Secular Stagnation Hypothesis Research Articles

Does the old-age dependency ratio place a drag on secular growth?

The secular stagnation hypothesis suggests that population aging (65+) places a drag on long-run growth, but this assertion remains a matter of debate. To address this issue, we use a panel of OECD countries for the years 1975–2014 to estimate the relationship between the old-age dependency ratio (population 65+/population 15–64) and secular growth (10- and 20-year intervals). Our empirical evidence clearly shows that the old-age dependency ratio has a negative effect on growth, confirming the demographic implications of the secular stagnation hypothesis. We also propose an overlapping generations model that explains this pattern in the data. Within this framework, optimizing households invest in their children's human capital and save for retirement. We show that an increase in the old-age dependency ratio reduces productivity through a reduction in human and physical capital as more resources are transferred to the elderly. This reduction in productivity results in slower growth and secular stagnation.

Samuelson's last macroeconomic model: Secular stagnation and endogenous cyclical growth

On the occasion of the centennial of his mentor Alvin Hansen, Paul Samuelson published in 1988 a modified version of his seminal 1939 multiplier-accelerator model to address aspects of Hansen's secular stagnation hypothesis. The “Keynes-Hansen-Samuelson” model (or KHS, as he called it) was built to analyse the effects of population growth on the economy's trajectory. Several changes were then made. Instead of difference equations and a tight accelerator, as in his 1939 model, Samuelson deployed differential equations and a flexible accelerator to produce a nonlinear limit cycle. Despite Samuelson's strong claims for the analytical contributions of his 1988 paper, it has – in contrast with the 1939 model – received only scant attention by macroeconomists and historians of economics alike. Samuelson's 1988 paper was his last published macroeconomic model, based on his long-established tradition of non-optimising macro-dynamics. Our paper provides a close reading of that article and some analytical results that shed new light on the formal aspects of Samuelson's 1988 model. We also discuss how it historically links up with business cycle models advanced by John Hicks, Nicholas Kaldor, Roy Harrod and Richard Goodwin and examine how far Samuelson's use of the term secular stagnation differs from Larry Summers's recent reconstruction of it.

Population Dynamics, Migration, and the Secular Stagnation Hypothesis

Population Dynamics, Migration, and the Secular Stagnation Hypothesis

Does the Secular Stagnation hypothesis match the data? Evidence from the USA

This paper focusses on Secular Stagnation in the United States. It answers to two research questions. First: is Secular Stagnation a fact? Second: conditional to the previous reply, how does the literature meet the qualitative and quantitative evidence? I focus on historical annual data related to the USA from 1870 onwards. The contribution to the debate is manifold. Firstly, I provide a careful systematization of the concept and explain why this definition is crucial for the topic analysis. Secondly, I talk about Secular Stagnation in terms of labor and multifactor productivity growth: their decline since the 1970s is not comparable to any previous shortfall. Thirdly, the definition allows to evaluate whether present-day debates on the phenomenon are supported by data, but it also lets to disentangle the most relevant channels through which Secular Stagnation emerges. Therefore, I carry out a comparative validation exercise on the different lines of thought. Finally, as long as Secular Stagnation is confirmed as empirical evidence, also policy implications can be drawn from the different theoretical frameworks. Despite the several contrasting approaches and viewpoints, I trace out a complementary in policy implications.

More age, less growth? Secular stagnation and societal ageing

PurposeThe aim of the study is to demonstrate evidence that societal ageing and poor economic growth are linked in the advanced economies. It challenges the claim however that secular stagnation represents a serious problem for future prosperity.Design/methodology/approachThis paper critically reviews recent formulations of the secular stagnation hypothesis concerning stalled economic growth in the advanced economies and the links between demographic ageing and economic slowdown. It outlines both trends (of ageing and stalled growth) and reviews some of the key empirical studies that have sought to determine the role played by demographic change in accounting for the relative lack of growth in the advanced economies.FindingsThe advanced economies are ageing and their economic growth is slowing, although a causal link between these two phenomena remains unproven. However, even if no direct causal link can be drawn between these two processes the focus upon the impact of societal ageing serves as a stimulus to re-think the nature of future growth in our increasingly ageing and unequal societies.Research limitations/implicationsWhile the measurement of demographic trends is relatively straightforward, there are more problems in specifying the exact parameters of macroeconomic growth. This makes empirical studies in the area difficult to interpret. However studies in this area have value in widening thinking about the role of ageing and the nature of growth in the future.Practical implicationsRather than fearing the prospect of an age related slowdown in the rate of growth in the advanced economies, these developments offer opportunities to focus upon redistribution more than growth, while supporting a programme of growth with equity in the world's developing economies.Social implicationsWhile a demographically over-determined model of the secular stagnation hypothesis is dubious, the future ageing of the advanced economies is certainly a challenge. It is also an opportunity for rethinking ideas about ageing, growth and development. Adopting such a more nuanced perspective offers a counter-narrative to the demographic catastrophising that is often evident when discussing 'societal ageing'. It also suggests the value of shifting the perspective of seeking ever increasing growth toward a greater focus upon redistribution, between and within the generations.Originality/valueThere has been very little engagement with the secular stagnation hypothesis outside economics. Behind its macroeconomic formulation, however, lie assumptions about the ageing of society that can easily become examples of unwarranted demographic catastrophising. By bringing this topic to the attention of the social sciences, the paper can serve as a stimulus for rethinking both ageing and growth.

Secular Stagnation as a Result of Economic Maturity or Deepening Underdevelopment?

In this article, we critique the secular stagnation hypothesis and offer an alternative theoretical framework capable of more fully explaining the current economic trajectory of developing countries: falling interest rates, asset price deflation, and falling investment.

Hansenova i Samersova hipoteza o sekularnoj stagnaciji u makroekonomiji

At a times when the world's most developed and those less developed economies are recording historically weak levels of economic performance after the Great Recession of 2008, when the world is facing decades of low demographic growth, in the frames of macroeconomic theory Summers revives the discussion about Hansen's once-debated and forgotten "old" secular stagnation hypothesis through a "new" secular stagnation hypothesis. Consequently, the subject of research in this paper are Hansen's "old" and Summers' "new" secular stagnation hypotheses, which together belong to Keynesian theories of stagnation and are based on the demand-side causes. The aim of this paper is to analyze, present and explain the key determinants of the observed instances in macroeconomic theory, trying to contribute to contemporary economic theory in terms of a critical analysis of the secular stagnation hypothesis of the two most important theoretical points of view in the macroeconomic thought.

Contagion Impact and Safe Asset Shortages: Implications for Secular Stagnation

This paper investigates the contagiousness of safe asset shortages as an implication of the secular stagnation hypothesis. Our motivation is to quantify the degree of financial contagion of safe asset demand among developed and emerging markets. We know that the insufficient supply of safe assets in developed economies led to increasing demand for risky EM Bonds. However, lower yields might not be observed in Emerging Economies due to expected inflation. To investigate this idea, we proxied expected inflation via a new variable called the Marginal Impact of Inflation (MII). Our dataset consists of 2-year and 10-year generic government yields, and we analyzed the reaction of developed and emerging economies to the United States and the United Kingdom’s safe asset demand. Our findings confirm that demand for US and UK safe assets shows the contagious impact for Developed Economies, not for Emerging Economies. Additionally, longer yields show stronger statistical evidence than shorter yields, as suggested by the secular stagnation hypothesis. According to empirical results, expected inflation is statistically insignificant for long-term and short-term yields for emerging economies. Thus, we can conclude that the Secular Stagnation Hypothesis is the problem of Developed Economies rather than Emerging Economies in that manner.

The Case against the New "Secular Stagnation Hypothesis"

The new “secular stagnation hypothesis” developed by Lawrence H. Summers attempts to justify why the demand stimulus applied in the aftermath of the global financial crisis failed to revive growth in a satisfactory manner. Building on previous ideas of Keynes, Hansen, and Bernanke, Summers claims that excess savings together with feeble investment drove the natural rate of interest down to zero and advanced economies into stagnation. As the US monetary policy rate is not allowed to fall below the zero bound, Summers calls for “quantitative easing” and more expansionary fiscal policy to spur investment demand. This paper refutes Summers’s hypothesis by revealing its internal inconsistencies and presenting both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on the long-term evolution of savings, investment, productivity, and capital stock. It also estimates the natural rate of interest following the approach of Salerno (2020), which is further refined based on Rothbard’s “pure interest rate” theory. The calculation shows that the natural interest rate did not drop to zero after the global financial crisis, but has actually remained consistently and significantly above the federal funds rate and the bank loan prime rate. This not only invalidates Summers’s central claim, but confirms once more the explanatory power of the Austrian business cycle theory in relation to the main trigger of the global financial crisis and its subsequent unfinished recovery.

The Secular Stagnation Hypothes is and the Future of Europe’s Advanced Economies

The secular stagnation hypothesis originated in the late 1930s when Alvin Hansen proposed that the American economy will experience a prolonged depression because of the slowdown in demographics. Widely discussed in the aftermath of the Great Depression, interest in this hypothesis has waned as the world entered a period of rapid economic growth after World War II. In the years following the Great Recession, the secular stagnation hypothesis has once again come to the forefront of economic research when Lawrence Summers introduced the so‑called “new secular stagnation hypothesis.” This article aims to establish whether the secular stagnation hypothesis is relevant to the future of Europe’s advanced economies. Two main symptoms of secular stagnation (demographic slowdown and decline in the natural rate of interest) are especially noticeable in Western Europe. The article has three parts. Part one contains a theoretical overview of the secular stagnation hypothesis. Part two comprises the empirical analysis of the macroeconomic situation in selected advanced economies in Europe and a short review of findings in the literature on the natural rate of interest. Part three identifies possible future problems and provides brief policy recommendations. I conclude that Italy, and to a lesser degree, Spain and Germany, are the countries most vulnerable to secular stagnation.

Consumer Motivation in Developed Economies With Secular Stagnation.

In recent years, the slow pace of economic growth, high indebtedness, and high unemployment registered in most developed economies since 2009 have revived the debate over the “secular stagnation hypothesis” first formulated by the Keynesian economist Alvin Hansen in 1938. This return of the secular stagnation hypothesis occurred in November 2013, when Lawrence Summers postulated that the global economy was facing a scenario of low growth, low inflation, and a reduction in GDP per capita due to a chronic insufficiency of aggregate demand. The causes should be sought not only in cyclical factors associated with a long financial cycle and excessive accumulated public and private debt, but also in structural changes in the central economies in recent decades, linked to the rapid slowdown in population growth and the gradual aging of the population. Finally, other factors also depress demand, such as the progressive exhaustion of the globalization process and the consolidation of new labor models. In light of these developments, this paper’s aim is twofold: first, to perform an econometric panel-data study in order to determine the influence of each of these factors in explaining secular stagnation in recent years for the selected sample of countries; and, second, to lay out proposals for reorienting the government intervention strategies adopted since the onset of the financial crisis to promote consumption and achieve sustained growth, job creation, and poverty reduction.

Aging, Output Per Capita, and Secular Stagnation

This paper re-examines the relationship between population aging and economic growth. We confirm previous research such as Cutler et al. (1990) and Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017) that show positive correlation between population aging and per capita output growth. Our contribution is demonstrating that this relationship breaks down when the adjustment of interest rates is inhibited by a lower bound on nominal rates, as during the Great Financial Crisis decade. Indeed, during the “secular stagnation regime” of 2008–2015 that prevailed in a number of countries, aging had a negative impact on living standards, consistent with the secular stagnation hypothesis. (JEL E23, E32, E43, G01, I31, J14)

Monetary Policy and Unnatural Low Interest Rates: Secular Stagnation or Financial Repression?

AbstractMarket interest rates have been on a declining trend over the past 35 years in all advanced economies, even reaching negative territory in some European jurisdictions. This article reviews two competing explanations for the occurrence of unnatural low interest rates. The secular stagnation hypothesis of Keynesian origin maintains that persistent non-monetary factors have caused a structural excess of desired savings over planned investments which steadily pushed down the equilibrium real interest rate that is consistent with a balanced economy. Major central banks in turn failed to sufficiently lower their monetary policy rates to revive aggregate demand, leading to anaemic economic recoveries and hysteresis effects. By contrast, the financial repression doctrine argues that central banks pursued low interest rates to ease the government budget constraint and serve political objectives. The Austrian School of Economics states that this monetary easing bias sowed the seeds of repeated boom/bust cycles and created economic distortions that dragged down potential growth and the equilibrium real interest rate. The core of the debate appears to be the long-standing controversy about the desirable role for the state in guiding the economy on a higher potential growth path as opposed to relying on the efficiency of market processes in generating prosperity.

Common Ownership and the Secular Stagnation Hypothesis

We extend the model in Azar and Vives (2018) to allow for investment and show that higher effective market concentration (augmented by common ownership) leads to lower equilibrium wages, real interest rates, lower output, lower labor share, and lower capital share as well (under a mild condition). We calibrate a multisector sector model of the US economy and find that the rise in common ownership may account for the broad evolution of labor and capital shares in the period 1985-2015 while measured increases in concentration cannot (under plausible values for elasticity parameters).

Goodbye grey skies? 2018's global shocks may be fading

▀ It may be premature to declare the onset of happy days for the global economy, but our trawl through the various drivers of weakness over the last year or so suggests the worst is behind us. ▀ Our lengthy list of lifting clouds is led by China, where policy stimulus is showing signs of boosting lending, but there are other sources of optimism too. The eurozone's run of bad luck may be turning, and there are reasons for optimism on trade wars. Plenty of 2018's bad news was interconnected and centred around adverse global financial conditions, US dollar strength and very tough external conditions for EM. These have reversed in Q1 2019 amid receding fears that global inflation is set to surge. ▀ But we are not yet proclaiming hello to blue skies. After all, recent shocks – good or bad – should on average fade over time. The context is one of weakening trend growth (we are partial believers in the secular stagnation hypothesis) and of pockets of weakness in global balance sheets, including in China. ▀ And we see three conspicuous potentially negative drivers for the global economy. First, there is the fading impact of the US fiscal boost. Second, there is a small probability that some of the ongoing negatives – such as trade wars – could blow up into something very nasty. Third, there is a possibility that negative momentum from past and ongoing shocks may push weakness into Q2 and beyond. ▀ But on balance, all of this adds up to a receding risk of global recession. We now attach a 20% probability to a fall in advanced economy GDP per capita over the next two years, down from 25% previously. Our increased optimism is based on (i) the analysis in this article, (ii) our growing confidence that soft landings are attainable and (iii) our assessment that late‐cycle vulnerabilities may be overstated.

Short-run effects of lower productivity growth. A twist on the secular stagnation hypothesis

Since 2010, U.S. GDP growth has been anemic, averaging 2.1% a year, and this despite interest rates very close to zero. Historically, one would have expected such low sustained rates to lead to much stronger demand. They have not. For some time, one could point to plausible culprits, from a weak financial system to fiscal consolidation. But, as time passed, the financial system strengthened, fiscal consolidation came to an end, and still growth did not pick up. We argue that this is due, in large part, not to legacies of the past but to lower optimism about the future, more specifically to downward revisions in forecast potential growth. Put simply, the anticipation of a less bright future is leading to temporarily weaker demand. If our explanation is correct, it has important implications for policy and for forecasts. It may weaken the case for secular stagnation, as it suggests that the need for very low interest rates may be partly temporary.

Bubbles in a Secular Stagnation Economy

The global fall in interest rates in recent decades has raised the possibility of a negative natural rate of interest. The secular stagnation hypothesis argues that a negative natural rate of interest is the underlying cause of the Great Recession. In this paper I demonstrate the role of bubbles in secular stagnation. Bubbles increase the natural rate of interest, hence they alleviate the cause of secular stagnation. This suggests a positive role for bubbles, however bubbles are intrinsically unstable. Larger bubbles are shown to be more unstable, and upon collapse the natural rate of interest falls, potentially triggering secular stagnation.

Secular stagnation: What the debate is about?

In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the recovery in economic activity has been weak and much of the academic and policy discussions seek to explain this sluggish growth. This literature review presents how the secular stagnation hypothesis re-emerged in 2013 and evolved over time. It identifies its key tenets, its most contentious points and its most important critiques. Secular stagnation has different interpretations, which complicates the debate, and the objective of this paper is to clarify the demarcation lines between various theories and to show how some of them amalgamated over time. The secular stagnation hypothesis links weak growth to a decline in natural interest rates. Most observers agree that natural interest rates have indeed declined over the past decade and may be in negative territory. However, there are diverging views about the factors which led to negative interest rates and how lasting their impact is likely to be. The secular stagnation hypothesis points to various fundamental factors and suggests a long-term effect, while the global savings glut and debt super-cycle concepts assume only a temporary impact and anticipate that global economic growth and real interest rates will eventually rebound.

A Model of Secular Stagnation: Theory and Quantitative Evaluation

This paper formalizes and quantifies the secular stagnation hypothesis, defined as a persistently low or negative natural rate of interest leading to a chronically binding zero lower bound (ZLB). Output-inflation dynamics and policy prescriptions are fundamentally different from those in the standard New Keynesian framework. Using a 56-period quantitative life cycle model, a standard calibration to US data delivers a natural rate ranging from − 1.5 percent to − 2 percent, implying an elevated risk of ZLB episodes for the foreseeable future. We decompose the contribution of demographic and technological factors to the decline in interest rates since 1970 and quantify changes required to restore higher rates. (JEL E12, E23, E31, E32, E43, E52)

Delving into the Secular Stagnation Hypothesis: A Firm-Level Analysis of the Private Sector’s Excess Savings in Advanced Economies

We document a persistent increase in excess savings (defined as the difference between gross savings and capital formation) and a steady decline of gross capital formation in a sample of non-financial firms from developed countries. These patterns developed even before the financial breakdown of 2007 reinforcing the case for a secular stagnation hypothesis. They go along with a deleveraging process and a decrease in the share of operating assets in total assets. We discuss three possible explanations for this long-term behavior: financial constraints, operative volatility, and the weakening of business dynamism itself.