Singular Causation Research Articles

Foundations of attribution in climate-change science

Attribution—the explanation of an observed change in terms of multiple causal factors—is the cornerstone of climate-change science. For anthropogenic climate change (ACC), the central causal factor is evidently ACC itself, and one of the primary tools used to reveal ACC is aggregation, or grouping together, of data, e.g. global mean surface temperature. Whilst this approach has served climate-change science well, the landscape is changing rapidly. First, there is an increasing focus on regional or local aspects of climate change, and on singular or unprecedented events, which require varying degrees of disaggregation. Relatedly, climate change is increasingly apparent in observations at the local scale, which is challenging the primacy of climate model simulations. Finally, the explosion of climate data is leading to more phenomena-laden methodologies such as machine learning. All this demands a re-think of how attribution is performed and causal explanations are constructed. Here we use Lloyd’s ‘Logic of Research Questions’ framework to show how the way in which the attribution question is framed can strongly constrain its possible and responsive answers. To address the Research Question ‘What was the effect of ACC on X?’ (RQ1), scientists generally consider the question ‘What were the causal factors leading to X, and was ACC among them?’. If the causal factors include only external forcing and internal variability (RQ2), then answering RQ2 also answers RQ1. However, this unconditional attribution is not always possible. In such cases, allowing the causal factors to include elements of the climate system itself (RQ3)—the conditional, storyline approach—is shown to allow for a wider range of possible and responsive answers than RQ2, including that of singular causation. This flexibility is important when uncertainties are high. As a result, the conditional RQ3 mitigates against the sort of epistemic injustice that can arise from the unconditional RQ2.

The role of mechanism knowledge in singular causation judgments

Singular causation queries (e.g., “Did Mary's taking contraceptives cause her thrombosis?”) are ubiquitous in everyday life and crucial in many professional disciplines, such as medicine or law. Knowledge about general causal regularities is necessary but not sufficient for establishing a singular causation relation because it is possible that co-occurrences consistent with known regularities are in an individual case still just coincidental. Thus, further cues are helpful to establish a singular causation relation. In the present research we focus on information about mechanisms as a potent cue. While previous studies have shown that reasoners consider mechanism information as important when it comes to answering singular causation queries, no formal model has been proposed that explains why this is case. We here present a computational model that explains how causal mechanism information affects singular causation judgments. We also use the model to identify conditions that restrict the utility of mechanism information. We report three experiments testing the implications of our formal analysis. In Experiment 1 we found that reasoners systematically use mechanism information, largely in accordance with our formal model, although we also discovered that some people seem to rely on simpler, computationally less demanding reasoning strategies. The results of Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate that reasoners have a tentative understanding of the conditions that restrict the utility of causal mechanism information.

HUME AND THE ‘SECRET CONNEXION’: WHY CAUSATION IS A SINGULAR AFFAIR

ABSTRACTThe great Scottish Enlightenment man of letters David Hume (1711–76) offered an account of causation in terms of regularities: repeated pairings of certain kinds of events. Anything more than this, a supposed ‘secret connexion’ binding individual causes and effects, is not something we could ever experience. This, at least, is the view traditionally ascribed to him. Here the account, and its empiricist motivation, is outlined, and a fundamental problem identified: his account of causation is in tension with his account of the way in which we acquire the concept of a distinctive connection between causes and effects. To explain both our experience of causation, and causation's intimate connection with time, we need to appeal to singular causation: the connection between individual events which Hume found so elusive.

Time and Singular Causation-A Computational Model.

Causal queries about singular cases, which inquire whether specific events were causally connected, are prevalent in daily life and important in professional disciplines such as the law, medicine, or engineering. Because causal links cannot be directly observed, singular causation judgments require an assessment of whether a co-occurrence of two events c and e was causal or simply coincidental. How can this decision be made? Building on previous work by Cheng and Novick (2005) and Stephan and Waldmann (2018), we propose a computational model that combines information about the causal strengths of the potential causes with information about their temporal relations to derive answers to singular causation queries. The relative causal strengths of the potential cause factors are relevant because weak causes are more likely to fail to generate effects than strong causes. But even a strong cause factor does not necessarily need to be causal in a singular case because it could have been preempted by an alternative cause. We here show how information about causal strength and about two different temporal parameters, the potential causes' onset times and their causal latencies, can be formalized and integrated into a computational account of singular causation. Four experiments are presented in which we tested the validity of the model. The results showed that people integrate the different types of information as predicted by the new model.

Ontic Explanation Is either Ontic or Explanatory, but Not Both

This paper advances three related arguments showing that the ontic conception of explanation (OC), which is often adverted to in the mechanistic literature, is inferentially and conceptually incapacitated, and in ways that square poorly with scientific practice. Firstly, the main argument that would speak in favor of OC is invalid, and faces several objections. Secondly, OC's superimposition of ontic explanation and singular causation leaves it unable to accommodate scientifically important explanations. Finally, attempts to salvage OC by reframing it in terms of 'ontic constraints' just concedes the debate to the epistemic conception of explanation. Together, these arguments indicate that the epistemic conception is more or less the only game in town.

Armstrong’s Theory of Laws and Causation: Putting Things into their Proper Places

[full article, abstract in English; abstract in Lithuanian] Armstrong’s theory of laws and causation may be articulated as something like the following, which we may refer to as the received view: “Laws are intrinsic higher-order relations of ensuring (necessitation) between properties. The instantiation of laws is identical with singular causation. This identity is a posteriori.” Opponents and advocates of this view, believe that it may fairly and correctly be attributed to Armstrong. I do not deny it; instead I seek to reconsider the received view, specifically by treating it as a part of Armstrong’s metaphysics. The main features that should concern us are truthmaker theory and the formal account of the constitutive parts of states of affairs. I also discuss Bird’s ultimate argument against Armstrong and show how its impact is weakened by this proper reading.

Preemption in Singular Causation Judgments: A Computational Model.

Causal queries about singular cases are ubiquitous, yet the question of how we assess whether a particular outcome was actually caused by a specific potential cause turns out to be difficult to answer. Relying on the causal power framework (Cheng, ), Cheng and Novick () proposed a model of causal attribution intended to help answer this question. We challenge this model, both conceptually and empirically. We argue that the central problem of this model is that it treats causal powers that are probabilistically sufficient to generate the effect on a particular occasion as actual causes of the effect, and thus neglects that sufficient causal powers can be preempted in their efficacy. Also, the model does not take into account that reasoners incorporate uncertainty about the underlying general causal structure and strength of causes when making causal inferences. We propose a new measure of causal attribution and embed it into the structure induction model of singular causation (SISC; Stephan & Waldmann, ). Two experiments support the model.

Causation, Probability, and the Continuity Bind

AbstractAnalyses of singular (token-level) causation often make use of the idea that a cause increases the probability of its effect. Of particular salience in such accounts are the values of the p...

A Reply to Céspedes’ Defense of Causal Contrastivism

In a recent article in this journal, Esteban Céspedes (2015) seeks to defend the contrastive account of singular causation from my criticisms (Steglich-Petersen 2012). Céspedes objects to my argument on three counts: (1) it is circular in presupposing a principle that it seeks to establish; (2) that same principle is false; and (3) even if the principle were true, it would not speak against the contrastive account. In this note I argue that all three objections are unconvincing.

A Defense of the Contrastive Theory of Causation

An argument proposed by Steglich-Petersen (2012) establishes that while contrastive causation can be applied to general causation and causal explanation, it is a mistake to consider it in cases of singular causation. I attempt to show that there is no mistake. Steglich-Petersen’s argument does not seem to be strong enough and is actually circular. Furthermore, I briefly argue that even if we take his argument to be valid, there is still a response from the side of contrastive causation.

Book review

Book review

The Role of Case Study Research in Political Science: Evidence for Causal Claims

Political science research, particularly in international relations and comparative politics, has increasingly become dominated by statistical and formal approaches. The promise of these approaches shifted the methodological emphasis away from case study research. In response, supporters of case study research argue that case studies provide evidence for causal claims that is not available through statistical and formal research methods, and many have advocated multimethod research. I propose a way of understanding the integration of multiple methodologies in which the causes sought in case studies are treated as singular causation and contingent on a theoretical framework.

On Anti Humeanism and Medical Singular Causation

In this paper I offer an anti-Humean interpretation of the causal interactions in somatic medicine. I focus on life-threatening pathological states and show how Nancy Cartwright’s capacities can offer a plausible epistemology for medical processes and the singular causal claims advanced in medical diagnoses. I argue that the capacities manifested in the emergence of symptoms and signs could be tracked down if healthy organisms are construed as nomological machines and suggest that the causal reasoning from current medical practice bears a tacit adherence to anti-Humean assumptions.

Against the Contrastive Account of Singular Causation

For at least three decades, philosophers have argued that general causation and causal explanation are contrastive in nature. When we seek a causal explanation of some particular event, we are usually interested in knowing why that event happened rather than some other specified event. And general causal claims, which state that certain event types cause certain other event types, seem to make sense only if appropriate contrasts to the types of events acting as cause and effect are specified. In recent years, philosophers have extended the contrastive theory of causation to encompass singular causation as well. In this article, I argue that this extension of the theory was a mistake. Although general causation and causal explanation may well be contrastive in nature, singular causation is not. 1 Introduction 2 The Contrastive Account of Singular Causation 3 Against the Contrastive Account 4 The Semantics of Contrastive Causal Statements 5 Are Binary Causal Statements Ambiguous? 6 Extensionality 7 General Causation and Causal Explanation 8 Conclusion

Singular Causation without Dispositions

Is singular causation best understood within a dispositionalist framework? Although a positive answer has not yet been wholly developed, different philosophers have made some positive contributions suggesting that it is. Against these suggestions, I claim that any possible account of singular causation in terms of real, irreducible, dispositions conveys unsolvable flaws in its very metaphysical foundations.

A Comparison of Nine Counterfactual Theories of Causation Using Seven Examples.

The article compares and evaluates nine last-decade counterfactual theories of singular causation, which were either created or inspired by David Lewis, Joseph Y. Halpern and Judea Pearl and presented in the texts of six other authors. Some differences between those theories that have not yet been described in literature are shown in the article. It is argued that the majority of those theories analyze intuitively similar examples in different ways. In that respect, those theories impose distinctions which, according to the folk theory of causation, are (and should be) absent.

An Anti-Reductionist Account of Singular Causation

When it comes to the conceptual analysis of causation, no one theory enjoys widespread acceptance. It is generally acknowledged that counter factual and probabilistic accounts of causation are subject to serious objections, at least when they are offered as reductive conceptual analyses. Process or transference accounts?again, if offered as reductive concep tual analyses?also face major difficulties. Given the prolonged failure to uncover a successful reductionist conceptual analysis of causation, anti reductionist accounts can become attractive. Perhaps the reason that we haven't yet found a successful reductionist analysis is simply that there isn't one to be found?perhaps causation is primitive. What is more, an account which posits a primitive relation of causation between particulars can handle many of the cases that cause trouble for reductive accounts. Yet the move toward primitivist or anti-reductionist accounts is resisted by many philosophers. After spelling out his reductive analysis of pro ductive causation, for example, Ned Hall writes:

The Properties of Singular Causation

Theories of singular causation have a genuine problem with properties. In virtue of what property do events (or facts) cause other events? One possible answer to this question, Davidson's, is that causal relations hold between particulars and properties play no role in the way a particular causes another. According to another, recently fashionable answer, in contrast, events cause other events in virtue of having a trope (as opposed to a propertytype). Both views face serious objections. My aim in this paper is to combine these two very different solutions to the problem of the properties of singular causation and to argue that this combined view can avoid objections against both of them.

Probability Theory and Causation: A Branching Space-Times Analysis

We provide a formally rigorous framework for integrating singular causation, as understood by Nuel Belnap's theory of causae causantes, and objective single case probabilities. The central notion is that of a causal probability space whose sample space consists of causal alternatives. Such a probability space is generally not isomorphic to a product space. We give a causally motivated statement of the Markov condition and an analysis of the concept of screening-off.

A posteriori Necessity in Singular Causation and the Humean Argument

The absence of a necessary connection in singular causation is a key step in the Humean argument against any form of necessity in causation. I argue that Hume's defence of this step is unsuccessful, and that the step could be skipped, accepting the possibility of necessary a posteriori truths. Still this does not suffice to guarantee a necessary connection in singular causation. Necessary a posteriori truths should be backed by necessary a priori truths. Thus, a main object of this paper is to argue that an a priori philosophical concept of causality involves a necessary connection between its terms.