Shadow Of Trial Research Articles

Behavioral Economics in Plea-Bargain Decision-Making: Beyond the Shadow-of-Trial Model

AbstractLegal scholars have long assumed that plea bargains are contracts negotiated between rational actors who adhere to the dictates of the normative shadow-of-trial model. The two key features that rational actors presumably haggle over in the shadow of trial are the criminal charge (and associated sentence) and the probability of trial conviction. The behavioral economics theory ofdiscounting, however, offers a theoretical foundation for testing the shadow-of-trial model. This article summarizes findings from experimental discounting studies in behavioral economics and psychological science – showing that these paradigms can be successfully applied to the plea-bargaining decision context wherein the likelihood of trial is uncertain and delayed, and the plea bargain is relatively certain and immediate. We suggest that the implications of applying discounting to plea bargaining are three-fold: (1) empirical evidence suggests that the shadow-of-trial model is too narrow; (2) the discounting of non-monetary losses may involve slightly different psychological processes than contexts involving monetary outcomes; and (3) probability of conviction and delay until trial constitute situational features that elicit guilty pleas despite a defendant’s factual innocence.

The Case for a Trial Fee: What Money Can Buy in Criminal Process

Money motivates and regulates criminal process. Conscious of adjudication costs, prosecutors incentivize guilty pleas with the prospect of a “trial penalty”—harsher post-trial sentences. Budgetary considerations motivate revenue-generating enforcement policies and asset forfeitures by law enforcement. States also charge defendants directly for nearly every criminal justice expense through mandatory fees, which can burden decisions to exercise rights. Additionally, defendants can pay for optional advantages. Right-to-counsel doctrine protects the right to pay for more and better legal assistance than the state is obligated to provide. Paying bail yields pretrial liberty. Diversion programs, for a fee, can supplant ordinary prosecution. Some defendants can choose their sentence—a fine or jail. But these opportunities are not available to all; their costs need not match one’s ability to pay. To examine roles and rules of money in criminal process, this paper considers the case for an optional criminal trial fee. Defendants who pay it would directly cover public litigation costs, which would leave the state indifferent, as a budgetary matter, between trials and guilty pleas. In return, defendants would get a penalty-free trial limited to the terms of a proffered plea bargain. The fee proves a useful device because its rationale and effects accord with entrenched precedents and policies, not least in how it extends the justice system’s differential treatment based on wealth. Yet the trial fee also promises positive effects. It would reduce prosecutors’ most-criticized bargaining tactics—excessively harsh trial penalties—without undermining bargaining’s important secondary functions, enlisting informants to cooperate and rewarding defendants who accept responsibility for their crimes. And even a modest increase in fee-financed trials would yield other benefits, such as citizen participation in applying criminal law and supervising government officials, and more data about “the shadow of trial” in which bargaining takes place

Why go to court? Bargaining failure under the shadow of trial with complete information

Why do legal disputes ever go to trial? Prior research emphasizes the role of mistakes, irrationalities, or asymmetric information because rational litigants with complete or symmetric information should choose pre-trial settlements over the costs and risks of trial. Using a dynamic incomplete-contracting framework, we provide an overlooked rationale for going to court. Even though risky and costly, going to court can be both rational and socially efficient when a court decision enhances property rights and deters future costly litigation. Experimental evidence supports these predictions. Our findings provide new insights into the incidence of litigation and trial.

Lawyering in the Shadow of Data

Attorney bargaining has traditionally taken place in the shadow of trial, as litigants alter their pretrial behavior—including their willingness to negotiate a settlement — based on their forecast of the outcome at trial and associated costs. Lawyers bargaining in the shadow of trial have traditionally relied on their knowledge of precedent, intuition, and previous interactions with the presiding judge and opposing counsel to forecast trial outcomes and litigation costs. Today, however, technology for leveraging legal data is moving the practice of law into the shadow of the trends and patterns observable in aggregated litigation data. In this Article, we describe the tools that are facilitating this paradigm shift, and examine how lawyers are using them to forecast litigation outcomes and reduce Coasean bargaining costs, in both litigation and transactional scenarios. We also explore some of the risks associated with bargaining in the shadow of big data and offer guidance to lawyers for leveraging these tools to improve their practice. Our discussion pushes beyond the cartoonish image of big data as a mechanical fortuneteller that predicts who will win or lose a case, supposedly eliminating research or deliberation. We also debunk the alarmist cliches about newfangled technologies eliminating jobs. Demand for lawyers capable of effectively bargaining in the shadow of big data will continue to increase, as the legal profession catches up to the data-centric approach found in other industries. Ultimately, this Article paints a portrait of what big data really means for practicing attorneys, and provides a framework for exploring the theoretical implications of lawyering in the era of information analytics.