Selective Realism Research Articles

Scientific realism, scientific practice, and science communication: An empirical investigation of academics and science communicators

We argue that the societal consequences of the scientific realism debate, in the context of science-to-public communication are often overlooked and careful theorizing about it needs further empirical groundwork. As such, we conducted a survey experiment with 130 academics (from physics, chemistry, and biology) and 137 science communicators. We provided them with an 11-item questionnaire probing their views of scientific realism and related concepts. Contra theoretical expectations, we find that (a) science communicators are generally more inclined towards scientific antirealism when compared to scientists in the same academic fields, though both groups show an inclination towards realism and (b) academics who engage in more theoretical work are not less (or more) realist than experimentalists. Lastly, (c), we fail to find differences with respect to selective realism but find that science communicators are significantly less epistemically voluntarist compared to their academic counterparts. Overall, our results provide first empirical evidence on the views of scientists and science communicators on scientific realism, with some results running contra to the theoretical expectations, opening up new empirical and theoretical research directions.

Towards an Affective Ludo-ethics of Re-enactment: Witnessing (in) Attentat 1942

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationNotes on contributorsArleen IonescuArleen Ionescu is Tenured Professor of English Literature and Critical Theory at Shanghai Jiao Tong University. Her major research interests are in the fields of Modernist prose, Critical Theory, Memory Studies, Holocaust and Trauma Studies. Her work on James Joyce and related aspects of Modernism, Maurice Blanchot, Jacques Derrida, Samuel Beckett as well as on various aspects of historical trauma has appeared in James Joyce Quarterly, Journal of Modern Literature, Joyce Studies Annual, Memory Studies, Oxford Literary Review, Paragraph, Parallax, Partial Answers, SLOVO, and Style, among others. She is joint Editor-in-Chief of Word and Text – A Journal of Literary Studies and Linguistics. Her books include Romanian Joyce: From Hostility to Hospitality (Peter Lang, 2014), The Memorial Ethics of Libeskind’s Berlin Jewish Museum (Palgrave, 2017) and, co-edited with Maria Margaroni, Arts of Healing: Cultural Narratives of Trauma (Rowman and Littlefield International, 2020). Email: anionescu@sjtu.edu.cnNotes1 Cowley, “Introduction,” xvii.2 See, for instance, LaCapra, “Trauma, Absence, Loss,” 723.3 Rothberg, The Implicated Subject, 1.4 Agnew, “An Introduction,” 327.5 Agnew, “History’s Affective Turn,” 300.6 Erickson, “The Real Movie,” 108.7 Laqueur, “The Holocaust Museum,” 31.8 Perry, “The Holocaust Is Present,” 173.9 See LaCapra’s development in Writing History, Writing Trauma, 91–94.10 Adorno, “Cultural Criticism and Society,” 34; also 70, 73.11 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 362.12 Ionescu, Memorial Ethics, 49.13 Zimmerman, “Manifesto for a Ludic Century,” 19, 20.14 See, among others, Young, “The Holocaust as Vicarious Past;” Mandel, “The Story of My Death;” Loman, “The Canonization of Maus.”15 Hirsch, Family Frames, 13.16 Chapman and Linderoth, “Exploring the Limits of Play,” 149.17 Feinstein, “Pushing the Limits of Artistic Representation,” 726.18 See the artist’s webpage on the Tate’s website at https://www.tate.org.uk/art/artists/zbigniew-libera-13716.19 Kleeblatt (ed.), Mirroring Evil.20 van Alphen, “Playing the Holocaust,” 77. See also Janisz, “Atrocity and Aesthetics;” Feinstein, “Zbigniew Libera’s Lego Concentration Camp;” Young, The Stages of Memory, 147–148.21 Ionescu, Memorial Ethics, 164.22 Chapman, Digital Games as History, 222.23 Anable, Playing with Feelings, xii.24 Pötzsch, “Selective Realism.”25 McKeand, “Videogames’ Portrayal of the Holocaust…”26 Ibid. See also Pfister, “‘Of Monsters and Men’” for a discussion of the ‘naive distinction between “evil” Nazis and normal German soldiers’ in Call of Duty: WWII.27 Rohrbough, “Racist Computer Games.” See also “Video Game Uncovered.”28 See the list of prohibited games in ‘Racist Groups Use Computer Gaming to Promote Hate’.29 Galloway, “Social Realism in Gaming.”30 Waxman, “Video Games May Be Key to Keeping World War II Memory Alive.”31 See Gardner, “Does a VR Auschwitz Simulation Cross an Ethical Line?;” de Jong, “Witness Auschwitz?;” and, more generally, Lebovic, “The ‘Virtual’ Future of Holocaust Education…”32 See Webster, “‘Imagination Is the Only Escape’…;” Parker, “Inside Controversial Game.”33 Kansteiner, “Transnational Holocaust Memory,” 313.34 Frasca, “Ephemeral Games,” 181 and 177.35 Langer, Admitting the Holocaust, 80.36 Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, 2430–2456. See also Spargo, “Sophie’s Choice,” 153; Tessman, Moral Failure, 162.37 Rothberg, The Implicated Subject, 38.38 Langer, Versions of Survival, 72.39 See Sicart, Beyond Choices, especially “Defining Ethical Gameplay,” 5–25. Sicart had already explored the notion and experience of ‘ethical gameplay’ in The Ethics of Computer Games and “Digital Games as Ethical Technologies,” the latter offering the most concise definition: ‘By ethical gameplay I am referring to the experience of a game by an agent that takes choices based on moral principles, rather than instrumental ones.’ (105).40 Šisler, “Attentat 1942.”41 See Šisler, “Contested Memories of War…;” Pötzsch and Šisler, “Playing Cultural Memory.”42 See Anable, Playing with Feelings, 131–134.43 Šisler, “Attentat 1942.”44 Ibid.45 Laub, “Bearing Witness,” in Felman and Laub, Testimonies, 71.46 Lothe, Suleiman and Phelan, “Introduction,” 3.47 Felman and Laub, “Forward,” in Testimony, xiv.48 Laub, “An Event Without a Witness,” 75.49 Ibid., 76.50 Ibid., 76.51 Trezise, Witnessing Witnessing, 9.52 For this notion, see Hirsch, Family Frames; Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory; Schwab, Haunting Legacies, passim.53 Richardson and Schankweiler, “Introduction,” 237.54 Caruth, Unclaimed Experience; LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust.55 Goldberg, Trauma in First Person, 39.56 Laub, “An Event Without a Witness,” 78–79.57 Charles Games, Attentat 1942 (Prague: Charles University, Czech Academy of Sciences, 2017), from which all subsequent quotations are also derived.58 Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, 92, 91.59 For a synthesis of these debates, see Ionescu, “Forgiving as Self-Healing?”60 See Goldberg, “An Interview with Professor Dominick LaCapra.”61 Caruth, “A Record That Has Yet to Be Made,” 49.62 Sirlin, William Styron’s Sophie’s Choice, 16.63 Ibid., 16.

Incompatibility and the pessimistic induction: a challenge for selective realism

Two powerful arguments have famously dominated the realism debate in philosophy of science: The No Miracles Argument (NMA) and the Pessimistic Meta-Induction (PMI). A standard response to the PMI is selective scientific realism (SSR), wherein only the working posits of a theory are considered worthy of doxastic commitment. Building on the recent debate over the NMA and the connections between the NMA and the PMI, I here consider a stronger inductive argument that poses a direct challenge for SSR: Because it is sometimes exactly the working posits which contradict each other, i.e., that which is directly responsible for empirical success, SSR cannot deliver a general explanation of scientific success.

Scientific Realism and Further Underdetermination Challenges

In an earlier article on this journal I argued that the problem of empirical underdetermination can for the largest part be solved by theoretical virtues, and for the remaining part it can be tolerated. Here I confront two further challenges to scientific realism based on underdetermination. First, there are four classes of theories which may seem to be underdetermined even by theoretical virtues. Concerning them I argue that (i) theories produced by trivial permutations and (ii) “equivalent descriptions” are compatible with the truth of standard theories; instead (iii) “as if” versions of standard theories are much worse from the point of view of theoretical virtues; finally (iv) mathematically intertranslatable theories either may become empirically decidable in the future, or can be discriminated by theoretical virtues, or realists may simply plead ignorance about their claims. Secondly, I consider Stanford’s underdetermination with respect unconceived alternatives, arguing that it essentially relies on the pessimistic meta-induction from the falsity of all past theories. Therefore, it can be resisted by (a) considering the radical advancement of present with respect to past science, and (b) arguing with selective realism that past successful theories, even if false, always included some true components.

On the Explanatory Power of Dispositional Realism

The article focuses on the unifying and explanatory power of the selective realism defended by Anjan Chakravartty. Our main aim is twofold. First, we critically analyse the purported synthesis between entity realism and structural realism offered by the author. We give reasons to think that this unification is an inconvenient marriage. In the second step, we deal with certain controversial aspects of the intended unification among three metaphysical concepts: causation, laws of nature and natural kinds. After pointing out that Chakravartty’s conception of laws is a plausible view that a scientific realist might endorse, we contend, on the contrary, that the concept of natural kind is dispensable in the framework of Chakravartty’s realism.

Effective theories and infinite idealizations: a challenge for scientific realism

Williams and J. Fraser have recently argued that effective field theory methods enable scientific realists to make more reliable ontological commitments in quantum field theory (QFT) than those commonly made. In this paper, I show that the interpretative relevance of these methods extends beyond the specific context of QFT by identifying common structural features shared by effective theories across physics. In particular, I argue that effective theories are best characterized by the fact that they contain intrinsic empirical limitations, and I extract from their structure one central interpretative constraint for making more reliable ontological commitments in different subfields of physics. While this is in principle good news, this constraint still raises a challenge for scientific realists in some contexts, and I bring the point home by focusing on Williams’s and J. Fraser’s defense of selective realism in QFT.

Local Selective Realism: Shifting from Classical to Quantum Electrodynamics

This article elaborates local selective realism in view of the shifting from classical to quantum electrodynamics. After some introductory remarks, we critically address what we call global selective realism, hence setting forth the background for outlining local selective realism. When examining the transition from classical to quantum electrodynamics, we evaluate both continuities and discontinuities in observational features, mathematical structures, and ontological presuppositions. Our argument leads us to criticise the narrow understanding of limiting-case strategies, and to reject the claim that we need a fully coherent theoretical framework to account for the transition from one theory to its successor in the case of electrodynamics. We close with a few remarks on the scope of local selective realism.

You are not a selective realist-dialetheist

In her (2019), Martínez-Ordaz puts forward an argument whose conclusion pretends to be a dilemma for selective realists: either selective realists cannot rule true contradictions out or the usual characterization of selective realism is incomplete. Then she argues that one should take the second horn and complete such a characterization with some logical constraints. In this note, I will defend that her argument for the dilemma is flawed at several steps and, moreover, that the dilemma is not dangerous and that her proposed completion of selective realism is not needed.

Bohmian Mechanics: Realism and the “Box” Experiment

It is difficult to articulate how we should take a realist attitude towards Bohmian mechanics because there are many versions of it. This paper aims to clarify the realist commitments of Bohmian mechanics and how we can understand it from a general scientific realist perspective. I use the box experiment, a double-slit like experiment conducted by Cardone et al. (Phys Lett A 326(1–2):1–13, 2004; Int J Mod Phys B 20(09):1107–1121, 2006), as a working example to argue that a causal realist account (in the sense of selective realism) that is applicable to Bohmian mechanics, has to be supplemented with the use of Inference to the Best Explanation. The reason is because causal realism on its own does not form a sufficient basis for realism about Bohmian mechanics. In particular, I argue that the existence of the pilot wave explains why we observe an anomalous interference effect in the experiment of Cardone et al. The conclusion to draw is that a complete realist account about Bohmian mechanics rests on explanatory considerations.

OUR TOWN

OUR TOWN

Against \u2018functional gravitational energy\u2019: a critical note on functionalism, selective realism, and geometric objects and gravitational energy

The present paper revisits the debate between realists about gravitational energy in GR (who opine that gravitational energy can be said to meaningfully exist in GR) and anti-realists/eliminativists (who deny this). I re-assess the arguments underpinning Hoefer’s seminal eliminativist stance, and those of their realist detractors’ responses. A more circumspect reading of the former is proffered that discloses where the so far not fully appreciated, real challenges lie for realism about gravitational energy. I subsequently turn to Lam and Read’s recent proposals for such a realism. Their arguments are critically examined. Special attention is devoted to the adequacy of Read’s appeals to functionalism, imported from the philosophy of mind.

Are you a selective-realist dialetheist without knowing it?

Recently there has been a tendency on the part of some scientific realists to weaken their philosophical theses with respect to the success of science. Some of them have suggested that a satisfactorily realist standpoint should be a highly modest approach to scientific success , leaving many with the impression that scientific realism nowadays is nothing that we once thought it was. In light of that, the main concern of this paper is methodological, here I want to answer the question how far can we push the boundaries of our realist commitments and still be in control of our philosophical claims. In particular, I deal with the issue of how a certain type of weak version of selective realism will necessarily allow for true contradictions, dialetheias –even if that is not desirable. Here I argue that if one presents a very weak characterization of selective realism, one that is in line with contemporary projects, this type of realism will not forbid the possibility of things such as dialetheias. I also claim that, if that is the case, we face the following dilemma: or our general characterization of selective realism is mistaken or selective realists cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of why and how to forbid dialetheias in science

Selective Realism and the Framework/Interaction Distinction: A Taxonomy of Fundamental Physical Theories

Following the proposal of a new kind of selective structural realism that uses as a basis the distinction between framework and interaction theories, this work discusses relevant applications in fundamental physics. An ontology for the different entities and properties of well-known theories is thus consistently built. The case of classical field theories—including general relativity as a classical theory of gravitation—is examined in detail, as well as the implications of the classification scheme for issues of realism in quantum mechanics. These applications also shed light on the different range of applicability of the ontic and epistemic versions of structural realism.

Mitos y mentiras sobre el realismo científico

Selective realist projects seek to strengthen scientific realism, but influential reactions (from anti-realist as well as realist camps) regard selectivist achievements as problematic and misguided developments, because -the story goes- those developments disfigure and devalue realism, transforming it into a position that is not worth taking into account. An examination of the charges formulated against selective realism and their respective historical background suggests, however, that the charges in question rest in myths and falsehoods about the character of realist positions; if so, the charges fail.

Quo vadis, realisme? O obecnym stanie sporu o realizm naukowy

The article investigates the intuition that both scientific realism and scientific antirealism are turning into degenerating research programs. The evolution of realism in reaction to pessimistic (meta)induction has certainly led to its increased sophistication as it has given rise to various versions of selective realism. However, many current discussions seem either too focused on semantic niceties or are turning into endless quarrels over case-study refutations of particular forms of realism. The point of finding a better understanding of the relations of scientific knowledge to the world seems to get lost in the process. Magnus, Callender, and Saatsi are among those who see the problem. Although drawing on different observations, they agree that the source of the problem is the wholesale approach according to which it is possible to resolve the realism debate in one move, by finding a single universal method of interpreting any scientific theory. Instead, they call for a more modest approach, based on case-by-case analyses. Particularly promising is Saatsi’s idea of exemplar realism, according to which realism should be an attitude motivating detailed case studies rather than a specific account of science in general.

Plastic Theatre and Selective Realism of Tennessee Williams

Plastic Theatre and Selective Realism of Tennessee Williams

Realism on the rocks: Novel success and James Hutton's theory of the earth

In this paper, I introduce a new historical case study into the scientific realism debate. During the late-eighteenth century, the Scottish natural philosopher James Hutton made two important successful novel predictions. The first concerned granitic veins intruding from granite masses into strata. The second concerned what geologists now term “angular unconformities”: older sections of strata overlain by younger sections, the two resting at different angles, the former typically more inclined than the latter. These predictions, I argue, are potentially problematic for selective scientific realism in that constituents of Hutton's theory that would not be considered even approximately true today played various roles in generating them. The aim here is not to provide a full philosophical analysis but to introduce the case into the debate by detailing the history and showing why, at least prima facie, it presents a problem for selective realism. First, I explicate Hutton's theory. I then give an account of Hutton's predictions and their confirmations. Next, I explain why these predictions are relevant to the realism debate. Finally, I consider which constituents of Hutton's theory are, according to current beliefs, true (or approximately true), which are not (even approximately) true, and which were responsible for these successes.

A (Fatal) Trilemma for best theory realism

The no-miracles argument (NMA) is the main inference-to-the-best-explanation kind of argument for scientific realism, and the pessimistic (meta-) induction (PI) is considered a main, if not the main, challenge for a NMA-based scientific realism. Doppelt (2014) advocates a new kind of inference-to-the-best-explanation supported scientific realism that he labels Best Theory Realism (BTR, previously introduced in Doppelt 2007a, 2011). If successful in replacing standard selective realism as the best version of scientific realism, BTR would be particularly good since it is not committed to the partial truth of past theories and thereby it is immune to the antirealist strategy of finding cases of past, predictively successful theories with predictively essential components not retained by later theories. The goal of this paper is to raise doubts about Doppelt’s attempt and argue that, other benefits of his proposal notwithstanding, it fails. In section 1 I summarize the main tenets of standard, retentive selective realism relevant for the present discussion. In section 2 I show that Doppelt’s main arguments against retentive selective realism do not work. In section 3, I argue that the way BTR faces the challenge posed by the historical record that motivates PI is unsatisfactory and puts Doppelt into a fatal trilemma: either he is committed to two claims that are untenable together; or endorses an extremely implausible form of present-science chauvinism; or unjustifiably discriminates explanation against prediction in historical record. The conclusion is that BTR falls short of substituting standard retentive selective realism as the most plausible realist position, and that thereby the cases of past successful theories with predictively essential parts not retained by posterior theories are still a real problem for a plausible realist position.

SELECTIVE REALISM VERSUS INDIVIDUAL REALISM FOR SCIENTIFIC CREATIVITY / SELEKTYVUSIS REALIZMAS VERSUS INDIVIDUALUSIS MOKSLINIO KŪRYBINGUMO REALIZMAS

Individual realism asserts that our best scientific theories are (approximately) true. In contrast, selective realism asserts that only the stable posits of our best scientific theories are true. Hence, individual realism recommends that we accept more of what our best scientific theories say about the world than selective realism does. The more scientists believe what their theories say about the world, the more they are motivated to exercise their imaginations and think up new theories and experiments. Therefore, individual realism better fosters scientific creativity than selective realism.

Selective Realism

The present article develops the concept of selective realism to understand how design features and narrative frames of first- and third-person shooters (F/TPS) exclude attention to salient, yet unpleasant, features of warfare such as problematic forms of violence, long-term psychological impacts, or sociopolitical blowbacks. Identifying four specific filters that frame player experiences, I argue that the resulting selectivity is significant because it is characteristic of the F/TPS genre as a whole that, through its wide dissemination, impacts upon the cultural framing of actual warfare. The article illustrates features of selective realism before it conducts in-depth analysis of the titles Spec Ops: The Line and The Last of Us to show how critical game design can invite a conscious unraveling of the generic frames and the ideological positions these invite. The article concludes with a reassessment of arguments regarding alleged sociopolitical impacts of war- and violence-themed computer games.