Philosophy Seminar Research Articles

Adultcentrism and the children's classroom: if you want to teach them you must know who they are

The paper addresses academic adultcentrism from the perspective of the pre-service instruction and practice of philosophy teachers, based on the experience we have gained while leading a Didactic of Philosophy seminar for a Philosophy and Letters academic program where students are engaged in the designing, implementation and evaluation of academic material and class performance for K-12 schools. After giving a brief presentation of the context in which philosophy teaching takes place, and a description of the logic and horizon that set the basis of our seminar, we define and discuss four particular ways in which adultcentrism permeates the preparation and performance of philosophy classes for classrooms with students ranging from 8 to 15 years old: cognitive, epistemic, pedagogical and disciplinary adultcentrism. As well as some of the ways in which, as part of the seminar, the students and the instructor have devised to address and overcome the adultcentrism problems. At the end of the discussion, an auto-critical note is included in order to show the limits of our own practices and base ground, as well as a way to define new necessary approaches and perspectives required to address both the problems we found to be at the bottom of current teaching practices. As well as n our own expectations, methods and ways to deal with those issues with our pre-service young colleagues.

Introduction

Abstract The introduction outlines the genesis and evolution of the two-year German Philosophy Seminar, setting the stage for the current special issue. Originating in 2019 at the University of London, the seminar initially focused on Martin Buber's philosophy, since his insights into dialogue and human relationality became once again topical and relevant in light of the recent broad and rapid changes in public and interpersonal communication. The 2020 shift to an online format due to the Covid-19 pandemic presented challenges but also facilitated global participation, fostering a virtual community. The seminar's success prompted its continuation, partnering with the Global Lehrhaus to explore contemporary themes in conjunction with Buber's philosophy. Across two academic years, sessions delved into Buber's ideas in dialogue with diverse perspectives such as Marxism, feminism, phenomenology, psychoanalysis, communication theory, and contemporary social philosophy. The resulting publication captures these discussions, emphasizing the enduring relevance of Buber's concepts in today's context.

Интерактивные методики обучения философии студентов направления подготовки «Менеджмент» в контексте миссии современного (технического) университета

Using the example of the introductory philosophy seminar for students of the Management training course, the application of the case study methodology is demonstrated as the most effective in the context of the implementation of the mission of a modern university, which has the generic properties of a university as a cultural phenomenon and, as a result, is aimed not only at the formation of a highly qualified specialist, but also sets itself a larger task the “production” of the personality of a professional who is able to fully solve both business problems and problems related to personal and social value-semantic, existential choice. It is shown how, through the use of mini-cases in the process of teaching philosophy, it is possible to create a genuine motivation to study the subject field of philosophy with prolonged educational goals: not only teaching philosophy as a discipline and gaining the skill of critical thinking, but also the study of philosophical problems, which will allow in the future to professionally solve managerial problems.

Agency and responsibility: The personal and the political

AbstractIn this paper, I review arguments according to which harsh criminal punishments and poverty areundeservedand thereforeunjust. Such arguments come in different forms. First, one may argue thatno onedeserves to be poor or be punished, because there is no such thing as desert‐entailing moral responsibility. Second, one may argue that poor people in particular do not deserve to remain in poverty or to be punished if they commit crimes, because poor people suffer from psychological problems that undermine their agency and moral responsibility. Third, one may argue that poor and otherwise marginalized people frequently face external obstacles that prevent them from taking alternative courses of action. The first kind of argument has its place in the philosophy seminar. Psychological difficulties may be important to attend to both in personal relationships and when holding ourselves responsible. Nevertheless, I argue that neither type of argument belongs in political contexts. Moral responsibility scepticism ultimately rests on contested intuitions. Labelling certain groups of people particularly irrational, weak‐willed, or similar is belittling and disrespectful; such claims are also hard to prove, and may have the opposite effect to the intended one on people's attitudes. Arguments from external obstacles have none of these problems. Such arguments may not take us all the way to criminal justice reform, but in this context, we can supplement them with epistemic arguments and crime prevention arguments.

Eugene O’Neill’s Philosophy of Difficult Theatre: Pity, Fear, and Forgiveness

Eugene O’Neill’s Philosophy of Difficult Theatre: Pity, Fear, and Forgiveness

Философский семинар математиков Омcкого государственного университета

The history of the creation of the ”Philosophy Seminar” of mathematicians in Omsk State University. Topics of reports.

Turning to Poetry for Help—Some Desultory Remarks

Abstract The ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry? I chip away at the quarrel, asking why we should think that poets do not aim at truth or why philosophers do not aim at beauty. Why shouldn’t poetry have a place in the philosophy seminar and vice-versa? Crucial to my chipping-away is the idea that there is an expanded but still meaningful sense of “logic” in which poetry is a logical exercise.

Defensive Harm, Consent, and Intervention

Philosophy & Public AffairsVolume 45, Issue 4 p. 356-396 Original Article Defensive Harm, Consent, and Intervention Jonathan Parry, Jonathan Parry orcid.org/0000-0002-2649-9220 Search for more papers by this author Jonathan Parry, Jonathan Parry orcid.org/0000-0002-2649-9220 Search for more papers by this author First published: 21 December 2017 https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12099Citations: 8 For comments on, and conversations about, this article, I am extremely grateful to Jessica Begon, Joseph Bowen, Lars Christie, Matthew Coakley, Helen Frowe, Jimmy Goodrich, Richard Healey, Lisa Hecht, Jeff McMahan, Janette Myers, Daniel Ramöller, Michael Robillard, Alex Silk, Victor Tadros, Leo Townsend, Alex Voorhoeve, and, especially, Daniel Viehoff. The article benefited from discussion with audiences at the University of Birmingham, the University of Oslo, the Manchester Centre for Political Theory (MANCEPT), Stockholm University, the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar, the University of Nottingham, Ryerson University, the 2015 Annual Meeting of the Oxford Institute for the Ethics and Law of Armed Conflict (ELAC) hosted by the Stockholm Centre for the Ethics of War and Peace (SCEWP) at Stockholm University, and the Society for Applied Philosophy 2015 Annual Conference hosted by the University of Edinburgh. Special thanks to two anonymous Associate Editors for this journal, whose detailed and challenging comments improved the article immeasurably. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume45, Issue4Fall 2017Pages 356-396 RelatedInformation

Including the Unaffected

Journal of Political PhilosophyVolume 22, Issue 4 p. 377-395 Original Article Including the Unaffected† Michael L. Frazer, Michael L. Frazer Government, Harvard UniversitySearch for more papers by this author Michael L. Frazer, Michael L. Frazer Government, Harvard UniversitySearch for more papers by this author First published: 11 September 2013 https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12024Citations: 2 †Previous versions of this article were presented at the Australian National University Philosophy Colloquium, the University of Sydney Philosophy Seminar, the Harvard University Political Theory Research Workshop and meetings of the Association for Political Theory and the Northeastern Political Science Association. In addition to all those who offered their suggestions at these venues, I would like to thank Coral C. Frazer, Eric Beerbohm, Ryan Davis, and Benjamin Hertzberg for their helpful comments, as well as Jennifer Page for her invaluable assistance. Thanks are also due to Robert Goodin and the anonymous reviewers for the Journal of Political Philosophy. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume22, Issue4December 2014Pages 377-395 RelatedInformation

Global Justice and Practice-Dependence: Conventionalism, Institutionalism, Functionalism

Journal of Political PhilosophyVolume 19, Issue 4 p. 399-418 Global Justice and Practice-Dependence: Conventionalism, Institutionalism, Functionalism LAURA VALENTINI, LAURA VALENTINI Politics, The Queen's College, Oxford I am grateful to Simon Caney, Elizabeth Cripps, Bob Goodin, Robert Jubb, Tamara Jugov, David Karp, Saladin Meckled-Garcia, Cécile Laborde, Thom Porter, Miriam Ronzoni, Federico Zuolo and the anonymous reviewers of this article for their comments on earlier versions of it. I also wish to thank the audiences at ‘Brave New World’ (University of Manchester, June 2007) and at the Royal Institute of Philosophy Seminar Series (Roehampton University, November 2008) for helpful discussion. Finally, my biggest thanks go to Christian Barry, for his invaluable written comments on an earlier draft, and to Christian List for his continued encouragement.Search for more papers by this author LAURA VALENTINI, LAURA VALENTINI Politics, The Queen's College, Oxford I am grateful to Simon Caney, Elizabeth Cripps, Bob Goodin, Robert Jubb, Tamara Jugov, David Karp, Saladin Meckled-Garcia, Cécile Laborde, Thom Porter, Miriam Ronzoni, Federico Zuolo and the anonymous reviewers of this article for their comments on earlier versions of it. I also wish to thank the audiences at ‘Brave New World’ (University of Manchester, June 2007) and at the Royal Institute of Philosophy Seminar Series (Roehampton University, November 2008) for helpful discussion. Finally, my biggest thanks go to Christian Barry, for his invaluable written comments on an earlier draft, and to Christian List for his continued encouragement.Search for more papers by this author First published: 04 October 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2010.00373.xCitations: 20 Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume19, Issue4December 2011Pages 399-418 RelatedInformation

Reason, Right, and Revolution: Kant and Locke

Philosophy & Public AffairsVolume 36, Issue 4 p. 375-404 Reason, Right, and Revolution: Kant and Locke KATRIN FLIKSCHUH, KATRIN FLIKSCHUH London School of EconomicsSearch for more papers by this author KATRIN FLIKSCHUH, KATRIN FLIKSCHUH London School of EconomicsSearch for more papers by this author First published: 04 November 2008 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2008.00146.xCitations: 22 Earlier versions of this article were given at a conference on Kant's Doctrine of Right in Jena during the summer of 2007; at the political philosophy seminar at the University of Edinburgh, the philosophy seminar at the University of Bristol, and the political theory workshop at the LSE. My thanks to participants at these events for their helpful comments and suggestions, including Chris Bertram, Sharon Byrd, Thomas Christiano, Philip Cook, Cecile Fabre, Tim Hayward, Joachim Hruschka, Chandran Kukathas, Jens Kulenkampff, Hannes Leitgeb, Bernd Ludwig, and Leif Wenar. I am especially grateful to Paul Kelly for his generous guidance on Locke; to Christian List for fascinating exchanges on collective and group agency, and to Arthur Ripstein for sustained and always enjoyable discussion on Kant. Many thanks, finally, to the Editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs for their helpful suggestions for revision of the penultimate draft. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume36, Issue4Fall 2008Pages 375-404 RelatedInformation

Dekanting preimplantation genetic diagnosis and the saviour child: a personal memoir

Being both an academic bioethicist and a member of a na-tional ethics body (in my case, the Swiss Bioethics Advisory Commission – NEK-CNE – from 2001 to 2007) is not always easy. The rules of the academic world favour independent thinking, speculative boldness, and examining all arguments with an open eye no matter how preposterous or politically incorrect they may appear at first sight. In «public bioethics» however, possible discourses are heavily constrained by extra-neous considerations. For one thing, the state of current law and the limits of realistic changes carry much weight. As the saying goes, la politique est l’art du possible, and what counts as possible in politics bears little relation to what counts as plausible, or at least worth discussing, in the philosophy seminar. More troublingly perhaps, arguments that cut no ice with many philosophers, or at least are considered mas-sively controversial, are sometimes treated as sacred mantras in public bioethics. Such is the concept of «human dignity». Someone only needs to assert, in the appropriately dour tone, that a particular biomedical practice is «against human dig-nity», and anyone disagreeing is facing an uphill battle.

The High School Philosophy Seminar and Philosophical Positivism (I)

The High School Philosophy Seminar and Philosophical Positivism (I)

The High School Philosophy Seminar (II)

The High School Philosophy Seminar (II)

Intellectual Transfer: Theodor W. Adorno's American Experience

By the late 1960s Theodor W. had already become a kind of institution in Germany. himself, appalled, was among the first to realize this. But at that point no one gave much thought to the fact that had also become a transatlantic institution. In 1967, when I was attending my first advanced seminar in philosophy, Angela Davis presented a paper and Irving Wohlfarth and Sam Weber were among the participants. All three played important roles in translating, introducing, and mediating and Wal ter Benjamin's relation to a larger world. In 1969 Martin Jay came to Frank furt. His work in the 1970s kept alive a consciousness of the relation between the European critical theorists and Max Horkheimer?both of whom had passed away by the mid-1970s?and Herbert Marcuse and Leo L?wen thal, who lived longer lives in California. In Frankfurt students of observed these milestones, reached in the face of critical theory's often quite isolated and unhappy history, with a mixture of pleasure and distrust. For those who thought of themselves as inheriting a living tradition, it was disconcert ing to be told that critical theory was already a closed book?an object of intellectual history rather than a framework of contemporary social analy sis. In 1983 Jay became the first person to address the idea of Adorno in America. Unfortunately, despite Jay's warnings to be on guard against anec dotes and clich?s about either or the German ?migr? experience,

Collective Intentionality, Evolutionary Biology and Social Reality1

The paper aims to clarify and scrutinize Searle”s somewhat puzzling statement that collective intentionality is a biologically primitive phenomenon. It is argued that the statement is not only meant to bringout that “collective intentionality” is not further analyzable in terms of individual intentionality. It also is meant to convey that we have a biologically evolved innate capacity for collective intentionality.The paper points out that Searle”s dedication to a strong notion of collective intentionality considerably delimits the scope of his endeavor. Furthermore, evolutionary theory does not vindicate that an innate capacity for collective intentionality is a necessary precondition for cooperative behavior.1 1Useful comments made by the participants of the Amsterdam seminar in Philosophy and History of Economics (11 November 2002), by the participants of the Third Workshop in Collective Intentionality (Rotterdam, 12-14 December 2002), and by the editors of this special issue are gratefully acknowledged. I also want to thank an anonymous referee for making helpful suggestions.

In Memory of Henry

I first met Henry W. Johstone Jr. during the spring of 1968. I was a doctoral candidate at the University of Wisconsin and Henry was in Madison as part of a distinguished visitor series hosted by my mentor, Lloyd Bitzer. Lloyd had invited a group of graduate students to his home to meet the guest of honor. I was particularly excited because Henry had accepted my paper on Aristotle's theory of exemplification to appear in the new international journal Philosophy and Rhetoric, which he edited. This was my first publication and I wanted to thank him, which seemed to this novice the appropriate thing to do. I remember that evening for Henry's seeming reserve, which I later learned was a deep shyness that masked his capacity for uncanny directness and a wicked sense of humor, and for his generosity in deflecting my naiveté about the basis for editorial judgments. I also remember it for his deft way of engaging a room of young rhetoricians with questions that conveyed his doubt about their subject (he later changed his mind) without clouding his sincere openness to what we had to say. The following fall, we met again during my interview for a position in the Speech Department at Penn State University. I was offered the position and became Henry's colleague as Book Review Editor of P&R. For the next thirty years, I was blessed to serve as Henry's partner-in-crime in the joys of life that may remain today only among the professoriate. We shared in the editorial work of the journal, in co-teaching our graduate seminar in Philosophy and Rhetoric, in our intellectual passion for the bonds and wars between philosophy and rhetoric, and in the pleasure of choosing the right bottle of wine. But more than that, we shared these common pursuits in contexts of luncheons, dinners, and social occasions that mixed intellectual work with the pleasure of treasured company.

Sacrifice: From Isaac to Patocka

Abstract In 1975, two years before his death, Patocka outlined three possible courses of action in an underground philosophy seminar: Plato's path — withdrawal from society into inner emigration; the sophists' path — compromise with society and survival; and Socrates' path — confrontation with society and, consequently, death. This taxonomy can be extended beyond Greek philosophy. Voltaire's Candide reached Plato's inner emigration in his garden. Heidegger chose the sophists’ path by first dedicating Being and Time to Edmund Husserl “in friendship and admiration,” and then preventing him from using the Freiburg University library, and eventually surviving both the Nazis and postwar denazification. Most philosophers, however, seem to have chosen a path between Plato's inner emigration and Socrates' self-sacrifice: Galileo was ready to fight for his views but under pressure abandoned them. Few philosophers have ever chosen Socrates' path.

The rationality of ideologies and religions1This paper is based on a series of lectures given at the University of Utrecht in October 1990. I wish to thank prof .dr Vincent Brümmer and his seminar in philosophy of religion for many fruitful questions and comments.

The aim of this article is to develop a criterion for deciding when it is rational to adhere to an ideology or a religion. Various views on the rationality of religions are discussed, and a structural view on ideologies and religions is developed. The view is then defended that it is rational to adhere to an ideology or religion only if it can serve to create and sustain values. For this purpose a utopian concept of human life is required on the basis of which we can decide both what is to count as failure, guilt etc., and also what attitude we are to adopt toward reality.

CONTINUING EDUCATION, THE PROMOTION OF CULTURE, AND THE SOCIAL ROLE OF THE UNIVERSITY

For many years, the author has been thinking about the problem of how to combine continuing education courses in universities with efforts to promote the dissemination of culture in the broadest sense. He begins his article with two definitions, one of the concept of continuing education itself, the other of the concept of culture. He indicates that increasingly a popular demand is being manifested for courses combining both objectives, particularly on the part of those who had to interrupt their studies prematurely or who completed them some time ago. He cites two seminars currently being offered at the University oE Athens, one an interdisciplinary seminar in philosophy, organized eight years ago, the other, a seminar in the philosophy of art. Both of them have opened their doors to all interested persons. They have been extremely popular, despite the fact that enrol‐lecs earn no credit for attending them. With the aid of the appropriate national authorities, similar programmes could be created in other universities in the countries belonging to Unesco so as to respond to a genuine social need.