines. Additionally, plans were reviewed for limitations and exclusionary criteria.ResultsIn nearly all state-based coverage policies, chronic pain management and multidisciplinary rehabilitation were not addressed. Coverage was most extensive (supported by 46 states) for spinal manipulation. Acupuncture, massage, and biofeedback were each covered by fewer than 10 states, while MBSR, tai chi, and yoga were not covered by any states. Behavioral health treatment (CBT and biofeedback) coverage was often covered solely for mental health diagnoses, although excluded for treating LBP.ConclusionOther than spinal manipulation, evidence-based, nonpharmacological therapies recommended by the 2017 ACP guidelines were routinely excluded from EHB benchmark plans. Insurance coverage discourages multidisciplinary rehabilitation for chronic pain management by providing ambiguous guidelines, restricting ongoing treatments, and excluding behavioral or complementary therapy despite a cohesive evidence base. Better EHB plan coverage of nondrug therapies may be a strategy to mitigate the opioid crisis. Recommendations that reflect current research-based findings are provided to update chronic pain policy statements.

Risk transfer formula for individual and small group markets under the Affordable Care Act.

The Affordable Care Act provides for a program of risk adjustment in the individual and small group health insurance markets in 2014 as Marketplaces are implemented and new market reforms take effect. The purpose of risk adjustment is to lessen or eliminate the influence of risk selection on the premiums that plans charge. The risk adjustment methodology includes the risk adjustment model and the risk transfer formula. This article is the third of three in this issue of the Medicare & Medicaid Research Review that describe the ACA risk adjustment methodology and focuses on the risk transfer formula. In our first companion article, we discussed the key issues and choices in developing the methodology. In our second companion paper, we described the risk adjustment model that is used to calculate risk scores. In this article we present the risk transfer formula. We first describe how the plan risk score is combined with factors for the plan allowable premium rating, actuarial value, induced demand, geographic cost, and the statewide average premium in a formula that calculates transfers among plans. We then show how each plan factor is determined, as well as how the factors relate to each other in the risk transfer formula. The goal of risk transfers is to offset the effects of risk selection on plan costs while preserving premium differences due to factors such as actuarial value differences. Illustrative numerical simulations show the risk transfer formula operating as anticipated in hypothetical scenarios.

Limiting the ACA's Threats to Small Group Health Insurance Markets

AbstractWe identify three threats to small group health insurance markets that may result from the 2014 implementation of certain provisions in the Affordable Care Act (ACA). First, small employers with predominantly low‐income employees may tend to opt out of small group markets because their employees will be better off with subsidized individual coverage. Second, small employers with employees of heterogeneous income levels will have strong incentives to offer coverage that is either “unaffordable” or fails to provide “minimum value” in order to preserve the availability of government subsidies for their low‐income employees. Finally, small employers that continue to offer group plans will face increased incentives to self‐insure those plans, further contracting small group markets and subjecting them to adverse selection. Collectively, these forces may destabilize small group markets and increase the ACA's fiscal cost. We therefore conclude by offering various reforms aimed at offsetting these risks and preserving the viability of small group markets.

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Regulation of the Health Insurance Industry

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is a comprehensive and multipronged reform of the US health care system. The legislation makes incremental changes to Medicare, Medicaid, and the market for employer-sponsored health insurance. However, it makes substantial changes to the market for individual and small-group health insurance. The purpose of this article is to introduce the key regulatory reforms in the market for individual and small-group health insurance and explain how these reforms tackle adverse selection and risk classification and improve access to health care for the hitherto uninsured or underinsured population.

Saving Small Employer Health Insurance

Health care reform devotes substantial attention to resuscitating the small group health insurance markets that serve employers with fewer than fifty full time employees. Unfortunately, a number of interweaving provisions embedded within the Affordable Care Act create strong incentives that, starting in 2014, will tend to undermine this market and, in the process, increase the fiscal cost of reform. First, small employers with predominantly low-income employees will tend to opt out of the small group market. Second, small employers with mixed-income employees will have strong incentives to offer coverage that is neither technically “affordable” or of “minimum value” in order to preserve the availability of premium and cost-sharing subsidies on the individual market for their low-income employees. Third, small employers with unusually low-risk employees will have strong incentives to self-insure any group plan they do offer in order to avoid cross-subsidizing higher-risk groups. Analyzing these risks collectively, this Article offers a number of recommendations for saving the small group market. For instance, it argues that the SHOP exchanges that are intended to organize the small group market in 2014 must strategically target the weaknesses of self-insurance by offering simple and risk-free coverage options that facilitate employee choice. They must also market this coverage aggressively in light of insurance brokers’ likely financial incentives to push self-insurance on small employers. Additionally, state and federal law makers should explore various possibilities for making small employers both more likely to offer group coverage and, if they do offer group coverage, to do so through SHOP exchanges rather than self-insured plans. Possibilities explored by this Article include amending the terms of the premium and small business tax credits, regulating stop-loss insurance, and imposing various restrictions or penalties that are aimed at preventing churning between the self-insured and small group markets.

Regulating The Use Of Prescription Drug Databases In Health Insurance Underwriting

<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span><p style="margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; text-align: justify; mso-pagination: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">This paper examines the use of commercially-available prescription drug profiles in the underwriting of individual and small-group health insurance plans.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It explains how these profiles are developed and used by insurers and analyzes their potential advantages and disadvantages to both insurers and consumers.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Current and pending legislation and regulations governing the use of these prescription databases are also explained.</span></span></p><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span>

Implementing Small Group Health Insurance Reform

This study analyzes administrative impediments to enrollment in HEALTHpact, a high-deductible plan with premiums capped at 10% of the average Rhode Island wage. HEALTHpact includes an opportunity for enrollees to reduce their deductibles from $5,000 ($10,000 for a family) to $750 ($1,500 for a family) if they engage in prespecified wellness behaviors. A stakeholder panel was convened to develop guidelines for insurers, which, in turn, were required to develop products satisfying those guidelines. Implementation was examined using stakeholder interviews and archival documents. Results indicate that since no funds were allocated for education and monitoring, there was little opportunity to promote "bottom up" demand or to oversee insurers. They also indicate that both insurers and brokers adopted strategies that inhibited take-up. Providing the resources necessary for effective government oversight and outreach will be critical to small group market reform nationally. So too will be promoting broker and insurer buy-in.

Small Group Health Insurance Reform in Rhode Island: Promises and Pitfalls of the HEALTHpact Plan

This study analyzes what design elements inhibited enrollment in HEALTHpact. HEALTHpact is a high deductible plan with a premium capped at 10 percent of the average Rhode Island wage. Deductibles are reduced if enrollees meet wellness criteria. Qualitative case study. Archival documents and 23 interviews. Inclusion of a subsidy would have led to lower premiums and more generous coverage. Although priced lower than other plans, HEALTHpact still did not offer good value for most firms. Wellness incentives also were too complex. Subsidies for purchase of insurance coverage are critical to national reform of the small group market. Designers also will need to carefully balance program complexity with innovation in encouraging wellness and product appeal.

Regulating a Health Insurance Exchange: Implications for Individuals With Mental Illness

Under the newly enacted health reform law, millions of lower- and middle-income Americans will purchase individual or family health insurance through state-based markets for private health insurance called insurance "exchanges," which consolidate and regulate the market for individual and small-group health insurance. The authors consider options for structuring choice and pricing of health insurance in an exchange from the perspective of efficiently and fairly serving persons with mental illness. Exchanges are intended to foster choice and competition. However, certain features-open enrollment, individual choice, and imperfect risk adjusters-create incentives for "adverse selection," especially in providing coverage for persons with mental illness, who have higher overall health care costs. The authors review the experience of persons with mental illness in insurance markets similar to the exchanges, such as the Massachusetts Connector and the Federal Employees Health Benefit Program, and note that competition among health plans for enrollees who are "good risks" can undermine coverage and efficiency. They review the possible approaches for contending with selection-related incentives, such as carving out all or part of mental health benefits, providing reinsurance for some mental health care costs, or their preferred option, running the exchange in the same way that an employer runs its employee benefits and addressing selection and cost control issues by choice of contractor. The authors also consider approaches an exchange could use to promote effective consumer choice, such as passive and active roles for the exchange authority. Regulation will be necessary to establish a foundation for success of the exchanges.

Reinsurance for High Health Costs: Benefits, Limitations, and Alternatives

Government-sponsored reinsurance for individuals with high health costs is a commonly proposed strategy to improve access and affordability in the individual and small-group health insurance markets. While reinsurance may have some benefits, other schemes may be more effective at accomplishing the same goals at lower cost. Reinsurance can be seen as a crude special case of risk-adjusted insurance subsidies. This paper estimates the effect of different reinsurance schemes on insurance premiums and insurers’ disincentives to enroll potentially high-cost individuals. We find that reinsurance is relatively ineffective at reducing cream-skimming incentives and argue that more sophisticated risk-adjustment schemes are more effective, particularly under community rating with guaranteed issue. Although in the past risk adjustment had been considered too complex to implement in practice, recent experience suggests that it is now feasible, and we argue that incorporation of risk adjustment would strengthen current health insurance reform efforts.

Where Do the Sick Go? Health Insurance and Employment in Small and Large Firms

Small firms that offer health insurance to their employees may face variable premiums if the firm hires an employee with high‐expected health costs. To avoid expensive premium variability, a small firm may attempt to maintain a workforce with low‐expected health costs. In addition, workers with high‐expected health costs may prefer employment in larger firms with health insurance rather than in smaller firms. This results in employment distortions. We examine the magnitude of these employment distortions in hiring, employment, and separations using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey from 1996 to 2001. We find that workers with high‐expected health costs are less likely to be new hires in insured small firms and are less likely to be employed in insured small firms. We find no evidence that state small group health insurance reforms designed to restrict insurers' ability to deny coverage and restrict premium variability have reduced the extent of these distortions.

Small Employers and the Provision of Small Group Health Insurance Coverage

mployers are the main source of health insurance for North Carolinians. In 2004, more than 60% of non-elderly North Carolinians accessed health insurance coverage through an employer-sponsored health insurance program. However, small businesses are much less likely to offer health insurance coverage than larger business. In 2002 and 2003, only 29% of North Carolina firms with fewer than ten employees offered health insurance coverage, compared to 68% of firms with 10-24 employees, 79% of firms with 25-99 employees, and 90% of firms with 100 or more employees. One reason that fewer small firms offer health insurance coverage may be due to higher health insurance premiums, on average, for smaller firms. In North Carolina, 2002-2003 the average annual health insurance premium for workers in small firms with fewer than 50 employees was $3,597, compared to $3,206 for firms with more than 50 employees. Small employers, those with 50 or fewer employees, are subject to health insurance rates set by state “small group” rating laws. These laws were modified in the 1990s to reduce the variation in premiums charged to small employers with similar employment characteristics. Small group rating laws are used to spread the health risks of small employer groups across a larger pool of workers. However, despite these laws, small-firm premiums continue to vary widely, and health insurance premiums are still higher on average for small firms than for larger firms. Reasons for (Not) Offering Health Insurance

Health Insurance Reform and HMO Penetration in the Small Group Market

This study uses data from several national employer surveys conducted between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s to investigate the effect of state-level underwriting reforms on HMO penetration in the small group health insurance market. We identify reform effects by exploiting cross-state variation in the timing and content of reform legislation and by using mid-sized and large employers, which were not affected by the legislation, as within-state control groups. While it is difficult to disentangle the effect of state reforms from other factors affecting HMO penetration in the small group markets, the results suggest a positive relationship between insurance market regulations and HMO penetration.

The Impact of States' Small Group Health Insurance Reforms on Uninsurance Rates

The impact of states' small group market reforms on uninsurance rates was examined. Reform status was quantified on five reform dimensions: Access Improvement, Premium Reduction, Premium Differential Reduction, Continuity of Coverage, and Enhancing Valued Plan Features. These reform indices were calculated based on actuarial judgment of the market impact potential of each regulation. Regression analysis showed no association between uninsurance rates and the depth of reforms on any dimension, while controlling for income, foreign-born population, black population, and employment in the smallest businesses. Possible reasons for the lack of impact are discussed.

A Comprehensive Snapshot of States' Small Group Market Reforms on Insurer Pricing and Rating Practices, 1999

This paper presents a qualitative analysis of states' small group health insurance reforms that impact small group premiums, mostly enacted by the states during 1996-99, following the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act in 1996. It draws from an intensive review of statutes of 48 states and the District of Columbia as of 1999. It analyses regulations related to insurer pricing and rating practices concerning rating criteria and rating bands, pricing incentives, premium stability from year to year, minimum loss rations, reinsurance and carve-out coverage for the medically uninsurable. It also covers regulations targeting employer purchasing and coverage practices such as pooled purchasing and adverse selection. This is the second of a two-part series analyzing states' small group market reforms, the first being devoted to state reforms to promote access and improving the value of health plans offered in this market (Xirasagar et al. 2004). The variety in pricing and rating reforms illustrate the differences in the depth of reforms across states, and represent a far wider range of potential actuarial combinations than the sample of reforms documented in past literature.

A Comprehensive Snapshot of States' Small Group Market Reforms on Access and Enhancing Valued Plan Features, 1999

Small group health insurance statutes of 48 states and the District of Columbia, as of 1999, were reviewed. Reform provisions judged to have some relevance for the market are catalogued and total 74 distinct regulations. Judgment of market relevance was based on actuarial experience at a leading health insurance company. The regulations are categorized under: (1) Access improvement; (2) Pricing and Rating Reforms; (3) Improving stability of coverage; and (4) Improving valued features of plans. The nuances and variety of these regulations, adopted in various combinations by the states, are discussed. The complexity of the reform scenario suggests the need for impact studies that take into account the totality of reform. Past studies have evaluated the impact of selected major reforms in isolation, and, thus, have been inadequate to provide definitive conclusions on the reforms' impact.

Small Group Health Insurance

States are ranked based on the potential of their small group health insurance reforms to enhance health insurance uptake. Reforms were quantified based on their market impact potential. Five dimensions of reforms were identified, Access Improvement, Premium Reduction, Premium Differential Reduction, Continuity of Coverage, and Enhancing Valued Plan Features. The reform indices representing these dimensions were developed based on document review of state statutes, combined with actuarial judgment to identify and assign scores to market-relevant regulations in line with their impact potential. The distribution of the states' reform scores and rankings show wide variation in the depth and focus of their reforms. Only seven of the top ten states on the Total Reform index had consistently higher scores on two or more reform dimensions. The conceptual linkages between specific regulations and the documented small group market problems lead to normative expectations of an association between the depth of state reforms and the prevalence of uninsurance.