Secure Message Transmission Schemes Research Articles

Secure Message Transmission for V2V Based on Mutual Authentication for VANETs

The advancements in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) require more intelligent security protocols that ultimately provide unbreakable security to vehicles and other components of VANETs. VANETs face various types of security pitfalls due to the openness characteristics of the VANET communication infrastructure. Researchers have recently proposed different mutual authentication schemes that address security and privacy issues in vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication. However, some V2V security schemes suffer from inadequate design and are hard to implement practically. In addition, some schemes face vehicle traceability and lack anonymity. Hence, this paper’s primary goal is to enhance privacy preservation through mutual authentication and to achieve better security and performance. Therefore, this article first describes the vulnerabilities of a very recent authentication scheme presented by Vasudev et al. Our analysis proves that the design of Vasudev et al.’s scheme is incorrect, and resultantly, the scheme does not provide mutual authentication between a vehicle and vehicle server when multiple vehicles are registered with the vehicle sever. Furthermore, this paper proposes a secure message transmission scheme for V2V in VANETs. The proposed scheme fulfills the security and performance requirements of VANETs. The security analysis of the proposed scheme using formal BAN and informal discussion on security features confirm that the proposed scheme fulfills the security requirements, and the performance comparisons show that the proposed scheme copes with the lightweightness requirements of VANETs.

Secure message transmission scheme in wireless sensor networks

Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have been the subject of intensive research in the past few years and the backbone of most maximum present information technology. WSNs have been employed in various applications such as track monitoring battlegrounds in military fields and patients’ medical requirements in the civilian field. The wireless sensor networks are always randomly distributed in an open area (hostile), pervasive environment, and open media channel. Thus, WSNs are vulnerable to several species of attacks. Moreover, messages may be easily intercepted or altered because the transmission is not secure, hence effective key management scheme is strongly needed to reduce the risks. Cryptography methods are a crucial aspect of WSNs to reach security goals. In this paper, we propose an efficient and secure message transmission scheme that combines the Knapsack algorithm with the Diffie-Hellmann process to encrypt messages. The results and analysis show that the proposed scheme is efficient and it achieves most of the security goals providing high privacy and security. It is also resilient against some of the well-known attacks.

General Error Decodable Secret Sharing Scheme and Its Application

Consider a model of secret sharing schemes with cheaters. We say that a secret sharing scheme is error decodable if we can still recover the secret <i xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">s</i> correctly from a noisy share vector (share <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">1</sub> ', ..., share <i xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">n</i> '). In this paper, we first prove that a perfect secret sharing scheme is error decodable if and only if the adversary structure Γ satisfies a certain condition called <i xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">Q</i> <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">3</sup> . Next, for such Γ , we show a scheme such that the decoding algorithm runs in polynomial-time in | <i xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">S</i> | and the size of a linear secret sharing scheme which realizes Γ. We finally show an application to 1-round perfectly secure message transmission schemes (PSMT).

Round-efficient perfectly secure message transmission scheme against general adversary

In the model of Perfectly Secure Message Transmission Schemes (PSMTs), there are n channels between a sender and a receiver, and they share no key. An infinitely powerful adversary A can corrupt (observe and forge) the messages sent through some subset of n channels. For non-threshold adversaries called Q 2, Kumar et al. showed a many round PSMT (Ashwin Kumar et al. On perfectly secure communication over arbitrary networks. PODC 2002, pp. 193---202, 2002). In this paper, we show round efficient PSMTs against Q 2-adevrsaries. We first give a 3-round PSMT which runs in polynomial time in the size of the underlying linear secret sharing scheme. We next present a 2-round PSMT which is inefficient in general. (However, it is efficient for some special case.)

Almost Secure (1-Round, n-Channel) Message Transmission Scheme

It is known that perfectly secure (1-round, n-channel) message transmission (MT) schemes exist if and only if n ≥ 3t + 1, where t is the number of channels that the adversary can corrupt. Then does there exist an almost secure MT scheme for n = 2t + 1 ? In this paper, we first sum up a number flaws of the previous almost secure MT scheme presented at Crypto 2004 . We next show an equivalence between almost secure MT schemes and secret sharing schemes with cheaters. By using our equivalence, we derive a lower bound on the communication complexity of almost secure MT schemes. Finally, we present a near optimum scheme which meets our bound approximately. This is the first construction of provably secure almost secure (1-round, n-channel) MT schemes for n = 2t + 1.