Separate Authority Research Articles

Advancing Customary Village Development in Bali Through Community Participation: Do Village Government Roles Matters?

Objective –The provision of customary village funds in Bali can be viewed as a governmental initiative aimed at the preservation of cultural heritage. For the effective implementation of customary village development, it is imperative to involve the community directly and also acknowledge the role of the government.Methodology –The research was conducted in the Province of Bali with 94 customary villages as research objects. The methodology employed for data collection involved the distribution of questionnaires to the leaders of customary villages. The data was subsequently processed using moderation regression analysis, supplemented by interviews to augment the information provided by the respondents.Results –The study's findings indicate that the involvement of the community had a significant impact on the growth of conventional villages in Bali. The mobilisation of resources by the village government can potentially enhance the impact of community participation on the development of customary villages in Bali.Research limitations/implications –This research only reveals the success of customary village development in terms of community and government participation. This research has the impact that it is necessary to pay attention to the development of traditional villages to maintain local wisdom so that harmonization in society can be realized.Novelty/Originality –The originality of this research found that even though there is a separation of authority between the village government and customary village, the village government is still allowed to mobilize the community to be involved in the development of customary village so that environmental and cultural preservation can be achieved.

Revisiting Flexibility in Design: An Analysis of the Impact of Implementation Uncertainty on the Value of Real Options

Abstract Flexible design, often embodied as Real Options, has proven valuable in sustaining system performance under operational uncertainty. By building “options,” decision-makers buy the right, but not the obligation, to upgrade at a later time. Prior studies implicitly assume decision-makers can “call” the option in a timely manner, however, in most sociotechnical systems, this is far from certain. Budget cycles, supply chain logistics and separation of authority and budget lead to implementation delays. To test, we developed a Monte Carlo simulation of a representative Army vehicle project. We first replicate prior studies without implementation delays, then incorporate delays for comparison. Once added, the value of flexibility degrades rapidly. The rate of degradation varies based on the flexibility strategy. Our results suggest a need to consider implementation uncertainty in evaluating flexible design options and open a new path for matching flexible design strategies to anticipated sources of implementation uncertainty.

Peran Peradilan Islam dalam Penegakan Hukum Islam di Kesultanan Buton

This article tries to reveal the existence of the Islamic Courts in the Sultanate of Buton to measure the extent of its role in the enforcement of Islamic Law in the past. History explains that when Islam entered the territory of Southeast Sulawesi, the kingdom of Buton changed its status to Buton Sultanate and applied Islamic law throughout the empire. Using historical approach, the researcher succeeded in revealing the fact that in the area of the past Sultanate of Buton, once stood two institutions of Islamic Court named Syarana Adati and Syarana Hukumu or Syarana Agama. The authority of Syarana Adati was to deal with criminal cases where as Syarana Hukumu or Syarana Agama took care of certain civil cases such as marriage, divorce and inheritance. Despite the separation of authority, the two institutions can be categorized as Islamic Courts because the legal system used as a backdrop was Islamic Law. The study also finds out that the two institutions play a significant role in the upholding of Islamic law in the past as they were supported by the kingdom, and a strong legal culture both among law enforcers and in the community

Місцеве самоврядування як важлива засада поділу влади, взаємодії людини і держави, розвитку сучасних демократичних процесів

Місцеве самоврядування як важлива засада поділу влади, взаємодії людини і держави, розвитку сучасних демократичних процесів

Games with a Local Permission Structure: Separation of Authority and Value Generation

It is known that peer group games are a special class of games with a permission structure. However, peer group games are also a special class of (weighted) digraph games. To be specific, they are digraph games in which the digraph is the transitive closure of a rooted tree. In this paper we first argue that some known results on solutions for peer group games hold more general for digraph games. Second, we generalize both digraph games as well as games with a permission structure into a model called games with a local permission structure, where every player needs permission from its predecessors only in order to generate worth, but does not need its predecessors in order to give permission to its own successors. We introduce and axiomatize a Shapley value type solution for these games, generalizing the conjunctive permission value for games with a permission structure and the beta-measure for weighted digraphs.

Michael J. Glennon: National Security and Double Government

As a senator running for the office of president, Barack Obama was a harsh critic of the national security policies of President George W. Bush. Yet, once elected president, Obama continued, and expanded, the security policies of his predecessor. Understanding this puzzle is the motivation behind Michael Glennon’s important book, National Security and Double Government. To resolve this puzzle, Glennon turns to a framework provided by William Bagehot, a nineteenth century British businessman and journalist, in his analysis of the evolution of the English Constitution. Bagehot noted that a dual set of institutions had emerged in Britain. One set consisted of the ‘‘dignified institutions,’’ which included the monarchy and House of Lords. These institutions were ‘‘dignified in the sense that they provide a link to the past and excite the public imagination’’ (p. 5) through a range of public rituals and the associated pomp and circumstance. The second set were the ‘‘efficient institutions,’’ which included the House of Commons, the Cabinet, and the Prime Minister. These institutions, which are largely hidden behind the dignified institutions, were, according to Bagehot, what actually drove policy and government activities. Glennon applies and extends Bagehot’s dual institutions framework to the U.S. security state. In the context of the U.S., the dignified institutions include the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. These are the institutions that most people have in mind when they think of the Founding Fathers or when they praise America for its constitutionally-constrained government. These institutions foster and perpetuate feelings of loyalty, patriotism, and nationalism among citizens. The origins of the U.S. dignified institutions can be found in the ‘‘Madisonian’’ structure of dispersed power across the three branches of government. In advocating the separation of authority across the three branches, James Madison, and the other Founders, intended to create an arrangement which appreciated that the maintenance of liberty and freedom required checking against ambition in government.

Hobbes on Political Authority, Practical Reason and Truth

The role of sovereign authority in Hobbes' political philosophy is to establish peace and stability by serving as a definitive and unambiguous source of law. Although these broad outlines of Hobbes' account of political authority are uncontentious, matters quickly become more complicated once one seeks its normative basis. This much is evident from recent debates on the normative status of the laws of nature and the related issue as to whether Hobbes is better categorised as an incipient legal positivist or as a heterodox natural law thinker. In this paper I argue that although the positivist and natural law commitments in Hobbes' theory of political authority can be partially reconciled, such a reconciliation points to the need for more substantive theories of practical reason and truth than are to be found in Hobbes' official statements on these topics. Section II examines the positivist and natural law dimensions in Hobbes' thought and suggests that the role of sovereign authority in providing the definitive interpretation of the laws of nature allows a partial reconciliation to be effected. In section III, I consider the tension between this reconciliation and Hobbes' instrumentalism about practical reason and equivocal separation of authority and truth.

Games with a local permission structure: separation of authority and value generation

It is known that peer group games are a special class of games with a permission structure. However, peer group games are also a special class of (weighted) digraph games. To be specific, they are digraph games in which the digraph is the transitive closure of a rooted tree. In this paper we first argue that some known results on solutions for peer group games hold more general for digraph games. Second, we generalize both digraph games as well as games with a permission structure into a model called games with a local permission structure, where every player needs permission from its predecessors only to generate worth, but does not need its predecessors to give permission to its own successors. We introduce and axiomatize a Shapley value-type solution for these games, generalizing the conjunctive permission value for games with a permission structure and the \(\beta \)-measure for weighted digraphs.

Intergovernmentalism or Functionalism? Foreign Policy in the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty

Neo functionalism and its consequential foundations in the study of unity and the integration of nation-states in a non-coercive way have played a major role in the formulation of integration-oriented theories of governance. The European Union (EU) as a functional establishment has traveled a long trajectory from its initial economic cooperation programs to social and political harmonization schemes as well. Intergovernmentalism as a decision making factor by Member States has created a new source of balance and stability throughout the European Union. The Lisbon Treaty, with the new identity that it created after the failure of the European Constitution has been comprehensive in its approach to all procedures and rules of the former treaties of the community. That treaty has renewed the EU with major changes in foreign policy and has granted more power to the European Parliament. In general, the connection between the European Council and the supranational sections of the EU have originated more influence for individual states to enforce their own interests rather than working for collective gain. The establishment of the High Representative as executive power in foreign policy (CFSP) is moving toward the intergovernmental territory which takes the EU away from their functional abilities and it reduces the principle of community-oriented functions to constructive power building by the political interests of different Member States.One might ask 'are the European Union and its own functional regional institutions repositioning themselves as intergovernmental establishments?' The Lisbon Treaty as a general agreement in between twenty seven Member States is now finding new perception to balance these supranational and intergovernmental sectors together. With no measurements available to control the level of each section, with the exception of the European Parliament, the separation of authority of the European governing body can therefore influence intergovernmental activities and reduce the supranational nature of integration. How new developments form the future of foreign policy of the European Union will remain a question, perhaps metamorphosing and progressing to continue internally and externally affecting the European Union and its decision making process.

Why people don’t like doctors – medical practice in a dysfunctional society

Doctors have felt increasingly threatened over the last 25 years. It seems as though the profession has few friends these days. There is constant criticism appearing in the media. Insurance companies and commercial organisations struggle with the rising costs of medical care, increasingly at the doctor and patients expense. Politicians and health economists want to interfere at every turn in what are regarded as traditional medical activities and our colleagues in the legal profession see us simply as a means of making a living. It is hardly surprising that we feel like a profession under siege. Curiously, and despite the fact that we seem to be in conflict with large and powerful groups in different areas, we have retained a remarkable degree of respect from the public at large. Politicians and journalists, at least as far as New Zealand goes, remain well and truly at the bottom of the ‘‘most respected and trusted professions list’’ in New Zealand. Many of the medical profession s problems stem from a direct clash between the values inherent in good medical practice and those (if you can call them ‘‘values’’), which exist in today s society. Doctors traditionally are somewhat authoritarian, cautious, and reactionary as opposed to being proactive. It is the nature of our job. This all sits rather poorly with what might be termed ‘‘the brave New World’’ of today s society. Indeed, the ‘‘The Dysfunctional Charter’’ might best sum up the values inherent in today s society. It might be said, by the way, that one feature of a ‘‘dysfunctional society’’ is separation of authority from responsibility.

Rate Regulation in the Field of Consumer Credit. I

E previous article traced the grow|ing skepticism with which writers 1 have regarded competition as an effective regulative force the small-loan field. What follows is an examination of the merits of such a position. The negative case for competition within aflat-rate structure.-Before being willing to abandon competition it is necessary not only to ascertain its merits but to weigh alternatives. Because administrative rate control represents the other extreme from competition, and because several states are already experimenting this direction, it is the alternative considered the discussion which follows. The merits of a graduated (two) rate structure, legislatively set, are touched upon later. The writer is willing to admit at the outset that competition has not operated with theoretical smoothness lowering aggregate rates and adjusting differential rates. Further, that should not be expected, since all actual markets contain imperfections. Only if the latter are very great must competition be supplanted, and what follows shows that there is little evidence that cash lending is unduly peculiar this respect. The cost (price) of making loans depends on three variables-quality of borrower, loan size, and lender efficiency. Since there is no way of dealing directly with differences lenders' personal abilities, lender efficiency may be considered largely a function of the size of the loan office. Of the three variables the first is the least subject to measurement and therefore is difficult to deal with administratively. No efforts have been made to do so. Few people have been bold enough to suggest that state or municipal governments should undertake to make .... small necessitous loans, the collectability of which depends larger measure on the judgment of the lender selecting his borrowers.66 The same conclusion holds a fortiori of any attempt by the state to control the selection of risks by private lenders; the separation of authority and financial responsibility would bring about an impossible situation. The conclusion is inescapable that in the final analysis, competition must be relied upon to determine the credit standards which will be applied under any rate structure.67 Probably because of its objectivity the size-of-loan factor has received greater legislative attention. It is not possible to say that all loans of the same size have the same cost unless, as is rarely true, all the borrowers question are equal risk. (Differences size of loan offices are abstracted from here.) A loan may be thought of as a combination of a given size and a given risk grade. A flat maximum rate designates an infinite number of these combinations as marginal, i.e., as loans which it is only just profitable to make. All combinations which either or both parts are better than marginal are more profitable at the maximum rate.