MLR, 101 .2, 2006 53I projected adult subject is imagined as having 'no relation to dependency, no relation to themother' (p. 86). Perhaps the most striking aspect of this essay is its emotive tone. Johnson writes of Sylvia Plath's failed attempts to tell her mother that she 'hated' her and of the 'inexpressible hurt' inflicted on her mother; she writes too of mothers 'shouldering the blame' forwhat has 'malfunctioned' in the relationship with the child. What is at stake seems tomatter (in both senses, as significance and asmateriality) more than or differently from-the ideals of aesthetic wholeness or of sexual fusion. Discussing the violence directed to and felt by mothers, Johnson notes that the construction of ideal motherhood conflicts with aworld inwhich maternal child abuse is 'very real'. Johnson's subtle readings, too, are here 'very real', powerfully engaging with affects and effects which exceed (even as they are produced by) rhetorical strategies. LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY CLAREHANSON Theoretical Inquiry: Language, Linguistics, and Literature. By AUSTIN E. QUIGLEY. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 2004. xxii+262 pp. /35. ISBN 0-300-IOI66-X. Austin Quigley's writing stresses order and balance, as in this sentence: 'The recur ring appeal of the pluralist perspective is that it recognizes and seeks to address the dangers to critical practice of unreflective monism while seeking also to avoid the alter native danger of uncontrolled relativism but the recurring challenge is to characterize the nature of a compelling and controllable alternative' (p. 20). Each substantive, and each qualifier here, reappears many times in the book, and while perhaps itsAugustan balance, opposing 'multiplicity' to relativism, is an asset for Quigley's position as a Dean at Columbia, it is certainly at the heart of his thesis, which challenges critical theory for its tendencies towards monism-reflective or unreflective-and which asks that different theories listen to each other. After an anonymously titled 'Preface' and 'Introduction', which seem to duplicate each other, he embarks on the theorists he wishes to examine: Saussure, J.R. Firth, Bakhtin, Chomsky, Halliday, andWittgen stein. These, of course, are not the theorists that critical theory leans on (with the exception of Saussure, at the heart of structural linguistics, and Bakhtin), but they are the subjects of amost scrupulous and interesting analysis, examining their rela tionships to language, and to the creation of systems of thought within linguistics, and finding each, with the exception of Wittgenstein, about whom Quigley writes excellently, imprisoned in their own system, just at the moment of their maximum achievement. The theory each of them creates cannot quite be self-sufficient, and the conclusions on page I23, that Saussure, Chomsky, and Halliday become imprisoned within abstractions which they have done their best to avoid, are very finely made. Three points and criticisms arise, none the less. The model that Quigley uses being that of language, it condemns him to a certain ahistoricism inhis use of theory, aswhen he argues, in a passage typically full of binary opposites, that 'the modern conflict between structuralism and post-structuralism is [. . .] the most recent version of ancient conflicts between authority and anarchy, necessity and freedom, monism and relativism, conviction and contingency, and belief and doubt' (p. 7 ).More critically, itmeans that he is limited to reading theory in relation to linguistics, which cuts down on what he can say about Derrida, who has an address to linguistics, but to more than that. The limited response to deconstruction shows in a refusal to quote Derrida save in the footnotes, and perhaps in too much reliance on John Ellis's Against Deconstruction (Princeton: Princeton University Press, I989). Claiming that deconstruction sees the text as 'internally multiple' (p. I6I), which, of course, comes 532 Reviews near to what he wants to argue for, save that he does not care for deconstruction, he argues that everything in Derrida is inWittgenstein. But this means not seeing what was distinctive about the 'turn to theory' of the I970s: its anti-humanism, and emphasis on the constructed nature of what counts as the 'human'. Taking Saussure's semiology, he ignores Peirce's non-linguistically based semiotics, and so has nothing to say on Deleuze, who takes Peirce as...