Security Dangers Research Articles

Policy Research of Network Security about Employment Management System in Colleges and Universities

The college education has developed unceasing and the number of collegian is step up with more extrude contradiction of student employment. The tough job market requires the vocational counsel and management should be more scientific, standard and effective. At present, the applied employment management system for the graduates has the characteristics of high-efficiency, convenient with speediness that played an important role in high-efficiency employment of graduates. However, there has hidden danger of high-efficiency network security. The employment management and amount of relevant personal information might affect seriously for the network security questions. Therefore, research the network security of information management system about college employment is very important.

Vetting Mobile Apps

Billions of copies of apps for mobile devices have been purchased in recent years. With this growth, however, comes an increase in the spread of potentially dangerous security vulnerabilities. Because of an app's low cost and high proliferation, the threat of these vulnerabilities could be far greater than that of traditional computers. Thus, purchasing organizations or third-party labs should vet the apps before selling them, and consumers need to understand the risks of apps and the prospects for ensuring their security.

The AE Identification Methods to Welding Defect by Wavelet Analysis

In the engineering applications area, welding defect is a major hidden danger of structure security. the bending failure process of welded specimens is detected by using AE technique and the data samples of typical welding defect source are collected, and by using wavelet technique the typical AE datas acquired through experiment are analyzed, characteristic information of the typical acoustic emission source such as electromagnetic noise, plastic deformation, micro-crack initiation, crack unsteady expansion and fracture, etc are extracted. A serial acoustic emission source identification methods based on the energy spectrum coefficients of wavelet are established and which can realize accurately distinguishing of different acoustic emission sources, so as to provide a theoretical basis to detect equipment welding defects by acoustic emission technology dynamic in engineering practice.

System Dynamics Based Insider Threats Modeling

Insider threat has been recognized as one of the most dangerous security threats and become a much more complex issue. Insider threat is resulted from the legitimate users abusing their privileges and cause tremendous damage or losses. Not always being friends, insiders can be main threats to the organization. Currently, there is no equivalent prevention solution for insider threat to an intrution prevention system or vulnerability scanner. From the survey of literature of insider threat studies, we conclude that the system dynamics (SD) is an effective tool to analyze the root causes of insider threat incidents and evaluate mitigation strategies from people, process, and technology perspectives. A generized case based SD model can be tailored and applied to analyze and evaluate specific insider threat incidents. We present a well known insider threat incident of Taiwan and tailor the generized case based SD model to analyze it. The simulation results indicate that the risk of insider threats can be reduced and the probability of detecting insider threats can be increased.

Insider Threat Analysis of Case Based System Dynamics

One of the most dangerous security threats today is insider threat, and it is such a much more complex issue. But till now, there is no equivalent to a vulnerability scanner for insider threat. We survey and discuss the history of research on insider threat analysis to know system dynamics is the best method to mitigate insider threat from people, process, and technology. In the paper, we present a famous case of insider threats in Taiwan using system dynamics to analyze the tailored model. We may reduce the risk and increase the probability of detecting insider threats from personnel of simulation model. The study concludes with suggestions for future research and implications for system dynamics who are interested in insider threat issue.

Medical ethics at Guantanamo Bay detention centre and in the US military: a time for reform

Medical ethics at Guantanamo Bay detention centre and in the US military: a time for reform

Wolfowitz Conjecture: A Research Note on Civil War and News Coverage

How news coverage is affected by dangerous security environments is an important issue for political scientists who rely upon journalistic accounts of political events. It is also a controversial issue in the policy arena. In June of 2004, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz attributed the American public’s pessimism regarding U.S. efforts at stabilizing Iraq to the manner in which Iraq was covered by the U.S. media, suggesting that journalists in Iraq were holed up in hotels rather than in the field. This statement was conjecture, but if there is indeed a link between news coverage and violence, then this would be important for social scientists to understand. In this article, I probe this link by examining how conflict intensity and journalist deaths affect both the volume and length of news coverage in civil wars from 1992 to 1999. This paper shows that news coverage is largely unaffected by violence, except in the most extreme circumstances.

On Estimating Post-Cold War Enemy Intentions

In the winter 1978 issue of International Security, Raymond L. Garthoff authored a seminal article outlining common fallacies in United States government estimates of enemy intentions during the Cold War. Now, given the significant changes in threat over the past 30 years, it seems appropriate to take a fresh look at fallacies – evaluating old ones and introducing new ones – in enemy intentions estimates pertaining to post-Cold War (and post-9/11) security dangers. Based on its assessment, this article concludes that the challenges to accurate intelligence assessment of enemy intentions, and the need to move away from dysfunctional standard operating procedures, have never been higher.

Seatbelt Use among Military Personnel during Operational Deployment

This study analyzed the wearing of seatbelts among British Forces personnel in Iraq and explored the various factors that prevented their use. Questionnaires were administered to 237 British Forces personnel in southern Iraq from December 2003 to January 2004. Data analysis was by percentages. A total of 78% of respondents knew the seatbelt regulations (i.e., to wear seatbelts always). Respondents perceived the biggest threats to driving to be bad roads, speeding, security dangers, and Iraqi drivers. Seatbelt usage by drivers was 52% always, 25% sometimes, and 22% never. This was similar to usage by front seat passengers (52%, 27%, and 21%, respectively). The main reasons for not wearing seatbelts for drivers and front seat passengers were inhibition of exit and weapons. A total of 66% of back seat passengers in Land Rovers never wore seatbelts. The wearing of seatbelts is mandatory. The Ministry of Defence seatbelt policy is clear and is understood by most service personnel. However, this study shows a disparity between awareness regarding the mandatory use of seatbelts and actual use. Soldiers perceive the use of seatbelts as restrictive in a hostile environment. More effective education is needed and should emphasize the importance of seatbelt usage even in hostile areas such as Iraq.

What They Think of Us

22 Historically Speaking March/April 2007 needs a big idea. Empires have another potentially beneficial value: they can nurture group tolerance, granting religious pluralism or a special role for diasporas: they also allow for enclaves of autonomy within their extensive spatial domains. They often welcome immigrants , especially those from the peripheries that they dominate. North Africans, Pakistanis, and Latinos have flowed into the countries that have often dominated diem. Nation-states often impose greater conformity on their peoples than do empires. The imperial syndrome also involves a particular relationship of rulers to ruled. An imperial regime searches not for discussion and deliberation, but for approval and acclamation. It measures popularity . The media replace parliamentary debate, and if there is any symptom of empire, it is the attrition of representative bodies. Perhaps they are formally kept in being—even Hider preserved a mock Reichstag . But government by debate loses its integrity and capacity. Granted, these tendencies afflict modern democracies in general, especially when they face complex social choices. Indeed, the attrition of legislative procedures in a democracy usually arises from the complexity of issues; in a proto-imperial situation it results as a response to alleged security dangers. Parliamentary delegates accept the executive 's diagnosis of danger rather than risk being seen as antipatriotic. They pass blanket delegations of power. And even if they insist on legislation, the executive claims the right to interpret the laws that they might pass. Popularity becomes the ultimate measure . If rulers fail in their enterprises, they can lose popularity very quickly. But until public opinion turns adverse, acclamation, photo-ops, spectacular games, and staged pageants replace debate. There are exceptions: rule by committee or by party can continue, as it did in die French Third Republic. But even here the issues that define empire and foreign policy are withdrawn from the arena of debate and discussion. Empire, like authoritarian government more generally, involves the rule of the exception: there is always an exceptional danger that defines imperial politics. The imperial syndrome embodies Carl Schmitt's notion that he who controls the exception in effect controls even democratic politics. The imperial syndrome involves a rampant growth of privilege and inequality that corrupts civic spirit. Empires can be democratic at home—the British expanded the suffrage as they expanded their empire; the French Third Republic was Europe's most democratic regime and it conquered Vietnam and Morocco—but empires cannot let their subject peoples share the same democratic ground rules. And even as they may extend formal equality, and even income equality, toward the bottom, they give die top immense new opportunities for enrichment. This presents grave difficulties of judgment. If millions of middle-income families are each given a small tax rebate, while at the same time several thousand wealthy citizens can each reduce their bill by tens of thousands or more, the redistribution may increase formal measures of equality. But who can doubt which distribution has a greater impact on civic participation? And this is the transaction that the imperial syndrome usually involves: not robbing the poor to pay the rich, although the periphery may be despoiled to pay the center, but fobbing off the humble so that privilege becomes more and more spectacular. For a while, public games, reality TV, philanthropy, and the admirable but hardly taxing charitable deeds of those enriched may counteract the emergence of populist class politics. How long that will last is not at all clear. Let me return to the initial question: Is America an empire? Does it diminish historical understanding , when asked whedier die U.S. is an empire, to say that it has come to behave (at least in recent years and perhaps decades) like an empire and exhibits the syndrome of empire? As a political and moral challenge , perhaps even more than an epistemological one, we must take the current analog of empire very seriously. Charles S. Maier is the Leverett Saltonstall Professor of History at Harvard University. His most recent book is Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors (Harvard University Press, 2006). 1 I am not trained as a philosopher and the philosophical problems of analogy are difficult. But for some recent discussions I...

High Hopes and Limited Prospects: Washington's Security and Nation-Building Aims in Afghanistan

Four years have passed since the United States and allied governments toppled the Taliban in Afghanistan and began security and nation-building operations. Despite the continuing deployment of thousands of Western troops and the expenditure of billions of dollars in foreign aid, current conditions in Afghanistan are perilous. Poverty is rampant, the drug trade has shown no sign of decline, warlords remain in power, and the Taliban continues to confront US and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation forces. With the US preparing to reduce its troop presence in 2006 and NATO poised to deploy forces into Afghanistan's dangerous southern provinces, Western security and nation-building efforts are at risk of failure.

Preventive Force in US National Security Strategy

The Bush administration's 2002 National Security Strategy touched off a vigorous debate in the United States and abroad, which intensified with the war in Iraq, over what appeared to be a novel, broad assertion of the right to use force to prevent latent threats from emerging, particularly threats associated with terrorism and nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. But the use of preventive force – and the debate over its legality and wisdom – predate the Bush administration's post-11 September 2001 strategy. A careful examination of the history, rationale, costs and benefits of using preventive force suggests that, while rare, preventive force has a legitimate role to play in tackling some of the most dangerous security problems facing the United States and the wider international community.

New Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security

Despite growing concerns after September 11, 2001, over the global terrorist threat and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, international security no longer hinges only on arms control and the prevention of war. Nonmilitary concerns, including emerging infectious diseases, environmental degradation, demographic trends, and humanitarian catastrophes, also represent significant threats to global stability. In this book, leading analysts offer an overview of critical security dangers facing the world today.The book looks first at the relationship between weapons and security, discussing such aspects of proliferation as nuclear entrepreneurship in Russia and the threat of biological warfare. It then examines nonmilitary security concerns, including resource scarcity, migration, HIV/AIDS in Africa, and why humanitarian assistance sometimes does more harm than good. Finally, it looks at the role of transnational actors, including terrorist groups, nongovernmental organizations, and the privatized military industry.

Nuclear-Armed North Korea and South Korea's Strategic Countermeasures

North Korea’s nuclear crisis is the most dangerous security threat South Korea has faced since the Korean War and is likely to serve as a turning point that can trigger a structural change in the status quo of the Korean peninsula. To the North Korean regime, nuclear weapons are a critical military element that can be used as a threat to dominate South Korea in the two countries’ rivalry and as a last resort to guarantee the regime’s survival and continuity. This paper first discusses capability and strategic implications of a nuclear-armed North Korea. The paper then examines the positions of the ROK and the United States on how to view and deal with North Korea’s nuclear crisis and highlights the differences of the two sides’ approaches. Finally, as a main argument of this paper, it is proposed that the South Korean government should adopt a new strategic paradigm in order to bring the North Korea nuclear problem to a final conclusion. The new approach maintains that it is time for the ROK to launch a strategy integrating coercion and inducement rather than sticking to the one-dimensional carrot‐only strategy. Three strategic countermeasures and related policy options are proposed to the South Korean government. In particular, this paper emphasizes the importance of being prepared for North Korea’s nuclear weapons in the military and security dimensions. 49

Human Trafficking: The Nadir of an Unholy Trinity

Terrorism, corruption, and international organized crime, a very “unholy trinity,” which globalization has at once enabled and encouraged, represent the most dangerous security threats to the developing democracies of Europe and the Eurasian region. While neither as lethal as the first order effects of terrorism, nor as corrosive to one’s confidence in government as state corruption, international organized crime’s trafficking of human beings can destroy the very “soul” of a state. Human trafficking – the commodification of human beings – represents a modern form of slavery, exploits and ruins women, and can kill. No nation can unilaterally defend itself against this threat.

Challenges and opportunities for humanitarian relief in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is in the midst of a profound humanitarian crisis resulting primarily from long-standing armed conflict, a devastating drought, and massive population migration. The economy, government, and health care system are in shambles. Currently, as many as 5 million Afghans are in camps either as refugees in neighboring countries or as internally displaced persons within Afghanistan. Much of the rest of the population is in dire need of basic essentials such as food, water, shelter, and basic medical care. Those attempting to carry out humanitarian relief face many daunting challenges, such as reaching remote locations, coping with a dangerous security situation, and working with limited resources. However, there are opportunities in the short run to save many lives and substantially improve the plight of Afghans by carrying out appropriate and effective emergency relief programs. Over the long term, effective medical and public health relief efforts will be an essential part of rehabilitating and rebuilding this devastated country.

National Missile Defence Revisited, Again

DAVID MUTIMER'S RESPONSE TO MY ARTICLE is a step in the right direction, although proponents and critics of NMD are still not fully engaged in constructive dialogue. Unfortunately, it falls well short of addressing the many logical errors and contradictions I describe in my article. Mutimer spends far too much time explaining why critics have some 'right' to protection from response to my arguments - one might ask why they need protection - and far too little time addressing the fundamental weaknesses of the critics' case. I respond here to Mutimer's five main arguments.(f.1)SHARING THE BURDEN (S) OF PROOF'The first and most important is that Harvey's argument reverses the of ... the clear implication of his article is that critics must make the case against NMD, or forward it should go' (p 332). The 'burden-of-proof' thesis is Mutimer's central tenet, important enough to be repeated throughout the article. Since its primary purpose is to justify his decision to avoid my arguments, I will address the thesis head-on. I hope this will prevent other critics from using the same excuse.There are at least three fundamental problems with Mutimer's line of argument. First, in applying the burden-of-proof analogy he misrepresents the prosecution and the defence. According to critics, proponents of NMD are guilty of one or more of six crimes: i) fabricating rogue state and other proliferation threats, ii) creating a dangerous security environment that threatens to destroy decades of arms control agreements, iii) producing yet another destabilizing arms race, iv) wasting at least $60 billion for an illegal defence system prohibited by the ABM treaty, v) lying about whether NMD technology has (or will ever) work, and vi) doing all of this to save an outdated military industrial complex from disappearing after the cold war. If the critics could prove that the evidence they have compiled is true, then supporters of NMD would be guilty as charged - indeed, NMD would deserve nothing less than the death penalty. But, if proponents are the defence in this case, doesn't the burden of proof lie with the prosecuting critics? Don't they have an obligation to establish the charges underlying their case? My defence of NMD includes a long list of logical errors and empirical flaws in the critics' arguments. If this were a court of law any competent judge and jury would throw the case out of court if the prosecution decided to ignore the problems with their case.But the debate is not taking place in a court of law, and we are not lawyers defending clients in a criminal case. This leads to the second serious flaw. The last thing academics should do in the midst of such an important policy debate is to recreate the problems that plague the legal profession. Getting off on a 'technicality' associated with 'default' positions (whatever they are) should never be considered an option. Whose 'understanding of debate' is Mutimer referring to here? How exactly did he arrive at his conclusion that 'the responsibility for making the case for the proposal rests with those proposing it.' Meanwhile, critics need not suffer the burden of proving their case against, as if these two sides of the debate are somehow separable. When were critics given the legal or constitutional right to refuse to respond to questions on the grounds that their answers might incriminate them? How, one might ask, should I defend NMD against these charges? Well, by pointing to major weaknesses in the critics' case, by establishing evidence of ballistic missile proliferation (the security problem NMD is designed to address), and by demonstrating that, in comparison to alternatives, NMD is a more secure, effective, and cost-efficient approach to the problem. And how, one might ask, should critics make the case against? By addressing the problems with their arguments, by establishing that ballistic missile proliferation is not a serious problem, and/or by demonstrating how their alternatives to NMD offer more secure, effective, and cost-efficient strategies for dealing with the problem of ballistic missile proliferation. …

From car bombs to logic bombs: The growing threat from information terrorism

The vulnerability of the critical infrastructure has led to increasing concern that it will be the target of terrorist attacks. This article explores definitional aspects of information terrorism and identifies two groups likely to find information terrorism attractive: conventional terrorist groups and information culture groups. As computer sophisticated youth move into the ranks of conventional terrorist groups, the groups will increase their reliance on computer technology, and information terrorism will be incorporated into a hybrid tactical repertoire. Information culture groups, however, confine their attacks to cyberspace. In contrast to the powerful group dynamics of the traditional underground terrorist group, networked groups, particularly information culture terrorists, may only be in contact electronically, and are subject to a radically different group psychology, virtual group dynamics, that significantly affects their decision making and risk taking, and has dangerous security implications.

U.S. interests in the Caspian Sea Basin

The Caspian Sea's vast energy wealth offers the industrialized world a vital new source of oil in the next century of exploding global oil demand. Caspian oil also has magnified the post‐Soviet competition for influence among Turkey, Russia, and Iran in Transcaucasia and Central Asia. The United States has failed to recognize what is at stake in the struggle for oil and influence in the Caspian Sea Basic, thus contributing to the rise of a potentially dangerous security environment in the region. The United States must articulate a new, more proactive policy toward the Caspian states aimed at promoting free access to regional energy reserves and encouraging cooperation rather than confrontation among rival powers.

Security threats are usually an inside job.

Although most health care providers fear the unnamed backer, the real risk of computer security danger lies in the hands of seemingly innocuous or harmless individuals within the institution. Creating information security from the inside out is the key to ensuring privacy and confidentiality.