Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements Research Articles

Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with third-party organizations: Initial payment, technological development, and refunding

This paper presents a new framework for international environmental agreements (IEAs) with technological development that incorporates an initial payment and refunding scheme (IPRS) in collaboration with third-party organizations (TPOs). In our IPRS, technological development is achieved by using a portion of initial payments from signatories to the TPO, with the remaining amount being refunded to the payers if they cooperate with the IEA. We examine self-enforcing IEAs using a stage game model. The results show that IEA size increases with the cost of technological development. Consequently, we provide a solution that achieves large-scale self-enforcing IEAs in collaboration with TPOs while resolving issues regarding initial participation in IEAs.

Trade sanctions and the stability of climate coalitions

We investigate whether trade sanctions against outsiders can foster climate cooperation in self-enforcing international environmental agreements if outsiders retaliate. We find a threshold effect: In small coalitions incentives to be a coalition member decrease whereas in large coalitions they increase. Thus, trade sanctions can be an effective tool in climate policy only after a sufficiently large climate coalition has already been formed. Even if larger stable coalitions are achieved with trade sanctions, implications for global welfare can be adverse, because additional trade distortions trade off with the environmental gains. We identify the USA and Europe as essential members of stable coalitions if outsiders retaliate.

Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements: Adaptation and Complementarity

This paper studies the impact of adaptation on the stability of an international emission agreement. To address this issue we solve a three-stage coalition formation game where in the first stage countries decide whether or not to sign the agreement. Then, in the second stage, signatories (playing together) and non-signatories (playing individually) select their levels of emissions. Finally, in the third stage, each country decides on its level of adaptation non co-operatively. We solve this game for two models. For both, it is assumed that damages are linear with respect to emissions which guarantee that emissions are strategic complements in the second stage of the game. However, for the first model adaptation reduces the marginal damages of emissions in a multiplicative way whereas for the second model the reduction occurs in an additive way. Our analysis shows that the models yield different predictions in terms of participation. In the first case, we find that the larger the gains of full cooperation, the larger the cooperation. However, in the second case, the unique stable agreement we find consists of three countries regardless of the gains of full cooperation. These results suggest that complementarity can play in favor of cooperation but that it is not a sufficient condition to obtain more participation in an emission agreement. Finally, we would like to point out that our research indicates that the way adaptation reduces damages plays a critical role over the outcome of the coalition formation game.

International Environmental Agreements – The Impact of Heterogeneity Among Countries on Stability

The present paper examines the stability of self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) among heterogeneous countries in a two-stage emission game. In the first stage, each country decides whether or not to join the agreement, while in the second stage the quantity of emissions is chosen simultaneously by all countries. We use quadratic benefit and environmental damage functions and assume k types of countries that differ in their sensitivity to the global pollutant. We find that the introduction of heterogeneity does not yield larger stable coalitions. In particular, we show that, in the case of two types, when stable coalitions exist their size is very small, and, if the asymmetry is strong enough, they include only one type of countries. Moreover, heterogeneity can reduce the scope of cooperation relative to the homogeneous case. We demonstrated that introducing asymmetry into a stable, under symmetry, agreement can disturb stability.

International Environmental Agreements - Stability with Transfers Among Countries

The paper examines the stability of self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) among heterogeneous countries, allowing for transfers. We employ a two-stage, non-cooperative model of coalition formation. In the first stage each country decides whether or not to join the agreement, while in the second stage countries choose their emissions simultaneously. Coalition members agree also to share the gains from cooperation in the first stage. We use quadratic benefit and environmental damage functions and assume two types of countries differing in their sensitivity to the global pollutant. In examining the impact of transfers on the coalition size, we apply the notion of Potential Internal Stability (PIS). Results show that transfers can increase cooperation among heterogeneous countries. However, the increase in the coalition size, relative to the case without transfers, comes only from countries belonging to the type with the lower environmental damages, which are drawn into the coalition by the transfers offered. Furthermore, the level of cooperation increases with the degree of heterogeneity. However, the reduction in aggregate emissions achieved by the enlarged coalition is very small leading to dismal improvement in welfare, which confirms the paradox of cooperation.

Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements among Asymmetric Countries and Welfare

Theoretical analyses of self-enforcing international environmental agreements (IEAs) have adopted the assumption of identical countries. In this paper, we assume that countries are asymmetric in terms of abatement technologies. By examining the IEA formation and total welfare, we show that i) the asymmetry leads to multiple sizes of self-enforcing IEAs, which corresponds to the multiple equilibria of a coalition formation game Maruta and Okada (2005); ii) technology transfer can lead to a smaller size of self-enforcing IEA, resulting in welfare loss. We also examine the rule of IEA and discuss that the unanimity rule plays an important role in IEA formation.

Self-enforcing international environmental agreements and trade: taxes versus caps

We study self-enforcing international environmental agreements (IEAs) in a model with symmetric countries, international trade, and emission tax policy and find that the first-best global IEA may be self-enforcing. This is in sharp contrast to the known case of cap-and-trade policy in which self-enforcing IEAs have fewer signatories and fail to achieve significant improvements in welfare and damage reduction compared to global non-cooperation. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for global self-enforcing IEAs and show, amongst other things, that they are more likely with less severe climate damage. Another result is that their determinants are similar for climate coalitions playing Nash or being Stackelberg leaders.

Is trade liberalization conducive to the formation of climate coalitions?

The present paper analyzes the impact of moving from autarky to international trade on the formation of self-enforcing international environmental agreements with Nash coalitions. With and without trade, stable coalitions consist of two countries at most—in contrast to the model that portrays coalitions as Stackelberg leaders (Eichner and Pethig in Public Econ 102:37–50, 2013). Although the coalition steps up its mitigation effort in the transition from autarky to trade, world emissions rise and thus constitute a ‘green paradox of trade liberalization.’ Opening the borders not only increases global pollution, but also reduces the aggregate welfare of all countries.

Self-Enforcing Environmental Agreements, Trade, and Demand-andSupply-Side Mitigation Policy

AbstractIn a model of the world economy with identical countries and trade, Eichner and Pethig show that self-enforcing international environmental agreements (IEAs) may comprise up to 60% of all countries when the group of signatories curb domestic emissions via demand-side cap-and-trade policy. However, these IEAs reduce total emissions and raise welfare only slightly compared to business as usual. This paper investigates whether that poor mitigation performance can be improved upon, when governments have at their disposal a fossil-fuel supply tax in addition to the cap policy. If signatories can use the mixed policy, they choose a higher fuel supply tax than nonsignatories and thus succeed in shifting a larger share of the mitigation burden to nonsignatories. Although the number of signatories of self-enforcing IEAs is smaller with mixed than with stand-alone cap policy, the smaller IEAs achieve larger global emission reductions and higher welfare gains for all countries.

Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements and Trade: Taxes Versus Caps

This paper studies within a multi-country model with international trade the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) when countries regulate carbon emissions either by taxes or caps. Regardless of whether coalitions play Nash or are Stackelberg leaders the principal message is that the choice of caps or taxes matters. International trade and tax regulation are necessary conditions for the existence of the encompassing self-enforcing IEA, and that the latter is attained the more likely, the less severe the climate damage. Hence, cap regulation is inferior to tax regulation insofar as in case of the former there exist no large and effective self-enforcing IEAs, in particular not the encompassing self-enforcing IEA. Further results are that for the formation of encompassing self-enforcing IEAs it does not matter whether climate coalitions play Nash or are Stackelberg leaders or whether fossil fuel is modeled as a consumer good or an intermediate good.

Evolutionary farsightedness in international environmental agreements

This paper proposes a dynamic game model of the process through which countries join international environmental agreements (IEAs). The model assumes that both the number of signatory countries and the stock of accumulated pollution evolve over time, as a result of countries’ emission and membership decisions. The evolution of the number of signatory countries is described by a discrete-time replicator dynamics, while that of the stock of pollution results from feedback emission strategies. We show that evolutionary farsightedness, that is, the capacity of players to account for the impact of their decisions on the evolution of the number of signatory countries, is beneficial to the formation and stability of self-enforcing IEAs.

Self-enforcing environmental agreements and international trade

In the basic model of the literature on international environmental agreements (IEAs) (Barrett, 1994; Rubio and Ulph, 2006), the number of signatories of self-enforcing IEAs does not exceed three, if non-positive emissions are ruled out. We extend that model by introducing a composite consumer good and fossil fuel that are produced and consumed in each country and traded on world markets. When signatory countries act as a Stackelberg leader and emissions are positive, the size of stable IEAs may be significantly larger in our model with international trade. This would be good news if larger self-enforcing IEAs would lead to stronger reductions of total emissions. Unfortunately, in the presence of self-enforcing IEAs total emissions turn out to be only slightly less than in the business as usual scenario, independent of the number of signatories. We also investigate the role of international trade by comparing our free-trade results with the outcome in the regime of autarky. Our autarky model turns out to be coincident with the basic model of the literature alluded to above. We contribute to that literature by showing that in autarky the outcome of self-enforcing IEAs is also almost the same as in the business as usual scenario.

Self-Enforcing Environmental Agreements and International Trade

In the basic model of the literature on international environmental agreements (IEAs) (Barrett 1994; Rubio and Ulph 2006) the number of signatories of self-enforcing IEAs does not exceed three, if non-positive emissions are ruled out. We extend that model by introducing a composite consumer good and fossil fuel that are produced and consumed in each country and traded on world markets. When signatory countries act as Stackelberg leader and emissions are positive, the size of stable IEAs may be significantly larger in our model with international trade. This would be good news if larger self-enforcing IEAs would lead to stronger reductions of total emissions. Unfortunately, in the presence of self-enforcing IEAs total emissions turn out to be only slightly less than in the business as usual scenario, independent of the number of signatories. We also investigate the role of international trade by comparing our free-trade results with the outcome in the regime of autarky. Our autarky model turns out to coincide with the basic model of the literature alluded to above. We contribute to that literature by showing that in autarky the outcome of self-enforcing IEAs is also almost the same as in business as usual.

Trade Tariffs and Self-Enforcing Environmental Agreements

In the basic model of international environmental agreements (IEAs) (Barrett 1994, Rubio and Ulph 2006) extended by international trade, self- enforcing - or stable - IEAs may comprise up to 60% of all countries (Eichner and Pethig 2013). But these IEAs reduce total emissions only slightly compared to non-cooperation. Here we analyze the capacity of sign-unconstrained tariffs to enhance the size and performance of self-enforcing IEAs. We show that the size of stable IEAs shrinks when climate coalitions are Stackelberg leaders and set tariffs in addition to their cap-and-trade schemes. Surprisingly, these smaller IEAs reduce total emissions more effectively than the larger stable IEAs without tariffs. In the model with tariffs the signatory countries import fossil fuel and their tariff takes the form of a subsidy of fuel consumption and a tax on the production of the consumption good.

International Environmental Cooperation under Fairness and Reciprocity

Abstract This paper explores the implications of fairness and reciprocity for self-enforcing international environmental agreements on pollution abatement. Reciprocal countries reward fair behavior (positive reciprocity), but retaliate against countries behaving unfairly (negative reciprocity). We demonstrate that reciprocal countries that have moderate expectations from each other with respect to their national abatement strategies can support a greater degree of environmental cooperation than self-interested ones. However, when only very high abatement standards are deemed fair, then reciprocity could have a detrimental effect on international environmental cooperation. Our model therefore provides a novel perspective on the role of expectations in environmental negotiations.

Asymmetries in international environmental agreements

AbstractThis paper considers self-enforcing international environmental agreements when countries are asymmetric with respect to emission-related benefits and environmental damage. Considering these asymmetries simultaneously yields large stable coalitions, also without the option of transfers between signatories. However, these large stable coalitions are only possible if they include countries that have relatively high marginal benefits and a relatively low marginal environmental damage. This type of countries hardly contributes to the common good and the gains of cooperation from including this type of countries in the stable coalition are small. This confirms a persistent result in this literature that large stable coalitions usually go hand in hand with low gains of cooperation. Without the option of transfers it is always better to have a small stable coalition with countries that matter than a large stable coalition with countries that do not matter. Only with transfers might a large stable coalition be able to perform better.

Stable Climate Coalitions (Nash) and International Trade

The basic model of the literature on self-enforcing international environmental agreements is a model of autarkic countries. We extend that model by international trade and investigate its impact on the performance of 'Nash' coalitions and on their stability, in particular, in a general equilibrium framework. First we characterize the performance of coalitions and non-coalition countries with regard to emissions and welfare and compare business as usual with the coalition-fringe scenario. In qualitative terms, the results in our free-trade model turn out to be the same as in the basic model for quadratic functional forms. In our model with international trade countries influence the terms of trade with their choice of policy and they make strategic use of that terms-of-trade effect. We find, however, that in the quadratic version of our model - as in the basic model - stable coalitions consist of no more than two countries. Finally, we explore the outcome of trade liberalization by moving from autarky to free trade. Although the coalition steps up its mitigation effort, world emissions rise which may be referred to as a 'green paradox of trade liberalization'. Trade liberalization turns out to be bad for the environment as well as for the coalition countries’ welfare and the aggregate welfare of all countries; it reduces the range of profitable coalitions, and it even tends to hamper the formation of stable coalitions.

International environmental agreements under uncertainty: does the 'veil of uncertainty' help?

Na and Shin showed that the ‘veil of uncertainty’ can be conducive to the success of self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Later papers confirmed this conclusion about the negative impact of learning. In the light of intensified research efforts worldwide to reduce uncertainty about the environmental impact of emissions and the cost of reducing them, this conclusion is intriguing. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we analyse whether the result carries over to a more general setting without restriction on the number of players and which considers not only ‘no’ and ‘full learning’ but also ‘partial learning’. Second, we test whether the conclusion also holds if there is uncertainty about abatement costs instead of uncertainty about the benefits from global abatement. Third, we propose a transfer scheme that mitigates the possible negative effect of learning and which may even transform it into a positive effect.

A Simple Model of International Environmental Agreements with Bayesian Learning

In this paper I study the economics of self-enforcing international environmental agreements where agents never know what exactly the state of the world is. Explicitly, I consider countries using Bayesian learning to update their beliefs on the state of the world. Using a very simple framework of allowing pollution as a common bad, I study how Bayesian learning conveys message to countries and whether a full disclosure of information can necessarily improve the aggregate welfare. Interestingly, I find that the value of information is always negative which suggests that strategic interactions between countries significantly make the countries worse off. I also consider a dynamic setting where countries emissions can affect the learning process and surprisingly I find that the equilibrium breaks down to a coalition that cannot have more than two countries.

The Case of two Self-Enforcing International Agreements for Environmental Protection with Asymmetric Countries

Non-cooperative game theoretical models of self-enforcing international environmental agreements (IEAs) that employ the cartel stability concept of D’Aspremont et al. (Can J Econ 16:17–25, 1983) frequently assume that countries are identical, and they can sign a single agreement only. We modify the assumption by considering two self-enforcing IEAs and also two types of asymmetric countries. Extending a model of Barrett (Oxford Econ Pap 46:878–894, 1994), we demonstrate that there are similarities between one and two self-enforcing IEAs. But in the case of few countries and high environmental damage we show that two self-enforcing IEA work far better than one self-enforcing IEA in terms of both welfare and environmental quality. Our simulation shows that only if all countries that have fewer benefits and higher cost from pollution abatement must build one coalition, there is hope that two myopic stable coalition can be formed. Moreover, if the cost-benefit functions of pollution abatement impose that the first myopic coalition is formed by countries, which have higher benefits and lower cost from pollution abatement, then two IEA’s worsen abatement and welfare in comparison to one IEA. But, if the first myopic coalition is formed by countries, which have smaller benefits and higher cost from pollution abatement, then two IEA’s improve abatement and welfare in comparison to one IEA.