Skilled Unskilled Wage Inequality Research Articles

Spillover effect of foreign direct investment on wage-inequality in Indian manufacturing industries

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to study the spillover effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) on skilled–unskilled wage inequality in the Indian manufacturing industries.Design/methodology/approachThe authors show theoretically with a model of spillover that if foreign firms (receiving FDI) have a negative spillover effect on domestic firms (not receiving FDI), then the level of capital and skilled workers in the domestic firms falls down. Consequently, the authors conduct an empirical analysis by using system GMM estimation technique on the firm-level data of the Indian organised manufacturing sector.FindingsThe authors show that wage inequality worsens when there is negative spillover effects like competition spillover or skill spillover effect of FDI in India.Originality/valueTo the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first attempt to measure the various spillover effects of FDI on the wage inequality in the Indian manufacturing industries by using firm-level data.

Impact of Trade Liberalisation on Wage Inequality and Skill Formation: A Theoretical Analysis

We consider a small open economy with three sector and four factors. Agricultural sector produces output with unskilled labour and land. Manufacturing sector and skill formation sector produce output with skilled labour and capital. Skill formation sector transforms the unskilled labour into skilled labour. We also consider an extended version of this model where agricultural sector also uses capital. So capital is mobile between all three sectors. Both change in the price of manufacturing sector and capital stock alter skill formation in a similar direction. But change in the price of manufacturing sector leads to change in skilled–unskilled wage inequality in the same direction whereas due to change in capital stock it changes in opposite direction. In our extended study, where capital is mobile between all three sectors, the results of the basic model are unaltered. JEL Codes: F13, J31

The impact of environmental policy on wage inequality

AbstractConsider a small open Harris and Todaro's model. This paper analyzes the impact of the policy of environmental protection on skilled–unskilled wage inequality. We find that, in the economy with urban unemployment, if the elasticity of substitution between unskilled labor and pollution in the urban low‐skill sector is small (large) enough then a rise in the pollution tax will expand (narrow down) skilled–unskilled wage inequality. In addition, we prove that, in the economy with full employment, a rise in the pollution tax will raise the skilled–unskilled wage inequality, if the elasticity of substitution between unskilled labor and pollution is larger than that between capital and pollution in the urban low‐skill sector.

Non-traded goods, firm dynamics and wages in a service economy

By considering the term-of-trade and volume-of-trade effects, Jones (2012) examines the distributive effect in a competitive economy with non-traded goods. This paper reexamines the effect in an imperfectively competitive economy with firm dynamics. A rise in foreign demand can generate revenue and also mitigate market distortion, whereas skilled-unskilled wage inequality can be magnified or mitigated via the effect on firm entry or exit. Thus, how to achieve the trade-off among growth, inequality and the environment becomes an important task for government decision-makers, especially so during the pandemic of Covid-19.

FINANCIAL DISCRIMINATION AND WAGE INEQUALITY IN CHINA

This paper investigates how financial discrimination influences skilled-unskilled wage inequality in China. In the basic model, we find that a reduction of financial discrimination will reduce skilled-unskilled wage inequality. In the extended model, we find that skilled-unskilled wage inequality will be narrowed down if and only if the substitution elasticity of unskilled labor and the intermediate product in the private sector is larger than that of the skilled labor and capital in the public sector. When considering the reality of China, we predict that a reduction of financial discrimination leads to the decline of wage inequality.

Wage Inequality and Unemployment in the Presence of Imported Intermediate Goods: A Theoretical Analysis

This article develops a static three-sector and five-factor competitive general equilibrium model of a small open economy: sector 1 is the rural agricultural sector, which produces products using informal or unorganised unskilled labour and land as inputs; sector 2 is the urban manufacturing, final-goods-producing sector that produces products with the help of unskilled labour, who get unionised wages, and capital; and sector 3 is the service sector, which uses skilled labour with formal wages, capital and sophisticated hi-technology-intensive imported intermediate goods produced abroad as inputs. We show that an exogenous increase in capital inflow or an increase in tariff on imported intermediate input reduces the skilled–unskilled wage inequality and lowers unemployment as long as the return to capital is unaltered and output adjustments absorb the entire shock of the two policies. Such capital inflow increases rural wage and reduces unemployment via the Harris Todaro mechanism but interestingly does not allow the skilled wage to increase. Thus, two critical policy targets can be accommodated at the same time. JEL Codes: F13, J31, J46

Redistribution and wage inequality

This paper explores how redistribution affects skilled-unskilled wage inequality through the general equilibrium approach. We analyze six redistribution policies, which includes redistribution from (1) skilled labor to unskilled labor, (2) unskilled labor to skilled labor, (3) capital owners to skilled labor, (4) capital owners to unskilled labor, (5) skilled labor to capital owners, and (6) unskilled labor to capital owners. We find that redistribution policy (1) will reduce wage inequality, while redistribution policy (2) will increase wage inequality. For redistribution policies (3)–(6), how redistribution affects wage inequality depends on the labor intensities of the skilled sector and the unskilled sector. The result shows that redistribution does not necessarily reduce skilled-unskilled wage inequality.

Search Costs and Wage Inequality

Abstract This paper analyzes how search costs affect skilled-unskilled wage inequality. In the basic model, we find that an increase in skilled labor’s search costs will decrease wage inequality if the skilled labor market and the unskilled labor market are separated. In the extended model, our findings are as follows: (i) Even if there exists free entry into the unskilled labor market or the endogenous provision of public goods, an increase of search costs in the skilled labor market will decrease wage inequality; and (ii) if skilled search costs are negatively related to the skilled wage, wage inequality will be increased.

Institutional change and wage inequality

This paper analyzes how institutional change affects wage inequality. Institutional change is regarded as the reduction of contractual incompleteness. When institutions become better, contracts are less incomplete. Our main finding is that institutional change will narrow down (resp. widen) wage inequality if the share of the surplus in the skilled sector is sufficiently low (resp. high). When introducing incomplete contracts into the framework of skilled-unskilled wage inequality, we can obtain some different insights.

Globalisation, crime and wage inequality: a theoretical analysis

Purpose This study aims to focus on the effects of economic globalisation programme on the problems of criminal activities and on the degree of skilled–unskilled wage inequality. Design/methodology/approach A competitive general equilibrium model of a small open economy is developed. Unskilled labour moves from the production sector to the criminal sector. Those who join the criminal sector snatch a part of capitalists’ income and skilled workers’ income to finance their consumption and face positive probability of being caught and punished. The size of the criminal sector and the rental rate on capital are simultaneously determined in the short-run equilibrium of this model where factor endowments are exogenously given at a particular point of time. Findings An increase in the capital endowment resulting from an exogenous foreign capital inflow raises demand for labour and wage rates in both the sectors. So, it lowers the rental rate on capital and thus aggravates the problem of skilled–unskilled wage inequality because the skilled labour using sector is more capital intensive than the other production sector. However, it may lower the size of the criminal sector and thus may raise the level of the gross domestic product. Originality/value There exists substantial theoretical works on the problem of skilled–unskilled wage inequality, but none of these works focuses on the general equilibrium allocation of unskilled labour to the criminal sector. On the other hand, existing models specialised to analyse theoretical implications of crime and punishment do not focus on the interaction between crime and wage inequality.

Anti‐immigration policy in the destination country and skilled–unskilled wage inequality in a source economy with or without unemployment

AbstractThis paper is aimed at theoretically examining the consequence of the anti‐immigration policy adopted in the destination country on the skilled–unskilled wage inequality in a source nation using a couple of two‐sector, specific‐factor general equilibrium models in both the presence and absence of unemployment. Emigration requires incurring some capital cost for professional skill formation on the part of every prospective emigrant that adds to the opportunity cost of emigration. The authority of the destination country determines the number of visas to be granted and hence directly controls the magnitude of skilled emigration from the source country. In the migration equilibrium, the expected skilled wage income abroad is equal to the opportunity cost of emigration. In both the presence and absence of unemployment of unskilled labor, the outcome of the policy on the wage inequality crucially hinges on both the magnitude of the fixed cost of emigration and the technological factors. In the specific‐factor Harris–Todaro model, the degree of imperfection in the unskilled labor market is an additional factor. Finally, some policy recommendations have been made for protecting the interest of the poor unskilled workforce.

Capital market distortion, firm entry and wage inequality

Distortions in the capital market are notable in developing economies like China. By building up a dual production structure with oligopolistic competition in urban manufacturing, this paper investigates the distributional and welfare effects of capital market distortions. We find that in the short run, an increase in the capital market distortion in favor of urban firms can lower both the skilled and unskilled wages. However, in the long run, the preferential policy on reducing capital cost to the urban sector attracts new entry of firms, which can worsen the skilled-unskilled wage inequality in the economy. This firm-entry effect of the capital market distortion on wage inequality is empirically confirmed for China.

Urban bias and wage inequality

AbstractThis paper explores how urban bias affects skilled–unskilled wage inequality through building several general equilibrium models. In the basic model, we find that an increase in the degree of urban bias will widen wage inequality if the unskilled sector is more capital intensive than the skilled sector and reduce wage inequality if the skilled sector is more capital intensive than the unskilled sector. In the extended models, we find that the conclusion obtained in the basic model almost still holds under different conditions.

Insecure resources, rent seeking, and wage inequality

This paper explores how insecure resources affect skilled-unskilled wage inequality in the background of rent seeking. Through building the general equilibrium models embedded with contest success functions, we find that wage inequality is determined by the output elasticities of rent-seeking efforts and the capital intensities of different sectors, and that sometimes the threshold of insecure resources also plays an important role.

Skilled-unskilled wage inequality and structural transformation in a dual economy

In this paper, we develop a sectoral model of a less developed economy with a backward agricultural sector dependent on unskilled labour and with an advanced industrial sector dependent on capital and skilled labour and also with a private education sector whose role is to transform an unskilled labourer into a skilled one. Using a Ramsey framework of consumption saving allocation, we analyse how the economy grows over time through accumulation of capital and through transformation of unskilled labour into skilled labour. Such a model helps us to analyse how the structural shift from agriculture to industry takes place and what role do sector specific polices play in this context. We analyse short-run as well as long run effects of sector specific policies on the degree of wage income inequality as well as on the endogenous rate of economic growth; and find that sector specific policies produce opposite effects. Subsidization to agricultural sector leads to an improvement in the degree of wage income inequality but lowers the rate of economic growth in the long run. On the other hand, subsidization or protection to the manufacturing sector produces just the opposite result.

Public pollution abatement and wage inequality

ABSTRACTThis paper constructs three-sector general equilibrium models to investigate how public pollution abatement affects the skilled–unskilled wage inequality. In the basic model with full employment, we find that a higher degree of public pollution abatement will decrease the wage inequality if the intensity of skilled labor in the urban skilled sector is sufficiently large and expand or narrow down the wage gap if this intensity is sufficiently small. In the extended models, we consider other four cases, and obtain the results similar or dissimilar to that of the basic model.

Structural change and wage inequality

This paper investigates how structural change driven by factor intensity differences affects the skilled-unskilled wage inequality through the three-sector general equilibrium approach. In the basic model, we find that when structural change happens in the urban skilled sector (resp. the urban unskilled sector), the wage inequality will be expanded (resp. narrowed down) if the capital-labor ratio in this sector is larger than one. In the extended models, we introduce urban unemployment and the open capital market separately into the basic model, and find that the main results of the basic model almost still hold.

Privatization and wage inequality in developing countries

This paper studies how partial privatization influences the skilled-unskilled wage inequality in developing countries through the general equilibrium approach. When the degree of product differentiation between the public sector and the private sector is small enough, an increase in the degree of partial privatization will raise both the skilled wage rate and the status quo unskilled wage rate, and the wage inequality will be narrowed down (resp. expanded) if the substitution elasticity of the rural sector is sufficiently small (resp. large). Compared with the existing literature, this paper provides a new perspective and obtains some new results.

Factor‐biased public infrastructure and wage inequality

AbstractThis paper analyzes how factor‐biased public infrastructure affects the skilled–unskilled wage inequality. In the basic model with a full employment economy, we find that when the weighted dependence of skilled labor and capital in the urban skilled sector on public infrastructure is large enough relatively to that of unskilled labor and capital in the urban unskilled sector, the wage inequality will be expanded. We also discuss labor‐biased and capital‐biased public infrastructure in our framework, and find that the relative dependences of relevant labor or capital on public infrastructure are important determinants of wage inequality. In the extended models, we analyze separately the issue of wage inequality in the economy with unemployment and the totally open capital market, and find the results of the basic model almost still hold.

Horizontal Mergers and Wage Inequality

This paper incorporates horizontal mergers into the general-equilibrium framework embedded with game theory and separately analyzes how horizontal mergers in the skilled sector and the unskilled sector influence the skilled unskilled wage inequality. In an economy with full employment, a horizontal merger in the skilled sector will certainly reduce the wage gap. In an economy with unemployment, a horizontal merger in the skilled sector will conditionally expand the wage inequality. Whether in an economy with full employment or in an economy with unemployment, a horizontal merger in the unskilled sector will conditionally widen the wage gap.