Animal Consciousness Research Articles

Intrinsic value, sovereignty rights, and sentient animals in Antarctica

ABSTRACT Two things central to the Antarctic Treaty System fill the minds of ethicists and political theorists the more often they reflect upon them: territorial sovereignty (AT, IV.2) and the intrinsic value of Antarctica (Protocol, art.3). Regarding its intrinsic value, in the first half of the paper I argue that to give adequate consideration to the different morally significant constituent parts of Antarctica, it is necessary to recognise sentient animals as a fundamental source of intrinsic value. In the second part of the paper, I look at the implications this interpretation would have particularly, but not only, for those States with sovereignty claims over the continent. The conclusion I draw is twofold. On the one hand, State sovereignty in Antarctica would have to become conditional to acting on the continent in ways that are consistent with the respect owed to wild sentient animals. On the other hand, claimant States and State parties would be required to revisit and amend domestic policies that generate direct harm or unreasonable risk to wild animals in the white continent, even when performed far away from Antarctica.

Animal emotions and consciousness: a preliminary assessment of researchers' perceptions and biases and prospects for future progress.

Scientists and philosophers have long struggled with the question of whether non-human animals experience emotions or consciousness. Yet, it is unclear where the scientific consensus on these topics lies today. To address this gap, we administered a survey of professional animal behaviour researchers to assess perceptions regarding (i) the taxonomic distribution of emotions and consciousness in non-human animals, (ii) respondents' confidence in this assessment, and (iii) attitudes towards pitfalls and potential for progress when addressing these questions. Respondents (n = 100) ascribe emotionality and consciousness to a broad swath of the animal taxonomy, including non-human primates, other mammals, birds and cephalopods. Respondents' attribution of these phenomena was strongly associated with their confidence in their assessments (R 2 > 0.9), with respondents assuming an absence of emotions and consciousness when they were unsure. We also identify an emergent consensus of the components involved in a functional definition of emotions. Researchers are optimistic that tools either currently exist or will exist in the future to rigorously address these questions (>85%) and that animal behaviour, as a field, should do more to encourage research works on emotions (>70%). We discuss implications for publication bias and future work in this area as well as ethical considerations regarding animal care and use.

Rethinking Animal Consciousness Research to Prioritize Well-Being.

The authors critique the NY Declaration on Animal Consciousness, which does not denounce continued captivity and invasive research in the pursuit of animal consciousness markers. They argue that such research often increases animal suffering by accepting harmful practices. Instead, they propose a nonanthropocentric, ethical framework aligned with the Belmont Report's principle of beneficence, advocating for noninvasive methods in natural habitats. This approach prioritizes animal well-being, recognizing and safeguarding the intrinsic value of all conscious beings.

The role of consciousness in adaptive behaviour: A philosophy for the science of animal consciousness

What is the role of consciousness in nature? The science of consciousness has largely neglected the question through its emphasis on human experience. In this précis of A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness, I outline how we can move from a top-down approach that begins with investigations in humans to an evolutionary bottom-up approach that targets the adaptive origins of even the most minimal forms of subjective experience. I will also offer an introduction to the central thesis of the book, that is, the pathological complexity thesis, according to which consciousness evolved in order to enable animals to adaptively respond to their life history challenges.

Neuroscience of animal consciousness: still agnostic after all.

Neuroscience of animal consciousness: still agnostic after all.

Measures of spatial memory, peripheral inflammation and negative emotional state predict social-cognitive skills in healthy aging cats

Aging is a complex, multidimensional process. Normative aging is typically accompanied by declines in several cognitive domains, including memory and social cognition. As aging progresses, the often-overlooked early manifestations of cognitive decline can advance, leading to an inability to adapt to new situations and environments. Potential mechanisms influencing cognitive decline remain elusive, but, among other mechanisms, inflammaging, an age-related increase in the chronic production of pro-inflammatory mediators, and emotional stress are implicated. Cognitive function in cats is under-researched, with no studies on the link between potential risk factors and cognitive signs in aging subjects. Understanding this link is essential as it may facilitate the early identification of cognitive decline and encourage preventative, individualized interventions. We carried out a citizen science study to investigate, for the first time, the relationship between cognitive functions, stress, and the inflammatory markers interleukin (IL)-1β and IL-10 in 44 healthy, privately owned pet cats (7–14 years of age), who underwent standardized testing in their home environment. A task was employed to test spatial memory, requiring the cat to recall the location of a food-baited container. An unsolvable task was used to assess cats' social cognition and cognitive flexibility by measuring how they used referential communication (i.e., gaze alternation between the apparatus and the caregivers) compared to their persistence in trying to obtain food which was out of reach. Generalized linear regression analysis, conducted while adjusting for demographic factors and stress behaviors, revealed: 1) a predictive positive relationship connecting spatial memory and the use of social referencing with the caregiver (more gaze alternation) in the unsolvable task, highlighting the importance of the interplay between cognitive domains in sustaining complex behaviors, and 2) a reduced engagement in social referencing toward caregivers (less gaze alternation) in the presence of higher serum levels of IL-1β in the unsolvable task, especially as cats get older. A cat’s social cognitive performance was also negatively predicted by stress-related behaviors, which is not surprising given that cats are sentient creatures whose everyday behavior is also influenced by emotional states. These findings provide new insights into the crosstalk between different cognitive domains during aging and the potential contributions of emotions and inflammation to cognitive changes in healthy aging cats. Further research using this multidimensional approach will help explore these mechanisms of cognitive aging and potential markers for early detection of cognitive changes in older cats, which is critical for timely interventions.

Sentience and the Issue of Animal Welfare

Abstract In this article, I discuss a precondition of moral consideration that sets the bar lower at sentience. The popular sentience thesis identifies the capacity to feel pain as its condition of consideration. By appealing to the capacity to feel, it is possible to address some fundamental questions about anthropocentrism such as a threat to sentient animals in factory farming and unnecessary experimentation on nonhuman animals. This article interrogates the issue of animal welfare and exposes how discussions on moral considerations focusing on animal sentience exclude non-sentience animals from public welfare policy. While the sentience thesis is a well-established approach in the animal welfare literature, I argue that it lacks robust normative force and, as such, is inadequate for promoting animal welfare since it forces fragmentation of our moral life.

The Quest for Sentience: from Crustaceans to Plants

Although the use of the term “sentience” in philosophy dates to the 17th century, its use expanded particularly in the second half of the 20th century, with the emergence of non-anthropocentric ethics. A search for sentience in the animal kingdom began, which required the identification of a set of evidential sources. The difficulty in establishing, beyond any reasonable doubt, the existence of sentience in animals more distantly related to humans, and the consequences that the matter has for the legislation on animal protection, led to the proposal to apply the precautionary principle in animal welfare policy. This principle establishes that the fulfilment of minimum criteria is enough for the existence of sentience to be admitted. This led to the attribution of sentience to invertebrates, namely molluscs, insects, and crustaceans. As a result, the possibility of including decapod crustaceans into animal legislation is currently discussed. In this article, we will perform the comparative exercise of applying a framework of minimum criteria of sentience, previously applied to crustaceans of the order Decapoda, to vascular plants. The framework is composed of eight independent criteria and the likelihood of plants meeting each of them will be assessed and discussed in the light of the existing empirical evidence.

What Would Miffy Do? Applying Informed Consent by Proxy to All Sentient Animals.

If we want to take sentient non-human animals and their interests seriously, we can try to ask for their consent before using them for human purposes. With mentally competent humans, we speak of informed consent: for them to participate in scientific studies, for example, it is required that they consent explicitly, in full understanding of the risks and benefits. This full understanding cannot be expected from non-human animals. We must therefore look for ways to know what they want and to estimate what they would do if they had a deep understanding of their options and the consequences of these options for themselves and others. This concept is explored by applying it to animal experiments. The most promising method is to gain informed consent by proxy from thoroughly informed competent humans, in combination with seeking assent where possible and being alert to dissent.

The Animal-Human Relationship in War

Issues germane to animal history and military history intersect in the study of cavalry horses and their riders during the American Civil War. Animal historians should understand that warfare created a very different experience for horses than was true of their peacetime experience. Military historians should understand that horses were not just tools of war but sentient creatures with needs and emotions of their own. Weaponized equines exercised a degree of agency by exerting some control over their situations. The military system and battle severely stressed horses and men. Repetitive riding affected cavalrymen and horses in ways that resulted in serious health problems. Nevertheless, the war experience fostered bonds of affection between animals and humans in many cases while leading to callous abuse in many others. It also led to an enhanced appreciation for animals among cavalrymen who had bonded with their mounts, possibly promoting awareness of animal rights after the conflict.

Why we should study animal consciousness.

The New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness (Andrews et al., 2024) highlights increasing empirical evidence supporting the existence of sentience in many animal species. The views in the declaration rest on an increasingly popular theoretical approach that comparative psychologists could use to guide research on non-human consciousness.

We don’t need a science of animal consciousness. On the unexpected insights gained from Walter Veit’s “A philosophy for the science of animal consciousness”

This paper is a critical commentary on Walter Veit’s book "A philosophy for the science of animal consciousness." My goal is to show that although Veit succeeds in presenting a compelling account of animal consciousness, he may have unintentionally undermined the purpose of such science. I argue that, despite the author’s claims, his theory is not as empirically grounded as he makes it out to be. Paradoxically, some of Veit’s arguments against his opponents seem to be double-edged. Still, I also argue that this is a necessary cost, as an alternative would be to succumb to a particular form of metatheoretical anthropomorphism. In effect, we end up with a surprising conclusion that we need many sciences of different consciousnesses, which seems at odds with Veit’s Darwinian continuity assumption. However, this only goes to show that the book is well worth discussing.

And the Winner Is - Anthropocentrism and Speciesism: Writing a History of Animals in New Zealand’s Agricultural and Pastoral Events

The paper explores news photographs from New Zealand between 1900 and 1932 and unpacks the happenings at agricultural and pastoral events. It utilizes an archival research strategy to find the news coverage of such events that is informed by an animalcentric philosophy. As such, it engages with critical posthumanist and poststructuralist thought. This allows the presence of nonhuman animals as sentient beings to be recognized and challenges previous approaches of scholarship. Thus, the paper writes farmed nonhuman animals into the history of agricultural and pastoral events. In illustrating what occurred at these events, the paper illuminates the anthropocentric bias and speciesism-grounded principles embedded in human attitudes toward farmed nonhuman animals. Humans treat fellow sentient beings unfairly and unjustly, which is problematic when nonhuman animal sentience provides moral worth. This study contributes to studies in leisure’s ‘animal turn’ by focusing on the entanglements of human and farmed nonhuman animals in events.

Interspecies Justice within a Normative Sustainable Development Framework–Animal-Friendly Energy Systems as a Test Case

This paper argues that existing human-animal relations contribute to the pressing socio-ecological crises of our time, and therefore, they should be discussed in the context of Sustainable Development. This holds true even from a purely anthropocentric perspective, as these crises are threats to humans. However, sentient nonhuman animals possess interests as well and should be included in the moral community. Therefore, ignoring their interests in Sustainable Development is falling short. Furthermore, the paper argues that the anthropocentric perspective of Sustainable Development is flawed because the normative foundations of Sustainable Development (intra- and intergenerational justice) can be convincingly applied to nonhuman animals. According to approaches of interspecies justice, the normative foundations of Sustainable Development not merely can but should be applied to nonhuman animals. The paper argues for including nonhuman animals into the scope of justice and, therefore, in a theory of Sustainable Development. What such inclusion means at the practical level is examined in the last section of the paper, which investigates a field of application important for transforming societies into more sustainable ones, namely energy systems. This last section discusses how more sustainable, more animal-friendly energy systems would look like.

Growing Confidence and Remaining Uncertainty About Animal Consciousness

While the study of consciousness has had a controversial history and, until recently, a pessimistic prognosis, recent views within the neuroscientific community suggest that a maturing if incomplete scientific understanding of consciousness is close at hand. The purpose of this essay is to specify the major points on which in my opinion there is widespread though not universal agreement, as proposed benchmarks for the current state of consciousness research across the phylogenetic spectrum. Most published definitions of consciousness boil down to a focus on it as a process arising in a nervous system engaged with a body and its environment, giving rise to subjective (personal) experience. A broad consensus on the phenomenology of consciousness sees it consisting at a minimum of (1) awareness_ _and focused attention, (2) unity of perception, (3) qualitative variations in content, (4) mental causation, and (5) a sense of self. There is also broad agreement that the substrate of consciousness requires sizeable, complex nervous systems organized into several hierarchical levels of processing. Further insight is gained by reconstructing the evolution of subjective phenomenological experience ― most likely from multiple origins, hosted by a diversity of body and brain architectures, and diverging into markedly different forms across the animal kingdom. However, three major mysteries about phenomenological experience that remain unresolved are (1) the neurological correlates of consciousness, (2) the apparent gap between phenomenology and mechanism, and (3) the process that monitors the brain activity admitted into consciousness.

Inferring Consciousness in Phylogenetically Distant Organisms.

The neural dynamics of subjectivity (NDS) approach to the biological explanation of consciousness is outlined and applied to the problem of inferring consciousness in animals phylogenetically distant from ourselves. The NDS approach holds that consciousness or felt experience is characteristic of systems whose nervous systems have been shaped to realize subjectivity through a combination of network interactions and large-scale dynamic patterns. Features of the vertebrate brain architecture that figure in other accounts of the biology of consciousness are viewed as inessential. Deep phylogenetic branchings in the animal kingdom occurred before the evolution of complex behavior, cognition, and sensing. These capacities arose independently in brain architectures that differ widely across arthropods, vertebrates, and cephalopods, but with conservation of large-scale dynamic patterns of a kind that have an apparent link to felt experience in humans. An evolutionary perspective also motivates a strongly gradualist view of consciousness; a simple distinction between conscious and nonconscious animals will probably be replaced with a view that admits differences of degree, perhaps on many dimensions.

Modelling developments in consciousness within a multidimensional framework.

A recent advancement in consciousness science has been the introduction of a multidimensional framework of consciousness. This framework has been applied to global states of consciousness, including psychedelic states and disorders of consciousness, and the consciousness of non-human animals. The multidimensional framework enables a finer parsing of both various states of consciousness and forms of animal consciousness, paving the way for new scientific investigations into consciousness. In this paper, the multidimensional model is expanded by constructing temporal profiles. This expansion allows for the modelling of changes in consciousness across the life cycles of organisms and the progression over time of disorders of consciousness. The result of this expansion is 2-fold: (i) it enables new modes of comparison, both across stages of development and across species; (ii) it proposes that more attention be given to the various types of fluctuations that occur in patients who are suffering from disorders of consciousness.

Debates on humanization of human-animal brain chimeras - are we putting the cart before the horses?

Research on human-animal chimeras have elicited alarms and prompted debates. Those involving the generation of chimeric brains, in which human brain cells become anatomically and functionally intertwined with their animal counterparts in varying ratios, either via xenografts or embryonic co-development, have been considered the most problematic. The moral issues stem from a potential for "humanization" of the animal brain, as well as speculative changes to the host animals' consciousness or sentience, with consequential alteration in the animal hosts' moral status. However, critical background knowledge appears to be missing to resolve these debates. Firstly, there is no consensus on animal sentience vis-à-vis that of humans, and no established methodology that would allow a wholesome and objective assessment of changes in animal sentience resulting from the introduction of human brain cells. Knowledge in interspecies comparative neuropsychology that could allow effective demarcation of a state of "humanization" is also lacking. Secondly, moral status as a philosophical construct has no scientific and objective points of reference. Either changes in sentience or humanization effects would remain unclear unless there are some neuroscientific research grounding. For a bioethical stance based on moral status of human-animal brain chimera to make meaningful contributions to regulatory policies, it might first need to be adequately informed by, and with its arguments constructed, in a manner that are factually in line with the science. In may be prudent for approved research projects involving the generation of human-animal brain chimera to have a mandatory component of assessing plausible changes in sentience.

Hedonic valence at the core of consciousness: A review of "A philosophy for the science of animal consciousness" by Walter Veit

A book review of “A philosophy for the science of animal consciousness” by Walter Veit Routledge, 2023, 162 pages, ISBN 9781032343617.

'Down pythons' throats we thrust live goats': snakes, zoos and animal welfare in nineteenth-century Britain.

In nineteenth-century Britain, captive snakes in menageries and zoological gardens were routinely fed with live prey - primarily rabbits, pigeons and guinea pigs. From the late 1860s, this practice began to generate opposition on animal welfare grounds, leading to a protracted debate over its necessity, visibility and morality. Focusing on the c.1870-1914 period, when the snake-feeding controversy reached its zenith, this article charts changing attitudes towards the treatment of reptiles in captivity and asks why an apparently niche practice generated so much interest. By looking at the biological arguments put forward for and against live feeding, the article traces the changing nature of humanitarian activism in the late nineteenth century and shows how the shifting character of the live-feeding debate paralleled wider trends in the animal welfare movement. It also highlights the different types of knowledge and expertise involved in the debate, as naturalists, veterinary surgeons, legal professionals, zookeepers and humanitarians offered conflicting perspectives on questions of reptilian dietary requirements and animal sentience.