Semantic Conception Of Theories Research Articles

Semantic realism in the semantic conception of theories

Semantic realism can be characterised as the idea that scientific theories are truth-bearers, and that they are true or false in virtue of the world. This notion is often assumed, but rarely discussed in the literature. I examine how it fares in the context of the semantic view of theories and in connection with the literature on scientific representation. Making sense of semantic realism requires specifying the conditions of application of theoretical models, even for models that are not actually used, which leads to several difficulties. My conclusion is that semantic realism is far more demanding than one would expect. Finally, I briefly examine some pragmatist alternatives.

Logicism and ramsification

ion principles of the logical form of Hume’s Principle. The identity criteria for geometrical objects described by theories of physical space are ‘‘empirically constrained’’ in the sense that the equivalence relations in the definiens of such principles are ‘‘established experimentally’’ (39). In contrast, the central identity principle for numbers guiding the application of arithmetic is Hume’s principle. This is, as was already shown in the previous chapter, fully general and thus not constrained by empirical facts. Ramsification and scientific structuralism The second thematic focus of the book concerns contributions to the logical analysis of theoretical knowledge in work by Russell, Ramsey, and Carnap. Chapters 4–7 develop a critical discussion of the Ramsey-sentence reconstruction of theories and its structuralist underpinnings. In addition, several points of contact with the semantic conception of theories, Putnam’s model-theoretical arguments against metaphysical realism, and van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism are addressed here. Chapter 4 covers much of the ground discussed in the subsequent chapters of the book and will therefore be the focus of the present review. The chapter begins with a critical evaluation of a recent ‘‘observation’’ made by Michael Friedman regarding Carnap’s ‘‘neutralism’’ in the debate on the nature of theoretical entities. Friedman’s point—as Demopoulos presents it—is based on a comparison between van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism and Carnap’s Ramsey-sentence reconstruction of theories. A ‘‘central tenet’’ of constructive empiricism is the distinction between the truth of a theory and its empirical adequacy. As Demopoulos shows, this distinction can be trivialized, however, by a simple model-theoretical argument. Very roughly, it can be shown that an empirically adequate theory is always also true if its observational models are of the right size. Friedman’s observation is that Carnap’s own position is not affected by this trivialization argument and thus turns out to be philosophically preferable to van Fraassen’s account. Carnap’s neutralism is the view that questions concerning the ontological status of theoretical entities should really be understood as questions about the choice of linguistic frameworks. Thus, the traditional realism–instrumentalism controversy should be deflated to the dispute over whether one should adopt a language with or without theoretical terms. As a consequence, Carnap’s use of the Ramsey sentence seems to escape the above trivialization argument, simply because the distinction between truth and empirical adequacy is irrelevant in his neutralist account. Demopoulos’ main point in the paper is to present a second model-theoretical argument directed against Carnap’s alleged neutralism. The result is based on a simple mathematical toy example, namely an arithmetical theory T with one ‘‘observational’’ and one ‘‘theoretical’’ predicate. The specific theory has two important properties: First, all of its observational consequences are true in the standard or intended numerical model. Second, T itself as well as its Ramsey sentence R(T) is not true in any expansion of this intended model but only in 258 Metascience (2014) 23:255–261

The semantic conception and the structuralist view of theories: A critique of Suppe’s criticisms

Different conceptions of scientific theories, such as the state spaces approach of Bas van Fraassen, the phase spaces approach of Frederick Suppe, the set-theoretical approach of Patrick Suppes, and the structuralist view of Joseph Sneed et al. are usually put together into one big family. In addition, the definite article is normally used, and thus we speak of the semantic conception (view or approach) of theories and of its different approaches (variants or versions). However, in The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism (Urban and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989), starting from certain remarks already made in “Theory Structure” (in P. Asquith and H. Kyburg (Eds.), Current Research in Philosophy of Science, East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1979, pp. 317–338), Frederick Suppe excludes the structuralist view as well as other “European” versions from the semantic conception of theories. In this paper I will critically examine the reasons put forward by Suppe for this decision and, later, I will provide a general characterization of the semantic family and of the structuralist view of theories in such a way as to justify the inclusion of the structuralist view (as well as other “European” versions) as a member of this family.

Foundations of "new" social science: institutional legitimacy from philosophy, complexity science, postmodernism, and agent-based modeling.

Since the death of positivism in the 1970s, philosophers have turned their attention to scientific realism, evolutionary epistemology, and the Semantic Conception of Theories. Building on these trends, Campbellian Realism allows social scientists to accept real-world phenomena as criterion variables against which theories may be tested without denying the reality of individual interpretation and social construction. The Semantic Conception reduces the importance of axioms, but reaffirms the role of models and experiments. Philosophers now see models as "autonomous agents" that exert independent influence on the development of a science, in addition to theory and data. The inappropriate molding effects of math models on social behavior modeling are noted. Complexity science offers a "new" normal science epistemology focusing on order creation by self-organizing heterogeneous agents and agent-based models. The more responsible core of postmodernism builds on the idea that agents operate in a constantly changing web of interconnections among other agents. The connectionist agent-based models of complexity science draw on the same conception of social ontology as do postmodernists. These recent developments combine to provide foundations for a "new" social science centered on formal modeling not requiring the mathematical assumptions of agent homogeneity and equilibrium conditions. They give this "new" social science legitimacy in scientific circles that current social science approaches lack.

Perspective—Quasi-Natural Organization Science

Positing that organizational phenomena result from both individual human intentionality and natural causes independent of individuals' intended behavior, the need for a quasi-natural organization science is identified. The paradigm war is defined in terms of positivism and postpositivism, with the suggestion that a more relevant epistemology might be scientific realism. The current unconstructive paradigm proliferation is seen as resulting from an underlying cause, idiosyncratic organizational microstates, phenomena identified by postmodernists. The article develops quasi-natural organization science as an antidote to multiparadigmaticism by recognizing that mathematically, computationally, and experimentally intense twentieth century natural sciences all have microstate idiosyncrasy assumptions similar to those postmodernists suggest are true of organizational phenomena. By framing a quasi-natural organization science focusing on microstates, my intent is not to deny the relevance of either intentionality and subjectivity or natural science and objectivity. The article attacks the microstate idiosyncrasy problem on four frontiers: micro- and macroevolutionary theory, semantic conception epistemology, analytical mechanics, and complexity theory. The first frontier develops the natural side of quasi-natural organization science to explain natural pattern or order. This “order” arguably results from multilevel coevolutionary behavior in a selectionist competitive context in the form of multi-level selectionist effects. The second frontier reviews the historic role of idealized models, as understood by historical realists and the “semantic conception of theories”—idealized constructs such as point masses or the rational actor assumption—that currently successful sciences, such as physics and economics, drew upon early in their life-cycles to sidestep the idiosyncrasy problem. Organization scientists are encouraged to develop theories in terms of idealized models. The third frontier attends to the role of ‘instrumental conveniences’ as essential constructs in the early life-cycle stages of sciences and the importance of studying rates. For example, a construct such as a pressure vessel acts as a container translating idiosyncratic gas particle movements into a directed pressure stream where particles emerge at some rate. Drawing on Sommerhoff's “directive correlation” concept as an analogous “container” in firms, this section argues that such containers can be used in organizational analysis to translate idiosyncratic microstates into probabilistic rates of occurrence, thereby allowing the use of intrafirm rate models and Hempel's deductive-statistical model of explanation. An example is given showing how human resource variables can be translated into rate concepts and then used in the context of the directive correlation and the deductive statistical model. The fourth frontier draws on complexity theory as a computational/analytical approach that directly incorporates idiosyncrasy by use of dynamical (nonlinear) methods. Complex adaptive systems, kinds of complexity, the causal role of complexity, and levels of adaptive tension likely to foster self-organization are discussed. An example shows how a complexity theory approach differs from a conventional explanation of why participative management decision making styles have failed to proliferate. The combined effect of rate dynamics, statistical mechanics, and dynamical analysis lays the platform for a realist, predictive, and generalizable quasi-natural organization science, thereby offering a possible resolution of the paradigm war. The mitigation of idiosyncrasy effects allows a reemphasis of background laws in organization science, as opposed to the further emphasis of contingent details advocated by post-modernists.

The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism. Frederick Suppe

Previous articleNext article No AccessBook ReviewsThe Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism. Frederick Suppe John ForgeJohn Forge Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Isis Volume 82, Number 3Sep., 1991 Publication of the History of Science Society Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/355917 Views: 7Total views on this site Copyright 1991 History of Science Society, Inc.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Review of The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism.

Review of The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism.

The semantic conception of theories and scientific realism

Frederick Suppe has come to enjoy a position of undisputed leadership in the post-positivistic philosophy of science. Students of the field will therefore welcome publication of the present account of his views. The fourteen chapters derive from papers published since 1971, but which have been subje

Book Reviews

Book reviewed in this article:Timo airaksinen, The Ethics of Coercion and Authority.Panayot Butchvarov, Skepticism in ethics.Suppe, Frederick, The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism.Sanford, David H. If P, then Q; Conditionals and the Foundations of Reasoning.

Explanation in the Semantic Conception of Theory Structure

The semantic conception of theories has a relatively short history the beginnings of which Frederick Suppe has traced to von Neumann (Suppe 1988). Two other early initiators and advocates were Evert Beth in 1948-49 (Beth 1948, 1949; see also 1961) and Patrick Suppes in 1957 in his Introduction to Logic (Suppes, 1957). Beth advanced what has become known as a state space approach while Suppes advanced a set-theoretical predicate approach.Suppes suggested that scientific theories are more appropriately formalized as set-theoretical predicates. Shortly thereafter in 1961 Robert Stoll in his Set Theory and Logic (Stoll, 1961) made a similar claim about the formalization of informal theories of which scientific theories are instances. Suppes wrote a number of papers during the 1960's in which he indicated the features of theories that were better represented on a set-theoretical predicate conception of theories (see, for example Suppes, 1962).