Single Nontransferable Vote System Research Articles

When do elections help autocrats? The plight of Palestinians under SNTV in Jordan

Autocrats are often accused of manipulating electoral rules to favour pro-regime groups at the expense of the opposition. They select electoral systems, gerrymander districts, and engage in electoral fraud to ensure that elections do not challenge their rule. We investigate the extent to which incumbent rulers engage in such tactics by focusing on the case of Jordan. In particular we examine whether the Jordanian regime has ‘tweaked’ the single non-transferable vote system (SNTV) so that it systematically favours ethnic Jordanian tribes of nomadic descent, who form the bedrock of support for the monarchy and against ethnic Palestinian tribes, who are more supportive of opposition parties. SNTV is also notorious for causing coordination problems for parties – or tribes in this case – that offer candidates. Using data from municipal elections, we find that the regime does indeed advantage nomadic residents. Municipalities with a significant presence of these residents were assigned a greater number of council seats per unit of population and lower district magnitudes, facilitating electoral coordination. Nomadic tribes also performed better with regard to voter coordination but not in nominating the optimal number of candidates. eOur findings demonstrate that clean elections in authoritarian countries if done “right” can perpetuate and bolster regime favourites while simultaneously disenfranchising their challengers.

Party theory of parliamentary debate and the endogenous nature of parliamentary institutions: Theoretical implications from Japan’s diet

We add new insights to the party theory of parliamentary debate proposed in Proksch and Slapin’s The Politics of Parliamentary Debate by combining a quantitative replication analysis of floor speeches with a qualitative explanation of the endogenous transformation of two institutions mediating elections and parliamentary speech in the Japanese Diet. Although the House of Representatives in Japan used a single non-transferable vote system with particularly strong personal vote-seeking incentives, our analysis based on a new dataset shows that, contrary to the theory’s predictions, the pattern of speech activities among party leaders and backbenchers is close to that of Germany, which has a party-centered proportional representation system. Such seemingly contradictory results, however, can be consistently understood within the scope of the theory if we consider the patterns of endogenous change in the parliamentary system and party organization. These results highlight the potential for further development of the theory.

Only Right Makes Might? Center-Right Policy Competition Among Major Japanese Parties After Electoral Reform

The effects of the 1990s reforms to the electoral system of Japan's House of Representatives have been among the most frequently discussed topics in political science research on the country. These reforms saw the replacement of a hitherto single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system by a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system with a strong Single Member District (SMD) and a weaker Proportional Representation (PR) component. Many studies have suggested that the reforms may have had significant impact on the strategies of political parties. Generally, SMD systems have been widely thought to favor larger parties, while PR systems are more beneficial to small and medium-sized parties. On the content side, larger parties seeking control of the government would try to win the support of large numbers of floating voters by campaigning on universal/programmatic policy appeals, as opposed to particularistic interests. In contrast, smaller parties would cater towards their core supporters’ preferences. Previous studies have noted that the old SNTV system in Japan had produced results similar to PR systems (Reed 2003). Japan's electoral reform may have thus changed the strategy of large parties, which would need to win more seats in the SMDs to gain (or hold onto) power, while smaller parties have continued to try and win seats via the PR tier. Therefore, the reform provides valuable research material in so far as we can simultaneously observe different effects by the SMD and the PR systems on parties of different sizes.

Electoral reform in authoritarian regimes: veto player uncertainty in Jordan

What explains the move of Jordan to a proportional representation (PR) electoral system in 2016 but not in 2012? This is puzzling given the high public pressure for electoral reform in 2011–12 in the wake of the Arab uprisings compared to 2016. Applying veto player theory to Jordan, this article argues that the non-adoption of PR in 2012 and the subsequent move to PR in 2016 lies mainly in the regime’s perceived uncertainty associated with the results of elections. In 2012, it was feared that elections under a PR system would replicate the 1989 opposition-dominated parliament. The regime, therefore, opted for a mixed system by complementing the single non-transferable vote system with a national party list. To justify such a system, compared to the demanded PR system, the regime resorted to rhetoric directed at both elite and mass levels. In 2016, however, the uncertainty associated with adopting a PR system ceased to exist. The fragmentation of Jordan’s strongest opposition group, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, reduced uncertainty about their electoral strength. At the same time, malapportionment reduced uncertainty regarding the outcomes of the elections. The article shows how electoral reform in authoritarian regimes, as in some democracies, can be explained through the perceived uncertainty of elections’ outcomes.

The Elephant in the Voting Booth?

In 2005, the single nontransferable vote system for legislative elections in Taiwan was replaced by a mixed-member majoritarian system, with an accompanying reduction in available district seats. In theory, by increasing the threshold of exclusion and placing the power of nomination in the hands of political parties, this reform should reduce vote-buying and local factionalism. We collected data on legislative nominees charged with vote-buying and on the local factional ties of candidates. Our results suggest that the reforms did reduce these problems. First, comparing the proportion of candidates charged with vote-buying before and after the reform shows a decrease in the second and third post-reform elections. Second, factional status predicts a candidate’s likelihood of running in consecutive elections before the reform but not after. Differences between factional and nonfactional candidates ceased to be significant after the reform, revealing the decreasing relevance of factions.

Party Competition under the Single Non-transferable Vote System

選挙制度は有権者の選好を議席に変換する重要な制度である。戦後日本においては衆議院、参議院、そして、地方議会の選挙に至るまで中選挙区制が採用されてきた。55年体制においてほぼ全期間で絶対多数を維持した自民党は、この選挙制度による恩恵を受けていたのであろうか。これに対して既存研究では、中選挙区制において大政党だけが候補者擁立戦略の問題に直面するため、中選挙区制は大政党にとって不利であると指摘された。後続の研究は自民党がこの課題を克服できたのか否かを巡って論争してきたが、これらの研究の多くが政党の得票率を所与として分析を行ってきたため、得票率自体が中選挙区制の影響を受けるという重要な視点が見落とされてきた。中選挙区制によって各政党の得票率がどのような影響を受け、それがどのように議席数に反映されたのかを分析した結果、自民党が総合的に少し議席を減らしたのに対し、社会党は総合的に大きく議席を減らしたことが明らかになった。中選挙区制は第二党である社会党に不利にはたらくことで結果的に自民党に有利にはたらいてきたのである。

Is democratic nomination good for women's candidacy? Examining the case of Taiwan

ABSTRACTIn order to understand why women tend to be under-nominated even though they are more likely to be elected compared to men in Taiwan, this study focuses on the nomination systems of two major political parties. The country provides a critical case of inter-party and intra-party comparison for women’s nomination, as the two major parties diverge in their practice of candidate selection. Further, the electoral reforms from the SNTV (Single Non-Transferable Vote) system to the SMD (Single-Member District) system have led parties to alter their strategies in selecting women candidates. With the nomination dataset compiled over the past 20 years, this study finds that more centralized nomination is more conducive to women’s candidacy, even under different electoral systems. Under the old SNTV system, the more centralized KMT (Kuomintang) nominated more women candidates than did the decentralized DPP (Democratic Progressive Party). Under the new SMD system, women’s representation as a whole actually increased in Taiwan, which runs contrary to the general expectation, compared to the multimember-district system and so the SMD tends to inhibit women’s representation. The growing centralization in the major parties after the electoral rule changed to the new system, has enhanced women’s candidacies, but the higher male incumbent advantage is a hurdle still to be overcome in the long term. This study argues that although electoral rules have altered the parameters of party competition, party nomination are critical factors for explaining changing women’s representation.

POLITICS WITHOUT PARTIES: AFGHANISTAN’S LONG ROAD TO DEMOCRACY

Democracy has not brought stability to Afghanistan in the almost two decades since the fall of the Taliban. But it would be wrong to conclude that the soil of Afghanistan is not conducive to the tree of democracy, when in reality it was never planted with any skill. Democracy did not fail in Afghanistan; it was never even tried.A series of connected mistakes began with the introduction of a flawed electoral system, no insistence on a transparent register of voters, lack of proper scrutiny of polling, and a lack of support for the development of reformist political parties and other functioning civil society institutions. From the start the US did not see this as a ‘nation-building’ project, but nevertheless US officials made far-reaching decisions about the nature of Afghan democracy. These were seriously unsound, and the electoral system introduced itself operated against the development of strong democratic institutions.This article outlines the problems inherent in the Single Non-Transferable Vote system, examines the history of Afghan political parties through the twentieth century and asks whether alternative and traditional forms of Afghan government provide any real obstacles to the development of modern politics. The 2004 constitution was the seventh since 1923: this was not a green field site in terms of institution-building as it was seen by many of the international officials who flooded in after the fall of the Taliban.

Running Multiple Candidates, Dividing the Vote Under the Single Nontransferable Vote System: Evidence From Japan's Upper House Elections

Political parties seek to make optimal nominations of candidates to maximize the number of seats they may win. In a multimember district with a single nontransferable vote (SNTV) electoral system, parties need to run the optimal number of candidates in each electoral district. If too many or too few candidates run, they may lose seats they might otherwise have won. In this situation, district‐level party organizations face a collective action problem: they do not have the incentive to run multiple candidates for fear of losing all seats, despite needing to do so in order for the party to win a majority of seats in a legislature. This study examines the factors that enable parties to run multiple candidates in SNTV districts, and shows that parties undertake this action when they are able to divide the vote between party candidates on the basis of geography in the case of Japan.

Re-election isn't everything: legislators’ goal-seeking and committee activity in Japan

ABSTRACTA number of political scientists have explained legislators’ behaviour as a function of their re-election, influence, and policy goals, but these goals are sometimes incompatible. This study seeks to explain under what conditions legislators emphasise the goals of building influence or shaping policy over re-election. The study focuses on Japanese legislators’ Diet committee attendance as a proxy for their attention to an influence or policy goal. It shows that legislators elected from an open-list proportional representation seat are most likely to emphasise building influence or shaping policy, while legislators elected from a district using a single non-transferable vote system are least likely to do so. Legislators are more likely to do so in a non-election year than in an election year. In addition, electorally stronger legislators are more likely to focus on influence or policy goals in an election year, while electorally weaker legislators are more likely to do so in a non-election year.

Debate: Why Does the Excellent Citizen Vote?

Journal of Political PhilosophyVolume 24, Issue 2 p. 245-257 Original Article Debate: Why Does the Excellent Citizen Vote?† Luke Maring, Luke Maring Philosophy, Northern Arizona UniversitySearch for more papers by this author Luke Maring, Luke Maring Philosophy, Northern Arizona UniversitySearch for more papers by this author First published: 28 September 2015 https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12081Citations: 6 †I am grateful for comments from Del Ratzsch, Geoffrey Brennan, Mark Murphy, Jason Matteson, Jeff Downard, George Rudebusch, and two anonymous referees. Read the full textAboutRelatedInformationPDFPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessClose modalShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Citing Literature Volume24, Issue2June 2016Pages 245-257 RelatedInformation RecommendedPresidential Debate Watching, Issue Knowledge, Character Evaluation, and Vote ChoiceWilliam L. Benoit, Glenn J. Hansen, Human Communication ResearchRunning Multiple Candidates, Dividing the Vote Under the Single Nontransferable Vote System: Evidence From Japan's Upper House ElectionsNaofumi Fujimura, Asian Politics & PolicyPolls and the Vote in BritainChristopher Wlezien, Will Jennings, Stephen Fisher, Robert Ford, Mark Pickup, Political StudiesA Misconceived Discourse on Political ObligationBhikhu Parekh, Political StudiesModes of UK Executive–Legislative Relations RevisitedMeg Russell, Philip Cowley, The Political Quarterly

Coordination failure and the politics of tribes: Jordanian elections under SNTV

We often question how electoral rules will impact elections around the world. I take up this important question in Jordan, which has the single non-transferable vote system. A paramount expectation from the larger literature is that district magnitude (M) will be a key determinant of the number of candidates with the number of candidates reduced to approximately M + 1. However, using district-level returns, I find that the effective number of candidates regularly departs from our theoretical expectations of M + 1 candidates. I further explore Jordan's unique case with an analysis of both district level characteristics and elite level sources of this coordination failure. On the one hand, even under authoritarian conditions, the relationship between the number of candidates and district magnitude is consistent with the larger literature. On the other hand, there is wide variation across districts, even among small magnitude ones, suggesting other factors at play that dampen the reductive effect of electoral institutions on the number of candidates. In particular, I argue it is the regime's strategic manipulation of the electoral rules that undermines strategic coordination and subverts the expected effects of both institutional and sociological factors on the number of electoral competitors. In addition, the tribal nature of Jordanian politics, and specifically the inability of tribal elites to limit entry, is a significant source of the large number of candidates.

Incumbency Disadvantage under Electoral Rules with Intraparty Competition: Evidence from Japan

Many studies have shown that incumbent candidates have an electoral advantage over nonincumbents under single-member-district systems, but less is known about whether incumbents enjoy the same electoral bonus under other electoral rules. This article focuses on multimember-district systems that allow intraparty competition and contends that incumbents may have little advantage or even a disadvantage over nonincumbents of the same party under these systems, although the incentives to cultivate a personal vote—one of the main sources of incumbency advantage—are greater in these systems. I demonstrate my argument using electoral data from Japan during 1958–93 when the country used the single nontransferable vote system. Having applied an estimation of incumbency advantage immune to endogeneity bias due to strategic retirement, I find supportive evidence to my argument. The results suggest that there is an important variation in incumbency advantage across electoral systems.

The Effects of Electoral Rules Upon Legislators’ Campaign Promises and Legislative Performance - A Comparison of Taiwan Legislative Yuan between its Sixth Term (2005-2008) and Seventh Term (2008-2012)

Prior literature has quite fully discussed about the effects of different electoral systems upon party systems. Some has paid attention to campaign strategies launched by political parties under different electoral systems. But few has explored the campaign promises made by individual legislators under different electoral systems. It’s even a vacuum in prior literature that has ever tried to study whether the degree of realizing these promises would vary with different electoral systems.This paper then aims to focus on these two related issues: 1. Whether the change of electoral systems would exercise impacts upon campaign promises made by legislative candidates;2. Whether that also further influences the degree of realizing the promises made by each legislator after s/he gets elected and performs her/his functions in a legislature.Two hypotheses are derived from prior theories and empirical studies for echoing these two issues. The first one is that a plurality with single member district system (SMD) would lead more to constituency – oriented campaign promises delivered by candidates than other systems do. The second one is that the SMD system would also be able to enhance the connection more between what a legislator promises before election and what s/he performs after being elected than other systems do. The paper uses Taiwan Legislative Yuan as a case. It further designs it into a quasi-experimental comparative framework, since Taiwan changed its Legislative Yuan electoral system in 2008 from a multiple-member district plus single non-transferable vote system (MMD & SNTV) to a mix one in which more than 2/3 of the seats (73/113) are elected from the SMD system. The paper then compares Taiwanese legislators’ campaign promises and related legislative performance after elected of the sixth term Legislative Yuan (2005-2008) to that of the seventh term (2008-2012). The paper will not only explore the effect of electoral systems upon campaign promises & legislative performance in a theoretical sense, but also like to further discuss which system may better enhance the tie between representatives and their constituencies. Finally, the paper expects to draw implications from this study so as to shed some light on representative theories & practices in a modern democracy.

Electoral Institutions, Hometowns, and Favored Minorities: Evidence from Japanese Electoral Reforms

This article presents evidence that electoral institutions affect the geographic distribution of both candidate electoral support and government resources. The author exploits two electoral reforms in Japan to identify the effect of institutional incentives: (1) the 1994 electoral reform from a multimember single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system to a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system with a single-member district (SMD) component and a proportional representation component; and (2) the 1925 electoral reform from a predominantly SMD system to a multimember SNTV system. Using several new data sets, the two main findings of this article are that (1) Japanese representatives competing in multimember SNTV districts had more geographically concentrated electoral support than those competing in SMDs and that (2) intergovernmental transfers appear to be more concentrated around Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) incumbents' home offices under the multimember SNTV system than under the MMM system. The findings in this article highlight the connection between institutions and geographic patterns of representation.

The Operation of the single non-transferable vote system in Vanuatu

The Republic of Vanuatu is one of the few democracies today that uses what is known as the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) – a method of election which in theory achieves a degree of seat/vote proportionality. Anglo-French Condominium authorities prior to independence adopted the SNTV to avoid the emerging dominance of the Melanesian Anglophones and protect minority Francophone interests. Two political parties emerged after independence in 1980, but they splintered after a decade and since 1991 Vanuatu has experienced a period of political instability involving 18 coalition governments. Studies of other countries’ experience with SNTV suggest that party factionalisation occurs frequently, but Vanuatu did initially achieve a degree of proportionality in outcomes and post-1991 instability owes its origins to factors other than the electoral system. In particular, the re-emergence of Vanuatu's traditional Melanesian bigman system of politics at independence has been a major factor contributing to the increasing fractionalisation.

Japan's Multimember SNTV System and Strategic Voting: A Rejoinder

Five major claims are made in our paper on strategic voting within the context of Japan's multimember single non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral system (Fournier and Kohno, 2000). Two claims deal with the reconciliation of Steven Reed's (1990) and Gary Cox's (1997) important work on extending Duverger's law to the Japanese case, and three claims deal with the informational effects of partisan labels on strategic voting.

Erratum: Seat Bonuses under the Single Nontransferable Vote System: Evidence from Japan and Taiwan

Erratum: Seat Bonuses under the Single Nontransferable Vote System: Evidence from Japan and Taiwan

Strategic Voting Equilibria under the Single Nontransferable Vote

Previous investigations of strategic voting equilibria in mass electorates have looked only at single-member districts. I shall investigate such equilibria in multimember districts operating under the single nontransferable vote system. What appear to be the most natural equilibria conform to the M + 1 rule, according to which strategic voting in M-seat districts produces exactly M + 1 vote-getting candidates in equilibrium, any others having their support totally undercut. This result provides the beginnings of a formal underpinning for Reed's recent extension of Duverger's Law to the Japanese case. The model also generates specific and empirically testable hypotheses concerning the exceptions to the M + 1 rule that one ought to expect in equilibrium. I test these hypotheses with Japanese data. Finally, the model also reveals a type of strategic voting that is specific to multimember districts. I use Japanese data again to explore the empirical importance of this kind of strategic voting.

Seat Bonuses under the Single Nontransferable Vote System: Evidence from Japan and Taiwan

L'article decrit les problemes que pose le systeme de vote unique non-transferable utilise au Japon et a Taiwan pour les elections nationales. Il etudie les consequences de ce systeme electoral pour les grands partis politiques, notamment le parti democratique liberal du Japon et le Kuomintang de Taiwan. Il souligne la frequence des erreurs imputables a ce systeme a partir des donnees issues des elections japonaises de 1958 a 1990 et des elections a Taiwan de 1980 a 1989