The goal of the paper is to determine the relation between theoretical presuppositions of linguistic worldview studies (LWS) and heterodox strains of philosophical semantics, as well as the connection with the semantic prerequisites of other schools of text linguistics, in particular corpus linguistics. Semantic consequences of the concept of defining in the LWS are presented. It is claimed that they do not pose great constrains on philosophical semantics (e.g. while the concept of stereotype developed by Hillary Putnam needs to be accepted, semantic externalism does not follow). It is proved that LWS are compatible with the concept of meaning-as-use, particularly with semantic inferentialism, as developed by Robert Brandom and Jaroslav Peregrin. The paper also considers the ontological status of meaning reconstructions proposed in the framework of the LWS, as an answer to critiques originating in more traditionalist or minimalist approaches to semantics. It is demonstrated that similar issues occur in other strains of text linguistics, for instance, in corpus linguistics. However, the paper claims that methodological precision and proper choice of a text corpus guarantee results satisfying from the perspective of empirical linguistics.