Sequential Elections Research Articles

Why do voters elect less qualified candidates?

Voters sometimes vote for seemingly less-qualified candidates. To explain this fact, we develop a political agency model with sequential elections in which a voter elects a politician among candidates with different competence (valence) levels, considering that politicians’ representation of voters’ preferences depends on their competence levels. We show that a negative relationship exists between politicians’ competence and their representation when a future challenger is likely to be incompetent and the reward for politicians is small. We also highlight voters’ private information on how they evaluate candidates’ competence, demonstrating that voters’ demand for incompetent candidates can be a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The complexity of online bribery in sequential elections

Prior work on the complexity of bribery assumes that the bribery happens simultaneously, and that the briber has full knowledge of all votes. However, in many real-world settings votes come in sequentially, and the briber may have a use-it-or-lose-it moment to decide whether to alter a given vote, and when making that decision the briber may not know what votes remaining voters will cast. We introduce a model for, and initiate the study of, bribery in such an online, sequential setting. We show that even for election systems whose winner-determination problem is polynomial-time computable, an online, sequential setting may vastly increase the complexity of bribery, jumping the problem up to completeness for high levels of the polynomial hierarchy or even PSPACE. But we also show that for some natural, important election systems, such a dramatic complexity increase does not occur, and we pinpoint the complexity of their bribery problems.

Control complexity in Borda elections: Solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control

Borda Count is one of the earliest and most important voting rules and has been central to many applications in artificial intelligence. We study the problem of control in Borda elections where an election chair seeks to either make a designated candidate win (constructive case), or prevent her from winning (destructive case), via actions such as adding, deleting, or partitioning either candidates or voters. These scenarios have been studied for many voting rules and the related control problems have been classified in terms of their computational complexity. However, for one of the most prominent natural voting rules, the Borda Count, complexity results have been known for only half of these cases until recently. We settle the complexity for all missing cases, focusing on the unique-winner model. We also exhibit two of the very rare cases where the complexity of control problems differs depending on the winner model chosen: For destructive control by partition and by run-off partition of candidates when ties promote, Borda is resistant in the unique-winner model (i.e., these two control problems are NP-hard), yet is vulnerable in the nonunique-winner model (i.e., one can decide in polynomial time whether control is possible). Finally, we turn to the model of online control in sequential elections that was recently proposed by Hemaspaandra et al. [62,61]. We show that sequential Borda elections are vulnerable to constructive and destructive online control by adding or deleting candidates, whereas we obtain coNP-hardness results for all types of online voter control in sequential Borda elections.

Soft clustering by convex electoral model

In this paper, we suggest a new technique for soft clustering of multidimensional data. It is based on a new convex voting model, where each voter chooses a party with certain probability depending on the divergence between his/her preferences and the position of the party. The parties can react on the results of polls by changing their positions. We prove that under some natural assumptions this system has a unique fixed point, providing a unique solution for soft clustering. The solution of our model can be found either by imitation of the sequential elections, or by direct minimization of a convex potential function. In both cases, the methods converge linearly to the solution. We provide our methods with worst-case complexity bounds. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first polynomial-time complexity results in this field.

The Complexity of Online Bribery in Sequential Elections (Extended Abstract)

Prior work on the complexity of bribery assumes that the bribery happens simultaneously, and that the briber has full knowledge of all voters' votes. But neither of those assumptions always holds. In many real-world settings, votes come in sequentially, and the briber may have a use-it-or-lose-it moment to decide whether to bribe/alter a given vote, and at the time of making that decision, the briber may not know what votes remaining voters are planning on casting. In this paper, we introduce a model for, and initiate the study of, bribery in such an online, sequential setting. We show that even for election systems whose winner-determination problem is polynomial-time computable, an online, sequential setting may vastly increase the complexity of bribery, in fact jumping the problem up to completeness for high levels of the polynomial hierarchy or even PSPACE. On the other hand, we show that for some natural, important election systems, such a dramatic complexity increase does not occur, and we pinpoint the complexity of their bribery problems in the online, sequential setting.

Making gender quota mechanics work: a paired comparison of Brazil and Peru

ABSTRACTWhy do similar quotas affect descriptive representation differently and different quotas produce similar results across states? Extant research posits that quota mechanics, which include quota design features and enforcement mechanisms, shape election outcomes. Quota mechanics uses electoral cycles as a common framework with critical junctures for cross-national comparison. A paired comparison of quota mechanics in Brazil and Peru juxtaposes an analysis of their similar 30 percent legislated quotas in sequential election cycles to identify differences that shape their divergent levels of descriptive representation. The findings suggest that quotas can foster critical mass representation in open-list proportional representation systems with the knowledge of quota mechanics. In other words, an understanding of how thresholds, placement mandates and voting procedures shape different stages of the electoral process and of how enforcement is a crucial component for an effective quota. The conclusion summarizes the benefits of the paired-comparison model, in particular for the large number of open-list proportional representation systems worldwide, and future research should further explore the quota mechanics across the world to better understand the process of political representation.

The complexity of online voter control in sequential elections

Previous work on voter control, which refers to situations where a chair seeks to change the outcome of an election by deleting, adding, or partitioning voters, takes for granted that the chair knows all the voters’ preferences and that all votes are cast simultaneously. However, elections are often held sequentially and the chair thus knows only the previously cast votes and not the future ones, yet needs to decide instantaneously which control action to take. We introduce a framework that models online voter control in sequential elections. We show that the related problems can be much harder than in the standard (non-online) case: For certain election systems, even with efficient winner problems, online control by deleting, adding, or partitioning voters is \(\mathrm {PSPACE}\)-complete, even if there are only two candidates. In addition, we obtain (by a new characterization of coNP in terms of weight-bounded alternating Turing machines) completeness for \({\mathrm {coNP}}\) in the deleting/adding cases with a bounded deletion/addition limit, and we obtain completeness for \({\mathrm {NP}}\) in the partition cases with an additional restriction. We also show that for plurality, online control by deleting or adding voters is in \({\mathrm {P}}\), and for partitioning voters is \({\mathrm {coNP}}\)-hard.

Presidential Primary Turnout 1972–2016

ABSTRACTWe explore the implications of sequential presidential primary elections for turnout in selecting the presidential party nominees. Drawing from a micro-level theory of participation in sequential elections, we develop a set of aggregate-level hypotheses that tease out different ways that candidate mobilization efforts as well as the legal and institutional structures within a sequential contest influence turnout in presidential nomination contests. Using data from all state primary elections from 1972–2016, we find that electorates facing winnowed candidate pools, and those with contests after the effective endings to presidential contests have substantially reduced turnout that effectively disenfranchises voters in many states. Sequenced primary elections lead to lower overall turnout and less meaningful participation for many voters during presidential nominations contests.

SEQUENTIAL OR SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS? A WELFARE ANALYSIS

Should all voters vote on the same day or should elections be staggered? Using a model of voting and social learning, we illustrate that sequential elections place too much weight on early states but also provide late voters with valuable information. Simultaneous elections equally weigh states but place too much weight on voter priors, providing an inappropriate advantage to front‐runners. Simultaneous elections are thus preferred if the front‐runner advantage is small, but sequential elections are preferred if the advantage is large. Our quantitative welfare analysis of presidential primaries suggests that simultaneous systems slightly outperform sequential systems.

Super Tuesday: campaign finance and the dynamics of sequential elections

I develop a model of campaign finance in primary elections in which campaigns, which supply hard information about candidates’ electability, must be financed by strategic donors. I provide a rationale for Super Tuesday electoral calendars in which a block of voters vote simultaneously early in the election followed by other voters voting sequentially. For a range of campaign costs, such a calendar maximizes expected donations to nomination campaigns and, thus, the ex-ante probability of electing the best candidate over all possible electoral calendars.

The complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections

Most work on manipulation assumes that all preferences are known to the manipulators. However, in many settings elections are open and sequential. We introduce a framework, in which manipulators can see the past votes but not the future ones, to model online coalitional manipulation of sequential elections, and we show that here manipulation can be extremely complex even for election systems with simple winner problems. We also show that for some of the most important election systems such manipulation is simple in certain settings. Among our highlights are: Depending on the size of the manipulative coalition, the online manipulation problem can be complete for each level of the polynomial hierarchy or even for PSPACE. We obtain the most dramatic contrast to date between the nonunique-winner and unique-winner models: Online weighted manipulation for plurality is in P in the nonunique-winner model, yet is coNP-hard (constructive case) and NP-hard (destructive case) in the unique-winner model. And we obtain what to the best of our knowledge are the first PNP[1]-completeness and PNP-completeness results in computational social choice, in particular regarding 3-candidate and 4-candidate (and unlimited-candidate) online weighted coalition manipulation of veto elections.

Why Iowa? How Caucuses and Sequential Elections Improve the Presidential Nominating Process. By David P. Redlawsk, Caroline J. Tolbert, and Todd Donovan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010. 336p. $91.00 cloth, $27.50 paper.

Why Iowa? How Caucuses and Sequential Elections Improve the Presidential Nominating Process. By David P. Redlawsk, Caroline J. Tolbert, and Todd Donovan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010. 336p. $91.00 cloth, $27.50 paper.

Election Timing and Party System Fragmentation: A Constituency Level Analysis of the 1967-2012 French Legislative Elections

Due to changes in laws affecting the duration of presidential terms and the timing of legislative and presidential elections, the timing of the French legislative elections relative to presidential elections in that country offers something akin to a natural experiment that allows us to examine election timing effects on the legislative vote fragmentation. To address this issue, we turn to district specific within - French aggregate data since 1965. Our country-specific findings show that there is lower legislative party fragmentation at the constituency level (effective number of parties according to the Laakso-Taagepera index) in the first round of sequential than in non-sequential elections. French political landscape is mainly structured around two political blocks, the left and the right blocks due to the two-round system used both for presidential and legislative elections. We argue that this reduced constituency party fragmentation in sequential elections occurs because of two voters’ surges from presidential to legislative elections: the first playing in favor of the locally best placed party that belongs to the new President’s political block (left or right according the period) to give him/her a clear majority, the second surge playing in favor of the locally best placed party that is member of the block opposed to the new President (left or right), to help create a stronger opposition. After first presenting simple bivariate comparisons showing lower fragmentation in sequential elections, we offer a logistic regression model of legislative party concentration that control for other factors, e.g., changes in party finance laws that affect incentives for party formation. In our model we continue find sequential elections to have a defractionalizing effect as compared to non-sequential elections. Thus, we would argue that election timing should be considered an important feature of electoral laws.

Why Iowa? How the Caucuses and Sequential Elections Improve the Presidential Nominating Process by David P. Redlawsk, Caroline J. Tolbert, and Todd Donovan

Why Iowa? How the Caucuses and Sequential Elections Improve the Presidential Nominating Process <i>by David P. Redlawsk, Caroline J. Tolbert, and Todd Donovan</i>

Pre-election polling and sequential elections

I consider a model in which the winner of a primary election faces a third candidate in a general election immediately thereafter. Prior to the primary election, there is a pre-election poll on how voters would vote in a hypothetical general election between one of the candidates in the primary election and the third candidate. I illustrate that voters have an incentive to misrepresent their voting intentions in the pre-election poll in order to influence voter beliefs about candidate electability in the general election and possibly cause voters to vote differently in the primary election.

Why Iowa? How Caucuses and Sequential Elections Improve the Presidential Nominating Process

Why Iowa? How Caucuses and Sequential Elections Improve the Presidential Nominating Process

Why Iowa?: how caucuses and sequential elections improve the presidential nominating process

If Barack Obama had not won in Iowa, most commentators believe that he would not have been able to go on to capture the Democratic nomination for president. Why Iowa? offers the definitive account of those early weeks of the campaign season: from how the Iowa caucuses work and what motivates the candidates' campaigns, to participation and turnout, as well as the lingering effects that the campaigning had on Iowa voters. Demonstrating how 'what happens in Iowa' truly reverberates throughout the country, five-time Iowa precinct caucus chair David P. Redlawsk and his coauthors take us on an inside tour of one of the most media-saturated and speculated-about campaign events in American politics. Considering whether a sequential primary system, in which early, smaller states such as Iowa and New Hampshire have such a tremendous impact, is fair or beneficial to the country as a whole, the authors here demonstrate that not only is the impact warranted, but it also reveals a great deal about informational elements of the campaigns. Contrary to conventional wisdom, this sequential system does confer huge benefits on the nominating process, while Iowa's particularly well-designed caucus system - extensively explored here for the first time - brings candidates' arguments, strengths, and weaknesses into the open and under the media's lens.

Herding with collective preferences

This paper studies a simple model of observational learning where agents care not only about the information of others but also about their actions. We show that despite complex strategic considerations that arise from forward-looking incentives, herd behavior can arise in equilibrium. The model encompasses applications such as sequential elections, public good contributions, and leadership charitable giving.

A Modified National Primary: State Losers and Support for Changing the Presidential Nominating Process

CAROLINE J. TOLBERT is professor of political science at the University of Iowa. She is coauthor of Digital Citizenship: The Internet, Society and Political Participation, which was ranked one of the twenty best-selling titles in the social sciences by the American Library Association. Her latest book is entitled Why Iowa? How Caucuses and Sequential Elections Improve the Presidential Nominating Process. AMANDA KELLER is a doctoral student in the department of political science at the University of Iowa. Her dissertation focuses on campaign contributions and political psychology, including personality and politics. TODD DONOVAN is professor of political science at Western Washington University. He is coauthor of Demanding Choices: Opinion, Voting and Direct Democracy and eight other books. His latest book is entitled Why Iowa? How Caucuses and Sequential Elections Improve the Presidential Nominating Process. *On 23 October 2009 the Academy of Political Science sponsored a symposium on the presidential nominating process and American democracy. The symposium was funded by Carnegie Corporation of New York and took place in the Academyʼs conference room in New York City. In this issue of PSQ we publish two of the papers presented at the symposium—one by Caroline J. Tolbert, Amanda Keller and Todd Donovan and the second by Costas Panagopoulos. The topic of the symposium was provoked by the 2008 election campaign, which raised several fundamental questions about the current system of selecting presidential and vice-presidential candidates. 1 Rob Richie and Paul Fidalgo, “Primary Power to the People,” accessed at www.fairvote.org, 17 July 2009.

Discrete choice model in a market with product differentiation: the Argentine pension fund system

AbstractThe objective of the paper is to identify the determinants of the market share of each AFJP and the matrix of direct and cross price elasticities, by using a discrete choice model of product differentiation, based on the random utility theory. The results obtained from the estimation of a simple logit model using a panel of quarterly data between December of 1995 and June of 2006 shows the existence of two competitive mechanisms used by firms: prices and a vector of variables explaining horizontal differentiation, such as quantity of branches and salesman. The estimation of the nested-logit model supports the hypothesis of sequential election, where firms are chosen by their price setting strategies, defining two groups of competitors. Finally, the regulatory change that eliminates fixed commissions provides additional importance to prices signals in consumers' utility.