Single Political System Research Articles

Интеллектуалы и политический дискурс сопротивления (зарисовки русской культуры)

In the article, the author shows how the government and the opposition interact in the political process. Actors representing opposition constantly produce political texts illustrating their alternative views. The existence of the opposition subject in a critical state in regards to the existing institutions of power is historically predetermined, which proves an active reflection from prominent theorists of political thought. A free dialogue of the government and the opposition is hardly possible in every single political system. In the case of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, this dialogue may be difficult. The consequences of free will for the subject of opposition can be quite severe. The author analyzes the political discourse of opposition as exemplified by the Soviet culture. The author is interested in the metaphors of opposition and their political context, which seems to be an inevitable condition and framework limiting creativity of one or another intellectual. The author studies a number of texts of the Soviet culture representatives, who used metaphors of opposition, and had a reputation of troublemakers. Such position of an intellectual generates sanctions of the repressive machine and predetermines very specific forms of presenting texts of opposition and apophasis. For convincing his own arguments, the author constantly turns to the heritage of the USSR representatives of unofficial culture in.

Conciliación o revolución: los caminos enfrentados del liberalismo peninsular (Portugal y España, 1863-1866)

Since the second half of the 19th century polices of reconciliation on the Iberian peninsula have moved along two opposite paths as the Spanish and Portuguese liberal regimes developed in different directions according to their different experiences and achievements. Although the success of the Regeneracao undoubtedly meant political and constitutional stability, it also caused a deep shift in the political dynamics and triggered the emergence of new parties. In Portugal, the design of these new political identities and the birth of an especially prominent radicalism marked the beginning of a new era rife with tensions and difficulties where attempts at reconciliation sought to guarantee the regime’s stability while stifling expectations of revolution. In Spain, despite the new liberal atmosphere, after the failure of O’Donnell’s attempts at reconciliation during his so called “long government”, the political structure remained beset by the same inertias and defects as in the previous decades, discouraging the progressives and driving them towards a pro-revolutionary stance. The threat of a future revolution exposed the limits of an exhausted regime, unable to unite the main political parties within a single political system.

Internationalized regimes: a second dimension of regime hybridity

Traditional approaches have conceptualized political regimes almost exclusively with reference to domestic-level political factors. However, many current and historical political regimes have entailed a major role for international actors, and in some cases the external influence has been so great that regimes have become internationalized. This article explores the concept of ‘internationalized regimes’ and argues that they should be seen as a distinct form of hybrid regime type that demonstrates a distinct dimension of hybridity. Until now, regime hybridity has been conceived along a single dimension of domestic politics: the level of competitiveness. Yet, some regimes are characterized by a different type of hybridity, in which domestic and international authority are found together within a single political system. The article explores the dynamics of internationalized regimes within three settings, those of international occupation, international administration and informal empire.

Diasporan Subalternities: The Armenian Community in Syria

This article offers an account of Syria’s substantial Armenian diasporic community, concentrating on how it negotiated its integration without assimilation into the larger Syrian society (itself not homogeneous but long dominated by a single political system). The analysis relies on themes and approaches developed by subaltern studies; ideas drawn from it enable us to delineate the trajectory of the diasporan community. Successfully maintaining its distinct cultural identity as a result of the closed nature of the political system, and further buttressed by the religio-cultural barriers between the Armenian Christian community and the Arab Muslim dominant groups, this community has nevertheless accepted permanent subalternization; it has failed to develop its full potential in cultural creativity and political confidence. Neither the technological nor the economic forces emanating from globalization, despite the liberalization policies pursued under the Asad governments, have proved sufficient to change the closed nature of the Syrian political economy. The permanent peripheralization of the Armenians in Syria has meant that they either dwell voicelessly in the realm of diasporan subalternities or exit. The community has declined, in terms of both numbers and vitality, since the early 1960s. This article proposes a theoretical framework that combines studies of diasporan transformation and Albert Hirschman’s analysis of “voice, exit, and loyalty” in order to develop a more complete picture of the evolution of an exilic community into a diasporic community and, finally, its decline and potential dissolution.

Roman Republics (review)

Reviewed by: Roman Republics Alexander Yakobson Harriet I. Flower . Roman Republics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010. xv + 204 pp. Cloth, $29.95. Flower's book offers a new interpretation of Republican history based on rejecting the traditional notion of a single Roman Republic. Flower's alternative periodization speaks of several republics (six to be exact), with several transitional periods. This thesis puts emphasis on cleavage rather than on (excessive) continuity implied, according to Flower, in the customary notion of "a single, monolithic republic" (17). Part 1, "Framework," presents the case for regarding the Roman history during the time in question as a history of several republics that differed from each other in crucial aspects, rather than being different versions, and stages of development, of a single political system. Periodization is, notoriously, at once indispensable and highly problematic. Among other things, it is "intrinsically and inevitably anachronistic . . . The Romans in antiquity did not think of their lives in terms of the phases and divisions that modern historians use. Too often, however, a chronological scheme seems to take on a life of its own. . . . By contrast, my study sets out to construct a periodisation that is based entirely on hindsight and that is explicitly characterized as such" (6). Thus the suggested list of republics and transitional periods does not purport to reflect Roman contemporary (or later) self-perception. Rather, it is meant to serve as a useful analytical tool for a modern historian—more useful than the "orthodox" notion of a single Republic, which, in Flower's view, tends to obscure the fundamental and radical changes that took place within this timeframe (including within each of the traditional sub-categories of Early, Middle, and Late Republic). The analytical advantages that such an approach promises are considerable. However, they come at a price. The Romans' own historical consciousness is important in analysing Roman society. There certainly seems to have been a strong and widespread feeling that the Republic—the "Roman people henceforward free, annual magistrates, the power of laws stronger than of men" (Liv. 2.1), "liberty and consulate" (Tac. Ann. 1.1), the "old res publica" of the Principate—was a distinct system of government that emerged with the expulsion of Tarquinius, underwent various changes and modifications while retaining its essential continuity, reached its apogee during what modern historians call the Middle Republic, deteriorated during what they call the Late Republic, collapsed during the civil wars of the 40s and was finally replaced by what, at any rate with hindsight, was clearly perceived as a new and fundamentally different political dispensation under Augustus. These feelings and perceptions were historical facts in their own right, [End Page 153] and people might sometimes be prepared to act upon them. Those who called upon Brutus in the last months of Caesar's dictatorship to follow the example of his putative ancestor, the legendary founder of the Republic, evidently saw the contemporary Roman Republic as a continuation, in some essential sense, of the one established by the first consul (although there is no reason to assume that they were ignorant of the fact that its political character had changed hugely since 509), rather than regarding their times as already post-Republican (according to Flower's reconstruction). They expected Brutus the praetor of 44 to share their historical outlook and political sentiments (closely interconnected) and to act accordingly. Of course, a political system can be regarded as both "new," in some important respect, and a continuation, in a larger sense, of an older one. The semi-official designation of five republics in France is certainly compatible with the notion of the continuous existence of the French Republic since the Third one. At the outset of the Fourth Republic, immediately after the liberation of Paris, De Gaulle rejected a suggestion that he should "proclaim the Republic," in the style of French revolutions, on the grounds that the Republic had continued to exist, legitimately, during the Vichy "transitional period." In Britain, on the other hand, it would have been inconceivable to label the political system emerging from any of the numerous changes since the Glorious Revolution (whose accumulative effect has indisputably been to transform the system of...

Diasporan Subalternities: The Armenian Community in Syria

This article offers an account of Syria’s substantial Armenian diasporic community, concentrating on how it negotiated its integration without assimilation into the larger Syrian society (itself not homogeneous but long dominated by a single political system). The analysis relies on themes and approaches developed by subaltern studies; ideas drawn from it enable us to delineate the trajectory of the diasporan community. Successfully maintaining its distinct cultural identity as a result of the closed nature of the political system, and further buttressed by the religio-cultural barriers between the Armenian Christian community and the Arab Muslim dominant groups, this community has nevertheless accepted permanent subalternization; it has failed to develop its full potential in cultural creativity and political confidence. Neither the technological nor the economic forces emanating from globalization, despite the liberalization policies pursued under the Asad governments, have proved sufficient to change the closed nature of the Syrian political economy. The permanent peripheralization of the Armenians in Syria has meant that they either dwell voicelessly in the realm of diasporan subalternities or exit. The community has declined, in terms of both numbers and vitality, since the early 1960s. This article proposes a theoretical framework that combines studies of diasporan transformation and Albert Hirschman’s analysis of “voice, exit, and loyalty” in order to develop a more complete picture of the evolution of an exilic community into a diasporic community and, finally, its decline and potential dissolution.

Ethnic Diversity and Democratic Stability: The Case of Irish Americans

Sustaining a stable political system in a multiethnic society while remaining committed to democratic norms is a problem. The difficulty lies in the fact that ethnic groups tend not to get along. This may be a rather simplistic way of stating the problem of ethnic conflict, but history has a way of proving its basic validity with depressing frequency. Incorporating several ethnic groups into a single political system means incorporating the basic problem of ethnic conflict as well, and this can place considerable strain on the political system in question. Such a system carries the seeds of instability within its constituent parts, and unless it can control the potential for ethnic conflict dwelling within it, such a system will fly apart. A commitment to democratic norms can be a liability for this kind of political system. Group loyalties dividing a multiethnic society can undermine a common identity, national culture, or consensus on democratic values. The intensity often characterizing ethnic confrontations can make political compromise impossible, and the discrimination often practiced by dominant groups to perpetuate group inequalities can spark violent, destabilizing confrontations. Conventional wisdom claims that often the only way to unite diverse ethnic groups into a single political system is through coercion. Like the Soviet Union or Marshal Tito's Yugoslavia, a stable political order must be imposed from above. Indeed, the historical record for ethnically diverse democracies is weak; multiethnic states have traditionally required force to hold them together. ' At best, those wishing to unite diverse

The Politics of Party Popularity: Canada 1974-1979

As Whiteley recently observed, studies of the impact of macroeconomic conditions on party popularity have become of the few growth industries around.' Although stimulating and provocative, much of this research can be faulted for failing to consider the impact of political events and political context. The role of parties, political leaders, and the mass media in shaping economic and other issue agendas often have been ignored in the specification and interpretation of analyses of party popularity. The implicit assumption in many studies seems to be that macroeconomic conditions directly influence an electorate, their effects bypassing the arena of partisan controversy and media representations of conflict therein. As a result, political variables frequently have been omitted entirely from party popularity functions or treated simply as ad hoc controls, lacking in substantive and theoretical significance. Investigations of the political economy of party popularity have been faulted on other grounds as well. Perhaps most basic, such inquiries often do not establish why a specific economic variable should influence party support in a particular political system during a given time interval.2 Relatedly, since the effects of economic variables may vary over time, analyzing their impact over lengthy periods may yield misleading results.3 Studies encompassing extended time spans also may encounter difficulties in achieving proper model specification because of an inability to measure shifts in long-term forces on partisan predispositions.4 The present research attempts to address these problems by performing a case study of economic and political influences on monthly variations in the popularity of governing and opposition parties in a single political system over a restricted time interval. The country chosen is Canada; the time period is 1974-79.5 Confining analysis to a five-year span eliminates the need to consider secular changes in long-term determinants of party preference and minimizes the possibility that parameter estimates will be confounded by changing public standards of acceptable economic performance or varying orientations toward government responsibility for managing the nation's economic affairs. The 1974-79 period has the added advantage of being one for which extensive survey data are available. These data enhance understanding of the Canadian political-cultural context during this period and thereby facilitate the development of hypotheses regarding the impact of economic and political factors on party support as well as interpretations of tests of such hypotheses. Finally, the 1974-79 interval is interesting because it was characterized by substantial volatility in party popularity.6 As Figure 1 shows, the popularity of the two largest national parties, the governing Liberals and the opposition Progressive Conservatives, fluctuated

The Dynamics of Centre-Periphery Relations: The Need for a New Geography of Resource Development

The centre-periphery model of the relations between developed and underdeveloped countries is based on the idea of the 'domination' of the latter by the former. The major instrument of this domination in recent times has been the multinational corporation. This paper calls attention to a number of countervailing strategies emerging in undeveloped countries to minimize some of the deleterious effect of this domination. These strategies include greater emphasis on national ownership of resources, insistence on real transfer of technology and stronger moves towards regional economic co-operation. For geography, these developments in centre-periphery relations have implications both for the understanding of the new competitive basis for global resource development and for greater research attention to the quaternary sector of global economic activities. THE CONCEPT OF CENTRE-PERIPHERY IN GLOBAL GEOGRAPHY IT will be useful to begin by considering the concept of a centre and a periphery in global geography. In this connection, it is perhaps appropriate to recall the pioneering contribution of Sir Halford Mackinder. In his seminal paper presented to the Royal Geographical Society in 1904 on 'The geographical pivot of history', Mackinder was at pains to make two points. The first was that with modern improvement in steam navigation by the end of the nineteenth century, the world had become a single political system where, according to him, 'every explosion of social forces, instead of being dissipated in a surrounding circuit of unknown space and barbaric chaos, will be sharply re-echoed from the far side of the globe, and weak elements in the political and economic organism of the world will be shattered in consequence'.' He contended that it was probably some half-consciousness of this fact that was at last diverting much of the attention of statesmen in all parts of the world from territorial expansion to the struggle for relative efficiency. The second point that he made was that within this system of close interrelationships, it was possible to identify two broad regions-a pivotal, continental heartland with vast resources and a broad marginal zone surrounding it, the two being linked together by the oceans. Figure i is from Mackinder's article and clearly depicts these two regions. For Mackinder, the state occupying the continental heartland would be virtually invulnerable to attack, except from the west, and would be able to utilize its resources for the development of a strong, agriculturalindustrial power. With this development would come also the opportunity to strike out against the marginal zone and eventually to gain control over the whole world. In terms of his representation, it is important to bear in mind that at the time the paper was presented, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was still an unformed chimera in the mist of time and for Mackinder, the state occupying the heartland was thought of as a possible combination of Germany and Tsarist Russia. Such a combination, he argued, could conquer the marginal zone comprising most of Europe, the Middle East, Africa, India and the Orient and with time Australia and the Western Hemisphere.

Issues and Integration in Malaysia

THIS ARTICLE* is concerned with both the general phenomenon of multiethnic politics and the more specific instance of the Federation of Malaysia, particularly Malaya proper.' Malaya's experiences in accommodating three sizable and distinctive ethnic communities within a single political system suggest several hypotheses which may prove useful in analyzing other multi-ethnic nation-states, or even sub-national units (e.g., the Tyrol, Mississippi, or Montreal). The Malayan experience first suggests that ethnic pluralism may persist and yet profoundly change in its character and its political setting. For instance, the relations between Malays, Chinese and Indians were the pivot of Malayan politics in I948, and they remain so today; yet the nature of those relationships has changed substantially in the last two decades. The political system is bound to change as these patterns of ethnic pluralism change. Nevertheless, the Malayan experience serves as a warning against the easy assumption that politics is a passive by-product of ethnic relationships. Certainly most governments in pluralistic, insecurely unified nations act on the belief that the political process can shape, as well as be shaped by, the inter-ethnic relationships. Decisions as to political organization, strategy, and goals-intentionally or unintentionally-can affect the perceptions of the various ethnic groups: of each other, of the political system and of the nation as a whole. In Malaya the Federal Government's education policy, its gradualist strategy, its ambiguity regarding ultimate goals and its Alliance Party organizational formula-all have been partially products, but also partially fashioners, of Malaya's changing ethnic pluralism. A third hypothesis draws attention to the fact that the political path toward national integration is rarely straight, particularly in the early stages, when contacts are just being made between the several sub-communities which eventually are to be consolidated into a single political community. Success in multiplying and intensifying inter-communal contacts is likely to generate not harmony and security, but conflict and