The Inner Cabinet's decision for arbitration on Taba represents not only chance of rescuing peace with Egypt but also danger of that peace's final destruction. Whoever thinks that Taba was reason peace with Egypt was shaky is only deluding himself. Peace with Egypt was jeopardized because second Likud government wanted to use Sinai agreements to free itself for its Palestinian policy: a policy of aggressive settlement in territories in order to implement a de facto annexation, and later fight against in territories (which has continued until now), and of course Lebanon war. Taba is just cover, not core, of matter. Only now are we getting down to basics. A solution to Taba problem is like withdrawal from Lebanon: long-term importance of both lies in clearing table so as to approach a solution to Palestinian problem. The decision to solve Taba problem through arbitration opens an opportunity for momentum on Palestinian issue, hence its importance. The danger is that Likud also understands this and Likud Inner Cabinet ministers raised their hands in support of decision not because they are seeking a solution of Taba problem but because they want to remove last obstacle prior to rotation. If their expectations materialize, peace with Egypt will die even if we return Taba according to arbiter's ruling, because Taba is not main point. The main point is Palestinian problem. The Likud may honor arbiter's ruling but will immediately launch a new round of settlements, using as a basis for this stiff anti-PLO policy in territories prepared by Labor party defense minister. In other words, arbitration decision promotes chances for renewed peace with Egypt, but at same time greater likelihood that rotation will take place threatens to deal a final blow to peace. The question is, what can be done to save peace during short time left before rotation? Prime Minister Peres pointed to answer in Jerusalem this past week: now is time to initiate political momentum vis-a-vis Jordan and Palestinians. In coming months we must reach a point of no-return in promoting peace on eastern front; then, even if Shamir assumes prime minister's position, he will have to accept fait accompli. One of major reasons for Hussein's wavering is his assessment that Israeli prime minister lacks determination not to implement rotation. The Israeli prime minister's allowing himself to be pulled into Likud's world of imagery and expressions, especially its threats regarding the PLO commands in Amman, and his consistent policy until Taba decision to seek a compromise with Likud in every crisis, were some of important factors that led king to Damascus. In this respect, a priority for Israeli policy (the Labor party line), is to create trust in seriousness of Israel's intentions. The rotation is within Likud's reach but it is absolutely necessary to convince Hussein that all is not lost and that in time left, it is possible to establish realities in territories that will prevent Likud from torpedoing peace. These realities may also lead to a new, unexpected, but real crisis with Likud over Palestinian problem. Peres' lack of determination on rotation affair was one reason for Hussein's wavering. Another reason was his difficulties on eastern front with PLO