Share Repurchase Announcements Research Articles

The beguiling behaviour of narcissistic CEOs: Evidence from repurchase announcements

AbstractWe study whether Chief Executive Officer (CEO) narcissism affects a firm's share repurchase announcements and their implementations. Using signature characteristics as a measure of narcissism, we find that US firms with narcissist CEOs are more likely to make repurchase announcements and announce higher repurchase dollar amounts. However, these firms are less likely to follow through. Actual repurchases by these firms are less frequent, and they use a smaller amount of cash for share buyback because they have a higher cashflow sensitivity of cash. Narcissist CEOs’ repurchase announcements are less driven by market timing and have a lower announcement effect compared to those by other CEOs. The higher rate and amount of repurchase announcements are more pronounced in poorly governed firms with narcissistic CEOs. These results are robust to various specifications including a difference‐in‐difference set‐up using CEOs’ exogenous turnover, controlling for other CEO traits and using an alternative measure of narcissism based on pronoun usage in CEO communications. Collectively, the results presented in this study demonstrate that narcissist CEOs play a critical role in the intensity of share repurchase announcements and their executions, particularly for firms with weaker governance structures.

Do Prior Financial Events to Share Repurchase Announcements Matter?

This study examines the effects of share repurchase announcements on Taiwanese firms after various financial practices and decisions from 2000 to 2020. First, we discuss whether there is a significant abnormal return on the price around share repurchase announcement. Furthermore, we explore whether firms take advantage of buyback announcements to signal the outsiders that the company’s stock price is undervalued. Second, we discuss whether the repurchase announcements have abnormal returns after financing or dividend distribution decisions as companies implement these decisions in response to future operating plans. Further, we explore whether there is a conflict between these funding operation policies and the repurchase announcement.  According to our results, there is an opposing effect between seasoned equity offering and share repurchase announcements. We found the effect of the announcement of share repurchase after a cash dividend is better than a stock dividend. The results also show that the effect of a share repurchase announcement after the issuance of convertible bonds is better than an ordinary corporate bond issue, especially the firms with a low market-to-book ratio. It means that convertible bonds can reduce liabilities if the investors convert the debt into equity and improve the company’s capital structure. JEL Codes: G14, G30

Ethical Issues Around Share Repurchase Announcements: The Role of Social Capital

Ethical Issues Around Share Repurchase Announcements: The Role of Social Capital

The Market Reaction to Repurchase Announcements

This paper investigates the drivers of the market’s reaction to share repurchase announcements in the UK and the related abnormality in stock performance. It uniquely captures the impact of globalisation in tandem with a variety of firm-level and macro-level determinants. We undertake multivariate OLS regression to test the determinants of the market’s reaction and find a negative influence when repurchases are tax-friendlier than dividends if there is high debt exposure and economic globalisation is rising, with a positive influence when the company has a history of distributing above average dividends. To quantify the short-term price abnormality, we employ event study analysis, and the findings compute positive (insignificant) stock price abnormality for nonfinancial (financial) firms. For long-term stock price abnormality, we compare against the FTSE 100 by computing annual geometric stock performances. The findings indicate a negative (insignificant) stock price abnormality for nonfinancial (financial) firms. The results can aid corporate management in improving repurchase timing, aid in the decision making of financial practitioners when trading or investing in repurchasing firms, and assist policymakers in mapping more efficient fiscal and cross-market trade frameworks.

What do market participants learn from share repurchases? Evidence from a return decomposition

This paper analyzes cash flow and cost of capital dynamics around share repurchase announcements of publicly traded US firms by decomposing stock returns into news related to cash flows and discount rates. After repurchase announcements, the cost of capital decreases significantly, while cash flows do not change. The decrease in the cost of capital is largest for firms that appear underpriced. These firms also experience the highest long-term returns after repurchase announcements. The findings suggest that market participants learn about a temporary overestimation of the cost of capital when firms announce share repurchases.

Does a Chairperson's military experience promote share repurchase? Evidence from Chinese listed companies

Although some studies have suggested that executives' military experience affects corporate decisions, whether and how it is associated with share repurchases is less well understood. Using a data set of 10,960 firm-year observations from A-share listed firms between 2005 and 2019, we found that firms run by military chairpersons are more likely to announce and implement share repurchases. In addition, we found the short-run abnormal returns of share repurchase announcements to be less favourable in firms with military chairpersons. The findings are best explained by the overconfidence hypothesis, which holds that military chairpersons are prone to overconfidence and perceive their firm's stocks as underpriced. We also found that the positive effect of chairpersons' military experiences on share repurchases is more pronounced when they have longer tenure. Moreover, we found that the involvement of grassroots committees of the Chinese Communist Party in firm decision-making could effectively restrain military chairpersons' overconfidence bias.

Ethical Issues Around Share Repurchase Announcements: the Role of Social Capital

Ethical Issues Around Share Repurchase Announcements: the Role of Social Capital

Institutional trading around repurchase announcements: An uphill battle

AbstractHighly sophisticated institutional investors are generally not profitable when trading around share repurchase announcements because they are pitted against better‐informed entities such as the firm and its insiders. The firm and its insiders know the announcement's intention and timing and enjoy regulatory exemptions regarding the timing and pricing of repurchase implementation or lack thereof. Institutions do not have the same advantages or information ex ante, but they do have access to the trades of insiders 2 days after the transaction date. We find that some institutions are profitable but only when insiders’ buying signal matches the firm's repurchase signal.

EU Regulation and open market share repurchases: new evidence

ABSTRACT This paper re-examines the impact of the EU Market Abuse Directive (MAD) on the market reaction around share repurchase announcements. We use a unique hand-collected dataset of firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange, and we find evidence that contrasts with previous conclusions for large European economies. The implementation of the MAD is followed by a significant increase in announcement abnormal returns, which is more pronounced in initial repurchase programs. Our results remain robust to a series of robustness tests. We attribute our findings to cross-country differences in institutional framework and pre-MAD existing national laws. Collectively, our results support the notion that EU directives do not have a uniform effect across Member States. Thus, the impact of such reforms should also be examined in individual capital market studies.

Share Repurchases, Risk, and Underpricing

This paper analyzes changes in firms' cash flows and discount rates around share repurchase announcements. Both cash flow and discount rate volatility decrease significantly after repurchase announcements. The decrease in volatility is smallest for firms that are likely to be underpriced and that experience the highest initial market reactions and long-term returns after the announcement. Firms with the largest decrease in volatility do not experience significantly positive long-term returns. Moreover, the level of the discount rate decreases from one quarter before until up to three years after the repurchase announcement for firms that are likely to be underpriced. The findings suggest that financial market participants learn about firms' systematic risk when firms announce share repurchases.

Time for gift giving: Abnormal share repurchase returns and uncertainty

We study share repurchase announcements for nine European countries between 2000 and 2017. In contrast to previous studies, we address the role of market uncertainty as a market-based determinant of positive average abnormal announcement returns, while including governance, liquidity risk and firm related control variables. Economic policy uncertainty and financial uncertainty, individually as well as jointly, positively affect abnormal returns. We suggest that this relation is due to a stronger signaling effect under increased uncertainty, as both information asymmetry and underpricing tend to increase. Also, a potential hedge against adverse market movements is more valuable. Optimal timing of repurchase announcements should therefore consider market uncertainty conditions.

Fund Management Structure and Conflicts of Interest: Evidence from Business Development Companies

Using the universe of Business Development Companies for the period 2006-17, we analyze the effects of fund management structure on managerial decisions and fund premiums. We show that externally managed funds trade at significantly higher discounts relative to their internally managed counterparts and they are 74% (67%) less likely to announce (execute) value enhancing share repurchase programs. We further find a significantly higher positive market reaction to share repurchase announcements of externally relative to internally managed funds. Overall, we show the benefits of internal management structure in avoiding agency costs associated with the dependence of managerial compensation on total assets.

What Drives the Declining Wealth Effect of Subsequent Share Repurchase Announcements?

Recent academic studies document that open market share repurchase announcements in the United States generate significantly lower returns than those reported in earlier studies. We find that the lower announcement return is associated with an increasing number of subsequent announcements in the more recent periods. Although the announcement period return from the initial announcement is positive, subsequent announcement returns are significantly decreasing. Further, we find that the decreasing returns of subsequent announcements are attributed to firms with negative past repurchase announcement returns. Our multivariate regression test results are consistent with the notion that the decreasing subsequent repurchase announcement returns are driven by hubris-endowed managers.

Anticipating the value of share repurchase announcements: The role of short sellers

AbstractThis study investigates whether short sellers anticipate undervaluation information before a repurchase announcement. Apart from exploring investment opportunities via searching for unfavourable information, short sellers should have the same incentive to identify favourable information to prevent potential losses. An observed significant negative relation between pre‐announcement short selling activities and announcement abnormal returns supports the informed hypothesis. This negative relation is stronger under high levels of information asymmetry, and more significant when the repurchase announcement is associated with the undervaluation.

Share repurchases and market signaling: Evidence from earnings management

AbstractFirms may repurchase shares to send true or false signals to the market. Since the mindset of managers is invisible, we measure it with earnings management. Discretionary accruals are used to proxy for earnings management. We show that earnings management is negatively related to the probability and frequency of share repurchase announcements. We also show that earnings management is negatively related to postannouncement 2‐year operating performance and stock returns. Our findings support the prediction that the magnitude of earnings management can serve as a reliable indicator of managers' mindsets with regard to the valuation of firms.

Share buybacks in India

We examine the market price and liquidity reaction to 239 share repurchase announcements in India. The average abnormal return on announcement day is 2.07 percent. Firms with larger promotor ownership stakes experience higher market reactions. Using the Amihud illiquidity measure and volume, we show that liquidity improves after the announcement. Open market repurchase programs increase market liquidity while tender offers do not. Liquidity improves more for high promotor ownership firms. Lastly, shorter duration repurchase programs improve liquidity more than longer duration programs. These results are consistent with our discussion of the pecking order of ownership structure in the low information transparency environment of India.

Operating performance and long‐run stock returns following share repurchase: Evidence from an emerging market

AbstractThis study examines the long‐term abnormal returns and operating performance following share repurchase announcements by Vietnamese listed firms. Applying matched control samples based on industry, exchange listing, size plus book‐to‐market, and pre‐event operating performance, we document significantly higher post‐repurchase buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns over the one‐year window. The outperformance becomes insignificant for most control samples with a longer horizon of 2 years after controlling for common pricing factors. Regarding operating performance, our results show improvement for repurchasing firms in the fiscal year concurrent with the repurchase announcements when we adopt the control sample based on pre‐event performance, but we do not find significant differences for the subsequent fiscal year. Examining the relation between the dual phenomena, we find some evidence of positive association in that firms with better post‐repurchase performance tend to have higher post‐event abnormal returns. This relation is stronger for firms with higher completion rates, consistent with the notion that actual repurchase is a stronger and more credible signal to the market.

Unexpected Share Repurchase Announcements

Open-market stock repurchase announcements are generally perceived by the stock market as a signal of firm undervaluation. Our study shows that repurchase announcements that were preceded by SEOs of other firms in the same industry within the prior six months (namely SEO-RPs) are more likely the result of lacking investment opportunities than signaling undervaluation, especially in concentrated industries. Specifically, we find investors response negatively to SEO-RP announcements while react positively to regular repurchase announcements. The higher the intensity of SEO activities in the industry, the more negative market reaction to SEO-RP announcements. We argue that the market doesn’t expect a repurchase announcement when other rival firms are raising more capital via SEOs. These SEO-RPs represent a negative surprise to the market and lead to a downward adjustment in value of the repurchasing firms in the announcement window. In the three-year post-announcement periods, the SEO-RP firms underperform regular repurchasing firms in both stock return and operating performance. Moreover, while regular repurchasing firms gradually increase their capital expenditures, SEO-RP firms significantly reduce their capital expenditures. These findings support our arguments that repurchase announcements that immediately follow SEOs of rival firms (SEO-RPs) more likely indicate the announcing firms entering a slower growth rate with fewer investment opportunities than signal the undervaluation problem. The underperformance in stock return and operation combined with a significant reduction in capital expenditures in the post-announcement periods are consistent with this logic and also explain why the market reacts negatively to SEO-RP announcements.

What do insiders know? Evidence from insider trading around share repurchases and SEOs

We examine the nature of information contained in insider trades prior to corporate events. Insiders' net buying increases before open market share repurchase announcements and decreases before seasoned equity offers. Higher insider net buying is associated with better post-event operating performance, a reduction in undervaluation, and, for repurchases, lower post-event cost of capital. Insider trading also predicts announcement returns and long-term abnormal returns following events. Overall, our results suggest that insider trades before corporate events contain information about changes both in fundamentals and in investor sentiment.

Does the new round of Company Law revision in China affect market reaction to share repurchase announcements?

ABSTRACT Share repurchase becomes prevalent in the recent years in China, and China gradually changes its regulatory attitude from restriction to encouragement on it. In this paper, we present that the new round of Company Law revision in China reduces the signalling role of share repurchases; however, when the firms deliver good signals on dividends payout, the negative link between regulatory changes and market reaction to share repurchases becomes weaker. The paper sheds lights on the most up-to-date regulatory change in terms of share repurchases in China and its effect on market reaction to share repurchases.