This article reviews and analyzes the Anglo-German diplomatic activities and interactions of some officials from both Britain and Germany before the First World War. It focuses on specific cases involving figures such as Henry Wilson and Prince Lichnowsky, aiming to explore the factors in the pre-war diplomatic interactions between Britain and Germany that led to Germanys strategic misjudgment and ultimately culminated in the outbreak of the war. Structural realism and the concept of security dilemma are employed to examine the intentions and positions of officials and the upper echelons on both sides. This study concludes that the prolonged strategic preparations by Britain and its vigilant attitude towards Germanys aggression demonstrated thorough consideration of the impending war. On the other hand, factors such as the German militarys satisfaction with its own development and the filtering of genuine information within its internal diplomatic system intensified the likelihood of war. Additionally, the ambiguous stance displayed by Britain towards the prospect of war also exerted a certain influence. Taking a research perspective centered on the analysis of mutual or internal interactions between the two parties, this article aims to offer novel insights for future investigations into the realm of strategic misjudgment preceding World War I.