Share Structure Reform In China Research Articles

Institutional investors and earnings management associated with controlling shareholders' promises: Evidence from the split share structure reform in China

We examine the effectiveness of institutional investors in constraining aggressive earnings management induced by strong contractual incentives. To this end we focus on the consequences of earnings-related promises (covenants) negotiated between corporate controlling shareholders and minority shareholders during China’s split-share structure reform, wherein failure to achieve profit benchmarks had the potential to transfer significant wealth from controlling to minority shareholders. Our initial analysis provides evidence that profit-promised firm-years are, on average, associated with income-increasing earnings management, and that this association is stronger for: (i) firm-years in which the profit-promise was satisfied, and (ii) firm-years in which proxies for the level of unmanaged earnings suggest that earnings management was needed to satisfy the promise. However, such benchmark-beating behavior is weaker for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership. Further analysis documents that the exit threat of institutional shareholders can discipline earnings management associated with profit promises. We also show that the effect of institutional shareholders in reducing earnings management associated with profit promises is greater for domestic mutual funds and for privately controlled firms. Interestingly, our evidence suggests that institutional investors only play an effective monitoring role over earnings management when their incentives are strongly aligned with those of other minority owners. In other cases, our evidence suggests that these investors may exacerbate the level of earnings management.

Dividend payout policies in the pre and post split share structure reform in China

This paper examines the motivation of dividend payout policies for Chinese listed firms before and after the Split Share Structure Reform in China from the corporate governance-related viewpoint. A...

Protection of small investors and firm value: Evidence from the split share structure reform in China

Protection of small investors and firm value: Evidence from the split share structure reform in China

Do bank loans still convey information to investors? Evidence from the split share structure reform in China

Bank loans can convey information about the borrowing firms that have proper corporate governance systems. Using a sample of bank loan announcements in China, we find that the market reaction is positive after the split share structure reform in 2005, which aligns the interests of large shareholders and minority shareholders, government and public investors, and alleviates their tunneling incentives. We also find that this effect is more pronounced for private firms as the reform mainly enhances corporate governance for private firms. The signaling role of bank loans is less pronounced for firms with less severe information asymmetry after the reform, e.g. higher shareholdings of mutual funds and higher proportion of independent directors. Related party transactions decrease when they obtain bank loans after the reform, which reflects the alleviation of tunneling after the reform.

Ultimate ownership, crash risk, and split share structure reform in China

Abstract This study investigates the relationship between ultimate ownership and stock price crash risk for Chinese firms and the impact on this relationship of the implementation of the split share structure reform, which rendered previously non-tradable shares freely tradable. We find that government-controlled firms, especially local ones, have a significantly higher crash risk than privately controlled firms. After the reform, crash risk of all firms decreases significantly, with a greater risk reduction for privately controlled firms than for government-controlled firms. Further evidence demonstrates that government-controlled firms with stronger political incentives tend to have higher crash risk.

The peer effect of corporate financial decisions around split share structure reform in China

AbstractWe examine the peer effects in financial decisions of Chinese listed companies for the period of 1998–2016 as well as around Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR). Consistent with the information‐based theory of learning, Chinese firms do adjust their capital structure in response to the changes in their peers’ market leverage ratios. The industries that are more competitive, with more young firms, and high leverage volatility tend to exhibit stronger peer effects. Within industries, the firms with lower market share and profits, paying no dividends, and being financially constrained mimic their peers more strongly than their counterparts. The evidence around the SSSR reveals that firms tend to follow their industry peers and leaders more closely in making financial decisions after the reform. Finally, the mimicking behavior in financial decisions enhances firm value in the long run and this finding is more evident after the reform.

Does executive directors from controlling shareholders improve corporate governance?

PurposeThe existence of controlling shareholders creates a remarkable difference between the corporate governance structures of Chinese firms and those of western firms. Despite the increasing importance of controlling shareholders, it remains disputable whether they are playing the “tunneling” roles or the “governance” roles. Therefore, more research is needed on what roles controlling shareholders are playing and how they play their roles. Previous empirical studies document a common phenomenon that directors play dual roles both on the board and in the top management team. Because of information asymmetry, the board of directors may not be able to perform its supervisory and strategic decision-making functions. Therefore, this paper aims to investigate whether controlling shareholders participate in firm management by appointing the executive directors and examine the economic consequences of controlling shareholder involvement.Design/methodology/approachIn the empirical tests, the authors use the split share structure reform in China as a natural experiment. Using the data from Chinese listed firms between 2001 and 2015 and difference-in-differences analysis, the authors examine the impact of the split share structure reform on the executive directors of controlling shareholders and the governance effect of controlling shareholders’ appointing executive directors to the management.FindingsThe authors find that controlling shareholders get involved in firm management by appointing executive directors to strengthen the supervision and incentives of managers. The authors also find that firms exhibit a lower level of earnings management and enhance and higher pay-performance sensitivity after controlling shareholders appoint executive directors to the top management team.Originality/valueAs the natural experiment of the split share structure reform enables us to mitigate endogeneity, the authors investigate the channels through, which controlling shareholders get involved in firm management from the unique perspective of executive director appointment. The study expands the literature on corporate governance and board functions. The findings provide new insights to the effect of controlling shareholder governance and casts light on a new way for controlling shareholders of Chinese firms to participate in firm management – by appointing executive directors.

Large Shareholder Incentives and Auditor Choice

SUMMARY This study investigates the impact of large shareholder incentives on firms' auditor choice using a quasi-natural experiment setting provided by the split share structure reform in China. The reform converted the previously non-tradable shares held by large shareholders into tradable shares and thus enhanced the alignment of large shareholders' and outside investors' interests. We find that firms switch from large auditors to small auditors following the completion of the reform. The results are robust to the audit firm merging effect and the firm fixed effects. Further analyses reveal that the effect is more pronounced in firms with greater agency costs prior to the reform and in firms located in a weak legal environment. Taken together, these results suggest that a reduction in conflicts between large shareholders and outside investors leads to a declining demand for high-quality audits. JEL Classifications: M42; G34. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

FLOAT, SPECULATION AND STOCK PRICE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SPLIT SHARE STRUCTURE REFORM IN CHINA

The Split Share Structure Reform in China offers a unique opportunity to test whether the supply of tradable shares (i.e., float) has a significant impact on the degree of speculation. After firms completed the reform, their float increased by 31% on average, while turnover and trading volume also increased substantially. We use information from firms’ reform plan to derive an estimate of the price premium of tradable shares over non-tradable shares before the reform and find that, after controlling for differences in liquidity and profitability, the price premium is significantly related to proxies for the level of speculative trading in tradable shares. Moreover, firms that were highly speculated before the reform had significantly smaller increase in turnover and trading volume than firms that were less speculated. Overall, our evidence confirms that there is a significant speculative component in the market price of tradable shares in China and a large increase in float dampens speculative trading.

Capital structure adjustment behaviors of Chinese listed companies: Evidence from the Split Share Structure Reform in China

The Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR) in China aims at reducing the agency problems between state owners and non-state shareholders via conversion of state-owned non-tradable shares into tradable shares, making state-owned shares sensitive to the stock market. The premise of the paper is that these changes would promote capital structure adjustments towards target leverage to maximize firm value. The evidence supports that the Split Share Structure Reform positively affects the leverage adjustment speeds of all firms after the share conversion. The firm level evidence indicates that the firms with better corporate governance mechanism featuring lower non-tradable state ownership and independent board adjust faster, and the firms with higher growth potential and bankruptcy risk also rebalance faster than the counterparts towards the optimal leverage. Nevertheless, entrenchment effect of concentrated ownership still dominates corporate structure decisions despite the reform.

State Ownership and Earnings Management: Evidence from the Split Share Structure Reform in China

State Ownership and Earnings Management: Evidence from the Split Share Structure Reform in China

Do Economic Incentives of Controlling Shareholders Influence Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure? A Natural Experiment

We evaluate whether voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure is influenced by the economic incentives of controlling shareholders. To examine this research question, we apply the natural experiment setting based on the Split Share Structure Reform in China. Following this Reform, Chinese state shareholders are allowed to trade their shares in the stock market, which increases their incentives to maximize the market value of the firms that they control. We present empirical evidence of increased CSR disclosure among listed state-owned enterprises after this Reform. This evidence suggests that the economic incentives of key stakeholders are associated with voluntary CSR disclosures.

Institutional Investors and Equity Prices: Information, Behavioral Bias, and Arbitrage

This paper investigates how institutional investors matter for asset pricing by using daily institutional trading data and a natural experiment, the split–share structure reform in China. This reform required all listed companies to convert their non-tradable shares to tradable shares after paying a negotiated compensation. We find that: 1). Only passive institutions are privy to company-specific details: they buy (avoid) shares of companies that end up with high (low) compensation ratios on announcement day T0. 2). Trading halts after T0. On the first subsequent trading day T1, both passive domestic institutions and individuals are prone to the disposition effect: they sell a large and abnormal amount of shares in the reform companies with high unrealized gains accumulated during the non-trading period, and 3). The selling pressure drives stock prices significantly below fair values. Both active and foreign institutions take advantage of the stock undervaluation and earn significant abnormal return, which eliminate stock mispricing.

Controlling Shareholderss Incentive and Corporate Tax Avoidance A Natural Experiment in China

The split share structure reform in China aligned the incentive of controlling shareholders with that of minority shareholders by granting trading rights to previously non-tradable shares. We find that the reform increases firms’ tax avoidance activities that are value-enhancing. However, the change in tax avoidance is only observed in state-owned firms where, compared to non-state-owned firms, the agency conflict between the controlling shareholder (the government) and minority shareholders is aggravated due to the fact that the former also serves as the tax claimant. Further, this effect is more pronounced in state-owned firms that are more likely to be influenced by the government prior to the reform. Finally, the reform reinforces a positive association between tax avoidance and firm value through an improvement in governance.

CEO Accountability for Corporate Fraud: Evidence from the Split Share Structure Reform in China

We use institutional-related theories and a unique natural experiment that enables an exogenous test of the influence of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR), state shareholders held restricted shares that could not be traded. This restriction mitigated state-owned enterprise controlling shareholders’ incentives to monitor managers. The data examined show the SSSR strengthens incentives of state-owned enterprise controlling shareholders to replace fraudulent management. Our findings support the view that economic incentives are important to promote corporate governance and deter fraud.

Controlling shareholders’ incentives and executive pay-for-performance sensitivity: Evidence from the split share structure reform in China

Using the split share structure reform in China as a natural experiment, we study how changes in controlling shareholder incentive affect the pay-for-performance sensitivity. The reform converts the shares owned by controlling shareholders from non-tradable to tradable shares. The removal of such market friction allows for a better alignment of interests between controlling and minority shareholders, which gives managers more incentives to improve corporate performance. We find that the pay-for-performance sensitivity improves greatly after the reform. Changes in the pay-for-performance sensitivity are also associated with firm ownership structure, the level of agency conflicts and governance quality. Given that firms with controlling shareholders are the dominant form of business organization in many countries around the world, our results have important implications in that they show that a better alignment between controlling and minority shareholders’ incentives has a significant effect on executive compensation.

The Real and Accrual-based Earnings Management Behaviors: Evidence from the Split Share Structure Reform in China

This paper investigates the earnings management activities in Chinese listed firms and the impact of the split share structure reform (SSSREF). We demonstrate that Chinese listed firms exhibited a long-term positive relationship between real and accrual-based earnings management activities over the 2002–2011 period. This reflects the environment of weak investor protection and lack of effective corporate governance in China. Our results also indicate that the SSSREF in China has not fundamentally improved firms' quality of financial information. This may be because ownership concentration remains high. However, it is of interest that the reform has created an incentive alignment effect exogenously. We find that firms' use of discretionary accruals was constrained, and they have consequently shifted to less detectable and under-scrutinized real earnings activities after the reform. This shift is similar to that seen with the direct regulatory changes in accounting reporting rules on firms' earnings behaviors in developed countries where the investor protection environment is strong. We suggest that firms' shifting between the accrual and real-based earnings methods is an overlooked area for investors to consider in the emerging market context, and may require the attention of regulators.

Executive compensation and the split share structure reform in China

The split share structure reform in China enables state shareholders of listed firms to trade their restricted shares. This renders the wealth of state shareholders more strongly related to share price movements. We predict that this reform will create remuneration arrangements that strengthen the relationship between Chinese firms’ executive pay and stock market performance. We confirm this prediction by showing that there is such an effect among state-controlled firms, and especially those where the dominant shareholders have a greater incentive to improve share return performance. Our results indicate that this reform strengthens the accountability of executives to external monitoring by the stock market, and therefore benefits minority shareholders in China.

Does Ownership Reform Influence Executive Pay in China?

The Split Share Structure Reform in China enables state shareholders of listed firms to trade their restricted shares. This renders the wealth of state shareholders more related to share price movements. We predict this reform will create remuneration arrangements that increase the relationship between Chinese firms’ executive pay and stock market performance. We confirm this prediction by showing such effect among state-controlled firms and especially those where dominant shareholders have greater incentives to improve share return performance. Our results indicate this reform strengthens the accountability of executives to external monitoring by stock market and therefore benefit minority shareholders in China. (First version: 29 March 2010)

Float, Speculation, and Stock Price: Evidence from the Share Structure Reform in China

The Split Share Structure Reform in China offers a unique opportunity to test whether the supply of tradable shares (i.e. float) has a significant impact on the degree of speculation. After firms completed the reform, their float increased by 31% on average, while turnover and trading volume also increased substantially. We use information from firms’ reform plan to derive an estimate of the price premium of tradable shares over non-tradable shares before the reform and find that, after controlling for differences in liquidity and profitability, the price premium is significantly related to proxies for the level of speculative trading in tradable shares. Moreover, firms that were highly speculated before the reform had significantly smaller increase in turnover and trading volume than firms that were less speculated. Overall, our evidence confirms that there is a significant speculative component in the market price of tradable shares in China and a large increase in float dampens speculative trading.