Sextus Empiricus Research Articles

Those Infinite, Multiform Stories without Fixity: Myth and History, a Very Long Engagement

This paper deals with the problematic relationship between ancient historiography and mythology, or mythological stories as historical sources for historical research. Although Greek historiography had, in a sense, already been confronted with the problem of mythological intrusions into the substance of methodologically well-developed historical procedures (as early as the 5th century BC), Roman historiography continued for a long time to critically investigate and purify the stories of the foundation myths. This paper presents a detailed analysis of some methodologically relevant passages that reveal the attitudes of individual Greek and Roman historiographers towards myth as a (non-)source. At the same time, it questions the attitude of (early) Roman historiography towards myth by examining the philosophical treatise of the 2nd/3rd century philosopher Sextus Empiricus.

Aristotle’s On the Good and the “Categorial Reduction Argument”

Abstract Alexander of Aphrodisias reports a series of arguments from Aristotle’s Περὶ τἀγαθοῦ purportedly deployed by Plato to defend his doctrine of principles. One of these arguments, the so-called “categorial reduction argument”, underpins the postulation of the two first principles, the One and the Great and Small, through a bipartition of all beings into two categories, labeled ‘in themselves’ and ‘opposites’. I scrutinize this argument and compare it with other Early Academic bicategorial divisions and especially with the tripartite categorial distinction, itself apparently based on material of Early Academic provenance, included in Sextus Empiricus’ Adversus Physicos 2.262-275. I argue that the Περὶ τἀγαθοῦ account of the “categorial reduction argument” leaves open certain philosophical problems, and Sextus’ report is best interpreted, rather than as a more detailed version of that account (as a common view would have it), as an alternative formulation of it that incorporates a philosophical attempt to disentangle those problems.

The argument from undecidable dissension

The five modes of suspension of judgment outlined by Sextus Empiricus (HP XV 164-188) coordinate a complex argumentative strategy to prompt the general suspension of judgment. But modes (τρόπος) are general argument forms that can be deployed individually against the dogmatist, who is willing to accept that a certain answer to a question establishes how things really are. In this case, the aim of the modes is not the general suspension of judgment but the continuation of the investigation. I present a deductive version of the mode of undecidable dissension that pinpoints some principles and assumptions the skeptics requires to run their arguments.

Skeptical Suspension in the Face of Disagreement

Abstract Pyrrhonian skeptics, according to Sextus Empiricus, suspend judgment in the face of equally strong oppositions, but they also continue to investigate. This joint characterization has puzzled scholars: Why keep investigating if the evidence demands epochē? On this point, Sextus has been accused of muddled thinking at best and incoherence at worst. In this paper, I explain how investigative activity harmonizes with the suspensive mindset. My interpretation helps to explain several puzzling features of Pyrrhonian philosophy in addition to the idea that one can both suspend judgment and continue investigating.

A Linguistic Muddle. Sextus’ Arguments against Universals at PH 2.227–8

Abstract At Outlines of Pyrrhonism (PH) 2.227–8, Sextus Empiricus argues that certain entities which his adversaries hold to be one and the same for different individuals are in fact not. This he does by, among other things, considering the truth-value of sentences of which the subject is a common noun, thereby drawing an interesting connection between metaphysics and semantics. In this article, I provide a careful analysis of Sextus’ arguments at PH 2.227–8 and explore the origins and limits of such a connection. In particular, I argue that Sextus’ argument at PH 2.227 probably reflects a Stoic argument against Aristotelian essences, thereby relying on specifically Stoic doctrines about universals and common nouns, whereas his next argument at PH 2.228 targets accidents. If this is true, it follows that the overall structure of PH 2.227–8 fits well with the typically Aristotelian distinction between essence and accident.

Did Descartes Read Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism? A Preliminary Study

ABSTRACT This article is an attempt to answer the question whether Descartes had read Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism. At first glance, the question seems trivial. This question, however, is of historico-philosophical significance in that it reveals, even if only partially, what Descartes, who is regarded as the father of early modern philosophy, inherited from his earlier intellectual legacy in formulating his own philosophy. I first compare statements from Sextus’s Outlines with corresponding statements from Descartes’s writings to identify their similarities in terms of content. This comparison focuses on their views regarding four subjects: the syllogistic, moral guidelines, the use of definitions, and true opinions. I then analyse and discuss whether the degree of similarity between these sets of statements is sufficient to conclude that the particular work of Descartes is based on Sextus’s arguments. This preliminary study can only provide indirect evidence that Descartes had read Sextus, for a thorough clarification of whether he read anything other than the works he himself stated that he had read (e.g., Cicero, Suárez), would require further circumstantial evidence, however weak it may be.

Investigation and Tranquillity in Sextus Empiricus

Abstract Sextus Empiricus tells us that the sceptics conduct investigations. Genuine investigations are commonly taken to have some connection with the aim of discovering truth. Sextus also tells us that the sceptics aim at tranquillity in their investigations. But they do this only by suspending judgement. In what sense, then, are their investigations connected with the aim of discovering truth? This article argues that there is a sense in which Sextus can reasonably take sceptical investigations to be connected with the aim of discovering truth, even though the sceptics only aim at preserving their tranquillity by suspending judgement.

SMITH, Plínio Junqueira, Sextus Empiricus Neo-Pyrrhonism: Skepticism as a Rationally Ordered Experience. (Cham, Springer, 2022, 367 pages.

SMITH, Plínio Junqueira, Sextus Empiricus Neo-Pyrrhonism: Skepticism as a Rationally Ordered Experience. (Cham, Springer, 2022, 367 pages.

О структуре философского учения Эпикура

The a rticle discusses three versions of the question of the structure of Epicurus’ philosophy. According to the fi rst version, Epicurus’ philosophical teaching consists of three parts: physics, ethics and canonics. An established tradition in the history of philosophy speaks in favor of this version. An important role in the formation of this tradition was played by such authors as Cicero, Seneca, Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius. According to the second version, Epicurus’ philosophical teaching is limited to two parts: physics and ethics. The Canonics is not considered as a separate section. It is part of physics. The basis for this version is the emphasis in the texts of Epicurus on two teachings: about nature and lifestyle. The two-part structure of epicureanism is also reported by some late Antique authors. According to the third version, the philosophical teaching of Epicurus does not have a strict division into separate parts. First of all, this is evidenced by the lack of clear statements of Epicurus about the structure of his teaching. It also follows from the texts of Epicurus that he adheres to a holistic view of philosophy, in which there is no special need to divide it into separate parts. In addition, works are attributed to Epicurus, the classifi cation of which is not reported. This may indicate a weak elaboration by Epicurus of the question of the structure of philosophical teaching. It was found that Epicurus does not share Plato’s and Aristotle’s representations about the classifi cation of sciences. Epicurus contrasts the representation of the division of sciences into theoretical, practical and productive with the opinion of the division of sciences into useful – contributing to the acquisition of serenity and useless – not contributing to the achievement of this goal. Epicurus’ disagreement with academics and peripatetics on this issue contributes to the assumption that Epicurus does not share other representations of his opponents, including the three-part structure of philosophy.

Pierre Gassendi: Humanism, Science, and the Birth of Modern Philosophy

Pierre Gassendi: Humanism, Science, and the Birth of Modern Philosophy

The Practical Price of Pyrrhonism

Sextus Empiricus presents Pyrrhonism as a skeptical lifestyle that is appealing, in large part, because of the tranquility it appears to afford. Addressing concerns about the practicality of such a lifestyle, Sextus suggests that Pyrrhonists can lead sufficiently ordinary lives while suspending belief about everything unclear. Here, I aim to offer a partial examination of the practicality and appeal of Pyrrhonism from the Pyrrhonist’s perspective. In particular, I examine how a skeptic would likely respond if asked to consider his potential use of problematic concepts in his daily life. I argue that, even if the Pyrrhonist’s skepticism is limited to certain types of controversial theoretical commitments, consideration of this issue would likely still cause him to worry that he is relying on beliefs about things unclear in his ordinary life. Along the way, I also hope to highlight some of the difficulties that a philosophically reflective person is likely to encounter if he is resistant to taking on philosophical commitments.

Shakespeare’s Epistemology and the Problem of Truth

The Encyclopedia Britannica defines epistemology as “the philosophical study of the nature, origin, and limits of human knowledge.” What, according to Shakespeare, was the origin of human knowledge? Various critics have attempted to understand Shakespeare’s epistemology, but most have ignored the blatant evidence in the plays that Shakespeare was, in fact, somewhat obsessed with epistemology. Digging deeper, it would seem that his attitude to the subject was informed by his readings of obscure Greek and Roman philosophers, especially Gorgias. But given that the man from Stratford apparently could not read Greek (it was not taught in 16th-century provincial schools), how could he have been able to read these theoretical and scholarly works? In this essay, I argue that the first Greek sophist, Gorgias, whose work is often associated with the skepticism delivered to early modern England by Sextus Empiricus, was a huge influence on the true author. I show that during the Enlightenment, there was an intellectual war between early scientists who studied nature and the ancient faithful who studied God. Shakespeare neatly skirted this dilemma by focusing on the possibility that art might itself created its own reality — one that was not immutable ‘truth’ in the traditional sense but rather a very mutable fiction that must always necessarily be viewed with suspicion. In the modern world, with the advent of ‘fake news’ — and a new and unsettling relativity concerning facts — Shakespeare’s bold experiment in epistemology becomes startlingly relevant.

Sextus and the Nature of Suspension

This article is an investigation of the nature of suspension of judgement as it is conceived by Sextus Empiricus. I carry out this investigation by examining what I take to be Sextus’ most pertinent remarks on the topic and by considering them in the context of contemporary philosophical work on the nature of suspension. Against the more frequently encountered idea that Sextus is operating with a privative conception of suspension, I argue that Sextus instead has a metacognitive account of suspension, whereby suspending constitutively involves acknowledging that one is not in a position to tell whether or not p.

HERMODORUS OF SYRACUSE AND SEXTUS EMPIRICUS’ ‘PYTHAGOREANS’ ON CATEGORIES AND PRINCIPLES

AbstractHermodorus of Syracuse, a Sicilian disciple of Plato, is reported by Simplicius to have set out a classification of beings, which is of a piece with an argument for principle monism (in Ph. 247.30–248.18 > F 5 IP2; 256.28–257.4 = F 6 IP2). A similar classification appears in Sextus Empiricus’ Aduersus mathematicos X (262–75), where it is officially ascribed to some ‘Pythagoreans’ (Πυθαγορικοί) or ‘children of the Pythagoreans’ (Πυθαγορικῶν παῖδες), but seems ultimately based on Early Academic material. Virtually all commentators have read these classifications conjointly. More radically, both have been taken to record Plato's oral teaching and to give essentially the same categorial scheme, which is regarded as the most developed instance of a so-called ‘Academic doctrine of the categories’. This article re-examines these texts and provides an alternative reading. Section 1 focusses on Hermodorus and defends three theses: (1) there was never such a thing as an ‘Academic doctrine of the categories’; (2) Hermodorus does not seem to recount what Plato said, but to propose an integrated interpretation and defence of aspects of his thought; (3) Hermodorus’ pronouncements about principles are incompatible with other testimonies on Plato's unwritten teaching, notably Aristotle's. Section 2 moves to Sextus and defends a fourth thesis: (4) despite their similarities, the classifications of Hermodorus and Sextus’ Pyrhagoreans are considerably different, though perhaps originated from the same debate.

Scepticism in African philosophy: A conversation with Jonathan Chimakonam on the notion of “arumaristics”

The significance of scepticism for philosophical inquiry appears to have been well articulated by epistemologists in diverse forms, but none to the best of my knowledge has shown its place and significance in African (epistemology) philosophy. In this article, I engage Jonathan O. Chimakonam on his notion of “arumaristics” and unveil its sceptical nature by showing that conversationalism or conversational thinking promotes scepticism in African philosophy since it requires the suspension of judgement. The problem is that Chimakonam did not explicitly indicate this sceptical dimension of his thought. I argue that since arumaruka as “doubt” is the root word of “arumaristics” which is itself the bedrock of conversationalism as a method of the conversational philosophy, then “arumaristics” is sceptical in nature and conversationalism promotes scepticism, the type that focuses on “suspension of judgement”, in African philosophy. My primary aim is to expose the importance of the method of conversational thinking as a form of scepticism in African philosophy, the significance of which is to deepen our understanding, and further propagate the value of the method of conversational thinking as articulated by Chimakonam. I discuss scepticism from the perspective of Sextus Empiricus and my method is essentially critical, expository and evaluative.

The Impact of Thomas Stanley's History of Philosophy on Margaret Cavendish

This essay argues that Thomas Stanley's magisterial History of Philosophy influenced the evolution of Margaret Cavendish's thought in ways that have not been previously recognized. While scholars have discussed Cavendish's evolving views of atomism and materialism, a comparison of her attitudes toward Pythagoras and toward skepticism before and after 1660 suggests that Cavendish adopted a more nuanced approach to skepticism—and to philosophical debate and dissent more generally—after encountering Stanley's work. Her reading of Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism in Stanley's 1660 volume may also have informed her vigorous epistolary exchanges with Joseph Glanvill on the subject of witchcraft.

Ֆալիբիլիզմի ակունքները անտիկ փիլիսոփայությունում / The Sources of Fallibilism in Ancient Philosophy

The main purpose of the article is to reveal the philosophical foundations and elements of fallibilism in the traditions of ancient philosophy and, in particular, skeptical teachings, to show the attempts of forming and applying the main principles of fallibilism in the teachings of ancient philosophers, recording the outlook and methodological importance of fallibilism in human existence and knowledge, the justification of knowledge, in the philosophical-historical process of the search for criteria of truth. To achieve the goal, the following tasks were set: to analyze the epistemological views and approaches of ancient Greek and modern philosophical teachings and authors that contributed to the formation and further development of fallibilism, and to study the outlook and methodological significance of fallibilism and its impact on different epistemological concepts and in the context of overcoming conceptual conflicts and extremes. Many original works and articles were used during the research. The research used the methods of analysis, synthesis, induction, deduction, analogy and historical comparison. The main conclusion derived from this research is that the skeptical views of many ancient Greek philosophers and especially Sextus Empiricus, Carneades, and Philo played a vital role in shaping the philosophical foundations of fallibilism and its worldviewmethodological significance. The approaches proposed by these authors facilitated the reinterpretation of classical notions of knowledge and cognition, thereby establishing alternative fallibilistic approaches to a wide range of epistemological issues. Importantly, fallibilism has historically demonstrated its significance of the outlook and methodological function in mitigating and resolving epistemological conflicts, as well as reconciling opposing and dead-end conceptual frameworks.

Sextus Empiricus’ Moral Scepticism Revisited

Pyrrhonism, named after the scepticism of Pyrrho of Elis, as one of the significant philosophical doctrines in the history of philosophy, was revived by Aenesidemus and Agrippa, and defended by Sextus Empiricus, its last follower, against criticisms in the theoretical and practical contexts. Pyrrhonian scepticism, based on three tenets as the state of equipollence, suspension of judgment and ataraxia, accepts adherence to appearances as a practical guide for life. The aim of this study is to discuss Sextus’ objections regarding two main problems, the nature of good and evil and the art of living, elaborated in Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Against the Ethicists and contemporary remarks on the subject. Thus, it will be addressed whether the sceptic way of life prescribed by Sextus is compatible with his theoretical framework and therefore, whether it can be applied in practice.

Kant and Zetetic Scepticism

This article examines Immanuel Kant’s criticism from the perspective of the preceding tradition of critical thought, with particular emphasis on Greek philosophy. Kant himself views criticism as a way to go beyond dogmatism and scepticism. On the other hand – as many researchers point out – Kant’s philosophy develops certain themes present in ancient scepticism. In the literature, there are numerous studies demonstrating Kant’s debt to the Pyrrhonian scepticism characteristic of Sextus Empiricus (ephecticism and epechism). In this article, I try to show that two different interpretations of scepticism can be formed on the basis of Sextus’ writings: zetetic scepticism and ephectic scepticism. Theinterpretation considers ἐποχή and ἰσοσθένεια as key ideas for scepticism and it is this latter option that is recognized in Kant’s thought by scholars, especially by Michael Forster. In my opinion, however, it is the first interpretation, not yet sufficiently recognized, that constitutes at least an equally strong complement to the first and may even be regarded as the proper source of Kant’s critical philosophy.

Discipulado y herencia filosófica en el pensamiento de Sexto Empírico

This paper deals with the figure of the master and the disciple in the framework of Sextus Empiricus' speculative guidelines. Each of the philosophies that the Skeptic takes up and reconstructs becomes a criticized model. Thus, the place of the master exercised by the philosophers who preceded him is systematically devastated. In this general framework, we take up in particular the case of the masters of the good life, who occupy Sextus particularly in the Pyrrhonic Sketches and in Against the Ethicists. There the operation of the skeptic finds its most radical position with respect to the possibility of setting oneself up as a teacher of others and of establishing disciplic relationships. However, the skeptical orientation cannot completely free itself from the interweaving of disciplic relationships.