Security Protocol Model Research Articles

Cyber Security to Android Mobile Devices

This article presents, summarizes, and develops cybersecurity technology concepts for Android mobile devices according to the current state of the problem. Based on the OSI model for android mobile devices, security protocols and applications, and also the main vulnerabilities and threats on the other hand, the current defenses against cyber attacks are revealed.

Light-Weight Security Protocol and Data Model for Chip-to-Chip Zero-Trust

Light-Weight Security Protocol and Data Model for Chip-to-Chip Zero-Trust

Formal Verification of CHAP PPP authentication Protocol for Smart City/Safe City Applications.

A smart city is a technologically advanced metropolitan region with several connected devices that collects data using various electronic technologies, voice activation methods, and sensors. The information obtained from the data is utilised to efficiently manage assets, resources, and services; in turn, the data is used to enhance operations throughout the city. Achieving security for smart cities is one of the major challenges as the number of connected devices increases the vulnerability also increases. The security of a smart city system depends on the reliability of the security protocols used by the security systems. To design and develop a highly secure system for a smart city the security protocols used must be highly reliable. To prove the reliability of a security protocol the validation technique is not desirable because of its several drawbacks, these drawbacks can be overcome using the formal verification technique which provides the mathematical proof for its correctness. In this work, The Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol Point-to-Point (CHAP PPP) which is more commonly used in PPP authentication of smart cities is formally verified using the well-known verification technique known as the model checking technique. The Scyther model checker is the tool used to build the abstract security protocol model.

A Security Protocol Model of Internet of Things for Resisting Known Plaintext Attack

Based on the current research status of security problems in the Internet of things and the communication characteristics of the internet of things, an Internet of things security protocol model that can resist known plaintext attacks was proposed. It realizes identity authentication, key distribution and data encryption in the process of information interaction. By using Casper and FDR tool to model and formalize the security protocol proposed, the security of this protocol was proved. The performance of the protocol was analyzed by comparing it with other IoT security protocols and calculating the expected network communication overhead.

Timed models of security protocols including delays in the network

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Model‐based mutation testing from security protocols in HLPSL

SummaryIn recent years, important efforts have been made for offering a dedicated language for modelling and verifying security protocols. Outcome of the European project AVISPA, the high‐level security protocol language (HLPSL) aims at providing a means for verifying usual security properties (such as data secrecy) in message exchanges between agents. However, verifying the security protocol model does not guarantee that the actual implementation of the protocol will fulfil these properties. This article presents a model‐based testing approach, relying on the mutation of HLPSL models to generate abstract test cases. The proposed mutations aim at introducing leaks in the security protocols and represent real‐world implementation errors. The mutated models are then analysed by the automated validation of Internet security protocols and applications tool set, which produces, when the mutant protocol is declared unsafe, counterexample traces exploiting the security flaws and, thus, providing test cases. A dedicated framework is then used to concretize the abstract attack traces, bridging the gap between the formal model level and the implementation level. This model‐based testing technique has been experimented on a wide range of security protocols, in order to evaluate the mutation operators. This process has also been fully tool‐supported, from the mutation of the HLPSL model to the concretization of the abstract test cases into test scripts. It has been applied to a realistic case study of the Paypal payment protocol, which made it possible to discover a vulnerability in an implementation of an e‐commerce framework. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Efficient construction of machine-checked symbolic protocol security proofs

We embed an untyped security protocol model in the interactive theorem prover Isabelle/HOL and derive a theory for constructing proofs of secrecy and authentication properties. Our theory is based on two key ingredients. The first is an inference rule for enumerating the possible origins of messages known to the intruder. The second is a class of protocol-specific invariants that formalize type assertions about variables in protocol specifications. The resulting theory is well suited for interactively constructing human-readable, protocol security proofs. We additionally give an algorithm that automatically generates Isabelle/HOL proof scripts based on this theory. We provide case studies showing that both interactive and automatic proof construction are efficient. The resulting proofs provide strong correctness guarantees since all proofs, including those deriving our theory from the security protocol model, are machine-checked.

Implementation of Physical Layer Key Distribution using Software Defined Radios

It was well known from Shannon’s days that characteristics of the physical channel like attenuation, fadingand noise can impair reliable communication. But it was more recently that the beneficial side effects of channelcharacteristics in ensuring secret communication started getting attention. Studies have been made to quantify theamount of secrecy that can be reaped by combining channel coding with security protocols. The Wiretap channelproposed by Wyner is arguably one of the oldest models of physical layer security protocols. In this paper, wepresent a brief tutorial introduction to the Wiretap channel, followed by an application of the physical layer modelto a class of Key Distribution protocols. We present results from an implementation of key distribution protocolsusing Software Defined Radio tools along with physical RF hardware peripherals. We believe this approach is muchmore tangible and informative than computer based simulation studies. Defence Science Journal, 2013, 63(1), pp.6 -14 , DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.14429/dsj. 63.3758

Safe abstractions of data encodings in formal security protocol models

Abstract When using formal methods, security protocols are usually modeled at a high level of abstraction. In particular, data encoding and decoding transformations are often abstracted away. However, if no assumptions at all are made on the behavior of such transformations, they could trivially lead to security faults, for example leaking secrets or breaking freshness by collapsing nonces into constants. In order to address this issue this paper formally states sufficient conditions, checkable on sequential code, such that if an abstract protocol model is secure under a Dolev–Yao adversary, then a refined model, which takes into account a wide class of possible implementations of the encoding/decoding operations, is implied to be secure too under the same adversary model. The paper also indicates possible exploitations of this result in the context of methods based on formal model extraction from implementation code and of methods based on automated code generation from formally verified models.

Distributed temporal logic for the analysis of security protocol models

The distributed temporal logic DTL is an expressive logic, well suited for formalizing properties of concurrent, communicating agents. We show how DTL can be used as a metalogic to reason about and relate different security protocol models. This includes reasoning about model simplifications, where models are transformed to have fewer agents or behaviors, and verifying model reductions, where to establish the validity of a property it suffices to consider its satisfaction on only a subset of models. We illustrate how DTL can be used to formalize security models, protocols, and properties, and then present three concrete examples of metareasoning. First, we prove a general theorem about sufficient conditions for data to remain secret during communication. Second, we prove the equivalence of two models for guaranteeing message-origin authentication. Finally, we relate channel-based and intruder-centric models, showing that it is sufficient to consider models in which the intruder completely controls the network. While some of these results belong to the folklore or have been shown, mutatis mutandis, using other formalisms, DTL provides a uniform means to prove them within the same formalism. It also allows us to clarify subtle aspects of these model transformations that are often neglected or cannot be specified in the first place.

Modeling and Analysis of Security Protocols Using Colored Petri Nets

Security protocols are the basis of security in networks. Therefore, it is essential to ensure that these protocols function correctly. However, it is difficult to design security protocols that are immune to malicious attack, since good analysis techniques are lacking. In this paper, the current main analysis techniques using Colored Petri Nets (CP-Nets) for analysis of security protocols are introduced. Based on the techniques, a new method using CP-Nets for the analysis of security protocols is presented. Specially, in the new method, an intruder CP-Net model is presented that provides an open-ended base for the integration of multiple attack tactics. This is a viable approach to overcome the state space explosion problem. Furthermore, the automated analysis tools CPN Tools is used. The Andrew secure RPC protocol is chosen to illustrate how a security protocol is analyzed using the new method. After model checking, an attack is found which the same as the one found by Gavin Lowe. These are stunning confirmations of the validity of the new method for analyzing security protocols.

Multi-Attacker Protocol Validation

Security protocols have been analysed focusing on a variety of properties to withstand the Dolev-Yao attacker. The Multi-Attacker treat model allows each protocol participant to behave maliciously intercepting and forging messages. Each principal may then behave as a Dolev-Yao attacker while neither colluding nor sharing knowledge with anyone else. This feature rules out the applicability of existing equivalence results in the Dolev-Yao model. The analysis of security protocols under the Multi-Attacker threat model brings forward yet more insights, such as retaliation attacks and anticipation attacks, which formalise currently realistic scenarios of principals competing each other for personal profit. They are variously demonstrated on a classical protocol, Needham-Schroeder's, and on a modern deployed protocol, Google's SAML-based single sign-on protocol. The general threat model for security protocols based on set-rewriting that was adopted in AVISPA (Armando et al. 2005) is extended to formalise the Multi-Attacker. The state-of-the-art model checker SATMC (Armando and Compagna, Int J Inf Secur 6(1):3---32, 2007) is then used to automatically validate the protocols under the new threats, so that retaliation and anticipation attacks can automatically be found. The tool support scales up to the Multi-Attacker threat model at a reasonable price both in terms of human interaction effort and of computational time.

LTL model checking for security protocols

Most model checking techniques for security protocols make a number of simplifying assumptions on the protocol and/or on its execution environment that greatly complicate or even prevent their applicability in some important cases. For instance, most techniques assume that communication between honest principals is controlled by a Dolev-Yao intruder, i.e. a malicious agent capable to overhear, divert, and fake messages. Yet we might be interested in establishing the security of a protocol that relies on a less unsecure channel (e.g. a confidential channel provided by some other protocol sitting lower in the protocol stack). In this paper we propose a general model for security protocols based on the set-rewriting formalism that, coupled with the use of LTL, allows for the specification of assumptions on principals and communication channels as well as of complex security properties that are normally not handled by state-of-the-art security protocol analysers. By using our approach we have been able to formalise all the assumptions required by the ASW protocol for optimistic fair exchange and some of its key security properties. Besides the previously reported attacks on the protocol, we report a new attack on a patched version of the protocol.

A formalism for visual security protocol modeling

Existing visual modeling paradigms do not adequately cover the visual modeling of security protocols: sequences of interactions between principals in a security system. A visual formalism for security protocol modeling should not only be well-defined but also satisfy certain pragmatic criteria: support for compositional, comprehensive, laconic, and lucid models. Candidate techniques from the OMG's Model Driven Architecture, based largely on UML 2.0, lack a formal syntax and semantics. Well-defined visual formalisms outside of UML have shortcomings with respect to one or more of the pragmatic criteria. We present the GSPML visual formalism as a solution that satisfies all of the pragmatic criteria. We show that GSPML is well-defined with structural operational semantics and a hypergraph grammar syntax.

Relating Strand Spaces and Distributed Temporal Logic for Security Protocol Analysis

In previous work, we introduced a version of distributed temporal logic that is well-suited both for verifying security protocols and as a metalogic for reasoning about, and relating, different security protocol models. In this paper, we formally investigate the relationship between our approach and strand spaces, which is one of the most successful and widespread formalisms for analyzing security protocols. We define translations between models in our logic and strand-space models of security protocols, and we compare the results obtained with respect to the level of abstraction that is inherent in each of the formalisms. This allows us to clarify different aspects of strand spaces that are often left implicit, as well as pave the way to transfer results, techniques and tools across the two approaches.1

A Syntactic Criterion for Injectivity of Authentication Protocols

Injectivity is essential when studying the correctness of authentication protocols, because noninjective protocols may suffer from replay attacks. The standard ways of verifying injectivity either make use of a counting argument, which only seems to be applicable in a verification methodology based on model-checking, or draw conclusions on the basis of the details of the data-model used. We propose and study a property, the loop property, that can be syntactically verified and is sufficient to guarantee injectivity. Our result is generic in the sense that it holds for a wide range of security protocol models, and does not depend on the details of message contents or nonce freshness.

Security protocols: from linear to classical logic by abstract interpretation

We relate two models of security protocols, namely the linear logic or multiset rewriting model, and the classical logic, Horn clause representation of protocols. More specifically, we show that the latter model is an abstraction of the former, in which the number of repetitions of each fact is forgotten. This result formally characterizes the approximations made by the classical logic model.