Shielded Special Nuclear Material Research Articles

Fissile mass estimation using β-delayed γ-rays and neutrons from fast and epithermal induced fissions

A potential method for mass estimation of shielded special nuclear materials (SNM) is proposed. The method uses fast and epithermal neutrons, generated by an external pulsed neutron source, to induce fission in SNM. The subsequent β-delayed γ-rays and neutrons, emitted by the fission products, are measured simultaneously by two 3He slab detectors and a coaxial high purity germanium (HPGe) detector, located around the tested material. Measuring simultaneously both, β-delayed γ-rays and neutrons measurement, offers improved sensitivity for fissile materials detecting.Laboratory examination of the method was performed in the Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly (PUNITA), using CBNM (Central Bureau for Nuclear Measurements) samples of Uranium.

An Artificial Neural Network System for Photon-Based Active Interrogation Applications

Active interrogation (AI) is a promising technique to detect shielded special nuclear materials (SNMs). At the University of Michigan, we are developing a photon-based AI system that uses bremsstrahlung radiation from an electron linear accelerator (linac) as an ionizing source and trans-stilbene organic scintillating detectors for neutron detection. Stilbene scintillators are sensitive to fast neutrons and photons and have excellent pulse shape discrimination (PSD) capabilities. The traditional charge integration (CI) method commonly used for PSD analysis eliminates piled-up pulses and relies on a particle discrimination line to separate neutrons and photons. The presence of the intense photon flux during AI creates a significant number of piled-up events in the stilbene scintillator, thereby posing a great challenge to the traditional CI method. Identifying true single neutron pulses becomes challenging due to the presence of a pile-up cloud and overlapping neutron, photon and pile-up clouds in the PSD analysis. To mitigate the effect of pulse pile-up and identify true single neutron pulses from stilbene scintillators, an artificial neural network (ANN) system is developed. The developed ANN system identifies single neutron pulses and neutron-photon combinations from piled-up events. The results obtained from a 252Cf measurement in the presence of the intense photon flux show that the developed ANN system outperforms the traditional CI method. Since many piled-up events lie above the particle discrimination line, they get misclassified as neutrons by the traditional CI method resulting in 27% overestimation of the net neutron count rate during the linac pulse. The overall net neutron count rate (single and restored neutrons) during the linac pulse, estimated by the ANN system is 62.32% of the ground truth. Energy spectroscopy of the ANN attributed single neutron pulses further provides evidence on the detection of prompt fission neutrons from the 252Cf fission source.

A Method to Estimate the Atomic Number and Mass Thickness of Intervening Materials in Uranium and Plutonium Gamma-Ray Spectroscopy Measurements

To accurately characterize shielded special nuclear materials (SNM) using passive gamma-ray spectroscopy measurement techniques, the effective atomic number and the thickness of shielding materials must be measured. Intervening materials between the source and detector may affect the estimated source isotopics (uranium enrichment and plutonium grade) for techniques which rely on raw count rates or photopeak ratios of gamma-ray lines separated in energy. Furthermore, knowledge of the surrounding materials can provide insight regarding the configuration of a device containing SNM. The described method was developed using spectra recorded using high energy resolution CdZnTe detectors, but can be expanded to any gamma-ray spectrometers with energy resolution of better than 1% FWHM at 662 keV. The effective atomic number, Z, and mass thickness of the intervening shielding material are identified by comparing the relative attenuation of different gamma-ray lines and estimating the proportion of Compton scattering interactions to photoelectric absorptions within the shield. While characteristic $\text {K}_\alpha $ x-rays can be used to identify shielding materials made of high Z elements, this method can be applied to all shielding materials. This algorithm has adequately estimated the effective atomic number for shields made of iron, aluminum, and polyethylene surrounding uranium samples using experimental data. The mass thicknesses of shielding materials have been estimated with a standard error of less than 1.3 g/cm2 for iron shields up to 2.5 cm thick. The effective atomic number was accurately estimated to 26 ± 5 for all iron thicknesses.

Spectroscopic neutron detection using composite scintillators

Shielded special nuclear material (SNM), especially highly enriched uranium, is exceptionally difficult to detect without the use of active interrogation (AI). We are investigating the potential use of low-dose active interrogation to realize simultaneous high-contrast imaging and photofission of SNM using energetic gamma-rays produced by low-energy nuclear reactions, such as [Formula: see text]B(d,n[Formula: see text]C and [Formula: see text]C(p,p[Formula: see text]C. Neutrons produced via fission are one reliable signature of the presence of SNM and are usually identified by their unique timing characteristics, such as the delayed neutron die-away. Fast neutron spectroscopy may provide additional useful discriminating characteristics for SNM detection. Spectroscopic measurements can be conducted by recoil-based or thermalization and capture-gated detectors; the latter may offer unique advantages since they facilitate low-statistics and event-by-event neutron energy measurements without spectrum unfolding. We describe the results of the development and characterization of a new type of capture-gated spectroscopic neutron detector based on a composite of scintillating polyvinyltoluene and lithium-doped scintillating glass in the form of millimeter-thick rods. The detector achieves >108 neutron–gamma discrimination resulting from its geometric properties and material selection. The design facilitates simultaneous pulse shape and pulse height discrimination, despite the fact that no materials intrinsically capable of pulse shape discrimination have been used to construct the detector. Accurate single-event measurements of neutron energy may be possible even when the energy is relatively low, such as with delayed fission neutrons. Simulation and preliminary measurements using the new composite detector are described, including those conducted using radioisotope sources and the low-dose active interrogation system based on low-energy nuclear reactions.

Combining Radiography and Passive Measurements for Radiological Threat Localization in Cargo

Detecting shielded special nuclear material (SNM) in a cargo container is a difficult problem, since shielding reduces the amount of radiation escaping the container. Radiography provides information that is complementary to that provided by passive gamma-ray detection systems: while not directly sensitive to radiological materials, radiography can reveal highly shielded regions that may mask a passive radiological signal. Combining these measurements has the potential to improve SNM detection, either through improved sensitivity or by providing a solution to the inverse problem to estimate source properties (strength and location). We present a data-fusion method that uses a radiograph to provide an estimate of the radiation-transport environment for gamma rays from potential sources. This approach makes quantitative use of radiographic images without relying on image interpretation, and results in a probabilistic description of likely source locations and strengths. We present results for this method for a modeled test case of a cargo container passing through a plastic-scintillator-based radiation portal monitor and a transmission-radiography system. We find that a radiograph-based inversion scheme allows for localization of a low-noise source placed randomly within the test container to within 40 cm, compared to 70 cm for triangulation alone, while strength estimation accuracy is improved by a factor of six. Improvements are seen in regions of both high and low shielding, but are most pronounced in highly shielded regions. The approach proposed here combines transmission and emission data in a manner that has not been explored in the cargo-screening literature, advancing the ability to accurately describe a hidden source based on currently-available instrumentation.

Active Interrogation of Depleted Uranium Using a Single Pulse, High-Intensity Photon and Mixed Photon-Neutron Source

Active interrogation is a method used to enhance the likelihood of detection of shielded special nuclear material (SNM); an external source of radiation is used to interrogate a target and to stimulate fission within any SNM present. Radiation produced by the fission process can be detected and used to infer the presence of the SNM. The Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) and the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) have carried out a joint experimental study into the use of single pulse, high-intensity sources of bremsstrahlung x-rays and ${\bf D}({\gammab}, {\bf n}){\bf H}$ photoneutrons in an active interrogation system. The source was operated in both x-ray-only and mixed x-ray/photoneutron modes, and was used to irradiate a depleted uranium (DU) target which was enclosed by up to $150 \, {\bf g}{\cdot}{\bf cm}^{ - 2}$ of steel shielding. Resulting radiation signatures were measured by a suite of over 80 detectors and the data used to characterise detectable fission signatures as a function of the areal mass of the shielding. This paper describes the work carried out and discusses data collected with $^{3}{\bf He}$ proportional counters, NaI(Tl) scintillators and Eljen EJ-309 liquid scintillators. Results with the x-ray-only source demonstrate detection ( $ >\!\!\! {3\sigmab }$ ) of the DU target through a minimum of $ 113 \, {\bf g}{\cdot}{\bf cm}^{ - 2}$ of steel, dropping to $85 \, {\bf g}{\cdot}{\bf cm}^- {2}$ when using a mixed x-ray/photoneutron source. The $^{3}{\bf He}$ proportional counters demonstrate detection ( $ >\!\! { 3\sigmab }$ ) of the DU target through the maximum ${149}. 7 \, {\bf g}{\cdot}{\bf cm}^{ - {2}}$ steel shielding deployed for both photon and mixed x-ray/photoneutron sources.

BENEFITS OF TIME CORRELATION MEASUREMENTS FOR PASSIVE SCREENING

The “FLASH Portals Project” is a collaboration between Arktis Radiation Detectors Ltd (CH), the Atomic Weapons Establishment (UK), and the Joint Research Centre (European Commission), supported by the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG). The program's goal was to develop and demonstrate a technology to detect shielded special nuclear materials (SNM) more efficiently and less ambiguously by exploiting time correlation. This study presents experimental results of a two-sided portal monitor equipped with in total 16 4 He fast neutron detectors as well as four polyvinyltoluene (PVT) plastic scintillators. All detectors have been synchronized to nanosecond precision, thereby allowing the resolution of time correlations from timescales of tens of microseconds (such as (n, γ) reactions) down to prompt fission correlations directly. Our results demonstrate that such correlations can be detected in a typical radiation portal monitor (RPM) geometry and within operationally acceptable time scales, and that exploiting these signatures significantly improves the performance of the RPM compared to neutron counting. Furthermore, the results show that some time structure remains even in the presence of heavy shielding, thus significantly improving the sensitivity of the detection system to shielded SNM.

Low-background detection of fission neutrons produced by pulsed neutron interrogation

Measurements designed to detect shielded Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) have been carried out using a pulsed 8.5-MeV neutron source. Fission-neutron counts were detected as a function of time in the intervals between 100-μs neutron bursts at burst frequencies of 500, 1000, and 2000 Hz. The pulse timing sequences were chosen to optimize detection of fission neutrons produced by thermal-neutron-induced fission in the SNM. Fission neutrons were detected directly as proton, carbon, and silicon recoils in silicon carbide (SiC) semiconductor fast neutron detectors. SiC detectors recorded neutron counts during and immediately following the source neutron bursts, allowing detection of fission neutrons with short (120 μs) die-away times. The SiC detectors demonstrated excellent background discrimination with more than 2000 neutron counts observed in time intervals where zero background counts were detected.

Accelerator-driven neutron source for cargo screening

Advanced neutron interrogation systems for screening sea-land cargo containers for shielded special nuclear materials (SNM) require a high-yield neutron source to achieve the desired detection probability, false alarm rate, and throughput. The design of an accelerator-driven neutron source is described that utilizes the D(d,n)3He reaction to produce a forward directed beam of up to 8.5MeV neutrons. The key components of the neutron source are a high-current radio frequency quadrupole (RFQ) accelerator and a neutron production gas target. The 5.1m long, 200MHz RFQ accelerates a 40mA deuteron beam from a microwave-driven ion source coupled to an electrostatic low energy beam transport (LEBT) system to 6MeV. At a 5% duty factor, the time-average D+ beam current on target is 1.5mA. A thin entrance window has been designed for the deuterium gas target that can withstand the high beam power and the gas pressure. The source will be capable of delivering a flux >1×107n/(cm2s) at a distance of 2.5m from the target and will allow full testing and demonstration of a cargo screening system based on neutron stimulated SNM signatures.