Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Research Articles

Prosaic Organizational Failure

We use the case of the now-dead Shoreham Nuclear Power Station to pose some questions, and a few answers, about organizational failure. The analysis centers on the symbolism of organizational plans, specifically how organizations use plans to justify increasingly complex systems to themselves and to others. That such plans are based on sparse or nonexistent experience, and that they are often wildly unrealistic, suggests some reasons why high-technology, high-risk systems do not foster organizational learning.

Shoreham in repose

A pictorial presentation is given of the Shoreham nuclear power station in Wading River, NY, which is in the process of shutting down before it ever started to operate. The controversy over the plant and its cloudy future are briefly discussed. >

Nuclear Protective Action Advisories: A Policy Analysis and Evaluation

ABSTRACTWidespread spontaneous evacuation, the tendency for people to evacuate even when not advised to do so, has been highlighted as one of the likely behavioral responses to a nuclear power plant emergency. Utility company representatives contend that protective action advisories can be structured so as to stifle the magnitude and geographic extent of spontaneous evacuation. Data from a utility‐company‐sponsored telephone survey of households on Long Island, New York, where the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station is located, are used in this paper to test this proposition. Analyses of responses given to three sets of increasingly serious reactor accident scenarios, with and without information instructing people what protective actions to take, raise serious questions about the ability of emergency notification messages to affect human behavior in a radiological emergency. The results suggest firstly, that even if people me specifically advised not to evacuate, most would be inclined to do so; and secondly, that attempts to stifle the propensity to evacuate among those who are not at risk are likely to increase the propensity to stay behind among those who are at risk and should evacuate.

Predicting nuclear reactor emergency evacuation behavior

Logistic regression analyses of survey data from a sample of households within the vicinity of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station support nearly all of the hypothesized linkages in a theoretical model of nuclear reactor emergency evacuation decision-making. The results indicate that, if a TMI type accident were to occur at the Shoreham plant, nearly one-third of the Long Island population (~ 289,000 households) would evacuate voluntarily or spontaneously. Implications for future-oriented nuclear emergency evacuation planning are discussed.

A probabilistic model for flammable pool fire damage in nuclear power plants

A new code, called VULCAN/STADIC-2, has been developed to aid the probabilistic risk of the spread of fire damage within a large enclosure. By combining simplified theoretical and empirical physical models (VULCAN) with the Monte Carlo simulation technique in STADIC-2, the code is able to estimate the conditional frequency of fire suppression before damage can occur to equipment near a fire. The code was developed principally for situations in which a fire ignites over a pool of flammable liquid within a room in a nuclear power plant. The room may contain overhead cables, cabinets housing electrical equipment or both. The models in the code utilize contemporary empirical and analytical information on equipment damage criteria, fire thermal modeling, fire damage spreading, and fire suppression. Results of an application to oil pool fires in the relay room of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station and results of sensitivity studies are presented. An overview of fire analysis methodology used in probabilistic risk assessments is also presented to provide perspective.

A Model of Evacuation--Decision Making in a Nuclear Reactor Emergency

A model for decision making about evacuation during a radiological emergency is tested by loglinear causal modeling and with data from a survey of households in the vicinity of the Shoreham nuclear power station on Long Island. The model incorporates intention to evacuate as a surrogate for actual behavior and attributes of both location and local residents as predictors of evacuation. The results strongly suggest that the model can forecast magnitude and spatial extent of spontaneous evacuation for any commercial nuclear installation, if a radiological emergency should occur. LICENSEES of commercial nuclear power plants in the United States are required to devise, in conjunction with state and local governments, plans to ensure protective measures during a radiological emergency.1 These plans must comply with prescribed federal guidelines, and final approval is the joint responsibility of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).2 However, the criteria that are to be used in both the preparation and the evaluation of the plans are based almost solely on knowledge about human behavior in natural disasters and nonradiological technological emergencies.3 Studies conducted in the aftermath of the accident at the Three Mile Island nucleargenerating facility near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in March 1979 strongly implied that emergency plans, developed according to such criteria, are likely to be inadequate and ineffective for a major nuclear-reactor accident. During the Three Mile Island crisis, the advisory from the governor of Pennsylvania instructed the evacuation of pregnant women and preschoolaged children within a five-mile radius of the malfunctioning reactor and everyone else within a ten-mile radius to stay indoors. This advisory should have resulted in the evacuation of approximately 3,500 persons. However, it was estimated that 144,000 persons, or 39 percent of the population within * I wish to thank William A. V. Clark, J. Nicholas Entrikin, Bernard Logan, Melvin Oliver, Bruce W. Pigozzi, and Donald J. Zeigler for their comments on drafts of this article. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Emergency Planning: Final Regulations, Federal Register, Vol. 45, 1980, p. 55402. 2 Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1980). 3 Robert T. Jaske, Emergency Preparedness: Status and Outlook, Nuclear Safety, Vol. 24, 1983, pp. 1-11; James H. Johnson Jr., Planning for Spontaneous Evacuation during a Radiological Emergency, Nuclear Safety, Vol. 25, 1984, pp. 186-194; Susan L. Cutter, Emergency Preparedness and Planning for Nuclear Power Plants Accidents, Applied Geography, Vol. 4, 1984, pp. 235-245; and Richard T. Sylves, Nuclear Power Plants and Emergency Planning: An Intergovernmental Nightmare, Public Administration Review, Vol. 44, 1984, pp. 393-401. * DR. JOHNSON is an associate professor of geography at the University of California, Los Angeles, California 90024. This content downloaded from 207.46.13.113 on Thu, 06 Oct 2016 04:24:00 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW fifteen miles of the facility, departed.4 The process whereby individuals and families left their homes without official directive was called spontaneous evacuation.5 An analysis of responses to the accident from a geographical perspective used the term evacuation-shadow phenomenon to identify the tendency of people beyond or outside the designated dangerous zone to leave spontaneously or voluntarily.6 This behavior had occurred in other crisis situations but never at the magnitude observed during the Three Mile Island incident. The gap between expected and actual evacuation was so wide that it highlighted a need for improved methods to estimate the flow and extent of spontaneous evacuation movements.7 This article presents a causal model of evacuation-decision making during a nuclear reactor emergency. The model is tested by a modified version of path analysis and with data obtained from interviews in a survey of a representative sample of households in the vicinity of the Shoreham nuclear power station on Long Island, New York. The results of the test demonstrate that the model can be used to forecast for any commercial nuclear power plant both magnitude and geographical extent of spontaneous evacuation if a radiological emergency occurs.

EVACUATION BEHAVIOR IN RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENTS∗

A telephone survey of 2,595 households on Long Island, NY provides a data base for analyzing potential spatial behaviors in response to an accident at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station in Suffolk County. These intended behaviors approximated the actual behaviors of Three Mile Island area residents during the general emergency at that plant in 1979. Using evacuations from natural and other technological hazards as a basis for comparison, we conclude that evacuations in response to nuclear power plant accidents are likely to be characterized by an extreme over-response to limited protective action advisories; this phenomenon needs to be considered in behaviorally-based radiological emergency response planning.

Spectral lines: Through the looking glass

The Long Island Lighting Co. (Lilco), a private investor-owned utility, on Jan. 10 notified Suffolk County, N.Y., in which its nearly complete Shoreham nuclear power station is located, that it would withheld $26.2 million in real-estate taxes. The Lilco directors took the step both as a protest of the assessment on the plant and in response to Suffolk County's opposition to allowing it to operate.

Distinguishing Human Responses to Radiological Emergencies

Inherent in the revised emergency planning regulations recently issued by the federal government is the assumption that people will follow official protective action advisories during a nuclear reactor accident. In this paper the authors argue that this is an unrealistic assumption and present empirical evidence which supports the proposition that a radiological emergency in likely to give rise to a high degree of extreme public behavior. Their analyses indicate that less than one-third of the households on Long Island are likely to follow instructions in the event of an accident at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. Among the families who would not follow instructions, some would underreact but most would overreact. Perceived distance from the plant and age of household head appear to be the strongest discriminators among those who are most likely to follow orders, those most likely to underreact, and those most likely to overreact. Implications for radiological emergency preparedness and response planning are discussed. 71 references, 3 figures, 8 tables.