Sein Und Zeit Research Articles

MEMAKNAI HIDUP DI DEPAN KEMATIAN DALAM REFLEKSI KOMPARATIF HEIDEGGER DAN RAHNER

Death is usually seen as the end of everything. So many people try and build an effort to run from death in so many ways, both conventional and modern, from the traditional one to the high technology usage. However, whatever we do, we finally face death. The fear of death sometimes makes humans run from it, make a tranquilization, an inauthentic attitude, or according to Heidegger “inauthenticity of being-toward-death”. Consequently, so many opportunities for a meaningful life are left behind. By using the qualitative method through literature research, this inquiry comes to a reflection of the meaning of life in the face of death in the frame of comparative study. This paper is based on Heidegger’s argument in his book Sein und Zeit (SZ). A new terminology he built, Sein-zum-Tode, stimulates various questions vis-a-vis the reality of life encountered by the entire society in today’s world. Are there any relevances of his argument on death to build a meaningful life here and now? To make a balance of reflection, this paper presents the theological perspective of Karl Rahner, Heidegger’s former student. By comparing these two thinkers, between a philosopher and a theologian, the author comes to a reflection that the mystery of death must be understood in relation to the creative and meaningful life in this world

The Organization of Pessimism: Profane Illumination and Anthropological Materialism in Walter Benjamin

This paper explores Walter Benjamin’s relationship with French Surrealism from sources rarely studied or practically unknown until now. First, I will set out the direct link between the theses on “profane illumination” and the “organization of pessimism” in Der Surrealismus. Die letzte Momentaufnahme der europaischen Intelligenz , and various texts by Pierre Naville, one of the most active figures in the Surrealist movement between 1925 and 1929. Second, I will consider Benjamin’s commentaries in Pariser Passagen and convolute “S” of the Passagen-Werk about Surrealist writings and Martin Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit , flagging up the implications of this confrontation for Benjamin’s ideas of secularization of mysticism and messianism. Lastly, I will seek to refine the meaning of Benjamin’s “anthropological materialism” and its relevance to those sections of the Passagenarbeit that are dedicated to the evolution of social movements since the French Revolution.

Affectivity in Heidegger II: Temporality, Boredom, and Beyond

AbstractIn ‘Affectivity in Heidegger I: Moods and Emotions in Being and Time’, we explicated the crucial role that Martin Heidegger assigns to our capacity to affectively find ourselves in the world. There, our discussion was restricted to Division I of Being and Time (BT). Specifically, we discussed how Befindlichkeit as a basic existential (i.e., a structure of Dasein's being that constitutes both the manner in which Dasein exists and discloses itself) and moods as the ontic counterparts of Befindlichkeit (i.e., the pre‐reflective ways in which Dasein relates to and discloses the world) make circumspective engagement with the world possible. Indeed, according to Heidegger, it is primarily through moods that the world is ‘opened up’ and revealed to us as a world that is suffused with values and entities that already matter to us. In this companion essay, our aim is to expand our analysis of affectivity in the following ways: first, we revisit our discussion of Befindlichkeit in light of Heidegger's discussion of temporality in Division II of BT; second, we discuss the basic or fundamental mood (Grundstimmung) of boredom (Langeweile) and its ontological significance; we conclude by providing a brief characterization of how Heidegger's notion of mood changes in his later thinking.

Review of George Pattison, Heidegger on Death: A Critical Theological Essay

George Pattison’s Heidegger on Death (HD) aims at critically assessing Heidegger’s analysis of death included in his magnum opus Being and Time (BT) (1927). Given the peculiar status of Heidegger’s analysis, tightly interwoven into a complex argumentative narrative touching on an array of foundational issues in philosophy, Pattison must first of all spell out for his reader Heidegger’s overall project in BT and show how Heidegger’s analysis of death fits in it. As the author makes clear, HD isn't meant to be a piece of Heidegger scholarship but rather ‘... an essay about death that uses Heidegger ... as a way of thinking about the question of death in a Christian and theological perspective’ (HD, p. 12). This self-imposed task places a second burden on Pattison, i.e., to draw on theological premises to examine Heidegger’s analysis of death and find it ultimately wanting. An implicit third burden, which the author only occasionally seems to intend to meet, is to state in exactly what sense the said premises are Christian and theological; although Pattison draws on a wealth of religious writers including Augustine, Luther, Franz Rosenzweig, Gabriel Marcel, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, and (above all) Kierkegaard, it is not always clear it is the religious dimension of this material that does the critical job intended by Pattison. The book is divided into six chapters and an introduction. In the Introduction, Pattison motivates his focus on death by the centrality of the topic in human experience, and his focus on Heidegger with his claim that the German philosopher is one ‘who has offered the most intellectually consistent and rigorous account of death in modern philosophy’ (HD, p. 13). Pattison should have warned his reader that Heidegger’s account of death is not so much the most consistent and rigorous in modern philosophy as being virtually the only one: there are systematic reasons why death has not been a serious topic of discussion in philosophy (modern or otherwise), and omitting these reasons can mislead the reader into thinking that Heidegger is a choice among many. The truth is that Heidegger’s focus on death is highly idiosyncratic, matching the highly SOPHIA (2014) 53:575–577 DOI 10.1007/s11841-014-0453-x

Play as Polemos

Much has been written about Heidegger's various influences on Gadamer's thinking, especially as the latter culminates in Truth and Method. Scholars often point to the way Heidegger's notions of “thrownness” and “historicity” in Being and Time (BT) influence Gadamer's insistence on the centrality of tradition for hermeneutical understanding, and his notions of the “fusion of horizons” (horizontverschmelzung) and the “hermeneutic circle.”1 But scholars have appeared to overlook, or at least underestimate, the influence some of Heidegger's other notions have exerted on Gadamer's thought. In this paper I want to address crucial aspects of this neglect; I shall explore the relation between Heidegger's notion, as he explains it in Introduction to Metaphysics (IM), of truth as unconcealment (aletheia), and compare it to Gadamer's notion, as he describes it in Truth and Method, of truth as emergent, in play (Spiel), from the event (Ereignis) of conversation and of the work of art.

La confrontation Binswanger-Heidegger dans les Zollikoner seminare. Qu’est-ce qu’avoir un corps ?

Il s’agit ici de suivre le destin d’un silence, celui dans lequel, dès Être et temps, Heidegger fait basculer l’espace du corps pour ne le laisser réapparaître, près de quarante ans plus tard, que dans les Zollikoner Seminare. Le corps ne conquiert son autonomie que peu à peu, sans doute parce que celle-ci signerait le retour d’une âme et finalement d’une nature humaine définitivement congédiées. D’abord processus, Leiben plutôt que Leib, le corps est un apparaître ou plutôt un montrer. Montrer c’est entrer en rapport, pour dire l’absent. Mais dire comment ? Si Heidegger et Binswanger s’accordent sur le principe d’une intercorporéité, ils divergent sur la nature de la relation avec l’autre corps, un corps qui pourtant se donne à voir davantage que le mien. Tandis que chez Heidegger celle-ci ressortit d’une parole fondatrice – même chez l’aphasique – chez Binswanger – qui fait ici retour aux catégories de la phénoménologie husserlienne – elle relève de l’intentionnalité. Cette intentionnalité est singulière : elle est intrinsèque au corps, qu’elle achemine du Körper au Leib. Mais cet acheminement s’effectue par le biais d’une réflexivité extrinsèque, effet de la rencontre avec l’autre telle qu’elle s’accomplit par exemple dans le Prendre-par : la relation avec l’autre (extérieur) n’est rendue possible par la relation avec l’autre (intérieur). Le corps est donc d’abord l’intercorps, argument silencieux d’une nostrité dont toute folie exprime la nostalgie, dont toute rencontre instaure, en même temps qu’un nouvel espace, la définitive présence. Here we must follow the fate of a silence, where, right from Sein und Zeit, Heidegger swings over the body space. It reappears, only forty years later, in the Zollikoner Seminare. But this body hasn’t won its autonomy, probably because it would mean the return of definitive dismissed soul and human nature. First defined as a process, Leiben rather than Leib, body is an appearing, or better a showing. To show is to enter in relation, in order to say the absent. But to say how? Even if Heidegger and Binswanger agree on the principle of an intercorporeity, they disagree reciprocally about the nature of the relation with the other body, a body which nevertheless gives itself to see more than mine. While by Heidegger, the latter is a matter of a founding speech – even by the aphasic – by Binswanger, it is a matter of the intentionality. There intentionality is singular: it is intrinsecal to the body, it leads from the Körper to the Leib. But this leading is accomplished by means of an extrinsecal reflexivity, result of the encounter with the other man, such as she takes effect for instance in the “to take hold of”: the relation with the other (external) man is made possible by the relation with the (internal) other man. The body is first intercorporeity, the silent argument of this We-ness, whose nostalgia every madness expresses, whose definitive presence, as well as a new space, all encounter establishes.

Heidegger's Descartes and Heidegger's Cartesianism

Abstract: Heidegger's Sein und Zeit (SZ) is commonly viewed as one of the 20th century's great anti‐Cartesian works, usually because of its attack on the epistemology‐driven dualism and mentalism of modern philosophy of mind or its apparent effort to ‘de‐center the subject’ in order to privilege being or sociality over the individual. Most who stress one or other of these anti‐Cartesian aspects of SZ, however, pay little attention to Heidegger's own direct engagement with Descartes, apart from the compressed discussion in SZ §§19–21. I here show through a careful reading of Heidegger's lectures on Descartes from the years immediately preceding SZ that, while he has sharp criticisms of Descartes and certain ‘Cartesian’ aspects of modern philosophy along the lines commonly recognized, he also aims to disclose what he calls the ‘positive possibilities’ in Descartes and the philosophy he inspired. I detail a number of these and then show that they force us to see Heidegger's own early project as largely unconcerned with dualism and mentalism per se, and much more with questions of the philosophical methodology that gives rise to them. Moreover, I show that a careful reading of Heidegger's treatment of the cogito makes clear that he is no serious way attempting to ‘de‐center the subject’ and that the fundamental question of the ‘analytic of Dasein’ is one that takes Descartes as an immediate jumping off point: how can I articulate what I understand myself to be as the general kind of entity I am, and on what besides me does my being depend?

Heidegger’s “Phenomenology of Failure” in Sein und Zeit

(ProQuest-CSA LLC: ... denotes non-USASCII text omitted.) Failure speaks, in its own way-as an adman and therefore with little importance-the crucial logic, or rather it inscribes discourse in that logic. Jean-Luc Marion, The Idol and Distance: Five Studies Heidegger's Sein undZeit is replete with silent keywords that underwrite unfolding of existential analytic of Dasein in particular and project of fundamental ontology in general. One such keyword is that organizes, among other things, phenomenality of conscience in a crucial second chapter of Division II-Dasein's attestation of an authentic potentiality-for-being, and resoluteness-but also transition from Zuhandenheit to Vorhandenheit and practical-methodological orientation of phenomenology as an impossible praxis above actuality. And yet, when it comes to Heidegger's even most sympathetic of Heidegger's commentators cannot resist temptation to convert it, without hesitation, into or, rather, failures of Heidegger. Besides more substantial failures to account for body and for life of Dasein within boundaries of fundamental ontology, conversion to which I am alluding hardly needs to be explained two decades after noisy controversy. Suffice it to say that another keyword that never fails to surface next to the of Heidegger is silence. Two general, though closely linked, variations theme are exemplified, one hand, in debate between Dominique Janicaud and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and, other, in work of David Pareil Krell. While I do not intend to follow path of conversion of I will merely catalogue least futile of its outcomes. What drives first debate is question of ground for something like a in Heidegger's case. In Heidegger, Art and Politics Lacoue-Labarthe writes: To speak of moral failing \faute] presupposes that there exists an ethics, or at least an ethics is possible. Now, it is probably case today that neither of these conditions is fulfilled.1 He further justifies his doubts regarding actual existence and even possibility of ethics within Heideggerian problematic itself, referring to the general exhaustion of philosophical possibilities that must affect ethical, delimitation of ethics and humanism, etc. It is this very justification that Janicaud finds difficult to accept, despite praising Lacoue-Labarthe's prudence and acknowledging historical caesura that governs his theoretical position. For Janicaud, the only politics liable to unmask Nazism as profoundly criminal is a politics that demands that one 'bend a knee' in front of ethical principles.2 Rejecting such politics in name of Heidegger, we deepen closure of metaphysics, but also augment thinker's concrete moral failure, repeating it. In spirit of Lacoue-Labarthe's approach, David Krell undertakes an immanent critique of Heidegger, which is rather refreshing, notwithstanding Janicaud's justifiable rejoinder: I shall say what I believe would hurt most-that his silence concerning fate of European Jewry between 1933 and 1945 is a of ein Versagen des Denkens. ... I still believe that in Heidegger's texts there is and that when thinking fails an abyss opens right there page.' It turns out that failure of thinking, for Krell, is simultaneously narrower and broader than moral failure. It is narrower than latter because (assuming that hermeneutical violence and physical violence are still radically discontinuous, though this assumption may not be entirely warranted in Krell's case) abyss he spots opens only on page, in internal contradictions of thought, such as inclusion of human beings in category of a standing reserve-the inclusion that challenges tenets of existential analytic of Dasein. …

Heidegger's philosophy of space and place

The purpose of Martin Heidegger's Being and Time ( BT ) is to recover the experience of Being that lies concealed behind the dominant modes of Western thought. BT represents a well-founded phenomenological attempt to interpret the everyday understanding of Being that Dasein always already has. Much of the contemporary discourse in human and social geography, such as on class, race and gender, centres on issues that can generally be described as grounded within a socio-political context. However, while recognising their value, these approaches are often unsatisfactory in that they fail to consider Dasein's Being-in-the-World as a unique and peculiar phenomenological problem. Dasein's spatiality is used expressly to establish that Dasein is spatial and Dasein can be spatial only as care. Dasein's spatiality, or place, expresses the bounded and lived spatiality that characterizes Being-in-the-World. Heidegger's body of philosophy should be of great interest to geographers in their attempts to understand themselves as part of the studies of the interaction between man and world. This is what hermeneutic phenomenology is all about, and is what geographers such as Edward Relph, Yi-Fu Tuan and John Pickles try to tell us in their many works on humanism, phenomenology and geography.

Being-in-the World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I (review)

Reviews359 acceptance of the finally unintelligible standpoint of "total critique": it is not easily reconciled with his understanding of Hölderlin's significance, nor with his troubling "yes" and "no" to technology. But even where he seems to me to overshoot his mark, Wolin never is very far off the mark. TL· Politics ofBeing deserves a broad audience. Yale UniversityKarsten Harries Being-in-the World:A Commentary onHeidegger's Beingand Time, DivisionI, by Hubert L. Dreyfus; 340 pp. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1991, $30.00 cloth, $15.95 paper. This is the most distinguished, helpful, and accurate commentary in English on Heidegger's notoriously difficult work. It is a book whose arrival has been long anticipated. Descriptions ofDreyfus's lectures at Berkeley and the "Fybate" student Zusätze based on them have been circulating for two decades. Being-in- Ûie-World is rich, thoughtful, and thought-provoking, and will particularly help convince those many philosophers who have been curious but skeptical and disdainful of Heidegger that he is, in fact, a philosopher to be reckoned with, whether or not he is one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. The core of Dreyfus's interpretation—for this is no mere "commentary"— is Heidegger's rejection of the central role of "theory" in philosophy since Plato. In particular, Dreyfus has Heidegger rejecting the familiar idea that human existence (Dasein) involves an implicit theory about the world which philosophy can articulate in a systematic fashion. In this, Heidegger resembles the later Wittgenstein, but Dreyfus is very quick to insist on the differences, not the least of which is Heidegger's rejection (and Wittgenstein's acceptance) of ordinary language as an adequate language for philosophy. But according to both of them, the basis of human life or "being-in-the-world" is not knowledge but shared activity, and, for Heidegger, it is only against this background of shared activities that we can formulate theories in science and theses in philosophy. However, theses and theories can never have the all-embracing scope hoped for by the philosophers, and the background itself does not consist of implicit theories. A full spelling out ofour background practices is impossible, according to Heidegger; at best we can point them out, provide an interpretation of them perhaps, but with the essential understanding that what we are interpreting is already an established, "mindless" shared interpretation. Human existence, for 360Philosophy and Literature Heidegger, is nothingother than this continuous, self-interpretingactivity within the context of already given social practices and interpretations. Accordingly, Heidegger insists that we must reject the traditional view of an individual self which is capable ofdetachment and objectivity, and we must reject in its entirety the Cartesian vocabulary of subject, mind, representation and consciousness (along with its newer phenomenological variants such as "intentionality" and "being-for-itself" in Husserl and Sartre). Most ofthese themes are familiar, but Dreyfus shifts the emphasis away from the more "existentialist" Heidegger (who is relegated to an appendix) and spends much of his time discussing the nature ofbackground practices and our shared interpretive activities, attacking various Cartesian views and current theories and fashions in cognitive science and epistemology. Dreyfus's discussion is always lively and seductive and his defense of Heidegger persuasive. The danger is that the energy and clarity ofDreyfus's presentation may well blunt the deserved representation of Heidegger as an obscurantist. I often found myself wondering , as I read Dreyfus's clear and persuasive account of some Heideggerian theme that had perplexed me for years, whether the engaging insight, argument , or example did indeed belong to Heidegger or whether the credit instead belonged to Dreyfus and his colleagues. Dreyfus, like many Heideggerians, presents Heidegger not only as an important philosopher but as something much, much more. We are assured that his ontology is not just a corrective for a philosophical tradition gone wrong but an antidote to what ails the world—a sage-like posture that Heidegger himself was keen to adopt. If we learn to appreciate Heidegger, we are told, we will learn to be-in-the-world in a new and different way, to understand alternative practices and ways ofunderstanding. Personally, I doubt it—though to...

Heidegger's Pragmatism: Understanding, Being and the Critique of Metaphysics, and: Heidegger, Kant and Time (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 631 criterion of ordinary language had a conventionalist outcome which sought to create a common set of legitimate language uses. That this is not even mentioned in this context is a serious omission. There is an objectivist thrust in recent linguist philosophy which, like structuralism, is antisubjectivistic. If there is a negativism in it, it involves the virtual deletion of the subjective individual. An instance of linguistic nihilism is perhaps found in the free play of language and the capricious interpretation of texts espoused by Derrida. At any rate, justice is not done to the issue of the suppressed nihilistic consequences of "the philosophy of language." The Specter of the Absurd invites criticism because it is an ambitious and comprehensive work that deals with many complex and contentious issues. Like similar studies, it tends to disclose metastasizing sources of nihilism and finds nihilistic tendencies and implications in numerous places. Crosby's strengths are his recognition of the value of certain insights of the philosophy of nihilism--its emphasis on perspectival knowledge, its sensitivity to human differences and differential values, its awareness of the tragic dimensions of human life, its valuation of freedom, its appreciation of the contingencies of existence and the insecurities of life---and his compassion for those who suffer from the unjust, senseless, and random negativities of existence. In his moving accounts of the personal experience of "existential nihilism," as well as his literary illustrations of this theme, he approaches a sensitivity to the human condition and a wisdom that is rare in recent philosophical discourse. Although some of the details in this wide-ranging work are contestable, it is an accessible, interesting, and serious study that can be read with profit by many. P.S. One curiosity, which has nothing to do with the content of the book, is that the commentary on its back cover mentions Derrida as one of the sources of contemporary nihilism. This is certainly an arguable point, but unfortunately Derrida is not mentioned anywhere in The SpecteroftheAbsurd! If possible, SUNY Press should correct this oddity. GEORGE J. STACK State University ofNew York, Brockport Mark Okrent. Heidegger'sPragmatism: Understanding, Being and the Critique of Metaphys- /cs. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988. Pp. xiii + 3ou. $29.95. Charles M. Sherover. tteidegger, Kant and Time. Current Continental Research, vol. 8o5. Washington: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and University Press of America, 1988. Pp. xvii + 32~. Paper, $18.75. The two books under review here both adopt a common strategy in response to the problem of philosophical writing about Heidegger. As anyone who has read him in German or another language realizes, Heidegger constructed a strange new idiom, "Heideggerese," which spans the time before and after he abjured the term "philosophy " for his work. How then is one to write, philosophically, in English, about Heidegger's work? Should one jump into the project enthusiastically, perhaps coining a few hyphenations of one's own in an anglified new idiom, "Heideggerlish"? Or 632 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28:4 OCTOBER 1990 should one attempt to translate not only Heidegger's German into English, but also the idiom of his work into some supposedly neutral "philosophical" language? The working out of other options is a pressing need, although it need not be taken up by everyone. In these two books, the second approach is adopted by Okrent and Sheruver. To varying degrees, they both attempt such a double translation of Heidegger. The difficulties faced by all translators are intensified in the case of Heidegger, especially considering his insistence that all translation is interpretation, and that all interpretation--especially his own--is "violent." In other words, Heidegger consistently denies that one can translate without losing something. The questions then become: What is lost in the translation? and, Is the loss worth the gain? (The major gain in translation, obviously, is time saved. One need not lose time struggling with another language or style of thought if one can read a version of it in one's own language. Heidegger, of course, had a lot to say about saving and losing time in Beingand Time.) Along with these concerns, it would also seem that Heidegger...

Husserl on Ryle's Review of “Sein Und Zeit”

(1970). Husserl on Ryle's Review of “Sein Und Zeit”. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology: Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 14-15.