Sender Behavior Research Articles

Cultural facial expressions dynamically convey emotion category and intensity information

Communicating emotional intensity plays a vital ecological role because it provides valuable information about the nature and likelihood of the sender's behavior.1,2,3 For example, attack often follows signals of intense aggression if receivers fail to retreat.4,5 Humans regularly use facial expressions to communicate such information.6,7,8,9,10,11 Yet how this complex signaling task is achieved remains unknown. We addressed this question using a perception-based, data-driven method to mathematically model the specific facial movements that receivers use to classify the six basic emotions-"happy," "surprise," "fear," "disgust," "anger," and "sad"-and judge their intensity in two distinct cultures (East Asian, Western European; total n= 120). In both cultures, receivers expected facial expressions to dynamically represent emotion category and intensity information over time, using a multi-component compositional signaling structure. Specifically, emotion intensifiers peaked earlier or later than emotion classifiers and represented intensity using amplitude variations. Emotion intensifiers are also more similar across emotions than classifiers are, suggesting a latent broad-plus-specific signaling structure. Cross-cultural analysis further revealed similarities and differences in expectations that could impact cross-cultural communication. Specifically, East Asian and Western European receivers have similar expectations about which facial movements represent high intensity for threat-related emotions, such as "anger," "disgust," and "fear," but differ on those that represent low threat emotions, such as happiness and sadness. Together, our results provide new insights into the intricate processes by which facial expressions can achieve complex dynamic signaling tasks by revealing the rich information embedded in facial expressions.

Modeling package delivery acceptance in Crowdshipping systems by Public Transportation Passengers: A latent class approach

The subject of this research is to model the probability of accepting package delivery tasks in Crowd-Shipping (CS) systems focusing on shipping packages by Public Transportation (PT) passengers. Real-world implementation of such a PT-based CS initiative requires a proper grasp of the behavior of crowd shippers, package receivers, and senders, among which crowdshippers are at the center of attention. Given survey data collected from 2,208PT passengers in the Sydney metropolitan area, this study constructs a model for package delivery task acceptance among PT passengers who express a willingness to participate as crowdshippers. A Latent Class (LC) choice model is developed and estimated to explore different classes of participant characteristics and preferences for accepting CS delivery tasks, under different levels of offered incentive, package weight, and required detour distance at the destination. As a key finding, the model identifies three classes, namely “leisurely”, “avid”, and “skeptical” users with class sizes of 19%, 53%, and 28%, respectively. Leisurely users tend to be majorly employed with relatively higher ages and lower PT trip frequency per month. This class shows a potential desire to take CS tasks as long as they are not logistically burdensome. Avid users, forming the largest class of the population, are mostly younger PT passengers who are less sensitive to task difficulty and might accept even CS tasks with minimum incentives (around AU$3). Skeptical users, displaying high PT trip frequency per month and high income, are unwilling to accept the CS tasks unless get compensated well.

Intention or Request: The Impact of Message Structures

This paper investigates how different message structures impact communication strategy as well as sender and receiver behavior. Specifically, we focus on comparing communication games with messages stating an intention versus a request. Our experimental results show that when a game includes self-signaling or self-committing messages, the two message structures yield negligibly different results. However, when the messages of the game are neither self-signaling nor self-committing, we find that more subjects send messages suggesting cooperation with request than intention. Interestingly, subjects also deviate from their suggested actions more frequently with request than intention. We surmise lying aversion plays a prominent role in contributing to the differences in games where messages lack the self-committing property.

Influencing Factors That Determine the Usage of the Crowd-Shipping Services

The objective of this study is to understand how senders choose shipping services for different products, given the availability of both emerging crowd-shipping ( CS) and traditional carriers in a logistics market. Using data collected from a United States (U.S.) survey, Random Utility Maximization (RUM) and Random Regret Minimization (RRM) models have been employed to reveal factors that influence the diversity of decisions made by senders. Shipping costs, along with additional real-time services such as courier reputations, tracking info, e-notifications, and customized delivery time and location, have been found to have remarkable impacts on senders’ choices. Interestingly, potential senders were willing to pay more to ship grocery items such as food, beverages, and medicines by CS services. Moreover, the real-time services have low elasticities, meaning that only a slight change in those services will lead to a change in sender behavior. Finally, data-science techniques were used to assess the performance of the RUM and RRM models and found to have similar accuracies. The findings from this research will help logistics firms address potential market segments, prepare service configurations to fulfill senders’ expectations, and develop effective business operations strategies.

Deception and reputation – An experimental test of reporting systems

We use a repeated sender-receiver game in which sender behavior is revealed to future counterparts either by (i) standardized computer reports or (ii) individual reports composed by the receivers. Compared to our baseline, both reporting systems significantly decrease the rate of deceptive messages chosen by senders. However, we find that computer reports reduce deception to a higher extent than individually written reports. This comparably higher impact can be explained by the senders’ anticipation of a high number of missing or deficient receiver reports that we find. We conclude that the precision of a reporting system has a higher importance for reducing deception than its personal character via individual feedback. Surprisingly, the reliability of computer reports is not correctly anticipated by receivers, who trust individually written reports more in the beginning and hence seem to back the wrong horse initially.

Design a novel routing criterion based on channel features and internal backup routes for cognitive radio network

In the routing process, the cost (or weight) of routes determine via a function named routing criterion. Therefore, the design of Optimal Routing Criterion (ORC) is one of the most crucial issues in routing. The existence of unstable channels in Cognitive Radio Network (CRN) has caused the design of ORC in CRN converts to a challenging topic. In this paper, at first, the CRN is modeled as a multigraph where each vertex shows one secondary user (SU) and each edge a channel between two neighboring SUs. In this multigraph, each edge has two weights; the first weight is determined based on the behavior of PU senders and protection of PU receivers, and second weight based on the channel bandwidth. At the next step, an ORC for CRN, referred to as ETED_BEST, is proposed. ETED_BEST is designed based on the obtained model, routes provided by the intermediate nodes belonging to the route and probability theory that calculates the delay between two SUs in CRN precisely. Performance evaluation is conducted through simulations, the results show that end-to-end performance improved significantly.

When to Drop a Bombshell

Sender, who is either good or bad, wishes to look good at an exogenous deadline. Sender privately observes if and when she can release a public flow of information about her private type. Releasing information earlier exposes to greater scrutiny, but signals credibility. In equilibrium bad Sender releases information later than good Sender. We find empirical support for the dynamic predictions of our model using data on the timing of U.S. presidential scandals and U.S. initial public offerings. In the context of elections, our results suggest that October Surprises are driven by the strategic behaviour of bad Sender.

How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?

This paper experimentally studies unilateral communication of intentions in eight different two-player one-shot normal form games with complete information. We find that communication is used both to coordinate and to deceive, and that messages have a significant impact on beliefs and behavior even in dominance solvable games. Nash equilibrium and cognitive hierarchy jointly account for many regularities, but not all of the evidence. Sophisticated sender behavior is especially difficult to reconcile with existing models.

Message in a bottle: major urinary proteins and their multiple roles in mouse intraspecific chemical communication

Within a species, sharing of data about identity, sex, health and hormonal status or feeding resources confers an advantage for survival and is actively pursued by linking signalling molecules to specific behavioural or neurohormonal responses. The proper identification of the signals (morphology), their correct use (grammar) and their meaning (semantics) allow us to understand the link between signals and responses. In mice, Mus musculus, the identification of meaningful molecules has revealed that both small airborne molecules and custom-tailored proteins are involved in chemical signalling. Among them, the major urinary proteins (MUPs) are barrel-like lipocalins excreted in urine. They bind and transport volatile molecules that may have different meanings, yet MUPs participate in transmitting different pieces of information. Therefore, they are not a simple blend of molecules but a communication system with its own rules to produce, transmit and process information. These actions affect both the physiology and the behaviour of sender and receiver. In fact, functional, behavioural and anatomical specializations allow production and emission of chemosignals by the sender, and proper signal detection and response management by the receiver. Moreover, the response to chemosignals may vary in time, according to internal and external conditions. The mechanism of biological chemical signalling is so efficient and versatile that MUPs are now used as molecular traps to develop biomimetic chemical sensors.

To Trust or Not to Trust That is Not the Question

We propose that there are three determinants of sender behavior in trust games: Beliefs re-garding the amounts returned, risk aversion, and reciprocity. Particularly, we are interested in the role of reciprocity because the possibility of negative expected reciprocal utility may lead to betrayal-averse sender behavior, i.e. to a situation where reciprocal subjects send less money than solely selfish ones. In our experiment, most subjects show distinct social preferences in the receiver role, but in the sender role they do not distinguish between a standard trust game with a human partner and a non-social, lottery-like setting, where a computer plays the role of the receiver. This means that the relevance of reciprocity considerations under uncertainty might be fundamentally different from those when no uncertainty is present. Furthermore, we find that sendings are mainly driven by overoptimistic beliefs. We use a modified version of the reciprocity model of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger [Games Econ. Beh. 47 (2004) 268] to explain our results and thereby show why reciprocal and selfish subjects almost do not differ in their sending behavior if one controls for beliefs and risk aversion. For other experimental settings, our model does predict differing behavior, which is in line with findings reported in the literature.

A game-theoretic analysis of preventing spam over Internet Telephony via audio CAPTCHA-based authentication

Spam over Internet Telephony SPIT is a potential source of disruption in Voice over IP VoIP systems. The use of anti-SPIT mechanisms, such as filters and audio CAPTCHA Completely Automated Public Turing Test to Tell Computer and Humans Apart can prevent unsolicited calls and lead to less unwanted traffic. In this paper, we present a game-theoretic model, in which the game is played between SPIT senders and internet telephony users. The game includes call filters and audio CAPTCHA, so as to classify incoming calls as legitimate or malicious. We show how the resulting model can be used to decide upon the trade-offs present in this problem and help us predict the SPIT sender's behavior. We also highlight the advantages in terms of SPIT call reduction of merely introducing CAPTCHA, and provide experimental verification of our results.

Truth-telling and trust in sender–receiver games with intervention: an experimental study

Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling in sender–receiver games. We show that this phenomenon is robust to the random intervention of a truthful regulator. In addition, intervention significantly increases the excessive trust of receivers while the overall percentage of truthful messages received does not change much with or without intervention. We offer a theoretical explanation for the behavior of senders and receivers, using a logit agent quantal response equilibrium (logit-AQRE) model incorporating a non-monetary lying cost for senders (like Peeters et al. in Scand J Econ 115(2):508–548, 2013). We show that our experimental findings are all consistent with the predictions of this model. Moreover, we find that the lying cost is significantly higher under intervention, implying that truthful intervention is beneficial for receivers and justified as a tool for policy makers acting on behalf of informationally inferior parties.

Comparative Analysis of ADTCP and M-ADTCP: Congestion Control Techniques for Improving TCP Performance over Ad-Hoc Networks

Identifying the occurrence of congestion in a Mobile Ad -hoc Network (MANET) is a major task. The inbuilt congestion control techniques of existing TransmissionControl Protocol (TCP) designed for wired ne tworks do not handle the unique properties of shared wireless multi -hop link. There are several approaches proposed for detecting and overcoming the congestion in the mobile ad -hoc network. In this paper we present a Modified AD-hoc Transmission Control Protocol (M -ADTCP) method where the r eceiver detects the probable current network status and transmits this information to the sender as feedback. The sender behavior is altered appropriately. The proposedtechnique is also compatible with standard TCP .

Constructing formal rules to verify message communication in distributed systems

This study presents a method to construct formal rules used to run-time verify message passing between clients in distributed systems. Rules construction is achieved in four steps: (1) Visual specification of expected behavior of the sender, receiver, and network in sending and receiving a message, (2) Extraction of properties of sender, receiver, and network from the visual specification, (3) specification of constraints that should govern message passing in distributed systems, and (4) construction of verifier rules from the properties and the constraints. The rules are used to verify actual sender, receiver, and network behavior. Expected behavior of the client (process) is one that to be and the actual one is the behavior should be verified. The rules were applied to verify the behavior of client and servers that communicated with each other in order to compute Fibonacci numbers in parallel and some violations were discovered.

The effect of consequential thinking on trust game behavior

AbstractContrary to rational Expected Monetary Value (EMV) predictions that no money will be transferred in Trust Games, in experiments players make positive transfers. Theorists have proposed modifying the Sender's utility function while retaining utility‐maximization assumptions to account for this behavior. Such accounts assume that Senders can grasp the possible outcomes of their choices, their probabilities, and utilities. In reality, however, Senders' choices are unexpectedly complex, and the assumption that they approximate expected utility maximization is highly implausible. Instead, we suggest that Senders are guided by general propensities to trust others. Two experiments examine the effect of inducing consequential thought on Sender behavior. One induced consequential thought directly; the other did so indirectly. The amount sent was significantly reduced following either manipulation. This suggests that models of Sender behavior in Complex Trust Games should not assume that participants routinely engage in consequential thinking (CT) of the depth that would be required for utility maximization. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Oligopoly limit-pricing in the lab

We examine the behavior of senders and receivers in the context of oligopoly limit pricing experiments in which high prices chosen by two privately informed incumbents may signal to a potential entrant that the industry-wide costs are high and that entry is unprofitable. The results provide strong support for the theoretical prediction that the incumbents can credibly deter unprofitable entry without having to distort their prices away from their full information levels. Yet, in a large number of cases, asymmetric information induces incumbents to raise prices when costs are low. The results also show that the entrants' behavior is by and large “bi-polar:” entrants tend to enter when the incumbents' prices are “low” but tend to stay out when the incumbents' prices are “high.”

Oligopoly Limit-Pricing in the Lab

We examine the behavior of senders and receivers in the context of oligopoly limit pricing experiments in which high prices chosen by two privately informed incumbents may signal to a potential entrant that the industry-wide costs are high and that entry is unprofitable. The results provide strong support for the theoretical prediction that the incumbents can credibly deter unprofitable entry without having to distort their prices away from their full information levels. Yet, in a large number of cases, asymmetric information induces incumbents to raise prices when costs are low. The results also show that the entrants' behavior is by and large bi-polar: entrants tend to enter when the incumbents' prices are low but tend to stay out when the incumbents' prices are high.

HRM Practices and Knowledge Transfer in MNCs

This chapter introduces HRM practices that help MNCs to overcome knowledge transfer barriers (knowledge-driven HRM practices). It argues that MNCs can institute various HRM practices that impact knowledge transfer barriers associated with behavior of knowledge senders and receivers. HRM practices relevant for absorptive capacity of subsidiary employees form two groups – cognitive (job analysis, recruitment, selection, international rotation, career management, training and performance appraisal) and stimulative (promotion, performance-based compensation, internal transfer, orientation programs, job design and flexible working practices). The application of cognitive HRM practices enhances the ability of knowledge receivers to absorb transferred knowledge, while the use of stimulative HRM practices increases their motivation. Temporary and permanent types of international assignments respectively influence the ability and motivation of expatriate managers to share their knowledge.

Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk

In previous work on cheap talk, uncertainty has almost always been modeled using a single-dimensional state variable. In this paper we prove that the dimensionality of the uncertain variable has an important qualitative impact on results and yields interesting insights into the mechanics of information transmission. Contrary to the unidimensional case, if there is more than one sender, full revelation of information in all states of nature is generically possible, even when the conflict of interest is arbitrarily large. What really matters in transmission of information is the local behavior of senders' indifference curves at the ideal point of the receiver, not the proximity of players' ideal point.

TCP congestion control with a misbehaving receiver

In this paper, we explore the operation of TCP congestion control when the receiver can misbehave, as might occur with a greedy Web client. We first demonstrate that there are simple attacks that allow a misbehaving receiver to drive a standard TCP sender arbitrarily fast, without losing end-to-end reliability. These attacks are widely applicable because they stem from the sender behavior specified in RFC 2581 rather than implementation bugs. We then show that it is possible to modify TCP to eliminate this undesirable behavior entirely, without requiring assumptions of any kind about receiver behavior. This is a strong result: with our solution a receiver can only reduce the data transfer rate by misbehaving, thereby eliminating the incentive to do so.