Self-Government Arrangements Research Articles

Self-governance mediates small-scale fishing strategies, vulnerability and adaptive response

As global change accelerates, natural resource-dependent communities must respond and adapt. Small-scale fisheries, essential for coastal livelihoods and food security, are considered among the most vulnerable of these coupled social-ecological systems. While previous studies have examined vulnerability and adaptation in fisheries at the individual, household, and community level, these scales of organization are inconsistent with many of the legal and regulatory frameworks that function in practice to mediate behavior, decision-making, and adaptation. Here, we use cooperative- and privately-owned fishing enterprises in Northwest Mexico as a case study to examine how different forms of marine self-governance experience and respond to climate shocks. Leveraging social-ecological network methods to examine changes in fisheries participation and vulnerability during a recent period of pronounced regional oceanographic change, our analysis suggests that: 1) different forms of SSF self-governance (and the fishing strategies and harvest portfolios with which they are associated) help determine the impacts of and response to environmental change; and 2) that there may be important trade-offs between short-term responses which function to prevent or mitigate lost fishing revenue and long-term changes in climate vulnerability. In particular large fishing cooperatives, predicted to be highly vulnerable on the basis of network theoretic metrics, exceeded expectations (maintaining or increasing resource revenues) while demonstrating a degree of path dependency that may function to increase sensitivity and undermine resilience as climate change progresses. In providing an empirical evaluation of how self-governance arrangements characterized by different group sizes, access regimes and levels of cooperation respond to system perturbation, we aim to advance common pool resource theory while offering targeted guidance for the development of more nuanced and equitable climate adaptation policies.

Social cohesion and self-governance arrangements among small-scale fisheries in Puerto Rico

In small-scale fisheries that suffer from weak formal governance, fishers use a variety of institutional strategies to self-govern. These self-governance arrangements may or may not be forms of collective action, yet they rely on informal institutions (such as norms of reciprocity) in generating social cohesion among users so that common rules can be agreed upon. Social network perspectives have been used to understand the cohesiveness of fishers operating with different gear types or in different communities, yet less is known about how social cohesion differs between fishers that operate through formal cooperative arrangements, such as fishing associations, and independent fishers who operate solely at the community level through informal cooperation. Using mixed methods, we compared the social cohesion of commercial fishers arising from information-sharing and work-support networks in four fishing communities of north-eastern Puerto Rico, as they coped with prolonged hurricane recovery and the COVID-19 pandemic. A series of exponential random graph models (ERGMs) were applied to untangle the drivers of cohesion emerging from fisher’s information-sharing patterns. Fisher’s communication was driven not just by operating at the same landing site or using the same primary gear type, but also by choosing to organize their fishing under the same self-governance arrangement. Specifically, fishers that were members of fishing associations mostly communicated among themselves, while independent fishers talked across arrangements, indicating the role of fishing associations in fostering social cohesion. However, associated fishers were less likely to receive information than independent fishers, suggesting the need for targeted communication strategies within each group. Moreover, independent fishers had more work support ties and a greater diversity of supporting actors across the supply chain, suggesting their need for higher levels of linking social capital. Multiple social factors explained whether fishers choose to be members of fishing associations or remain independent, including trust in leaders and agreement on membership rules. These findings highlight the importance of knowing the cohesiveness of cooperation networks among small-scale fishers.

The Oslo Agreement: A Study of the Conflict Peace Process Arabic-Israel

The Oslo Agreement is one of the most important peace processes between Israel and Palestinians aimed at resolving the prevailing conflict. Although this agreement can be seen as an ongoing process, the conflict remains the most troubling issue in the Middle East. This article describes the conflict identification and literature review related to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP) and the process of formalizing the Oslo Agreement. The conversation between the two parties involved, among others, interpreting rights, boundaries, housing and others. There are different perspectives and views regarding this agreement. Instead, this article analyzes the Oslo Accords including Oslo I and II which were signed in 1993 and 1995 to achieve security in the Middle East.

Inside and Outside Perspectives on Institutions: An Economic Theory of the Noble Lie

If there exist no incentive or selective mechanisms that make cooperation in large groups incentive-compatible under realistic circumstances, functional social institutions will require subjective preferences to diverge from objective payoffs – a “noble lie.” This implies the existence of irreducible and irreconcilable “inside” and “outside” perspectives on social institutions; that is, between foundationalist and functionalist approaches, both of which have a long pedigree in political economy. The conflict between the two, and the inability in practice to dispense with either, has a number of surprising implications for human organizations, including the impossibility of algorithmic governance, the necessity of discretionary rule enforcement in the breach, and the difficulty of an ethical economics of institutions. Leeson and Suarez argue that “some superstitions, and perhaps many, support self-governing arrangements. The relationship between such scientifically false beliefs and private institutions is symbiotic and socially productive” (2015, 48). This paper stakes out a stronger claim: that something like superstition is essential for any governance arrangement, self- or otherwise. Specifically, we argue that human social structure both requires and maintains a systematic divergence between subjective preferences and objective payoffs, in a way that usually (though in principle does not necessarily) entails “scientifically false beliefs” for at least a subset of agents. We will refer to the basis of such preferences from the perspective of those holding them as an “inside perspective,” as opposed to a functionalist-evolutionary explanation of their existence, which we will call an “outside perspective.” Drawing on the theory of cooperation, we then show that the two perspectives are in principle irreconcilable, discussing some implications of that fact for political economy and the prospects of social organization.

A Rights-based Approach to Indigenous Sovereignty, Self-determination and Self-government in Canada

The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP) calls for the right to self-determination, as self-determination is a prerequisite for Indigenous people to recongnize their political, social, economic, and collective human rights. Canada has historically been unsupportive of UNDRIP as the federal government considers UNDRIP at odds with Canadian sovereignty and existing Canadian institutions. While the right to self-government is currently protected under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, it is defined narrowly and falls short of allowing meaningful self-government for the majority of Indigenous people. This paper considers the conflicting nature of self-determination and self-government through considering the impact of Indigenous sovereignty on state sovereignity, an analysis of various approaches to self-government in Canada, and the feasability of adopting a rights-based approach to self-government. This paper concludes that utilizing a human rights-based approach to self-government addresses the perceived conflicts at the state-level while providing for the creation of meaningful self-government arrangements. Self-government arrangements must be created by Indigenous communities for Indigenous communities in order to reflect the diverse needs of Indigenous people regardless of their territorial affiliation or formal Indian status.

Bi-Ethnic Federalism and the Question of Sovereignty: Understanding the Competitive Security Postures in Cyprus

Abstract When ethnic groups negotiate self-government arrangements, ‘ethnic sovereignty’ lies boldly at the heart of their security considerations. The constitutional nature of self-determination and the extent of territorial control can determine the degree of ethno-territorial sovereignty attributed to groups. However, in competitive contexts influenced by fear and mistrust, groups interpret these pillar elements in ways that increase their own sense of security. The present study argues that legal and political positions on sovereignty in Cyprus are largely built around the competitive security assumptions held by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaderships, and explains how the divergent viewpoints and understandings of sovereignty reflect the underlying security fears and suspicion of parties. The analysis finds that the two ethnic leaderships in Cyprus have sought to accumulate a distinct ‘sovereignty capital’ in an effort to safeguard their own and overpower each other’s perceived security intentions in the event of federal collapse, making thus the attainment of settlement in Cyprus particularly elusive.

Declaration of principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements between the state of Israel and the P.L.O. Agreed minutes to the declaration of principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements



“Working Together”: The Dynamics of Multilevel Governance in Nunavut

Aboriginal self-government is changing the governance landscape in Canada. This paper focuses on a little-studied aspect of aboriginal self-government arrangements, namely the horizontal dispersion of power among non-governmental institutions in the policy process. Nunavut, the Canadian territory created in 1999, offers a good example of this horizontal power dispersion. The Government of Nunavut is the only Canadian public government stemming from a land claim agreement. This creates a special set of obligations and entrenches a horizontal multilevel governance model, with a unique model of governance between a public government, the government of Nunavut (GN), that serves a predominantly Inuit population, and a nonprofit beneficiary organization, Nunavut Tunngavik Inc.(NTI), representing the Inuit of Nunavut. In this paper we map out the authority and legitimacy of these levels of governance and the impacts of this system on Nunavut public policies and access to resource development revenues.

Micro-level explanations for emergent patterns of self-governance arrangements in small-scale fisheries-A modeling approach.

Small-scale fisheries (SSFs) in developing countries are expected to play a significant role in poverty alleviation and enhancing food security in the decades to come. To realize this expectation, a better understanding of their informal self-governance arrangements is critical for developing policies that can improve fishers’ livelihoods and lead to sustainable ecosystem stewardship. The goal of this paper is to develop a more nuanced understanding of micro-level factors—such as fishers’ characteristics and behavior—to explain observed differences in self-governance arrangements in Northwest Mexico. We focus on two ubiquitous forms of self-governance: hierarchical non-cooperative arrangements between fishers and fishbuyers, such as patron-client relationships (PCs), versus more cooperative arrangements amongst fishers, such as fishing cooperatives (co-ops). We developed an agent-based model of an archetypical SSF that captures key hypotheses from in-depth fieldwork in Northwest Mexico of fishers’ day-to-day fishing and trading. Results from our model indicate that high diversity in fishers’ reliability, and low initial trust between co-op members, makes co-ops’ establishment difficult. PCs cope better with this kind of diversity because, in contrast to co-ops, they have more flexibility in choosing whom to work with. However, once co-ops establish, they cope better with seasonal variability in fish abundance and provide long-term security for the fishers. We argue that existing levels of trust and diversity among fishers matter for different self-governance arrangements to establish and persist, and should therefore be taken into account when developing better, targeted policies for improved SSFs governance.

Institutional Outcomes of Territorial Contestation: Lessons from Post-Communist Europe, 1989–2012

Since 1989, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have experienced major institutional transformations. As part of that process, territorial contestations between states and ethnic minorities engendered three outcomes: negotiated territorial self-government (TSG) arrangements; the denial of such arrangements; and the emergence of de-facto states. Through a qualitative comparative analysis of twenty-four minority TSG claims in seventeen post-communist CEE states, we find that: (i) TSG arrangements emerged as externally facilitated instruments for managing or preventing violent conflict in predominantly low-capacity, only partially democratic states; (ii) peacefully pursued TSG claims were most likely to be denied in high-capacity consolidated democracies; and (iii) de-facto states emerged where patron-states intervened in violent conflicts in low-capacity states. These findings defy widely held expectations about the influence of Europeanization, coupled with democratic consolidation, on the accommodation of minority claims; and they offer new insights into the significance of external intervention for the institutional outcomes of ethnic minority TSG claims.

Finding Order Amid Complex Small-Scale Fisheries Self-Governance Arrangements

Small-scale fisheries are distributed in isolated, rural coastal areas around the globe, often far away from the control of the State. As such they are a quintessential example of self-governance. Our aim is to find order in the overwhelming institutional diversity we see in small-scale fisheries around the world. To do this in this paper we develop some theoretical tools we argue are key to organize ideas and build and test theory about self-governance in the context of small-scale fisheries. We argue that the first step is to start by making clear which is the basic set of action situations most common in fishing. What are the basic set of action situations that make up what we define as “small-scale fisheries”? We argue they are a set of regularized relations of production that start by accessing capital and other means of production and property-rights to go harvesting and end with the discount of costs of fishing to determine the fisher’s profit. In continuing this relation of production into the future fishers and fishbuyers seek certain characteristics in one another. We investigated what characteristics do they seek in one another to give meaning to the concept of micro-institutional arrangements in fishing. We then investigated the role of micro-institutions in the context of the two dominant types of self-governance around the world: patron-client relationships and fishing cooperatives. We conclude with the identification of different patterns of behavior among the two different forms of self-governance in the case studies we investigated. It remains to be investigated in the future whether these patterns are generalizable or unique.

Self-Governance and Sustainable Common Pool Resource Management in Kyrgyzstan

How to best govern natural resources in order to enable a sustainable way of handling them is what both research and practice aim to achieve. Empirical findings from several studies indicate that resource users are able to successfully cooperate in the management of common pool resources and solve social dilemmas through self-governance arrangements. The authors explore the potential success of self-governance in irrigation systems, focusing primarily on the factors influencing compliance of irrigation water users under self-crafted and self-enforced rules in two Kyrgyz communities. A field experiment is employed to provide insights and some quantitative empirical data, further complemented by qualitative methods (questionnaires, group discussions and interviews) to enhance the analysis of the findings about working rules in irrigation at the community level. The results show that Kyrgyz irrigation users of the selected communities generally respond better in a self-governance setting in terms of rules compliance, distribution efficiency and equity. Compliance and cooperative behavior depend on group as well as individual variables including communication, social norms and the legitimacy of rules.

Introduction: Postimperial sovereignty games in the Nordic region

Benevolence, homogeneity and peace has never been the full story of the Nordic region. Building on a critical review of myths of ‘ Norden’ in international relations theory and beyond (international political economy, security studies, regional and European integration theory and postcolonialism), we develop the framework of postimperial sovereignty games for understanding contemporary Nordic foreign policy and regional dynamics. We shift focus from the ‘large’ Nordic countries to the remnants of Nordic empires: Iceland, Greenland, the Faroe Islands and Åland. On the one hand, these polities struggle to enhance their independence – Iceland even after becoming a sovereign state; the other polities via self-government arrangements. On the other hand, the former colonies develop close relationships to a supranational European Union in their effort to achieve independent subjectivity. Contrasting the developments towards increased independence and European integration, the article demonstrates the importance of imperial legacies. Firstly, it challenges Norden as a model security community. Secondly, it questions the image of a harmonious Nordic welfare model based on equality and consensus in light of the experiences of Iceland, Greenland, the Faroe Islands and Åland. Finally, it suggests that no theory of European integration is complete without taking imperial and postimperial processes into account.

Integrating Self-Governance in Heavily Regulated Policy Fields: Insights from a Dutch Farmers' Cooperative

Throughout the world, there is a growing interest in communities' self-governance of natural resources. However, many self-governance initiatives proceed with difficulty, particularly when these initiatives conflict with established rules and institutions. This paper addresses the question of the extent to which, and under what conditions, self-governance initiatives can become successful in heavily regulated policy fields. It, therefore, analyses a self-governance initiative by a Dutch farmers' association from two theoretical perspectives: Ostrom's institutional design principles and insights from the politics of self-governance. Whereas, Ostrom's principles focus on arranging interactions between the members of a self-governing community and their common resources, the focus of the politics literature is on the negotiations between the community and the governmental authorities to obtain room for self-governance. The paper reveals how the arrangements within the association influenced the negotiation between this community and the involved authorities, and vice versa. This mutual relationship can both positively and negatively influence the accomplishment of self-governance. Adequate self-governance arrangements can help to convince policy-makers to provide room in existing policies to accommodate self-governance. Conversely, policy-makers can help to set conditions for designing successful arrangements. Otherwise, both processes can negatively reinforce each other, and this can result in stalemates and blockades.

The Proliferation of Status Proposals for Abkhazia – Distinct Concepts or Mere Labels?

In the conflict between Georgia and the breakaway region of Abkhazia, status talks have not been successful. Yet, between 1989 and 2008 a number of proposals for Abkhazia’s status have surfaced which can be situated along a wide spectrum of concepts, from cultural autonomy to confederalism to independence. The example of Georgia/Abkhazia serves well to outline the extent to which desired status can been formulated, re-formulated and possibly misformulated in the context of an ethno-political conflict. This is especially illustrative when contrasted with the ‘Åland Example’. The mere labels given to self-government arrangements can play an important role in status negotiations, as these might render the arrangements proposed more or less vulnerable to rejection, e.g. due to historic experiences. The aim of this article is to highlight such complexities as pertinent in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict.

Institutional Conflict Settlement in Divided Societies: The Role of Subgroup Identities in Self-Government Arrangements

Institutions can contribute to regulating interethnic conflict; however, in many cases they fail to bring about lasting peace. The paper argues that their negligence of intraethnic factors accounts for some of this failure. Ethnic groups are often treated as unitary actors even though most consist of various linguistic, tribal or religious subgroups. This internal heterogeneity is often obscured by overarching collective ethnic identities that are fostered by interethnic conflict. However, when such interethnic conflict is settled, these subgroup differences may come back to the fore. This “resurgence” can lead to subgroup conflict about the political and economic resources provided through intergroup institutional settlements. Such conflict can in turn undermine the peace‐making effect of intergroup arrangements. Different subgroup identity constellations make such destructive effects more or less likely. The paper focuses on self‐government provisions in the aftermath of violent interethnic conflict and argues that lasting intergroup arrangements are especially challenging when they involve “contested” ethnic groups.

Formalization of water allocation systems and impacts on local practices in the Hingilili sub-catchment, Tanzania

Water scarcity caused by increased demands often leads to competition and conflict over water in many river catchments in Sub-Saharan Africa. At the local level, water users have in many places been able to solve water allocation problems by crafting institutions based on customs and traditions. These self-governing arrangements are not necessarily fair or good, but are able to adapt to the changing resource context. Simultaneously, many African governments have adopted new policies and laws, and established new institutions to achieve equitable and sustainable management of water resources. The formalization of the property right to water is often part of the recipe. This paper analyses the impact of one such government-led formalization process on local water allocation practices. Based on a field study in the Hingilili sub-catchment, Tanzania, we find that government interventions do not achieve the goal of equitable and sustainable water management. However, we find that the principle of good neighbourhood that still exists between the highland and lowland farmers in Hingilili could form a base to reconcile diverging water interests between the highland and lowland farmers. The paper shows that the concept of bricolage [Cleaver, F., 2002. Reinventing institutions: bricolage and the social embeddedness of natural resource management. The European Journal of Development Research, 14 (2), 11–30] is useful to demonstrate the need for new institutions to be sufficiently embedded in existing local practices to succeed, but this is not a sufficient condition. The hydraulic position of the various actors (upstream or downstream) must also be taken into account, and may be considered a driver for institutional innovation.

The Israeli Disengagement Plan: A Prejudicial Action

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is just that, a conflict. It has had its ups and downs, but it has been characterized by violence, and consequently is viewed as a violent struggle. There have been many efforts to end the cyclical relationship between the Israelis and Palestinians of attack and counter attack, resulting in several peace agreements and increased communication between both sides. Cooperation and dialogue have been hallmarks of the achievements and successes that do exist in this relationship. Now the Israelis have diverged from this course and are in the process of unilaterally withdrawing their troops and citizens from the Gaza Strip. The end to the Israeli occupation is a good thing, but it must be done properly, and it should not disrupt the peace process or the relationship between the Israelis and the Palestinians, unfortunately that is exactly what the unilateral plan has done. This article argues that the Unilateral Disengagement Plan being implemented by the Government of Israel as a means to pull its troops and settlers out of the Gaza Strip violates both the Israel and PLO: Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, as well as the Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, and thus prejudices them. By acting unilaterally, the Israelis violate direct terms of these agreements as well as the overall spirit of them. As these documents remain relevant tools in the peace process, the direct and deliberate violation of them by the Israelis can only have negative impacts upon the overall peace process and the relationship between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The actions Israel is pursuing will undermine the Palestinians' trust in the Israeli Government, and call into question their roll as a partner to peace.

One Resource Two Visions

With the signing of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo Accords) in 1993, the Israelis and Palestinians embarked upon a difficult path to share their joint water resources. Despite international efforts to encourage joint technical projects and institution building, obstacles remain for obtaining a comprehensive water agreement. This article explicates the main problems hindering water cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. It examines the different bargaining positions of the Israelis and the Palestinians in the water negotiations. Both the Palestinian and Israeli publics have different perceptions regarding the way the water issue should be resolved. The Palestinians tend to focus on the issue of water rights and compensation for water used by the Israelis during the occupation, and the Israelis instead tend to minimize issues related to international water law and emphasize technical solutions for future water sharing. These differences in perceptions and interpretations of international law will influence the nature of any future water agreement. This article argues that issues such as compensation and environmental liability could be added to the water negotiations as a way to advance a water-sharing agreement. Yet, there is little precedence in international law concerning how to assess and enforce environmental compensation and liability between states.

Rationality, Cooperation, and Common Pool Resources

Substantial dissatisfaction has emerged with the conceptualization of natural resource problems and individual decision making as represented in the tragedy of the commons model by Garret Hardin. A research program devoted to developing a theory of common pool resources that accounts for both successes and failures of cooperation among appropriators using common pool resources is reviewed. The theory identifies a set of configural attributes of resources and appropriators that, if present, support the emergence of self-governing arrangements. The model of individual decision making on which the tragedy of the commons is based—perfect rationality—is also challenged. Perfect rationality cannot account for cooperation. Alternative models of decision making are explored.