Sino-Japanese Dispute Research Articles

중일전쟁의 개전과 1930년대 동아시아 국제정치

When examining the outbreak and protracted course of the Sino-Japanese War, it is important to note the attitudes of neighboring countries such as the United States and the Soviet Union toward the Sino-Japanese issue, which arose as a result of Japan's aggressive continental policy, and how these attitudes influenced the outbreak of the war. Given that the Sino-Japanese War was a protracted eight-year war fought by the Chinese government with the support of the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom, and that it was an international event that directly influenced the outbreak of the Asia-Pacific War, it is necessary to understand the diplomatic process surrounding the war, not just the decision to escalate the war within the Japanese leadership and the decision to wage a protracted global war. After the Manchurian Incident, Japan's East Asian policy included an aggressive expansion of its influence on the Chinese mainland, which was embodied in aggressive public policies such as the army-led campaign to separate Hwaseong from North Korea. In response to these Japanese public policies, the Chinese government actively sought internal and diplomatic means to resist, while the Soviet Union and the United States, both of which were paying attention to East Asian affairs, gradually shifted their policies toward supporting China in the Sino-Japanese conflict and deterring Japanese aggression. The fact that 1935 was the year when Japan's public policy became overtly aggressive, as symbolized by the separation of Hwaseong, and that Sino-Japanese relations began to trend in a friendly direction from this year shows that the attitude of neighboring countries toward the Sino-Japanese dispute had already shifted in a direction favorable to China before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War.

Chinese Nationalism through the Prism of the Sino–Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands

ABSTRACT In the last two decades, against the backdrop of multiple anti-Japanese protests in China, the rise of Chinese nationalism has been much debated. By taking the 2010 and 2012 Sino–Japanese crises over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands as a case study, the article applies discourse analysis to media articles and interviews to ascertain the Chinese government’s propaganda toolbox in shaping the nationalist discourse, as well as to substantiate the defining features of anti-Japanese nationalism. The findings reveal a combination of strategies and techniques that the propaganda apparatus uses, such as the creation of an ‘us-versus-them’ dichotomy, galvanised inclusiveness, censorship, and ‘card-stacking’ to mould nationalism. The article substantiates empirically both top-down and bottom-up strains of nationalism, and their interaction through the four key themes of sovereignty, history, mistrust and reactivity. It finds that Japan bridges these strands of Chinese nationalism, but in its absence alternative views of nationalism are articulated.

The Chinese Practice of Treaty Law - Examining the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands from the Perspective of Treaty Law -

The sovereignty dispute between China and Japan regarding the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands has captured global media attention and is the cause of some tension between the two countries. One of the major claims of both countries is whether the Islands have been ceded to Japan, and if so, have they been reverted to China.Cession and reversion were completed through a series of treaties as follows: the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), the Wartime Declarations (the 1940s)(the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration),the San Francisco Treaty (1951), the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty (1952), the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (1960) , and the Okinawa Agreement (1971). The sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands has been illustrated sufficiently from the point of view of history, jurisprudence and international law. However, it is not common to analyze it and then demonstrate the rationality of Chinese claims to the sovereignty of Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands from a treaty law perspective. Therefore, this paper explores the dispute by evaluating and analyzing the treaty law, such as the terms of treaties, the interpretation of treaties, the legal force of treaties, treaties and third states, the confliction and invalidity of treaties and so on. From the perspective of treaty law and in pursuit of the spirit of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands have been China's territory since the ancient times and there is no legal basis for Japan to claim the sovereignty of Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands.

Traversing the soft/hard power binary: the case of the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute

AbstractSoft power and hard power are conceptualised in International Relations as empirically and normatively dichotomous, and practically opposite – one intangible, attractive, and legitimate, the other tangible, coercive, and less legitimate. This article critiques this binary conceptualisation, arguing that it is discursively constructed with and for the construction of Self and Other. It further demonstrates that practices commonly labelled and understood as soft power and hard power are closely interconnected. Best understood as ‘representational force’ and ‘physical force’ respectively, soft and hard power intertwine through the operation of productive and disciplinary forms of power. We illustrate this argument by analysing the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Both governments exercise representational force in constructing their respective versions of events and Self/Other. The soft/hard power binary itself plays a performative role as the Self is typically associated with soft power and the Other with hard power. The operation of productive power, moreover, privileges the attractiveness of the former and the repellence of the latter, and disciplinary power physically enforces these distinctions on subjects in both states. Finally, reinforced Self/Other distinctions legitimise preparations for violence against the Other on both sides, thus exposing how fundamentally entangled soft and hard power are in practice.

Domestic Motivation and the Case of the East China Sea ADIZ: Diversion or Mobilization?

The Sino-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands has intensified since 2012. In November 2013, China's Ministry of Defense declared an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea (ECS). An ADIZ refers to publicly defined area extending beyond national territory in which unidentified aircraft are liable to be interrogated and, if necessary, intercepted for identification before they cross into sovereign airspace (Welch 2013). While many states have set up their own ADIZs since 1948, the ECS ADIZ was considered a destabilizing move by East Asian states as well as other stakeholders because it includes the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and it applies generally to aircraft flying in the ECS ADIZ, regardless of whether the aircraft intends to enter the PRC's airspace (Rinehart and Bart 2015, 7). Since its announcement, many have sought to understand the motivation behind the ECS ADIZ. Some analysts have looked at it from a strategic perspective, while others have seen it as a result of Tokyo's provocative decision to nationalize the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 2012 in the context of the hawkish foreign policy orientation of the Chinese president, Xi Jinping. However, all of these explanations overlook the possibility that domestic factors also played an important role in deciding to implement an ADIZ. Noting this shortcoming, some contributors to a special issue of Asian Perspective on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands conflict presented analyses that took domestic factors into account. For instance, Togo (2014) and Hirano (2014) discussed how Japan's domestic have become entangled with international factors and how this has contributed to the dispute. Moore (2014, 238) looked at the role of politics at the domestic and international levels in China and Japan. Moore's argument is especially illuminating in that he establishes a two-level analytic framework to examine the interaction of ideational factors at different levels, in and across countries. In his conclusion, he suggests a face-to-face solution for the dispute, which would allow both sides [to] come away with enough face to proclaim victory to their constituents (238).However, although ideational factors are powerful in explaining the structure of conflict, they are insufficient to explain its timing. In this article, we argue that the issue cannot be fully understood without looking into the decisionmakers' political motivation. To offer another plausible explanation that may fill this gap, we consider two distinct theoretical frameworks: the diversionary foreign policy and the mobilization models. The first model is based on the idea that state leaders utilize external conflict to divert domestic attention away from their political, economic, or social problems in order to reconsolidate their power position. The second model deals with how state leaders manipulate international crises to mobilize patriotic sentiment among their citizens, making these citizens more willing to accept a radical policy agenda requiring the sacrifice of their individual rights. Both models focus on the linkage between domestic and foreign policy, but each has different theoret- ical and empirical implications. We assess which mechanism offers a better explanation of China's ADIZ decision by carefully reviewing available empirical evidence.Diversionary Incentive vs. Mobilization Effort: A Brief Theoretical ReviewScholars of Chinese foreign policy have made considerable efforts to understand the impact of domestic factors on China's decisions to take belligerent action. For example, Chen (1987) and Zhang (2010) argue that an important driver behind China's decision to fight a brief war with Vietnam in 1979 was Deng Xiaoping's domestic power struggle and his agenda of economic reform. In a broader examination of China's use of military force, Scobell (2003) also demonstrates that China's strategic culture, including the historical legacy of the cult of defense, the evolving civilmilitary culture, and military organizational culture, can be used to explain continuity and change in China's decisions to use military force abroad. …

How Economic, Strategic, and Domestic Factors Shape Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation in the East China Sea Dispute

Despite frequent talk of conflict and even war, economic and strategic factors suggest that the Sino–Japanese dispute over the East China Sea will not erupt into hot conflict, at least for the time being. However, for domestic reasons, overt cooperation remains a distant prospect.

The Sino-Japanese battle for soft power: pitfalls and promises

Beijing and Tokyo are currently involved in a zero-sum battle for soft power. Both governments are actively trying to shape how third party actors understand contested matters in their bilateral relationship. The dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands is the most obvious flashpoint in this ongoing struggle for hearts and minds. A soft power battle might seem like an innocent endeavour, but by entrenching enmity and legitimizing armed conflict, it might actually translate into one where hard power takes centre stage. Indeed, that the dissemination and entrenchment of affective identity narrative make violence seem normal, natural, realistic or perhaps even inevitable is the greatest danger associated with the ongoing Sino-Japanese dispute. However, if both parties were to agree to let the International Court of Justice settle their discord, the islands dispute could provide them with a chance to boost their respective soft power and lay the groundwork for a more peaceful order in East Asia. The article thus argues that the Sino-Japanese soft power battle contains both well-known pitfalls and a less well-known promise.

Япония: новая парадигма безопасности в свете обострения территориального спора с Китаем

The article is devoted to the current situation in the Sino-Japanese dispute over Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands, as well as to its implications for the policy of Tokyo in the national security field. The paper analyzes historical and legal arguments of the parties and shows that one of the main obstacles in resolving the conflict lies in the sphere of national prestige. Possible responses to the challenges Japan faces in connection with the aggravation of the Senkaku problem are observed in three areas: strengthening the security treaty with the United States, the resolution of the conflict within the bilateral framework with China and the diversification of Japan’s own security policy.

Sino-Japanese Relations Adrift in a Changing World

The Sino-Japanese dispute over the arrest of the Chinese fishing trawler captain is the most serious bilateral incident since 1952. Japan took an action viewed by Beijing as provocative and China overreacted. Feeling humiliated, Japan has sought allies to check on China. But China is not isolated. When it seeks to recover from its diplomatic setbacks in 2010, Beijing looks elsewhere because it has little trust in the DPJ government. As the world's second and third largest economies, China and Japan should improve relations. Without improved ties, they will find it even harder to manage emotionally charged disputes next time around. China and Japan are rivals but they are not yet enemies. The Chinese and Japanese governments need to exercise leadership, which includes making compromises when and where they become necessary. Since they have weakened capacity to deal with bilateral disputes, they should avoid them in the first place.

Sino-Japanese Energy Security and Regional Stability: The Case of the East China Sea Gas Exploration

The Sino-Japanese dispute over the East China Sea maritime resources was triggered by the unsettled maritime boundary and the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The dispute has been ascribed by many to intensified competition between China and Japan over energy supply. However this article attributes the fundamental cause of the conflict to power politics and political distrust, which are deemed to have the key role in preventing the two governments from finding a solution. The article analyses the origin and the causes responsible for the Sino-Japanese dispute over the East China Sea gas exploration, and then proceeds to investigate the diplomatic dialogues to reveal the key obstacles in the process.

Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The Pending Controversy from the Chinese Perspective

The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands have brought China and Japan into a bitter dispute for many decades. With regard to the real question of who owns sovereignty over the islands, the two claimants can not come to terms on several critical issues, such as whether the islands were terra nullius when Japan claimed sovereignty in 1895, whether Japan returned the islands to China after the Japanese defeat in WWII, and how their maritime boundary in the East China Sea should be demarcated according to international law. There is no ready solution to the longstanding stalemate, but the pending dispute could be shelved and managed from escalating into a military conflict.

The U.S. Role in the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands, 1945–1971

In 1996, the Sino-Japanese conflict over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands intensified to the point where the American mass circulation periodicalTimeasked: “Will the next Asian war be fought over a few tiny islands?” That such a question could be asked seems incredible given that the Diaoyu Islands, which lie north-east of Taiwan and west of Okinawa, consist of only five small islands and three rocky outcroppings with a total landmass of no more than 7 square kilometres or 3 square miles. Apart from their miniscule size, the islands are uninhabited, are incapable of supporting human habitation for an extended period of time and are unlikely to support any economic life of their own from indigenous resources.

Li Hung-chang and the Liu-ch'iu (Ryukyu) Controversy, 1871-1881

Li Hung-chang's role in China's foreign affairs during the late Ch'ing period has been a subject of much study. Little is known, however, about his role in the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Liu-ch'iu (Ryukyu) Islands in the period between 1871 and 1881. What was Li's attitude toward the tributary states in general, and toward the ex-tributary state, Japan, in particular, during the period of controversy? What was Li's influence on China's foreign policy decision-making during this period? How did Li resolve (or not resolve) the seeming dilemma at a time when China was thrust into the modern nation-state system while maintaining the traditional tributary state system? Specifically, what was Li's policy toward Liu-ch'iu vis-a-vis Japan?

The Quasi-War in East Asia: Japan's Expedition to Taiwan and the Ryūkyū Controversy

AbstractThe 1870s witnessed mounting tension among East Asian countries. In 1874,. Japan sent an expeditionary force to Taiwan to punish the aborigines there who had, in 1871, killed fifty-four shipwrecked Ryūkyūans (Liu-ch'iuans). By doing so, according to many scholars today, Japan was able to claim retroactively that the Ryūkyūan castaways were legally Japanese subjects, thereby ending the Sino-Japanese dispute over the ambiguous political status of the Ryūkyū Islands (the Chūzan Kingdom of Ryūkyū paid tribute to both China and the Satsuma-han of Japan before the 18705).This paper is a reappraisal of this episode of the ‘Quasi-war’ in East Asia. By going into the Chinese, Japanese, Ryūkyūan, and Western sources, it unfolds some unknown events which directly and indirectly led to the Japanese decision to send forces to Taiwan, as well as the Chinese reactions. The conclusion of this paper refutes the customary view which holds that China had in 1874 ‘renounced her claim over Ryūkyū and yielded to the Japanese claim she had earlier disputed.’ As this paper will show, neither Soejima Taneomi nor Ōkubo Toshimichi had succeeded in securing any Chinese endorsement of Japan's sovereign right over Ryūky¯. Nor did the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1874, concerning the settlement of the Taiwan crisis, legally settle the Ryūkyū problem, since Ryūky¯ was never mentioned in the Treaty. As a result, the issue continued to trouble Peking and Tokyo in the years that immediately followed.

Democracy and Foreign Policy. A Case History of the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1931-33.

Democracy and Foreign Policy. A Case History of the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1931-33.

Democracy and Foreign Policy, A Case History: The Sinojapanese Dispute, 1931–33. By <italic>R. Bassett</italic>, Lecturer in Political Science at the London School of Economics and Political Science. [Publications of the London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London.] (New York: Longmans, Green and Company. 1952. Pp. xxiii, 654.)

Journal Article Democracy and Foreign Policy, A Case History: The Sinojapanese Dispute, 1931–33. By R. Bassett, Lecturer in Political Science at the London School of Economics and Political Science. [Publications of the London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London.] (New York: Longmans, Green and Company. 1952. Pp. xxiii, 654.) Get access Democracy and Foreign Policy, A Case History: The Sinojapanese Dispute, 1931–33. By Bassett R., Lecturer in Political Science at the London School of Economics and Political Science. [Publications of the London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London.] (New York: Longmans, Green and Company. 1952. Pp. xxiii, 654.) Stanley K. Hornbeck Stanley K. Hornbeck Washington, D. C. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Historical Review, Volume 58, Issue 3, April 1953, Pages 627–629, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/58.3.627 Published: 01 April 1953

Democracy and Foreign Policy: a Case History

Journal Article Democracy and Foreign Policy: a Case History Get access Democracy and Foreign Policy: a Case History. the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1931–33. By R. Bassett. London, Longmans, Green for the London School of Economics and Political Science, 1952. xxiii+654 pp. Index. (Publications of the London School of Economics.) 9″ × 6″. 42s. F. C. Jones F. C. Jones Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 29, Issue 2, April 1953, Page 229, https://doi.org/10.2307/2609035 Published: 01 April 1953

Democracy and Foreign Policy, A Case History: The Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1931-33

Introduction. Prologue. Part 1. 1. The League Council and Manchuria. 2.The Controversy: First Stage Part 2: The Second Phase 3. Anglo-American Co-operation 4. The Stimson Note 5. The Letter to Senator Borah 6. British Opinion on the Borah Letter 7. The Sanctions Legend 8. Shanghai and Sanctions - 1 9. Shanghai and Sanctions - 2 10. Shanghai and Sanctions - 3 Part 3: The Third Phase 11. Waiting for the Lytton Report Part IV: The Last Phase 12. The Lytton Report 13. What Matsuoka Said 14. The Forensic Defence of Japan 15. The Breakdown of Conciliation 16. The Assembly's Report 17. The Arms Embargo Campaign 18. The Debate of February 27th, 1933 19. The Embargo 20. To the Tangku Truce Part 5: Post-Amistice 21. The After Years Part 6: Commentary 22. The Parties and the Dispute 23. Collective Action by Great Britain 24. Within Their Power 25. The Government's Policy Appendix. Index.

League of Nations Assembly Report on the Sino-Japanese Dispute

League of Nations Assembly Report on the Sino-Japanese Dispute

The Report of the Assembly of the League of Nations on the Sino-Japanese Dispute

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