Singapore Naval Base Research Articles

Pacific Fleet to Singapore?: Deterrence, Warfighting, and Anglo-American Planning for the Defense of Southeast Asia, 1937-1941

ABSTRACT For the 20 years before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Great Britain based its grand strategy in the Far East around the presence – and potential – of the Singapore Naval Base. The Americans, for a time, agreed in the project’s potential in the face of increasing Japanese belligerence. This analysis examines the place of the Singapore Naval Base in Anglo-American planning for the defence of Southeast Asia. It focuses on British efforts to lobby the Americans to deploy the Pacific Fleet to Singapore to deter Japan, the evolution of American plans for the defence of the Far East, and how all these interacted. It argues that the British desire to use the Pacific Fleet as a deterrent force based at Singapore, and the American assessments of how the Pacific Fleet would actually fight Japan from Singapore, represented a conceptual disconnect they could not overcome until faced with imminent hostilities. Scrutinizing the discussions and plans related to this understudied episode provides additional understanding not only how the aspirant allies viewed the growing threat from Japan, but also how they viewed each other.

Labour Formation, Identity, and Resistance in HM Dockyard, Singapore (1921–1971)

For close on half a century, the British naval dockyard in Singapore was a prominent employer in the colony. The huge facility attracted migrant workers from the region, and entire settlements and communities were established around the premises of the dockyard as well. This article seeks to place the legacy of Singapore's naval-base workers within the historical contexts of the entanglements between imperialism, diaspora, social movements, and labour resistance. The development of international labour flows, formation, and identity was reflected in the prominence of the migrant Malayalee community and its socio-religious organizations at the naval base. Furthermore, the routine individual defiance and industrial unrest went beyond disputes about wage levels and working conditions. They were enmeshed within the broader undercurrents of Singapore's transitory political culture, and between the interwar decades and the period of decolonization disturbances at the naval dockyard became part of larger political contestations.

Former Naval Cheapskate: Chancellor of the Exchequer Winston Churchill and the Royal Navy, 1924-1929

Winston Churchill is justly admired for his lonely advocacy of rearmament in the 1930s, but as Chancellor of the Exchequer in the 1920s he was an equally staunch and eloquent critic of arms budgets, particularly those of the Royal Navy. Motivated by a desire for funds to reduce taxes and increase social spending, as well as a sincere belief that no enemy could or would challenge Britain's strategic position in the foreseeable future, Churchill campaigned vigorously for strategic complacency and against naval expenditure throughout his tenure as Chancellor. He promoted the formal assumption that any war was at least ten years away and he strenuously opposed Admiralty plans for warship construction, naval aviation development, and a Singapore naval base. The result was a seriously weakened Royal Navy in the following decade when Churchill demanded a more assertive British foreign policy.

Major General William Dobbie and the Defence of Malaya, 1935–38

The Singapore naval base, first conceived in 1919 and endorsed by the British Cabinet in 1921, was the cornerstone of British strategic plan in the Far East. Dubbed as the Singapore strategy, the plan entailed the building of a secure naval base in Singapore. As Britain could not afford to station a separate fleet in the Far East, the main British fleet would sail to the Far East and operate from Singapore in the event of a crisis.

Britain and Japanese Espionage in Pre-War Malaya: The Shinozaki Case

During the second half of the 1930s, as Anglo-Japanese relations gradually deteriorated particularly after the outbreak of the war in Europe British colonial authorities became increasingly concerned about the activities of Japanese citizens resident in the South-east Asian territories. These activities, generally subsumed by the British authorities under the heading of 'espionage', have yet to receive the detailed examination recently devoted by scholars to the broader dimensions of the security of Malaya, and the Singapore naval base in particular. The Japanese population in the Malayan peninsula (administratively divided under the British into the Federated Malay States, the Unfederated Malay States and the Straits Settlements) had risen from a single individual in 1871 to over one thousand in the early twentieth century and to over six thousand by the 1930s. Japanese economic interests, though initially focused on the rubber estates, during the inter-war period came increasingly to be concentrated on mining, particularly iron-mining, thereby providing Japan with an increasingly valuable source of raw materials. The impression derived from memoirs by British expatriates and Malayans is of an energetic Japanese community in the inter-war period, engaged in a variety of trades, but mainly as fishermen, barbers, photographers and small shop-keepers, so that 'in almost every town or village of any consequence throughout Malaya there were one or two Japanese shops'. Consequently, the ubiquitous Japanese became the source of 'spy fever', as rumours circulated through the peninsula. The British colonial authorities, over-sensitive to possible diplomatic repercussions from action against nationals of a country still, nominally at least, friendly, obtained sufficient information to substantiate some of the suspicions of Japanese espionage, but generally preferred quietly to deport suspected agents. Nevertheless, occasionally cases did

The Strategic Illusion: The Singapore Strategy and the Defense of Australia and New Zealand. By Ian Hamill. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981. x, 387 pp. Maps, Acknowledgments, Abbreviations, Introduction, Appendix, Notes, Bibliography, Index. $23.50 (cloth); $15 (paper). (Distributed in the U.S. by Ohio University Press.) - The Singapore Naval Base and the Defense of Britain's Eastern Empire, 1919–1941. By James

The Strategic Illusion: The Singapore Strategy and the Defense of Australia and New Zealand. By Ian Hamill. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981. x, 387 pp. Maps, Acknowledgments, Abbreviations, Introduction, Appendix, Notes, Bibliography, Index. 99.50. - Volume 44 Issue 4

The Strategic Illusion: The Singapore Strategy and the Defense of Australia and New Zealand. By Ian Hamill. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981. x, 387 pp. Maps, Acknowledgments, Abbreviations, Introduction, Appendix, Notes, Bibliography, Index. $23.50 (cloth); $15 (paper). (Distributed in the U.S. by Ohio University Press.)The Singapore Naval Base and the Defense of Britain's Eastern Empire, 1919–1941. By James Neidpath. Oxford:

The Strategic Illusion: The Singapore Strategy and the Defense of Australia and New Zealand. By Ian Hamill. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981. x, 387 pp. Maps, Acknowledgments, Abbreviations, Introduction, Appendix, Notes, Bibliography, Index. 99.50. - Volume 44 Issue 4

Reviews of Books

Journal Article Reviews of Books Get access Britannia at Bay. The Defence of the British Empire against Japan 1931–1941. By PAUL HAGGIE (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981. £16); The Singapore Naval Base and Defence of Britain's Eastern Empire 1919–1941. By JAMES NEIDPATH (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981. £22.50); Blue-Water Rationale. The Naval Defence of New Zealand 1914–1942. By I. C. McGIBBON (Wellington, New Zealand: Government Printing Office, 1981. NZ $45); Old Friends, New Enemies. The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy. Strategic Illusions, 1936–1941. By ARTHUR J. MARDER (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981. £19.50). J. P. D. DUNBABIN J. P. D. DUNBABIN St Edmund HallOxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The English Historical Review, Volume XCVIII, Issue CCCLXXXVI, January 1983, Pages 170–176, https://doi.org/10.1093/ehr/XCVIII.CCCLXXXVI.170 Published: 01 January 1983

The Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of Britain's Eastern Empire, 1919-1941

The Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of Britain's Eastern Empire, 1919-1941

The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base, 1919-1942.

The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base, 1919-1942.

The Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of Britain's Eastern Empire, 1919–1941

The Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of Britain's Eastern Empire, 1919–1941 Get access The Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of Britain's Eastern Empire, 1919–1941. By James Neidpath. Oxford: Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press. 1981. 296 pp.£22.50. Stephen Roskill Stephen Roskill Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 58, Issue 1, Winter 1981, Pages 137–138, https://doi.org/10.2307/2618301 Published: 01 January 1981

Winston Churchill and the Singapore Naval Base, 1924–1929

Sir Winston Churchill's doctor has recalled the “stupefying” effect which the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942 had upon his patient. Britain's wartime leader, Lord Moran suggests, knew that the surrender was “something more than a reverse. I think he wondered if it were a portent”. The spectre of one of the worst defeats in British military history was to return to haunt Churchill in later years. His torment was, perhaps, not solely portentous but also recollective for in the years 1924–29 Churchill himself, while serving in Stanley Baldwin's second government, had played the major role in delaying the building and defence of the Singapore naval base and in disparaging its associated strategy.

New Zealand and the Singapore Base between the Wars

New Zealand was one of the first parts of the British Empire to offer Britain help in the building of the Singapore naval base and was the only Dominion to do so. It is true that considerable financial help was given by the Straits Settlements. Hong Kong, the Federated Malay States and the Sultan of Johore. Australia's naval programme was, also, based on the assumption that the base would be built. But the Reform Party Ministry in New Zealand was the only democratically elected government which supported the United Kingdom Government with a vote of funds.

The Strategic Significance of Singapore, 1917–1942. The Naval Base and the Commonwealth

The transfer of the former Royal Navy dockyard to the Government of Singapore, at a ceremony on 8 December 1968, went almost unnoticed in the press of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Yet twenty-seven years earlier, to the very day, the Japanese landings at Kota Bahru, followed immediately by the bombing of Pearl Harbor, inspired alarming headlines. In Australia and New Zealand, where for twenty years the Singapore naval base had been given the central place in all defence planning, the Japanese attack gave rise to the first real fears of invasion. As they faced this possibility they regarded the ‘impregnable fortress’ of Singapore as their first line of defence.

Australia and the Defense of Southeast Asia

AUSTRALIA, an island continent of about three million /- square miles, inhabited by eleven million people of pre ** dominantly West European descent, lies on the southern perimeter of Southeast Asia, which is heavily populated by peo ples of diverse racial origins with traditions, cultures and political and economic outlooks differing radically both among themselves and from Australia's. Until halfway through the Second World War, Australia's de fense policy was very much a product of its early history. Al though from 1862 Australia contributed financially to the mainte nance of its own internal security and external defense forces, its defense thinking was nurtured within the overall pattern of Brit ish strategic defense. As a natural corollary, and because of its deep concern over developments in Europe, it supported the United Kingdom in two world wars. Although in 1914 there was no immediate threat to Australia, 330,000 volunteers were sent overseas from a population of 5,000,000; and 60,000 of them died in the war. In 1939, with the British declaration of war on Ger many, the Australian Government immediately declared war also and began to build up forces as a contribution to the Allied effort. At their peak, Australian forces totaled 640,000 and in addition we made considerable supplies and services available to Allied forces. Support for the Allied effort in both these wars was based on traditional and emotional ties with the United Kingdom as well as logic. The unhappy events following the entry of Japan into World War II shattered the old concept that strategic defense could be left to the Royal Navy (augmented by Australian ships and using the Singapore Naval Base) while Australia concentrated mainly on local defense. The impregnable naval base was easily breached and taken. Two battleships, the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, were sunk within minutes of each other, a Japanese in vasion fleet penetrated as far south as the Coral Sea and Japanese soldiers were able to take over most of the settled part of New Guinea. Thus Australia's primary reliance on a protective power was destroyed. Australian and United States forces were able to

Britain in the Far East: The Singapore Naval Base

Britain in the Far East: The Singapore Naval Base

The Policies and Interests of Great Britain and Holland in the Far East

The Policies and Interests of Great Britain and Holland in the Far East. No traveller in Eastern Asia can fail to be impressed by the widespread alarm and hostility towards Japan's intentions and her economic penetration. This feeling is first to be encountered in Ceylon, where, despite the Singapore naval base, there is a distinct undercurrent of uneasiness among the Ceylonese political leaders. The attitude is much more pronounced in British Malaya, and becomes steadily stronger as one nears Japan. Sympathy for China is the dominant sentiment; but at the same time one encounters the belief that in the long run the Chinese may prove the more serious problem. A very important Dutch official typified this attitude when he remarked that he believed that Japan's ambitions in China would fatally overstrain her resources so that in a few years she would cease to be a menace, “but even after a couple of centuries the problem of the Chinese immigrants will be as serious as ever.”