Simple Lottery Research Articles

The effect of dynamic lactic exercises on the development of special endurance and the performance of some defensive skills for handball players


 Achieving the physical and skill requirements of handball for this game, especially at the high levels, must have a significant development in the level of sports training according to special exercises prepared by the coach. Which helps the player to perform a variety and fast, and this requires him to make more effort and speed in performance in line with the speed of the game, Therefore, the research problem was manifested by the existence of a weakness in physical abilities, including special endurance, and this in turn became evident in the performance of defensive skills, so the researchers decided in their attempt to improve the level of performance of defensive skills, through the implementation of exercises in a dynamic lactic style to develop special endurance (endurance of strength, endurance of performance) and some defensive skills. Objectives of the research Preparing dynamic lactic exercises in order to develop special endurance and some defensive skills for handball players and to identify the impact of these exercises in developing special endurance and some defensive skills for handball players. There is a positive effect of dynamic lactic exercises in the development of special endurance and the performance of some defensive skills for handball players. As for the research method, the researchers used the experimental approach with two equal groups, the control and the experimental, with the cardiac and post-test. All members of the community, as the research sample was chosen by the intentional method, and the sample included (18) players, They were divided into two groups, experimental and control, by means of a simple lottery, each group included (9) players, where the experimental group dealt with lactic exercises, and the control group dealt with trainer exercises. Training for two months, at a rate of (3) units per week As the total number of units reached (24) training units, the components of the training load were taken into account and standardized in accordance with the research objectives, as well as the players' physical and skill capabilities. The research The researchers recommended the use of lactic exercises with other variables and for other handball skills.
 

The influence of anchoring on the uncertainty effect

ABSTRACT The uncertainty effect suggests that people may violate fundamental economic theories by pricing a binary lottery below its lowest outcome. This article examines the effect of anchoring on the uncertainty effect in a simple monetary binary lottery. We asked participants in an experiment about their willingness to pay in a simple lottery embedded with a numerical anchor. The results show that low (high) numerical anchoring exacerbates (ameliorates) the irrational behaviour causing the uncertainty effect.

The Effect of Resiliency Training on Mental Health and Resilience of Pregnant Women with Unwanted Pregnancy: A Randomized Clinical Trial.

Unwanted pregnancy has many negative consequences in terms of women's physical and mental health. Resilience is a process of utilizing important resources to maintain mental health in the face of stress. In addition, resilience can be promoted through. This study was performed to evaluate the effect of resiliency training on the mental health and resilience of pregnant women with an unwanted pregnancy. This randomized clinical trial was conducted on 66 women in Sabzevar, Iran, in 2020 with unwanted pregnancies, mild or moderate mental health problems, and low resilience. The participants were randomly divided into two groups through a simple lottery. In the intervention group, resilience training was performed once a week in groups of 10-15 people in six training sessions, each lasting 60 to 90 minutes. Mental health and tolerability were measured using the 28-item General Health Questionnaire and the Connor-Davidson Resilience scale before the intervention, and immediately after and 1 month after the intervention. The mean (SD) of mental health immediately 35.46 (5.59) and 1 month after the intervention 33.73 (3.85) in the intervention group (F = 91.23; p < 0.001) was reduced significantly compared to the control group (F = 94.02; p < 0.001). The results of the mean (SD) showed that the resilience training intervention significantly increased the resilience score in the intervention group 84.36 (8.49)(compared to the control group (49.13) 6.67)((p < 0.001). Resilience training was effective in promoting the mental health and resilience of pregnant women with unwanted pregnancies.

Behavioral biases in short selling—An experimental study

AbstractShort selling is a common practice in financial markets. Although there is extensive research concerning short selling and short sellers, in the behavioral and experimental economics literature, there are only a few studies that examine it. This paper investigates the pricing of two forms of short selling both theoretically and experimentally—selling a lottery short and paying to close the short position. The theoretical framework presents and analyzes the two positions and the influence of the anchoring and uncertainty effects on the pricing. To test the theoretical framework, we asked participants in an experiment about the price they were willing to accept for the obligation to pay the lottery's outcome and the price they were willing to pay to close the obligation to pay the lottery's outcome they held. Moreover, we used a simple lottery with different framings, each one with a different anchor. Our results suggest that in the short‐selling position, behavioral biases, such as anchoring and uncertainty, impact the decision‐makers' bid prices.

Comment on Halevy (2007) 'Ellsberg Revisited: An Experimental Study'

Halevy (2007) experimentally tests the prediction of the Recursive Non-Expected Utility (RNEU) model that there is a positive correlation between degree of ambiguity aversion and degree of preference on reduction of compound lotteries ROCL. Halevy (2007) claimed that the experimental result supports the RNEU. In this study, we use Halevy’s data and conduct further analysis based on subject’s ambiguity attitude types: ambiguity neutral, ambiguity averse, and ambiguity loving. We find striking different results. First, there is no significant relationship between degree of preference on ROCL and degree of ambiguity aversion. Second, subjects who prefer simple lotteries are not more likely to be ambiguity averse than subjects who prefer compound lotteries. Third, ambiguity averse subjects are not more likely to prefer simple lottery than those who are ambiguity seeking. In sum, there is no evidence that ambiguity aversion can be well explained by preference on reduction of compound lotteries.

Poverty and probability: aspiration and aversion to compound lotteries in El Salvador and India

Some experimental participants are averse to compound lotteries: they prefer simple lotteries that depend on only one random event, even when the simple lotteries offer lower expected value. This paper proposes that many behavioral “investments” represent more compound risk for poorer people—who often face multiple dimensions of deprivation—than for richer people. As a result, identical aversion to compound lotteries can prevent investment among poorer people, but have no effect on richer people. The paper reports five studies: two initial studies that document that aversion to compound lotteries operates as an economic preference, two “laboratory experiments in the field” in El Salvador, and one Internet survey experiment in India. Poorer Salvadoran women who choose a compound lottery are 27 percentage points more likely to have found formal employment than those who chose a simple lottery, but lottery choice is unrelated to employment for richer women. Poorer students at the national Salvadoran university choose more compound lotteries than richer students, on average, implying that aversion to compound lotteries screened out poorer aspirants but not richer ones. Poorer and lower-caste Indian participants who choose compound lotteries are more likely than those who choose simple lotteries to have a different occupation than their parents, which is not the case for better-off participants. These findings suggest that the consequences of aversion to compound lotteries are different in the context of poverty and disadvantage.

Differential Prize Taxation and Structural Discrimination in Contests

This paper evaluates differential prize taxation and structural discrimination as a means of increasing efforts in the most widely studied contests. We establish that a designer who maximizes efforts subject to a balanced-budget constraint prefers dual discrimination, namely, change of the contestants’ prize valuations as well as bias of the impact of their efforts. Optimal twofold discrimination is often superior to any single mode of discrimination under any lottery. Surprisingly, in the general N-player contest game, under the prototypical simple lottery, it can yield the maximal possible efforts: the highest valuation of the contested prize. If a single mode of discrimination is allowed, then differential taxation is superior to structural discrimination.

Preference for Randomization?: Anscombe-Aumann Inconsistency in the Lab

Raiffa (1961) recommends that ambiguity averse participants use objective lotteries to randomly decide on which subjective lottery to bet. Such a preference for randomization is especially important in models based on Anscombe and Aumann's. In three experimental studies, I find little evidence for preference for randomization: five participants randomized out of 108 opportunities. Most participants are Anscombe-Aumann inconsistent; many pay to have a simple objective lottery, rather than an objectively probabilistically identical lottery that randomizes over subjective bets, even when they understand the probabilities. The order in which lotteries are presented matters; participants are more likely to be Anscombe-Aumann consistent when subjective uncertainty is presented first, which may indicate bounded rationality.

Systematic analysis of framing bias in missile defense: Implications toward visualization design

This paper examines the effects of framing on decision making in a homeland missile defense context across three tasks of varying complexity. Mathematically, each task was modeled as abstractions from a common resource allocation task. Logically, therefore, the effects of framing on human subjects should have been consistent across all the tasks. In the first experiment, a simple lottery was used to determine risk postures in a single-attribute case of missile defense. Results showed that, consistent with Prospect Theory, positive framing promotes risk-averse behavior whereas negative framing promotes risk-seeking behavior. In the second experiment, we used the Analytic Hierarchy Process to determine subject rankings in a multi-attribute case of missile defense. Results suggest that subjects’ performances under positive framing were significantly better than performances under negative framing. In the third experiment, we used a human-in-the-loop simulation to elicit human decisions in a missile defense resource allocation task. In comparison to the other experiments, the framing effect in the third experiment was diminished. We submit that decision biases detected in a simple choice task cannot be assumed to carry over to tasks of greater complexity even if the underlying mathematical formulation for all the tasks is the same. Moreover, we submit that the design of the graphical interface has a greater influence on human judgment bias than framing in tasks of higher complexity.

Illustrated Examples of the Effects of Risk Preferences and Expectations on Bargaining Outcomes

The author highlights bargaining examples that use expected utility theory. Bargainer payoffs in the event of a dispute are represented by a simple lottery. Expectations are assumed to affect a bargainer's subjective probabilities over lottery outcomes, and risk preferences affect the expected utility of a given lottery. Risk preferences and/or expectations are predicted to influence both negotiated outcomes and the likelihood of a bargaining impasse. The analysis shows that, ceteris paribus, risk aversion or pessimism, or both, will cause a bargainer to capture less of the pie in negotiations. Similarly, risk-loving and optimistic bargainers are more likely to experience impasse because of the disappearance of the contract zone. The results are intuitive, can be shown graphically and algebraically, and provide upper-level students with engaging examples that show the usefulness of expected utility theory.

Classroom Game on the Theory of Rent Seeking: Some Practical Experience

1. Introduction Teaching tools are valuable in teaching the often-abstract theoretical models of economics (e.g., Holt 1999). The theory of rent seeking is one of these abstract theoretical concepts; however, thanks to the classroom game proposed by Goeree and Holt (1999), the basic logic behind this theory can be illustrated in a very vivid way. The game's effectiveness is primarily due to the fact that the rules are very easy to understand and incorporate the major characteristics of the theoretical models of rent seeking (Tullock 1980, 1993; Nitzan 1994). Hence, it is possible for students to see the connections between the game and the theoretical background and thus gain an intuitive understanding of the phenomenon of rent seeking. In addition, the students enjoy the experiments very much because they offer a pleasant change from the usual class routine. We have played the game in a number of different classes at Justus-Liebig-University Giessen in Germany and Kasan State University in Russia. On the basis of the experience we have gained in these classes, we suggest two modifications to the setup of the game in section 3 of this paper. These modifications are intended to improve the already-high teaching value of the game. Furthermore, section 3 introduces an extension to the rules that can shed some light on the decision-making process of the students during the game. Before the changes in the setup and their effects on the outcome of the game are discussed, section 2 outlines the rules of the game as proposed by Goeree and Holt (1999) and briefly describes their experience in applying it. 2. The Original Classroom Game as Proposed by Goeree and Holt In the classroom game proposed by Goeree and Holt (1999), four teams of students apply for a number of telephone licenses. The game consists of two parts. The first part consists of a number of rounds. In every round, one license, worth $16,000, is at stake. Every team can complete up to 13 applications for the license per round. Each application results in costs of $3000 in the first round and $1000 in the later rounds. The license is allocated in a simple lottery. The team that wins the license increases its capital stock by the value of the license minus its application costs. All other teams suffer losses in the amount of their application costs. This setup resembles the starting point of the game-theoretic analyses of rent seeking put forth by Tullock (1980). Following Tullock (1980), the Nash equilibrium in this classroom game involves every player handing in (N - 1)V/(CN^sup 2^) applications, where V denotes the value of the licence, C denotes the costs per application, and N is the number of teams. Thus, the players are expected to fill in one application in the first round, in which C = $3000, and three applications in the later rounds, in which the teams incur costs of only $1000 per application. The Nash-equilibrial rent-seeking costs per round amount to $12,000 for a license worth $16,000. Starting with an initial capital stock of $100,000, every team is expected to maximize its capital stock by the end of the game. By keeping a record of the development of their capital stock, the students can see that rent seeking results in massive social costs. To show that these social costs can be avoided, the mechanism of license allocation is changed in the second part of the game, in which the winner is determined by an English auction.' The revenue from the auction is transferred to a poor society member, represented by a student outside the teams (Goeree and Holt 1999). Goeree and Holt (1999) applied this classroom game in a number of experiments at two universities in the United States. In their article, they picked out one representative experiment to illustrate the results a teacher can expect when applying the game. In this experiment, the average expenditure per round was far above the Nash equilibrium of $12,000. For C = $3000, the total costs incurred amounted to $39,000 for a license worth $16,000. …

On the Interaction of Risk and Time Preferences: An Experimental Study

Abstract Experimental studies of risk and time preference typically focus on one of the two phenomena. The goal of this paper is to investigate the (possible) correlation between subjects' attitude to risk and their time preference. For this sake we ask 61 subjects to price a simple lottery in three different scenarios. At the first, the lottery premium is paid `now'. At the second, it is paid `later'. At the third, it is paid `even later'. By comparing the certainty equivalents offered by the subjects for the three lotteries, we test how time and risk preferences are interrelated. Since the time interval between `now' and `later' is the same as between `later' and `even later', we also test the hypothesis of hyperbolic discounting. The main result is a statistically significant negative correlation between subjects' degrees of risk aversion and their (implicit) discount factors. Moreover, we show that the negative correlation is independent of the method used to elicit certainty equivalents (willingness to pay versus willingness to accept).

A test for lottery recruitment among four Banksia species based on their demography and biological attributes.

A stage-by-stage protocol for identifying simple or biased lottery, or non-lottery, patterns of seedling recruitment is outlined. For a simple (weighted) lottery to apply, the proportion of total individuals accounted for by one species at one stage of recruitment plotted against the proportion accounted for at a previous stage over a wide range of recruitment conditions should obey a linear regression with a=0 and b=1. For a biased lottery to hold, the regression is significant but a≠0 and/or b≠1. Demorgraphic, size and water relations data were collected over 3 years for four co-occurring Banksia species following two contrasting experimental fires. The first summer was exceptionally wet and the second was exceptionally hot and dry. Seedlings still alive by the 3rd year relative to the fire-killed parent plants conformed to a biased lottery in the case of B. speciosa and B. baxteri, while B. coccinea and B. pulchella had no mathematical structure (mean of the proportional ratios ≠ 1). Intervening stages, beginning with seed release, showed transient deterministic or simple lottery patterns in some cases, but the overriding trend was for biased lotteries. B. speciosa dominated the responses, with greater seed release than expected, fewer initial seedlings, lottery survival of 1st year seedlings and greater survival of 2nd year seedlings, when compared with the previous stages. Large seeds and subsequent high growth rates enabled B. speciosa to exploit soil water preferentially during the severe summer drought. The trend for B. speciosa to replace other species may be cancelled by stochastic processes not operating in this particular study.

Decision Analysis with Incomplete Utility and Probability Information

An approach to the solution of decision analysis problems under uncertainty with imprecise and incomplete information is presented. The methodology is designed for cases in which payoffs (conditional on the state of nature) are known precisely, but only limited or imprecise probability and utility information is available regarding a decision maker's beliefs and tastes. A decision maker provides: conditional payoffs, (optionally) bounds on state probabilities, bounds on the certainty equivalent for a simple lottery, any known relationships between probabilities of states of nature, and a series of strict preferences between pairs of vectors of conditional payoffs. We assume an exponential utility function with unknown parameter. The method proceeds by sequentially eliciting preferences, new bounds on probabilities and/or the certainty equivalent, and new relationships among probabilities until the problem is solved. The methodology is demonstrated through a two-state and a three-state example which illustrate the effects of the progressive elicitation of additional information.

Gambling away absenteeism.

Current conditions in health care make the battle against absenteeism critical. Of all the various methods devised, one seems to be consistently effective: positive reinforcement through a simple lottery incentive system. The authors describe this system's impact on reducing absenteeism.