Single Economic Unit Research Articles

Evaluating well‐being after compulsory resettlement: Livelihoods, standards of living, and well‐being in Manantali, Mali

AbstractDespite efforts to improve outcomes, resettlement projects that aim to improve livelihoods and living standards of the displaced often do not achieve their goals. Could greater attention to the well‐being of the affected improve resettlement outcomes? This article considers standards of living and well‐being among one resettled group, the Bahingkolu of Manantali, Mali, relocated in the mid‐1980s by construction of the Manantali Dam. Anthropological approaches to well‐being that include a greater understanding of people's own conceptions of well‐being and consider well‐being in relationship to their social and physical worlds help elucidate why the Bahinkolu are unsatisfied with their well‐being despite higher standards of living. Because they can no longer grow enough for food self‐sufficiency, they must encourage family members to work elsewhere, thereby risking the sustainability of the family as a single economic unit. In this context, household heads feel constant anxiety about their ability to maintain a cohesive household. The Bahingkolu publicly maintain that they are “victims of the resettlement” as a strategy to gain more resources for the community. To improve the generally negative consequences of involuntary resettlement, planning should expend more effort to appreciate the conceptions of well‐being among the affected.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM THROUGH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS

Explain the concept of consolidated financial statements, parent company, subsidiary company according to international and national standards. To study the composition of consolidated reports, the consolidation process, the principles of consolidation. Study the types of controlled entities, taking into account the proportion of voting rights held by the investor and the standards that govern them. Define the concept of control according to international standards and identify the factors that influence the determination of whether the investor controls the investee. The purpose of the paper is to develop methodological and practical recommendations for preparing group management reporting in accordance with international standards. Consolidated reporting should be prepared to identify the results of the analysis of the state and activities of the holding, there is a need to transform consolidated reporting in accordance with IFRS for entering the international market and attracting foreign investment. Methodology. The research is based on the application of general scientific techniques and methods. The methods of detailing, analysis and synthesis, deductive and inductive approach have been used to clarify the concept of "IFRS". The methods of selective observation and historical argumentation of the researched problems are applied – to generalise the unsolved problems of IFRS. Results. Consolidated financial statements undoubtedly contain important information for making financial and management decisions. Intra-group transactions can give an unrealistic picture of the activities of a group of companies, their sales, calculations, stocks and financial results; therefore, consolidated reporting gives a more objective picture of the operations and financial status of a single economic unit and does not replace the individual financial reports of group companies, since transactions between group members are not taken into account during consolidation. Practical implications. The concepts of consolidated financial statements, parent company, subsidiary company according to international and national standards are revealed. The composition of the forms of consolidated reporting, the consolidation procedure, the principles of consolidation are considered. The types of controlled entities, taking into account the investor's share of voting rights, and the standards governing them are presented. The concept of control in accordance with international standards is defined and the factors influencing the determination of whether the investor controls the investee are presented. Value/originality. Methodological and practical recommendations have been developed for the preparation of group management reporting in accordance with international standards.

THE ECONOMIC PAMPHLETEER: Economies of scale in food production

First paragraph: Why do industrial agricultural operations continue to displace smaller family farms in spite of their continued pollution of the natural environment and degradation of rural communi­ties? Large-scale, specialized agricultural operations, such as concentrated animal feeding operations (or CAFOs), persist because they have an economic advantage over smaller, diversified farming opera­tions. They have higher ecological and social costs but lower economic costs. This economic advan­tage is commonly referred to as economies of scale. In economic theory, there are two types of economies of scale. Internal economies of scale refer to differences in the costs of production associated with different sizes of production units. In animal agriculture, “scale” refers to the number of hogs, poultry, milk cows, or beef cattle in a single farming operation or production unit. In field crop and pasture-based animal production, scale refers to the acres of land in a single production unit. External economies of scale, on the other hand, refer to differences such as the costs of fertilizer or feed, or the cost of complying with government regulations, for different sizes of management units. Management units may include one or more production units under single man­agement or control (Ross, 2022). A single farm or production unit may comprise multiple parcels of land, but a farm management unit may comprise multiple farms that are managed as a single economic entity or unit. . . .

Compensation liability for antitrust damages caused by related companies – development of the concept of a single economic unit Case comment to the CJEU judgment of 6 October 2021 in case C-882/19 Sumal SL v Mercedes Benz Trucks España SL

The subject of this case comment is the analysis and assessment of the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) issued on 6 October 2021 in case C-882/19, brought by Sumal SL v Mercedes Benz Trucks España SL. The Sumal judgment concerns an important issue in the area of competition law, both public and private (private enforcement) – determining the group of entities responsible for infringements of competition law operating within one economic body. Earlier CJEU case law in this regard focused primarily on determining the liability of the parent company within a group of companies. In the Sumal judgment, however, the CJEU raised the issue of the liability of subsidiaries in the event of a breach of competition law by the parent company. The CJEU has by no means crossed out its earlier case law on the single economic unit, but looked at the issue from the opposite direction and specified the liability conditions of subsidiaries. Such clarification was undoubtedly desirable. However, it calls into question the principle of liability of subsidiaries in a situation where they were not directly involved in the infringement, rather than only indirectly or informally.

Blood is Thicker Than Water: Sister Liability as Part of the Single Economic Unit Doctrine in Light of the Sumal Case

Blood is Thicker Than Water: Sister Liability as Part of the Single Economic Unit Doctrine in Light of the Sumal Case

Th e Liability of a Subsidiary for Damage Caused by the Parent Company

CJEU in Sumal judgment (C-882/19, para 51) adjudicated that in circumstances where the existence of an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU has been established as regards the parent company, it is possible to invoke the civil liability of a subsidiary rather than of the parent company. The author of the paper questioned Sumal judgment on the ground that single economic unity is not a single undertaking encompassing subsidiaries and their parent company, but condition for imputability of liability for EU Competition law infringement done by subsidiary to the parent company. It is also contended that subsidiary within a single economic unit does not consider as an undertaking and as such can not be liable for infringement of Competition Law.

Ownership-neutral or ownership-blind? The case of Polish state-owned enterprises in EU merger control

Abstract The article discusses the challenges associated with the assessment of economic concentrations involving state-owned enterprises (SOEs) under the European Union (EU) merger control. It reveals inconsistencies in ascertaining the exercise of and the (anti)competitive effects stemming from the state control over the SOEs caused by the strategic use of the ‘single economic unit’ concept in cases involving both European and non-European SOEs. Using the example of Poland and its economic statecraft, the article demonstrates how the use of various ownership-based and regulatory mechanisms employed by the State allows it to preserve control over strategic industries and enterprises. The study suggests that insufficient attention to the state ownership and state control in the EU merger control may create a risk of anti-competitive market distortions caused by the SOE-led industrial policies of the Member States to the detriment of the functioning of the internal market.

“Sumal”

1. Article 101(1) TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that the victim of an anticompetitive practice by an undertaking may bring an action for damages, without distinction, either against a parent company who has been punished by the Commission for that practice in a decision or against a subsidiary of that company which is not referred to in that decision, where those companies together constitute a single economic unit. The subsidiary company concerned must be able effectively to rely on its rights of the defence in order to show that it does not belong to that undertaking and, where no decision has been adopted by the Commission under Article 101 TFEU, it is also entitled to dispute the very existence of the conduct alleged to amount to an infringement. 2. Article 101(1) TFEU must be interpreted as precluding a national law which provides for the possibility of imputing liability for one company’s conduct to another company only in circumstances where the second company controls the first company.

Consolidation of the State-Owned Enterprises in China: A Missed Opportunity for the EU Merger Control?

Mergers of China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) aimed at increasing their competitiveness and their presence on global markets raised a number of challenging questions concerning their appraisal under merger control regimes worldwide. The review of the Commission’s merger control practice reveals numerous instances where it presumed the existence of a ‘single economic unit’ comprising several Chinese SOEs when assessing competitive effects of Chinese SOEs’ acquisitions in Europe. The assertion of merger control jurisdiction over a Chinese SOE-to-SOE merger would require the Commission to treat these SOEs as autonomous economic entities, which will have an impact on future assessments of Chinese SOEs’ acquisitions of European companies.

The Error Cost of Marriage

Since its inception in 1918, the joint filing election has been one of the U.S. tax system’s most controversial concepts. This tax election allows married taxpayers to file a joint tax return or file two separate returns. Some err, either because they do not know they have a choice or simply because they choose unwisely and elect the less beneficial filing status. The writers of the Code acknowledged taxpayers may need to correct a filing status error. Married taxpayers filing separately can retroactively amend their filing status for a previous year to joint filing under certain circumstances at no cost. Surprisingly, joint filers do not enjoy this opportunity to amend prior returns to filing separately in any circumstance. Scholars have extensively argued for and against treating married taxpayers as a single economic unit rather than on an individual basis. But they have yet to notice this asymmetric amendment rule. This Article is the first to examine the overlooked problem of the asymmetric treatment of married taxpayers who wish to amend their initial filing status election. This asymmetric error-correction rule has two problems: it is unfair and inefficient. First, it enables only one group of married taxpayers to revisit their election and correct their filing status. Given that the U.S. tax system incentivizes joint filing in several ways, married taxpayers assume joint filing is the sole or favorable election for them. That, however, is not always the case. This rule has adverse effects on the fairness of the tax system, especially when it comes to female taxpayers who usually bear the cost of joint filing. Second, those who can correct their election do not bear correction’s administrative costs, producing an administrative inefficiency. After identifying and explaining this puzzling problem, the Article proposes an elegant solution: a Pigouvian rule enabling all married taxpayers to amend but requiring them to internalize all the associated administrative costs through a reduced tax refund. This rule eliminates both inefficiencies and unfairness.

Cross‐National Differences in Income Pooling among Married and Cohabiting Couples

AbstractObjectiveTo examine cross‐national differences in income pooling by relationship type.BackgroundIn most countries, there is a “cohabitation gap” with cohabiting couples less likely to pool their incomes and act as a single economic unit compared to married couples. There is very little cross‐national research comparing income management patterns of married and cohabiting couples. Despite large cross‐national variation in cohabitation prevalence, the limited research on income management finds surprisingly little variation in the “cohabitation gap.” Using a larger range of countries than used in previous studies, income management of married and cohabiting couples was compared to test whether the cohabitation gap can be explained by the cohabitation prevalence in a country, the degree to which cohabitation is related to economic disadvantage or to structural factors such as taxation.MethodMultilevel multinomial regression is used to study income pooling across 32 countries from the 2012 International Social Survey Programme.ResultsThe size of the cohabitation gap does vary across countries. In some countries, cohabiting and married couples act very similarly in terms of their income organization, whereas in others there is a large difference in the behavior of couples. There is little evidence that this is related to the prevalence of cohabitation; however, economic constraints, as well as taxation systems, are associated with the cross‐national variation in the cohabitation gap.ConclusionDifferences in the cohabitation gap reflect the context and policies of the countries within which couples live rather than ideological expectations surrounding relationship choice.

Experience in Tax Changes in Certain Central European Countries in the Past Two Decades

This study reviews the tax regimes of four Central European countries. A hundred years ago, these countries were part of a single economic and political unit, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (which included the entire territory of today’s Austria, Hungary, and Slovakia, and a significant part of Romania: Transylvania, Banat and Partium). Already then, different regions had different economic strengths, but their legal and cultural conditions were the same. By the end of the 20th century, despite their different historical development models, these four countries became once again part of a legal, economic and cultural entity, i.e. the system of the European Union, and then during the first decade of the 21st century, they became its full members. The tax changes implemented by these countries in the recent decades and their success in catching up with the level of welfare in the European Union are studied in this context.

Odpowiedzialność przebijająca w ramach private enforcement

In the context of private enforcement of competition law, the issue of piercing the corporate veil, that is, the possibility of holding a non-direct infringer liable becomes particularly important. Pursuant to the thesis of the CJEU ‘Skanska’ judgment, civil courts adjudicating in cases of damages for infringements of competition law should understand the concept of ‘undertaking’ in accordance with Article 101 TFEU and its established interpretation by the Court, which may mean also adopting, under private law, the doctrine of economic succession (economic continuity) and the concept of a single economic unit. Individual member states, such as Spain and Portugal, have already adopted relevant legal regulations regarding the issue in question. In other countries, this matter has become the subject of judicial considerations. In Poland, neither of these two situations occurs. One should opt for the broad adoption of the concept of piercing the corporate veil in the context of liability for damages arising from an infringement of competition law – with both EU and national dimension.

Vicarious Liability In Groups Of Companies And In Supply Chains – Is Competition Law Leading The Way?

In competition law, it has been established since long that a parent company and a subsidiary under certain conditions may be regarded as a ‘single economic unit’ – an ‘undertaking’ – with the consequence that the parent company can be held liable if the subsidiary has incurred criminal liability for competition law infringements. Although this parental liability has been much criticized, with the Skanska decision, the liability of the parent company for the acts and omissions of the subsidiary (‘vicarious liability’) has been widened. The question of parental liability for competition law infringements is part of a wider question of the possible liability of companies for acts and omissions of other companies with which they are somehow linked. This article firstly describes the development of the concept of the undertaking in the area of competition law and examines the implications of the Skanska decision for groups of companies with regard to competition law infringements (section 2). Secondly, it asks whether a similar pattern of development can be found in other areas of the law and whether the solutions adopted in competition law can be transferred to these other areas (section 3) and thirdly, whether the concept of an undertaking could be applicable not only to companies linked by ownership but also to companies linked by contract (section 4).

(Non‐)Enforcement of Directors’ Duties in Corporate Groups: Goh Chan Peng v Beyonics Technology Ltd

AbstractCorporate groups, a ubiquitous feature of modern business, pose formidable challenges for common law courts relying on traditional corporate law doctrine. Arising out of a corporate group's recent bid to recover millions of dollars in lost profits from a former director and CEO who had diverted a core business, Goh Chan Peng v Beyonics Technology Ltd raised thorny issues of separate legal entity doctrine, single economic unit theory, and reflective loss shared by common law legal systems. Despite finding that the defendant had breached his duties to the ultimate holding company, the Singapore Court of Appeal absolved the faithless director from most of his liabilities, relying on limited domestic precedent to the exclusion of a rich body of Commonwealth jurisprudence – including the House of Lords’ landmark Johnson v Gore Wood decision. This note explores the paths not taken by the court, and highlights the pitfalls of a narrow, autochthonous approach to problems of common law doctrine.

Single Economic Entity Doctrine in India

Does the Competition Act 2002 contemplate exclusion of Single Economic Entity Doctrine? Single Economic Entity doctrine entails that a single economic unit acts as one in a marketplace, regardless of its corporate form. Therefore, it ought to be treated as a single unit for antitrust law and policy (for instance, a parent company and its subsidiaries cannot collude with each other). The American and EU jurisdictions have evolved sophisticated tests to assess whether the corporate bodies together form one economic entity or not. The doctrine and the tests are applied by Indian competition authorities as well. However, the Indian Competition Act defines ‘enterprise’ as a firm or person acting in a market either directly or indirectly through its units, divisions or subsidiaries. In a recent case before Competition Appellate Tribunal, it was submitted that since the definition of ‘enterprise’ is provided for in the law, so long as the elements of the definition (which do not include direction and control test as required by single economic entity doctrine) are satisfied, it means that there is only one economic unit, and it ought to be treated as one. This paper examines the veracity of this submission and the implications that would entail if such a submission were to be accepted.

Chinese SOEs under EU Competition Law

The treatment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) under EU competition law is a complex and controversial topic. In particular, in order to determine whether the jurisdictional thresholds are met and what the competitive impact of the transaction would be, the Commission is tasked with assessing whether SOEs enjoy independent decision-making power from the State and vis-à-vis other SOEs. SOEs that lack such independent decision-making power are considered to form part of one ‘single economic unit’. The Commission has generally avoided making definite conclusions regarding the independence of SOEs. However, recent decision practice shows that the Commission is increasingly confident in concluding that various Chinese SOEs may form part of the same economic unit. This policy is likely to bring an increasing number of transactions involving Chinese SOEs under the scope of the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR). At the same time, however, the Commission’s decision practice and soft law instruments illustrate that concentrations between SOEs which form part of the same ‘economic unit’ fall outside the scope of the Merger Regulation and that agreements between such SOEs are not subject to Article 101 TFEU.

Restatement (SCOTUS) of Property: What Happened to Use in Murr v. Wisconsin?

A casual observer of the U.S. Supreme Court’s efforts over the years to formulate a regulatory takings doctrine could be forgiven if they were to conclude that the Justices were simply making things up as they went along. That certainly is the way it feels to some of us who try to apply the Court’s takings rules in actual cases. In most circumstances, a lawyer who attempts to predict their client’s chances is embarking on a fool’s errand, because there is no consistent pattern, unless the lack of consistency is itself a pattern. There are few clear rules, other than it is exceedingly difficult for owners to successfully challenge even those regulations which have devastating impact on the value of their property. The Court’s latest foray into regulatory takings, Murr v. Wisconsin, would not disabuse the observer of that conclusion. I say that because Murr’s rule for what constitutes the “property” against which the owner’s claimed loss is measured in takings cases where the owner possesses more than a single parcel is a confusing stew of mostly undefined factors: the “treatment of the land” under state law, the “physical characteristics” of the properties (which includes the parcels’ topography and “the surrounding human and ecological environment”), and, most strangely, “the value of the property under the challenged regulation.” I will be making three points in this paper. First, the narrow margin of victory in Murr, coupled with the Court’s denial of certiorari only four days later in another case presenting the same question, suggest the Murr factors are hardly set in stone, and could be modified by a different Court majority into a more understandable, practical, and workable rule, one based squarely in state property law. Second, although I won’t spend much time deconstructing the Murr majority’s three-factor test, I suggest that it simply missed what should have been the center of gravity in the case, the “three unities” which state and federal courts regularly apply in eminent domain cases to determine whether the taking of one parcel results in damages to another. Application of this test to determine how much of the claimant’s property constitutes the denominator in regulatory takings cases — asking whether the plaintiff uses multiple parcels together, whether the parcels are titled jointly, and whether they are physically close — would place the emphasis in all takings cases — both straight and regulatory — where it should be: on objectively measurable evidence that the owner uses two or more parcels together as a single economic unit. Finally, I argue that the Supreme Court’s adoption in Murr of a vague, difficult-to-apply test for takings claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments does not constrain state court from applying the three unities test under their respective state takings provisions. Until there’s a more favorable environment at the Supreme Court, property owners should concentrate their efforts on state law and state courts.

Problems Related to Determining of a Single Economic Entity under Competition Law

The article explores the problems related to the determination of a single economic unit under competition law. The first part of the article addresses the concept of a single economic entity. It is presumed that companies belonging to a group are separate undertakings, but under certain circumstances the group might constitute a single economic entity. The second part refers to the analysis of the concept of ‘control’, which is the main criterion describing the relationship inside a group of companies. The third part refers to the analysis of the cases when de jure separate undertakings are recognized as a single economic entity. When a company exercises decisive influence over another company, they form a single economic entity and, hence, are part of the same undertaking. Decisive influence is the most important criterion for recognizing that de jure separate undertakings constitute a single economic unit. Finally, the fourth part refers to problems concerning the presumption of the decisive influence. It is presumed that a parent company exercises a decisive influence over a subsidiary where it holds 100 percent of capital. Thus, separate companies are recognized as a single economic unit, if 100 percent of a company’s capital is owned by the controlling entity.

Salomon V Salomon: Have the Liquidator’s Arguments Been Buried with Time?

Extract: The decision of the House of Lords in Salomon v Salomon and Co Ltd is considered the ‘classic authority’ for the proposition that a company has a separate legal personality. This principle’s application engenders polarised debate, specifically with regards to corporate groups. Such groups generally operate as a single economic unit, with management of the parent company overseeing each company in the group (including subsidiaries). In Salomon, the liquidator mounted a number of counter-arguments. This critique focuses on the argument that the company was always Salomon’s agent in conducting business. In doing so, this critique questions whether the liquidator’s argument has continued significance in light of the agency quasi-exception and the general application of Salomon to corporate groups.