Industrial Self-Government Research Articles

On the Role of Local Associations in Industry Self-governance: A Case Study of the Local Civil Engineering and Urban Planning Association

On the Role of Local Associations in Industry Self-governance: A Case Study of the Local Civil Engineering and Urban Planning Association

‘The natural leader of the proletariat’: Eduard Bernstein on trade unions and the path to socialist cooperation

ABSTRACT This paper offers a reinterpretation of Eduard Bernstein’s theory of evolutionary socialism. It does so by examining the leading role that he envisioned for unions of skilled workers in the socialist movement. During his time in London in the 1890s, Bernstein’s engagement with English Fabianism led him to emphasize the proletariat’s differentiated nature. He claimed skilled workers most readily organized and became the first proletarians to develop class consciousness. Unskilled workers, on the other hand, remained largely unorganized and estranged from the socialist movement. Bernstein opposed the socialist political strategy of nationalization because it would subordinate unskilled workers to party revolutionaries rather than realize cooperative self-government in industry. This focus on promoting industrial self-government made Bernstein stress the importance of workers’ further unionization and adoption of skilled unionists’ method of collective bargaining. This would produce socialist cooperation because it facilitated cooperative wage determination. In Bernstein’s view, skilled unionists influenced the socialist party to take political action to organize and elevate more proletarians to class consciousness. In contrast to those who claim Bernstein prioritized the party’s autonomous ethical appeals and legislation, I emphasize his focus on union-party interactions and defense of unions as central for the advance into socialism’s cooperative society.

Corporatism in Early Twentieth-Century Britain: Three Alternatives for a Post-Liberal Order

This article engages with the most recent literature on the global circulation of corporatist projects, discussing three reform schemes elaborated in Britain during the first half of the twentieth century – G.D.H. Cole's guild socialism, Dudley Docker's technocratic business parliament and Harold Macmillan's conservative industrial self-government. Overcoming the often too rigid equivalences between corporatism and fascism, this article seeks to ascertain to what extent and with what nuances corporatist ideas circulated among non-fascist political circles in Britain. It is argued that the schemes analysed shared a similar corporatist matrix, which nonetheless served as the core idea of different political strategies. In the conclusions, it is claimed that these dissimilarities are consequential to the degree of adherence to the principles of capitalism, i.e. the profit-earning motive and the private ownership of the means of production, as well as to the democratic level of the institutions proposed.

The three legal dimensions of China’s big data governance

Big data governance has emerged as an important area of focus in recent times. In this article, we study the state of big data governance in China, discuss the balance of interests in big data, and seek to develop the theory of big data governance in law. In the past years, some academic achievements have been made in big data governance theories, personal data protection, and data property rights protection based on existing research related to big data governance. However, conflicts of interest in big data have been under-studied and under-analyzed. In this article, we conduct an in-depth study of the state of big data governance in China and develop a theoretical framework for constructing multi-subject governance based on the interest balancing approach, including the allocation of personal data rights and the rights of a data controller, to resolve the conflicts of interests in big data governance in the areas of private law, public law, and industry self-governance.

Enhancing trust in AI through industry self-governance.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is critical to harnessing value from exponentially growing health and healthcare data. Expectations are high for AI solutions to effectively address current health challenges. However, there have been prior periods of enthusiasm for AI followed by periods of disillusionment, reduced investments, and progress, known as “AI Winters.” We are now at risk of another AI Winter in health/healthcare due to increasing publicity of AI solutions that are not representing touted breakthroughs, and thereby decreasing trust of users in AI. In this article, we first highlight recently published literature on AI risks and mitigation strategies that would be relevant for groups considering designing, implementing, and promoting self-governance. We then describe a process for how a diverse group of stakeholders could develop and define standards for promoting trust, as well as AI risk-mitigating practices through greater industry self-governance. We also describe how adherence to such standards could be verified, specifically through certification/accreditation. Self-governance could be encouraged by governments to complement existing regulatory schema or legislative efforts to mitigate AI risks. Greater adoption of industry self-governance could fill a critical gap to construct a more comprehensive approach to the governance of AI solutions than US legislation/regulations currently encompass. In this more comprehensive approach, AI developers, AI users, and government/legislators all have critical roles to play to advance practices that maintain trust in AI and prevent another AI Winter.

Public Problems, Private Answers: Reforming Industry Self-Governance Law for the 21st Century

For the past twenty years, large corporations have routinely developed and enforced industry-wide standards to address problems that are only distantly related to earning a profit. This includes writing detailed private regulations for environmental protection, national security, working conditions, and other topics formerly reserved to governments. At the same time, the US Supreme Court has said that the Sherman Act forbids any “extra-governmental agency” that “provides extra-judicial tribunals for the determination and punishment of violations.” This seems to ban enforceable rules. Despite this, many US policymakers continue to argue that private standards are efficient and desirable. Many corporations are sympathetic but fear legal liability and are reluctant to participate unless and until the law is clarified. This article asks how existing law can be reformed to arrive at principled rules for deciding when private standards violate the Sherman Act. We begin with an historical account of recent private initiatives to regulate food processing, fisheries, forestry, and coffee production. We argue that these private rules are often just as effective – and burdensome – as government regulation. We then generalize from this evidence to explain when and how large corporations are able to impose their preferences through industry-wide standards. We also describe the politics that determines how large corporations use their power. We argue that the need to earn positive profit and defend market share frequently encourages – and sometimes forces – large companies to choose standards that please consumers. In these cases, consumers act as a shadow electorate that constrains private power in much the same way that real voters constrain elected officials. Finally, our examples show that big corporations often decide to share power with smaller rivals, suppliers, NGOs, and other stakeholders. We argue that these delegations are genuine and make private standards more accountable. The article concludes by asking how current law can be reformed. We argue that the Sherman Act serves two goals. The first is economic efficiency. We argue that private standards advance this goal by addressing problems (“externalities”) that lack well-defined market prices. We argue that private bodies should be allowed to address such problems in the first instance knowing that government may later step in to change or supplement policy. The second goal is to protect democracy from private power. We argue that this danger is minimal so long as (a) market structure encourages corporations to make choices that please consumers and other shadow electorates, (b) the standard setting body represents a wide range of affected stakeholders, or (c) industry selects the prevailing standard from multiple competing proposals. Significantly, all of these tests can be determined from objective evidence without obscure metaphysical inquiries into when private power becomes “illegitimate” or “poses a threat” to democratic politics.

Work culture of the Bata company

The paper deals with the Thomas Bata Company from its establishment until 1932. After defining the concepts, methods and goals, the authors remind Bata’s trips to America, which were crucial for changes in the company. The text then focuses on the Bata’s organization of production based on the workshop autonomy system (Bata is often called the pioneer of self-government in industry). Bata’s production method, even if entirely original, represents an example of masterful adaptation of scientific knowledge in the field of production to the specific local conditions of life in town of Zlín. This paper is also a reminder of the Bata’s tragic death in 12th July 1932 – 80 years has passed since that date.

Industry self-governance: A new way to manage dangerous technologies

Advanced technologies for making chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons can be purchased from hundreds of companies around the world. But negotiating treaties to regulate this trade would take years‘and even then, many governments lack the will or resources to enforce them. Security experts often suggest that the United States could avoid these difficulties by encouraging industry to govern itself. Recent experience in the artificial DNA industry shows that this approach can yield large dividends. At the same time, officials need practical guidance about when private standards are possible and what government can do to promote them. The authors argue that private security standards work particularly well for industries in which manufacturers face massive fixed-cost investments, sell to large buyers, and face risk from intelligent adversaries. This profile fits most high-technology industries that security experts care about. The authors also discuss strategies that governments can use to promote, influence, and learn from private initiatives to regulate dangerous technologies.

Industry Self-Governance and National Security: On the Private Control of Dual Use Technologies

High technology rms often produce goods that pose a signicant risk of injury. This means that upstream suppliers face legal liability if the products are misused or cause accidents. Alternatively, downstream buyers may lose a technology that could have been used to invent protable new products. Industry self-regulation is a natural and increasingly important way to reduce these risks. Our paper explores how upstream and downstream rms form preferences for private regulation. We nd that rms characteristically choose too little regulation where liability is imperfect and/or downstream rms fail to extract social surplus from consumers. Furthermore, regulatory backlash does not compensate for imperfect liability and often makes the situation worse. We also examine the conditions under which large downstream rms can impose a single industry-wide standard on suppliers.

Fuller et al. v. Harrah's, 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 22097

Gaming Law ReviewVol. 9, No. 1 Full Text CasesFuller et al. v. Harrah's, 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 22097Published Online:17 Feb 2005https://doi.org/10.1089/glr.2005.9.86AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB Permissions & CitationsPermissionsDownload CitationsTrack CitationsAdd to favorites Back To Publication ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail FiguresReferencesRelatedDetailsCited byFrustration of Purpose As An Excuse for the Non-Performance of Contractual Obligations Impacted by Coronavirus Pandemic-Related Governmental Restrictions: Some Preliminary ThoughtsSSRN Electronic JournalAccounting Choices and the Legal Environment: The Impact of the Ex Post Loss RuleSSRN Electronic JournalStructural Subjugation: Theorizing Racialized Sexual Harassment in HousingSSRN Electronic Journal, Vol. 14Public Problems, Private Answers: Reforming Industry Self-Governance Law for the 21st CenturySSRN Electronic JournalCopyright, Causality, and the CourtsSSRN Electronic JournalHalf-Time or Time and One-Half? Recent Developments Deprive Employees of Their Rightful Overtime Compensation under the FLSASSRN Electronic JournalInternational Jurisdiction over Copyright Infringements in the CloudSSRN Electronic JournalPolicing the Ballot: Citizens for Tax Reform v. Deters and Prohibitions on Volume-Based Compensation for Paid Signature GatherersSSRN Electronic JournalErasing Boundaries: Masculinities, Sexual Minorities, and Employment DiscriminationSSRN Electronic JournalRecovery of Interest on a Tax Underpayment Caused by a Tax Advisor’s NegligenceSSRN Electronic Journal, Vol. 1Retaliatory Litigation Tactics: The Chilling Effects of After-Acquired EvidenceSSRN Electronic Journal, Vol. 31Pennsylvania and PornographySSRN Electronic JournalBeer Advertising and Marketing Update: Structure, Conduct, and Social CostsSSRN Electronic Journal Volume 9Issue 1Feb 2005 InformationCopyright 2005, Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.To cite this article:Fuller et al. v. Harrah's, 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 22097.Gaming Law Review.Feb 2005.86-92.http://doi.org/10.1089/glr.2005.9.86Published in Volume: 9 Issue 1: February 17, 2005PDF download

Corporatist Economy in Britain? Capitalist planning for industrial self-government in the 1930s

Corporatist Economy in Britain? Capitalist planning for industrial self-government in the 1930s

Shaping Science and Industry: A History of Australia’s Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, 1926–49 by Carl B. Schedvin

TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE Book Reviews 353 beamte or factory inspectors of the Departments of Trade) and industrial self-government (Berufsgenossenschaften or trade corpora­ tions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act [1884], and steam-boiler inspection associations in charge of safe construction). Weber gives the briefest account (pp. 104— 11) of this basic pattern, with no details on accident prevention as attempted by pertinent standards. Instead, he is interested in public debates about enlarging or limiting the power of the federal government, or broadening the concept of occupational safety by including occupational health. As a conse­ quence, the Weimar period gains prominence, and the text is almost identical with chapters 8 and 9 of Technik und Sicherheit. Beginning in 1925, occupational health was gradually included in workmen’s compensation. During the 1960s and 1970s, the regulation of occu­ pational health and safety was seriously intensified, but the “dual system” remained basically unchanged, as Weber’s final chapter makes clear. Peter Lundgreen Dr. Lundgreen is professorofthe social history ofscience at the Universitat Bielefeld. He is the author of Standardization-Testing-Regulation: Studies in the History of the Sciencebased Regulatory State (Bielefeld, 1986). Shaping Science and Industry: A History ofAustralia’s Councilfor Scientific and Industrial Research, 1926—49. By Carl B. Schedvin. Sydney: Allen & Unwin (now Unwin Hyman, 8 Winchester Place, Winches­ ter, Mass. 01890), 1987. Pp. xix + 374; illustrations, tables, notes, index. $45.00. Two years into World War I, it was abundantly clear to many Allied leaders that their nations’ scientific and technological abilities had to be harnessed if they were to meet the challenge of the German partnership of the military with science-based industry. Britain’s response was the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (1915); it was natural that other Commonwealth nations would emulate this lead, and both Australia and Canada created advisory councils in 1916. Neither had the time or resources to act effectively for military research. As Carl Schedvin argues, the council and its successor, the Institute of Science and Industry (1921), had few advantages and little respect. The reorganization of federal science in 1926 and the formation of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) was built on hopes of a partnership dreamed of a decade earlier, but it was also a delicate political balancing act in the context of a very young federal system. Australia’s scientific commu­ nity was small, its universities only beginning to appreciate their role in science and technology, and the states’ scientific organizations— 354 Book Reviews TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE chiefly agricultural—were as yet little developed. And there was not much money. Yet when World War II brought tremendous challenges and rapid growth to the organization, the CSIR had firmly established itself and garnered respect in most quarters. Schedvin’s theme is that much of this success, as an organization, was due to the exertions of a trio of remarkable, farsighted men: Sir David Rivett, Sir George Julius, and A. E. V. Richardson. A chemist, an engineer, and an agricultural researcher, they could not have been more different, but as the de facto triumvirate that controlled the council’s operations over its first two decades, they ensured that its meager resources were marshaled to attack Australia’s most pressing scientific problems. Much of Schedvin’s account deals with the specific research pro­ grams sponsored by the council. Not surprisingly, the first efforts were oriented toward biological problems, because Australia de­ pended so heavily on the export of wool, meat, grain, and fruit. The council’s small corps of entomologists and botanists attacked a seem­ ingly endless array of insects, diseases, deteriorating meat, and weeds, while forming links with universities and deftly avoiding treading on the toes of state agricultural departments. The physical science problems facing a large, underdeveloped country, such as aeronauti­ cal research and standards testing, received the best attention the organization could spare. World War II brought a quadrupling of staff and a rapid expansion of problems to solve. The radar research program takes pride of place in this story. The council’s activities were of fundamental importance for the infrastructure of Australian science and technology. In 1926, few scientific posts existed, and trained personnel were rare...

Technik und Sicherheit in der deutschen Industriegesellschaft 1850 bis 1930 by Wolfhard Weber, and: Arbeitssicherheit: Historische Beispiele—aktuelle Analysen by Wolfhard Weber

352 Book Reviews TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE other scientific developments that allow DCL to occur at lower temperatures and pressures. These advances have improved the economics significantly so that in some of the newer processes more than 50 percent of the hydrogen gas, which is a major contributor to DCL’s high cost, reacts with the coal to form distillable liquid fuels rather than little-valued gaseous hydrocarbons. There are also several misleading statements, such as the year of establishing the Office of Coal Research (pp. 6, 7, 67, 114, 141); the use of coal gas as a synonym for water gas (pp. 39, 42); suggesting that CO is converted to H2 in the water gas shift, reactions conditions are changed to give CO2 for easier separation instead of CO (p. 42); and assigning the German government’s policy of rearmament after 1933 to the Wei­ mar government (p. 143). Anthony N. Stranges Dr. S i ranges teaches the history of science and the history of science in America at Texas A&M University. He is completing a book on the history of the synthetic fuel industry. Technik und Sicherheit in der deutschen Industriegesellschaft 1850 bis 1930. By Wolfhard Weber. Wuppertal: Bergische Universitat, 1986. Pp. 227; notes, bibliography. Paper. Arbeitssicherheit: Historische Beispiele—aktuelle Analysen. By Wolfhard Weber. Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1988. Pp. 248; illustrations, bibliography, index. Paper. Technik und Sicherheit (Technology and safety) is not a monograph in a proper sense but a somewhat hastily written compilation of perti­ nent materials collected by several research assistants. Wolfhard Weber’s idea is to concentrate on the public perception of technical risks rather than on the modes or details of regulating them. Public perception and discussion of technical safety are illustrated in indus­ trial exhibitions and social museums, occupational health, accident prevention, and transportation systems. The Weimar Republic pe­ riod, when conflicting interests were engaged in occupational health and safety, is treated most intensively. The reader who is not aware of the actual regulation of technical safety matters in Germany should turn first to Weber’s Arbeitssicherheit (Occupational safety) and start on page 100, when occupational health and safety as a “new value” become part of the political agenda in 1869. (In the long history of technological development in prein­ dustrial and early industrial times [pp. 29—96], only a few physicians took notice of dangerous working conditions, judging by our present standards.) Imperial Germany finally established the peculiar mixed system or “dualism” between public administration (Gewerbeaufsichts- TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE Book Reviews 353 beamte or factory inspectors of the Departments of Trade) and industrial self-government (Berufsgenossenschaften or trade corpora­ tions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act [1884], and steam-boiler inspection associations in charge of safe construction). Weber gives the briefest account (pp. 104— 11) of this basic pattern, with no details on accident prevention as attempted by pertinent standards. Instead, he is interested in public debates about enlarging or limiting the power of the federal government, or broadening the concept of occupational safety by including occupational health. As a conse­ quence, the Weimar period gains prominence, and the text is almost identical with chapters 8 and 9 of Technik und Sicherheit. Beginning in 1925, occupational health was gradually included in workmen’s compensation. During the 1960s and 1970s, the regulation of occu­ pational health and safety was seriously intensified, but the “dual system” remained basically unchanged, as Weber’s final chapter makes clear. Peter Lundgreen Dr. Lundgreen is professorofthe social history ofscience at the Universitat Bielefeld. He is the author of Standardization-Testing-Regulation: Studies in the History of the Sciencebased Regulatory State (Bielefeld, 1986). Shaping Science and Industry: A History ofAustralia’s Councilfor Scientific and Industrial Research, 1926—49. By Carl B. Schedvin. Sydney: Allen & Unwin (now Unwin Hyman, 8 Winchester Place, Winches­ ter, Mass. 01890), 1987. Pp. xix + 374; illustrations, tables, notes, index. $45.00. Two years into World War I, it was abundantly clear to many Allied leaders that their nations’ scientific and technological abilities had to be harnessed if they were to meet the challenge of the German partnership of the military with science-based industry. Britain’s response was the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (1915); it was natural...

The Great Experiment in Industrial Self-Government: The Lumber Industry and the National Recovery Administration

THE LUMBER BUSINESS provides key insights to the evolution and expansion of industrial capitalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries because of its propensity toward overproduction, cutthroat competition, and chronically unstable markets. Disorder and chaotic activity eventually brought forth a leadership bent on alleviating these tendencies through trade association cooperation on both regional and national levels. Modernists in the industry, including many prominent national lumbermen, were foremost among those who pressed for greater industrial cooperation and a lessening of discord and strife.' Although the First World War served as the great

Book Reviews : SELF GOVERNMENT IN INDUSTRY By G. D. H. Cole (Hutchinson Educational, London, 1972), pp, xxxv + 273. Price $9.00 (cloth), $5.40 (paperbound). WORKSHOP ORGANIZATION By G. D. H. Cole (Hutchinson Educational, London, 1973), pp. xiv + 186. Price $6.70 (cloth), $4.70 (paperbound)

Book Reviews : SELF GOVERNMENT IN INDUSTRY By G. D. H. Cole (Hutchinson Educational, London, 1972), pp, xxxv + 273. Price $9.00 (cloth), $5.40 (paperbound). WORKSHOP ORGANIZATION By G. D. H. Cole (Hutchinson Educational, London, 1973), pp. xiv + 186. Price $6.70 (cloth), $4.70 (paperbound)

Proportional Representation of Workers in the Auto Industry, 1934–1935

Exclusive representation of workers has long been a singular characteristic of American trade union practice, and is now incorporated as a major tenet of national labor policy. During the industrial self-government phase of the early New Deal, however, an experiment in proportional representation in collective bargaining was attempted in the auto industry. A relatively neglected chapter in labor history, that experiment and its significance for the development of collective bargaining in the auto industry are related in this article. (Author's abstract courtesy EBSCO.)

Marketing Boards

THE ‘endless adventure of government, has become the problem of problems, the real riddle of the Sphinx. The reason is immediate fear—fear both of war and of peace, Organisation is essential; there are two methods—to organise the world at once, or to organise smaller units and gear them up to each other as soon as time and hard thinking will permit. Both methods are required. The States of the British Commonwealth of Nations have many economic problems in common, and the need of some standing organisation to examine these problems has been repeatedly felt. Mr. Bruce, formerly Prime Minister of Australia, has suggested that some of the best minds available should be applied exclusively to these formidable tasks, particularly in view of the emergence of British agriculture as one of the great and growing agricultures of the Empire. Mr. Elliot greatly hopes that the work will be undertaken. But an organisation which holds within itself the possibility of just such a development—the Empire Marketing Board—has within the last few months been brought to an end. The failure of some of these attempts, the difficulties of others, do not exonerate us from the necessity for making fresh trials. Let us try marketing boards to cover the United Kingdom if we cannot get one to govern the world, if we cannot get one to span the Empire. In agriculture we are working on the lines of self-government in industry. We are trying to reconcile the producers and the customers, the industrial and the political aspects of the nation, which can no more be separated than the front and the back of a man's head.

The World of Labour: a Discussion of the present and future Trade Unionism and Self-Government in Industry

The World of Labour: a Discussion of the present and future Trade Unionism and Self-Government in Industry

A Case of Genuine Industrial Self-Government. II

A Case of Genuine Industrial Self-Government. II

A Case of Genuine Industrial Self-Government. I

A Case of Genuine Industrial Self-Government. I