Sex Discrimination Cases Research Articles

Ask a Political Scientist: A Conversation with Catharine A. MacKinnon about Power, Politics, and Political Science

Ask a Political Scientist: A Conversation with Catharine A. MacKinnon about Power, Politics, and Political Science

Appellate court assignments as a natural experiment: Gender panel effects in sex discrimination cases

AbstractThis paper argues that estimating causal effects on US Appellate Court panels can be advanced by analyzing the data as a series of natural experiments, fully exploiting the as‐if random assignment of judges to cases. As a template, this paper reanalyzes Boyd et al.'s data on sex‐discrimination cases. The question is the impact on the votes by male judges from having a female judge on their panel. Leverage from as‐if random assignment can be exploited only by restricting comparisons of treatments cases (in the example, female co‐panelist) exclusively to control cases (all‐male panels) from the same period and time period from which the treatment cases are drawn. With as‐if random assignment reducing the possibility of a biased estimate, the results confirms a gender panel effect similar in size to the claim by Boyd et al. Restricting comparisons to within the same circuit and time period further advances understanding of the causal mechanism. When male or female judges side with female plaintiffs, the females are more persuasive at swaying the votes of their male co‐panelists' votes.

What is equality? Investigating sex equality under law through a feminist jurisprudential lens

In this paper I aim to analyse conceptions of sex equality under law, and its discontents through a feminist jurisprudential lens. I firstly lay down the core ideas of feminist jurisprudence and then proceed to use that framework to analyse and discuss various Indian cases that involve a question of sex discrimination. Finally I trace the development of court’s reasoning in sex discrimination cases from a separate sphere theory approach to a transformative understanding of equality.

"Sears Discriminated against Me because of My Sex and Race": African American Women Workers, Title VII, and the Sears Sex Discrimination Case

"Sears Discriminated against Me because of My Sex and Race": African American Women Workers, Title VII, and the Sears Sex Discrimination Case

About the Contributors

About the Contributors

Resolving the Great Divide in Pregnancy Discrimination

The Supreme Court granted certiorari on July 1, 2014, in the Fourth Circuit case of Young v. United Parcel Service, to resolve a fundamental disagreement between the federal courts of appeals over the extent to which employers are required to provide reasonable accommodations to pregnant workers under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978. Prior to granting certiorari, the Supreme Court invited the Solicitor General to submit an amicus curiae brief providing the position of the United States. It was the opinion of the Solicitor General that the Fourth Circuit “erred in holding that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case of pregnancy-related sex discrimination,” and moreover that “[a] majority of the courts of appeals…to have considered claims similar to petitioner’s have erred” in interpreting the second clause of the PDA. If the Court agrees with the opinion of the Solicitor General, its decision will reverse the current approach in the majority of federal circuits, thereby substantially altering the litigation of pregnancy discrimination claims.

Risky Arguments in Social-Justice Litigation: The Case of Sex Discrimination and Marriage Equality

This Essay takes up the puzzle of the risky argument or, more precisely, the puzzle of why certain arguments do not get much traction in advocacy and adjudication even when some judges find them to be utterly convincing. Through a close examination of the sex discrimination argument’s evanescence in contemporary marriage litigation, this Essay draws lessons about how and why arguments become risky in social-justice cases and whether they should be made nonetheless. The marriage context is particularly fruitful because some judges, advocates, and scholars find it “obviously correct” that laws excluding same-sex couples from marriage discriminate facially based on sex or impose sex stereotypes. Yet advocates have tended to minimize these arguments and most judges either sidestep or go out of their way to reject them. Certain kinds of arguments, including the sex-discrimination argument in marriage cases, turn out to pose greater risks than others because they ask decisionmakers to confront long-settled social hierarchies and norms, such as those associated with gender roles. As a result, they risk inciting Burkean anxieties about the dangers of nonincremental change. Arguments that ask less of decisionmakers, such as those about animus associated with a particular enactment—or that have a more limited reach, such as heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation at a time when few explicitly antigay laws remain—are less likely to provoke that discomfort. Moreover, a win on these narrower arguments can also erode stereotypes and norms underlying a challenged law or social policy. In marriage cases, for example, a pro-equality ruling helps call longstanding marital gender roles into question even if the court’s decision never mentions sex discrimination. Still, risky arguments add value within litigation by powerfully calling attention to deep problems that underlie a challenged law. Through close study of these costs and benefits, the risky-argument frame advanced here aims to illuminate the complex dynamics of argumentation in the litigation and adjudication of social-justice cases.

Whiteness at Work

How do courts understand Whiteness in Title VII litigation? This Article argues that one fruitful site for such examination is same-race discrimination cases between Whites. Such cases offer a peek into what enables regimes of Whiteness and White supremacy in the workplace, and the way in which Whiteness is theorized within Title VII adjudication. Intra-White discrimination cases may range from associational discrimination cases to cases involving discrimination against poor rural Whites, often referred to as “White trash.” While intragroup discrimination is acknowledged in sex-discrimination cases and race-discrimination cases within racial minority groups, same-race discrimination between Whites is currently an under-theorized phenomenon. This Article maps current cases dealing with racial discrimination between Whites, arguing that these cases suffer from under-theorization stemming from courts’ tendency to de-racialize Whiteness and see White people as ‘not being of any race.’ This tendency has led to a limited doctrine of same-race discrimination between Whites, affording it recognition only when racial minorities are involved. Acknowledging Whiteness as a racial project— the product of White supremacy—may enable courts to better theorize intra-White discrimination. Such possible theorization is developed via the stereotype doctrine. Accordingly, same-race discrimination and/or harassment between Whites is often a result of Whites policing other Whites to conform to stereotypes and expectations regarding Whiteness, i.e., how White people should act or with whom they may associate. Recognizing dynamics of intra-White racialization and the racial work behind Whiteness, this Article concludes, is aligned with Title VII’s antisubordination goals, as it is in the interest of racial minorities as well.

When the Shadow Is the Substance: Judge Gender and the Outcomes of Workplace Sex Discrimination Cases

The number of workplace sex discrimination charges filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission approaches 25,000 annually. Do the subsequent judicial proceedings suffer from a discrimina...

The equal opportunity harasser, sexual harassment, gender-neutral words, and Ludwig Wittgenstein

The equal opportunity harasser (EOH) in sex discrimination cases is an employer who harasses both male and female employees alike. The EOH principle postulates that equal harassment of both genders equates to an absence of disparate treatment and therefore an absence of the discriminatory conduct necessary to violate antidiscrimination laws. In comparing the equality of the harassment, courts have generally focused on external indicators consisting mainly of perceptible manifestations of the harassment, such as the number of harassing episodes, the nature of the harassment, and most, notably, the words used during such episodes. This note’s focus is on the words used during the harassment. Its premise maintains that the external indicators analysis fails to consider implicit indicators, that is, the societal hierarchy and norms which shape the persons’ sentiments long before the employer employee relationship is formed. It is this less palpable background which lends meaning to the words used during the harassment. This note suggests that the most viable standard should hold the presumption that even apparently gender-neutral words are virtually inexorably due to sex, accordingly, the equal EOH should be per se rejected.

The Signaling Effect of Pro se Status

When claimants press their claims without counsel, they fail at virtually every stage of civil litigation and overwhelmingly fail to obtain meaningful access to justice. This research program harnesses psychological science to experimentally test a novel hypothesis: mainly, a claimant's pro se status itself sends a signal that biases decision making about the claimant and her claim. We conducted social psychological experiments with the public (N = 157), law students (N = 198), and employment discrimination lawyers (N = 39), holding the quality and merit of a Title VII sex discrimination case constant. In so doing, we examined whether a claimant's pro se status itself shapes stereotypes held about the claimant and biases decision making about settlement awards. These experiments reveal that pro se status influences stereotypes of claimants and settlement awards received. Moreover, the signaling effect of pro se status is exacerbated by socialization in the legal profession. Among law-trained individuals (i.e., law students and lawyers), a claimant's pro se status generates negative stereotypes about the claimant and these negative stereotypes explain the adverse effect of pro se status on decision making about settlement awards.

Unifying Antidiscrimination Law through Stereotype Theory

Has litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reached the limit of its utility in advancing workplace equality? After four decades of forward progress on antidiscrimination law in the courts, Supreme Court decisions in the last decade have signaled a retrenchment, disapproving of key theories scholars and advocates had pursued to address workplace discrimination in its modern, more subtle and structural forms. Yet sex and race inequality at work endure, particularly in pay and at the top of organizations. Notably, while the Roberts Court majority appears skeptical that discrimination persists and resistant to recognizing the role of employers in continued inequality, one subset of discrimination cases has enjoyed relative success in the courts: sex discrimination cases relying on the legal theory of sex stereotyping. In particular, plaintiffs alleging that they were discriminated against at work based on the operation of sex stereotypes related to family caregiving responsibilities or transgender status have pushed federal appellate and district courts toward a contemporary understanding of the operation of bias. Despite this unusual success during an otherwise bleak period in antidiscrimination law, advances in caregiver and transgender discrimination lawsuits remain on the margins, siloed in their own category of litigation. This Article argues that theoretical and doctrinal advances in sex stereotyping cases have broad application, with the potential to reinvigorate employment discrimination litigation under Title VII as a whole. The Article suggests that precedent from pioneering sex discrimination cases can and should be applied to cases alleging discrimination on other bases, including race and national origin. It proposes a more coherent, unified approach to antidiscrimination law that capitalizes on recent courts’ recognition of the operation of sex stereotypes at work. In an era in which the advancement of equality has stalled in both the workplace and the Supreme Court, a unified approach to Title VII litigation framed around stereotype theory offers an important path forward for antidiscrimination law.

Risky Arguments in Social - Justice Litigation: the Case of Sex Discrimination and Marriage Equality

This Essay takes up the puzzle of the risky argument or, more precisely, the puzzle of why certain arguments do not get much traction in advocacy and adjudication even when some judges find them to be utterly convincing. Through a close examination of the sex discrimination argument’s evanescence in contemporary marriage litigation, I draw lessons about how and why arguments become risky in social justice cases and whether they should be made nonetheless. This context is particularly fruitful because some judges, advocates and scholars find it “obviously correct” that laws excluding same-sex couples from marriage discriminate facially based on sex or impose sex stereotypes. Yet advocates have tended to minimize these arguments and most judges either sidestep or go out of their way to reject them.Certain kinds of arguments, including the sex discrimination argument in marriage cases, turn out to pose greater risks than others because they ask decisionmakers to confront long-settled social hierarchies and norms, such as those associated with gender roles. As a result, they risk inciting Burkean anxieties about the dangers of non-incremental change. Arguments that ask less of decisionmakers, such as those about animus associated with a particular enactment – or that have a more limited reach, such as heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation at a time when few explicitly antigay laws remain – are less likely to provoke that discomfort. Moreover, a win on these narrower arguments can effectively erode stereotypes and norms underlying a challenged law or social policy. In marriage cases, for example, a pro-equality ruling helps call longstanding marital gender roles into question even if the court’s decision never mentions sex discrimination. Still, risky arguments add value within litigation by powerfully calling attention to deep problems that underlie a challenged law. Through close study of these costs and benefits, the risky argument frame advanced here aims to illuminate the complex dynamics of argumentation in the litigation and adjudication of social justice cases.

Trailblazers and Those That Followed: Personal Experiences, Gender, and Judicial Empathy

This article investigates one causal mechanism that may explain why female judges on the federal appellate courts are more likely than men to side with plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases. To test whether personal experiences with inequality are related to empathetic responses to the claims of female plaintiffs, we focus on the first wave of female judges, who attended law school during a time of severe gender inequality. We find that female judges are more likely than their male colleagues to support plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases, but that this difference is seen only in judges who graduated law school between 1954 and 1975 and disappears when more recent law school cohorts of men and women judges are compared. These results suggest that the effect of gender as a trait is tied to the role of formative experiences with discrimination.

Testing Appellate Court Assignments as a Natural Experiment: Gender Induced Panel Effects in Sex-Discrimination Cases

The random assignment of judges in the US Appellate Courts has been underutilized in the study of court panel effects. The present study treats case assignment in the US Appellate Courts as a natural experiment, testing for panel effects of female judges in Title VII sex discrimination cases, comparing the votes of male fellow-panelists when the treatment judge is a female with the votes of fellow-panelists of the control judges who are male and of the same party as the female judge. All comparisons are within the same circuit and within the same two-year time window. The paper finds support for strong panel effects - that female judges influence the votes of male judges to be more liberal on sex discrimination cases.

The Evolution of Employment Discrimination Law: Changed Doctrine for Changed Social Conditions

Times change, and when they do, the law must as well. Much of the most important employment discrimination case law was established in the 1970s during an era when discrimination was both overt and pervasive. Moving forward forty years, discrimination has receded dramatically and is no longer seen as a default explanation for workplace decisions or statistical imbalances in a workforce. At the same time, the discrimination that remains is more complex, more subtle in nature and more difficult to identify. This article explores how the Supreme Court has navigated the declining but more complex nature of employment discrimination. In a series of recent cases, including the landmark sex discrimination case of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the Supreme Court has embarked on a judicial updating of the foundation of employment discrimination law with the Court quietly announcing that the old case law no longer fits contemporary claims of discrimination. In other words, what counted as discrimination in the 1970s no longer does today. Despite the criticism the Court has received for its decisions, I conclude that the Court was right to shed its old doctrine as the inferences of discrimination that were permissible during an earlier era fail to account for our changed social conditions. The real problem with the Court’s recent updating of the doctrine is not the shedding of the old but what it has left in its place – the Supreme Court has failed to adapt its doctrine to capture the complexities of modern discrimination, thus leaving a substantial gap between what the law defines as discrimination and what we know about the difficulties of uncovering subtle discrimination. This article also critiques the recent academic emphasis on “implicit bias” and instead offers some suggestions for moving forward in a way that might better adapt the legal doctrine to the complexities of modern discrimination. This includes the use of testers to document workplace discrimination, more emphasis on educating courts and jurors regarding the nature of subtle discrimination (not implicit bias) and the role employer self-interests might play in bringing greater diversity to the workplace.

Gender & Justice: Why Women in the Judiciary Really Matter. By Sally J. Kenney. New York and London, UK: Routledge, 2013. 310 pp. $35.95 paper.

Gender & Justice: Why Women in the Judiciary Really Matter. By Sally J. Kenney. New York and London, UK: Routledge, 2013. 310 pp. $35.95 paper.Political scientist Sally J. Kenney's recent book, Gender & Justice: Why Women in the Judiciary Really Matter, does more than simply make the case for a gender diverse judiciary. She also suggests how to accomplish this by using case studies from a variety of countries as examples of what has and has not worked. Ultimately relying on arguments used to diversify American juries, Kenney criticizes some feminists' strategies, including reliance on argu- ments that women will somehow judge cases differently. Instead, Kenney persuasively makes the case that using arguments that gender diversity strengthens the legitimacy of the judiciary is more effective and does not lead to the same essentialist pitfalls that result from arguments regarding differences between male and female judging.Kenney suggests that gender is best understood as a social process (p. 41). Arguments about differences between men and women are both essentialist and not supported by the work of political scientists who examine American judges' voting patterns. As Kenney's painstaking review of the literature shows, she is correct in this assessment. Aside from sex discrimination cases, there is little evidence that women decide cases differently than men. Yet, political scientists and other feminists continue to focus their efforts on this difference. Kenney acknowledges concerns that if women do not make a difference in case outcomes, why bother appointing them (p. 43)? It takes Kenney several chapters to address this question.Kenney takes the reader through some examples of attempts to diversify the bench, including the experience of state and federal court judges, and judges in the United Kingdom and European Court of Justice (ECJ). Kenney begins with Rosalie Wahl, the first woman justice appointed to the Supreme Court of Minnesota. Wahl's case marshaled the emotions of women in Minnesota, cre- ating a harmonic convergence whereby the governor, who was committed to appointing a woman, had the backing to make Wahl's appointment a reality. Kenney's reliance on emotions as a rallying point is somewhat ironic. While eschewing essentialism, Kenney suggests that women candidates are most successful when they emotionally connect with other women and feminist men. This plays into stereotypes that women are more emotional and less rational, a misperception (along with the myth that women are less qualified) often used to keep women off the bench.Using the Carter Administration as an example, Kenney's chapter on the federal bench is particularly edifying in identifying a successful strategy for appointing women. President Carter appointed a record number of non-traditional judges. The com- bination of an executive branch that was dedicated to diversity, including insiders within the administration who persistently pushed for women judges, along with pressure from outsider femi- nist groups, led to these successes. Kenney is clear that feminists who argue against becoming insiders, because the inside is inher- ently patriarchal, are wrongheaded. As the Carter example shows, insiders can act as valuable allies in bringing about feminist reforms, including diversifying the bench.In Chapters 5 and 6, Kenney moves to the experience of the United Kingdom and the ECJ. These chapters are somewhat con- fusing to read because Kenney jumps back and forth in time in describing various attempts to appoint female judges. …

Introduction: Symposium Honoring the Advocacy, Scholarship, and Jurisprudence of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg

I want to welcome back Justice Ginsburg to Columbia School. She has been a frequent visitor since her time here as a student in the late 1950s and again as a member of our faculty in the 1970s. I know she knows, but it is worth reiterating that she always has a home here at Columbia. Forty years and two weeks ago, on January 24, 1972, the Columbia School student newspaper reported an exciting development in the history of the law school-Dean Michael Sovern had announced the hiring of the first woman with full tenure to our law faculty. Under the headline Faculty Selects First Woman Member, the students wrote that Ginsberg--spelling her name wrong--currently a professor at Harvard will be the first woman to hold a tenured professorship here. It is expected that she will teach courses in procedure, which is her specialty, as well as one course and one clinical seminar on Sex Discrimination. The article here, and later on, framed Ruth Ginsburg's expertise as procedure, not sex discrimination--and in fact she had been working with Hans Smit, whose passing we memorialized yesterday, on the Columbia Project on International Procedure. Mike Sovern told me yesterday that when he made her the offer to join the faculty, she insisted that she would come only if she could teach Civil Procedure--something the law school did not need as we already had a deep bench in that area. But she was adamant and he relented. Just below the article announcing Ginsburg's hiring was another piece describing how the law school's Rights Group had been holding a non-credit Women and the Law series where outside experts would be coming in to lecture the students on topics such as Equal Protection, Government Benefits, Abortion and Other Controls of the Body, and Fair Employment. Given that prior to Ruth Ginsburg's hiring there was no one on the law faculty who could teach these issues, the students took it into their own hands and brought in outside experts to fill in the substantial gap in the faculty's expertise. The New York Times covered Ginsburg's hiring at Columbia and congratulated Columbia for having a prize! (1) I must say The New York Times has not given as much enthusiastic attention to our hiring decisions since then. She wasted no time getting involved in gender-equity issues close to home at the University. Within her first month here, she learned that as a cost-saving matter the University was planning to lay off twenty-five maids but no janitors. She took this issue on and in the end no one--male or female--lost their jobs. She also supported a comprehensive pay equity salary study, the extension of health insurance coverage for pregnancy, and the equalization of benefits paid to retired male and female employees under the TIAA-CREF plan--since women lived longer, we received smaller monthly payments. We snared a prize indeed! Professor Ginsburg distinguished herself at Columbia for skill in melding her teaching, scholarship, and advocacy. Over her eight years on our faculty, she taught a course called Women's Rights: Sex Discrimination and the and collaborated in the writing of the first case book in this area--Henna Hill Kay will be talking about the book this afternoon. And, as if starting a new teaching job, writing a case book, agitating for women's rights on campus, serving in the leadership of many professional committees, and being mother to two young children weren't enough, she also founded the ACLU's Women's Rights Project and litigated some of the most important gender-equality cases of the modern era. Between 1972 and 1980, she filed briefs in nine of the major sex discrimination cases decided by the Supreme Court and personally argued six of them, winning all but one. She also filed amicus briefs in fifteen related cases. Along the way, she became one of the principal architects of the constitutional paradigm of sex equality we have inherited today. …

In Re Nicholas Raymond InnerbichlerCase No. BAP No. NM-12-032, BAP No. NM-12-038, Bankr. No. 09-12437, Adv. No. 09-01126, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 727 (10th Circuit U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, February 25, 2013)

Gaming Law Review and EconomicsVol. 17, No. 5 CasesIn Re Nicholas Raymond InnerbichlerCase No. BAP No. NM-12-032, BAP No. NM-12-038, Bankr. No. 09-12437, Adv. No. 09-01126, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 727 (10th Circuit U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, February 25, 2013)Published Online:7 Jun 2013https://doi.org/10.1089/glre.2013.17512AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB Permissions & CitationsPermissionsDownload CitationsTrack CitationsAdd to favorites Back To Publication ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail FiguresReferencesRelatedDetailsCited byBetting on Farms: Feasible Chapter 12 PlansSSRN Electronic Journal, Vol. 539Disrupting Frivolous DefensesSSRN Electronic Journal, Vol. 276The Law and Economics of Investing in Bankruptcy in the United StatesSSRN Electronic JournalBankruptcy and Entrepreneurs: In Search of an Optimal Failure Resolution SystemSSRN Electronic JournalComments of Academics to Department of Education's RFI Regarding Evaluating Undue Hardship Claims in Adversary Actions Seeking Student Loan Discharge in Bankruptcy Proceedings (Docket No. Edd20177Opee0085)SSRN Electronic JournalA Legal Response to the Sovereign Citizen MovementSSRN Electronic Journal, Vol. 620The Consequences of a Relic's Codification: The Dubious Case for Bad Faith Dismissals of Involuntary Bankruptcy PetitionsSSRN Electronic JournalThe Abolition of Dysfunctional Contracts in Bankruptcy ReorganizationsSSRN Electronic JournalPositive Equity Prices with Insolvency under Legal Solvency TestsSSRN Electronic JournalExamining SuccessSSRN Electronic JournalWill Your Veil Be Pierced? How Strong is Your Entityys Liability Shield? Piercing the Veil, Alter Ego, and Other Bases for Holding an Owner Liable for Debts of an EntitySSRN Electronic JournalRisky Arguments in Social - Justice Litigation: the Case of Sex Discrimination and Marriage EqualitySSRN Electronic JournalWho Bears the Cost? The Necessity of Taxpayer Participation in Chapter 9SSRN Electronic JournalUCC InsuranceSSRN Electronic JournalAt a Crossroads: Lessons from the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP)SSRN Electronic Journal, Vol. 17Improving Fraudulent Transfer Law in Leverage Buy-Outs Through Judicial Certainty & ReliabilitySSRN Electronic JournalImproving Bankruptcy Sales by Raising the Bar: Imposing a Preliminary Injunction Standard for Objections to Section 363 SalesSSRN Electronic JournalDefending the Current State of Section 363 SalesSSRN Electronic JournalAn Empirical Analysis of Modern Forum Shopping in Bankruptcy and Solutions to the Venue Market FailureSSRN Electronic JournalInterpreting the Supreme Court’s Treatment of the Chrysler Bankruptcy and its Impact on Future Business ReorganizationsSSRN Electronic JournalIqbal 'Plausibility' in Pharmaceutical and Medical Device LitigationSSRN Electronic JournalThe Corporate/Securities Attorney as a 'Moving Target' - Client Fraud DilemmasSSRN Electronic JournalIncome Tax Claims in the Year of Bankruptcy: A Congressionally Created QuagmireSSRN Electronic JournalBankruptcy Law and Inefficient EntitlementsSSRN Electronic JournalFinancing Intellectual Property Under Federal Law: A National ImperativeSSRN Electronic JournalMuddy Property: Generating and Protecting Information Privacy Norms in BankruptcySSRN Electronic JournalOffshore Asset Protection Trusts: Having Your Cake and Eating it TooSSRN Electronic Journal Volume 17Issue 5Jun 2013 InformationCopyright 2013, Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.To cite this article:In Re Nicholas Raymond InnerbichlerCase No. BAP No. NM-12-032, BAP No. NM-12-038, Bankr. No. 09-12437, Adv. No. 09-01126, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 727 (10th Circuit U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, February 25, 2013).Gaming Law Review and Economics.Jun 2013.371-376.http://doi.org/10.1089/glre.2013.17512Published in Volume: 17 Issue 5: June 7, 2013PDF download

Rethinking Critical Mass in the Federal Appellate Courts

This article draws from critical mass studies of gender in other political institutions to inform an application to the US Courts of Appeals. The results demonstrate the utility of considering court-level aspects of diversity. As mixed-sex panels become more common within a circuit, both male and female judges increasingly support plaintiffs in civil rights claims, though the magnitude of the effect is larger for women. The presence of a female chief judge is also positively associated with pro-plaintiff decisions by men and women in sex discrimination cases.