Sector-specific Rules Research Articles

Success and Risks Related to Housing Projects in Pakistan: A Moderating Role of Project Management Risk Management

This study investigates the critical success factors (CSFs) and their interplay with project risks in determining the success of housing projects in Karachi, Pakistan, while considering the moderating role of risk management. Analyzing data from 432 project management professionals within Karachi-based housing societies, the study establishes significant relationships between CSFs and various project success dimensions, including time, cost, quality, project profile objectives, impact, stakeholder satisfaction, and preparation for the future. Additionally, the research reveals that project risks exert substantial influence on these success dimensions. Risk management is a strong moderator, increasing risk variable’s influence on project results. The findings provide insightful information for decision-makers, recommending the creation of sector-specific rules that place a strong emphasis on the highest standards in risk management and project execution. The construction industry benefits from this since it encourages long-term development and leads to better results for projects.

SHIPBREAKING IN PAKISTAN – THE NEED FOR ALIGNING WITH GLOBAL INSTRUMENTS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Pakistan has been the largest shipbreaking country during the 1980s and is presently among three of the largest shipbreaking countries in the world; however, shipbreaking through the beaching method has so far not been properly regulated and is evident from several incidents from time to time taken place as a result of sheer lack of consideration for health & safety of the workers and the coastal environment. Toxins in the ship’s structure are harmful residue and are extremely dangerous to natural resources and employee wellness. Notwithstanding, it is volatile in terms of adding its share to the economic growth by providing opportunities to employ and supply solid iron steel to the rolling mills to meet the demand of the country’s construction sector. Environmentalists have shown their concerns, especially over countries to the global south where the beaching method is popular for breaking down obsolete vessels. Several global instruments have been introduced to curtail bad practices bringing about environmental and health issues. It will be assessed whether existing local instruments in Pakistan are responding to these issues effectively or whether there is a need for introducing more regulations, especially sector-specific, to align the viable sector according to global regulations to be able to get the share by competing with regional competitors like India and Bangladesh.
 Although in one form or another, there have been efforts on a global level to address the environmental, health, and safety issues, as several such conventions about it have taken place since 1907. The “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea” (UNCLOS), the London Dumping Convention and Protocol and the World Charter for Nature. A Preservation of the Ozone Layer at the Vienna Convention on, Transboundary transfer of hazardous wastes, in particular from industrialised nations to poor or less developed countries, was prohibited under the Montreal Protocol until the Basel Convention under the United Nations Environment Program (to which Pakistan is a member) went into force in 1992. In 2002, technical rules were adopted for the ecologically responsible handling of ships’ complete and partial disassembly. In 2009, the International Maritime Organization established the Hong Kong Convention to address environmental dangers and worker safety and health., while decommissioning the ship, but so far, these global instruments in Pakistan have not been inducted in the procedures through local regulations; therefore, this study investigates industry viability on efficient administration and adherence to international law instruments being introduced by European Union Regulations and Hong Kong Convention, in an attempt to overcome the shortfall of earlier regulations under United Nations agencies. The effective implementation of existing local laws and making of sector-specific rules and regulations is highly desirable to respond to the earliest compliance gaps on the safe and environmentally sound dismantling of uneconomical ships. An analysis of the consistency of State legislation to respond to international legal instruments is recommended for the sustainable development of the ship-breaking industry in Pakistan.

A new impact assessment model to integrate space debris within the life cycle assessment-based environmental footprint of space systems

By analogy to conventional environmental impacts, the potential release of debris or generation of fragments can be considered as the emission of an environmental stressor damaging the orbital ‘natural’ resource which supports space activities. Hence, it appears relevant to integrate systematically the impact of the emission of debris on the orbital resource within the life cycle impact assessment (LCIA) step to broaden the scope of life cycle assessment (LCA) for space systems. The main objective of this article is to propose a set of characterization factors to compute the impact caused by the generation of debris within the orbital environment. To do so, the proposed approach follows the methodology of emission-related characterization models in LCIA. the characterization model enables to link the emission of debris and final economic damages to space activities through a complete impact pathway including the fate of debris in downstream orbital compartments, the exposure of targeted space objects to this debris, and the economic damage in case of collision between the debris and the space object. The model is computed for different compartments of the low earth orbit (LEO) region thanks to a discretization of the orbital environment. Results show that the potential damages are the highest for orbital compartments located in the orbital bands of altitude/inclination: 550–2000 km/52–54°, 1,200–2000 km/86–88°, 400–2000 km/96–100°, because of the downstream location of Starlink constellation, OneWeb constellation, and earth observation satellites, respectively. The proposed set of CFs can be used in the LCA of different space systems in order to include impacts and damages related to space debris, along with other environmental impacts. This original development fully in line with the standardized LCIA framework would have potential for further integration into harmonised sector-specific rules for the European space sector such as product environmental footprint category rules (PEFCR).

Smjernice u postlisabonskom europskom međunarodnom privatnom pravu

Smjernice u postlisabonskom europskom međunarodnom privatnom pravu

The effectiveness of the counter-cyclical loan-to-value regulation: Generic versus sector-specific rules

This paper considers the implications of the counter-cyclical loan-to-value (CcLTV) regulation in a setting where different types of borrowers from distinct sectors of the credit market co-exist. We consider two macro-prudential policy regimes, namely generic and sector-specific. We find that both regimes are more effective than the baseline regime (constant LTV ratios) in stabilising macroeconomic and financial stability, and welfare enhancing. Compared to the generic regime, the sector-specific regime delivers a higher degree of macroeconomic and financial stability. For both regimes there is a clear tradeoff between financial and macroeconomic stability, as the authority adjusts its preference between the two policy objectives. To enhance the effectiveness of the CcLTV regulation, we argue that the regulator should consider borrowers’ heterogeneity, and tailor the regulation according to the specific conditions of each sector of the credit market, rather than to the aggregate credit conditions.

COVID-19 contact tracing apps: a stress test for privacy, the GDPR, and data protection regimes.

Digital surveillance has played a key role in containing the COVID-19 outbreak in China, Singapore, Israel, and South Korea. Google and Apple recently announced the intention to build interfaces to allow Bluetooth contact tracking using Android and iPhone devices. In this article, we look at the compatibility of the proposed Apple/Google Bluetooth exposure notification system with Western privacy and data protection regimes and principles, including the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Somewhat counter-intuitively, the GDPR’s expansive scope is not a hindrance, but rather an advantage in conditions of uncertainty such as a pandemic. Its principle-based approach offers a functional blueprint for system design that is compatible with fundamental rights. By contrast, narrower, sector-specific rules such as the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and even the new California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), leave gaps that may prove difficult to bridge in the middle of an emergency.

The regulation of online political micro-targeting in Europe

In this paper, we examine how online political micro-targeting is regulated in Europe. While there are no specific rules on such micro-targeting, there are general rules that apply. We focus on three fields of law: data protection law, freedom of expression, and sector-specific rules for political advertising; for the latter we examine four countries. We argue that the rules in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) are necessary, but not sufficient. We show that political advertising, including online political micro-targeting, is protected by the right to freedom of expression. That right is not absolute, however. From a European human rights perspective, it is possible for lawmakers to limit the possibilities for political advertising. Indeed, some countries ban TV advertising for political parties during elections.

State Acquiescence or Connivance in the Wrongful Conduct of Third Parties in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights

This article examines the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights with regard to the acquiescence or connivance of states parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in the wrongful conduct of third states (which themselves may or may not be parties to the ECHR) or non-state actors. It discusses the origins of the acquiescence or connivance test in the Court’s case law, which is idiosyncratic and does not stem from general international law. The article also discusses the test’s legal nature, arguing that its conceptual basis remains unclear, and that the current state of the case law could support two theories. First, that acquiescence or connivance, as applied in the Court’s most recent cases, is an ECHR-specific rule of attribution of conduct, which deviates from the general rules of attribution in international law, as codified by the International Law Commission in its Articles on State Responsibility. The Articles themselves do allow for the possibility of sector-specific rules of state responsibility; Article 55 ASR, entitled lex specialis, thus provides that the Articles ‘do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of international law.’ One view of the Court’s acquiescence or connivance test is thus that it provides us with an example of a lex specialis rule of attribution of conduct in the sense of Article 55 ASR. The alternative view, however, is that the Court’s acquiescence or connivance jurisprudence would best be conceptually framed as an ECHR-specific theory of state complicity. Under such a framing, the state acquiescing or conniving in the wrongful conduct of a third party is being held responsible for the assistance it provides to that third party, rather than for the third party’s own conduct – in other words, the complicity rule is not necessarily an attributive one. While such a rule would arguably differ from the ILC’s general approach to wrongful state aiding and assisting in Article 16 ASR, it would not be an ECHR-specific rule of attribution, or at least it would not always operate with an attributive effect. I argue that such a conceptual framing would best accommodate human rights-specific needs while maintaining coherence with general international law. Even under such a framing, however, there are many aspects of the acquiescence or connivance test that require further clarification by the Court.

Slovak Telekom/Deutsche Telekom AG: The Interplay Between EU Competition Law and Sector Specific Rules in the Electronic Communications Sector

Abstract Case T-827/14, Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission, and Case T-851/14 Slovak Telekom a.s. v Commission, Judgments of 13 December 2018. Granting access to a product or service, which is required under sector specific regulation, on unfair, unreasonably complicated or delayed terms amounts to constructive refusal to supply, without the need to demonstrate that the regulated access product or service is an indispensable input. In addition, a margin squeeze test, to assess whether the difference between wholesale and retail prices is negative, should be carried out on a year-by-year basis, and not on a multi-period basis. Finally, when a parent is jointly and severally liable for anti-competitive conduct of its subsidiary, the liability of the parent can exceed that of the subsidiary only if it reflects the parent’s individual conduct in the infringement at issue.

Innovation, Variety & Fair Choice – New Rules for the Digital Economy: Expert Opinion for Finanzplatz München Initiative (FPMI)

(1) The digitization has unleashed enormous potential, reduced transaction costs, enhanced consumer welfare and inspired a new entrepreneurial culture. New technologies and business models lead to a far-reaching modernization of business. (2) Notwithstanding the dynamics of digitization, the economy is at a turning point: Its fundamental infrastructure is being transformed. Some platforms turn into gatekeepers of the market places of the digital economy. Due to network effects, economies of scale and superior access to data, the success of such platforms becomes self-reinforcing. In a plat-form economy competition is for the market – not on the market. Markets may be “tipped” and are organised and governed by one or two platforms only. (3) In such markets, “the winner takes it all”. The platform operator determines the success of suppliers and customers and steers the coordination of supply and demand according to its own parameters. This has elements of a centrally planned economy and suppresses the discoveries of a free market economy when customers and/or suppliers are dependent upon the platform. The prerequisites of innovation – different paths, diversity, capacities for openness – may no longer be given. (4) Real providers of goods and services may become dependent from suppliers of auxiliary services (the match-making platforms). They battle for access to the platform and for the best conditions with the platform operator, but no longer for the customer directly. The direct customer-supplier-interface gets lost. Competition is pushed to the periphery. That is a strange distortion of the functioning of markets. (5) Consumers may benefit from reduced transaction costs first, but soon may be caught in closed systems where consumer choice is reduced. When switching costs are high and multi-homing is not possible, consumers are bound to one platform and may be subject to manipulation of choices and conditions by the platform operator without transparency. Consumers take fewer decisions themselves and take these decisions on a less informed basis. (6) The platform economy works with data, algorithms and machine-learning. Markets are more and more integrated and connected. The use of data and the delegation of decisions to machines may create barriers to entry and technological lock-in effects. (7) Regulatory responses to the platform economy need to protect variety, innovation and fair choice for consumers. This requires an approach that ensures that markets remain able to perform their function in selecting winners and losers in a dynamic competitive race. Whilst regulation and enforcement need to be cautious with a view to potential “chilling effects”, it is also necessary to act quicker, more hands-on and more technology-sensitive than so far. (8) The EU needs to develop a framework for the governance of platforms. Such a frame-work needs to distinguish between open platforms, proprietary systems and gate-keeping platforms. The framework needs to provide rules for neutrality and interoperability, transparency and liability. (9) Competition law enforcement needs to take centre stage in the governance of the digital economy. Artificially narrow market definitions should be replaced by an improved look at the integration of markets. The focus should shift to innovation barriers and technological lock-in effects. Jurisdiction for merger control needs to be reformed so as to encompass shootout acquisitions of innovative rival firms that challenge the market power of platforms. The 2017-amendments of the German Act against Restraints of Competition are a good starting point for reforms. (10) Consumer awareness in the digital economy needs to be strengthened. In particular, awareness for the non-neutrality of search results and for the use of data, algorithms and machine-learning could be enhanced or fostered through transparency requirements. (11) The free flow of data is a prerequisite for innovation and variety in the digital economy. Interoperability and open standards need to be supported. An exclusive data right would be counterproductive at present and would create artificial barriers for innovation. Instead it is necessary to design a framework for access to essential data. Such a framework should ensure data portability (also for machine-generated rights) and establish a speedy ombudsman-system for granting access and determining remuneration. It may be necessary to provide for sector-specific rules, e.g. default rules for data sharing contracts and sector-specific disclosure rules (e.g. for automated driving).

Position Statement of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition of 26 April 2017 on the European Commissionns 'Public consultation on Building the European Data Economy'

This Position Statement responds to the Communication of 10 January 2017 by which the European Commission launched a public consultation on the future legal framework for data-driven markets that emerge in the course of the current digitization of industrial production and the advent of smart products in which sensors are embedded. In particular, the Position Statement comments the Commission’s ideas on a possible future data producer’s right as a means of promoting access to data. While the Max Plank Institute agrees that there are indeed instances where there is a need to “unlock data”, it rejects a data producer’s right. Rather, the Institute recommends considering more targeted data access rights that would specifically react to situations in which a manufacturer of smart products would otherwise try to reserve related markets for itself. The Max Planck Institute thereby takes inspiration from the data portability right that has already been implemented as part of the Basic Data Protection Regulation. Moreover, general principles on the design of data access regimes are developed. In sum, the Max Planck Institute favours a sector-specific approach to the introduction of a general data access right or a generally applicable data access regime. Sector-specific rules are especially needed for answering more concrete questions such as regarding the person entitled to claim access or the one of whether a data holder should be remunerated for granting access to data.

Free Trade Agreements and Regulatory Change: Examples from the Generic and Biosimilar Sectors

Comprehensive free trade agreements (FTAs) have increasing importance and impact on domestic legislation and significantly affect regulated industries, such as pharmaceuticals. Recent FTAs include provisions on regulatory cooperation and convergence, as well as intellectual property provisions going well beyond the scope of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). These rules have particular importance for the generic and biosimilar medicines’ sectors and have important links to public health objectives. A growing number of sectors are covered by the substantive provisions of FTAs, often by means of dedicated and sector-specific rules and chapters catering to country- and/or industry-specific needs and interests. The article provides the relevant background in terms of trade law, trade negotiations and FTA trends, particularly as they relate to intellectual property rights and pharmaceuticals. The article places its core emphasis on the domestic impact of FTAs. Examples are drawn from the pharmaceutical sector of generic and biosimilar medicines. The potentially decisive impact of FTAs implies the necessity that all interested parties be more pro-actively involved in order to shape the future of the applicable legal frameworks, internationally and domestically.

Unfair Commercial Practices:

Millions of European internet users access online platforms where their personal data is being collected, processed, analysed or sold. The existence of some of the largest online platforms is entirely based on data driven business models. In the European Union, the protection of personal data is considered a fundamental right. Under Article 8(3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, compliance with data protection rules should be subject to control by an independent authority. In the EU, enforcement of privacy rules almost solely takes place by the national data protection authorities. They typically apply sector-specific rules, based on the EU Data Protection Directive. In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission is the primary enforcer of consumers’ (online) privacy interests. The agency’s competence is not based on the protection of fundamental rights, but on the basis that maintenance of a competitive, fair marketplace will provide the right choices for consumers to take. In this Article the US legal framework will be discussed and compared to the EU legal framework, which forms our finding that in the EU rules on unfair commercial practices could be enforced in a similar manner to protect people’s privacy. In the EU, the many frictions concerning the market/consumer-oriented use of personal data form a good reason to actually deal with these frictions in a market/consumer legal framework.

Balancing differentiated interests and conceptualizations in environmental management

Purpose– The purpose of this paper is to explore the everyday practices and routines undertaken by an authority to support internal coordination and deal with sector-specific interests and conflicting goals, and how exclusive interests and objectives in policy work are construed, understood, and negotiated in practice.Design/methodology/approach– An institutional ethnographic approach was adopted to investigate how policy-formulated goals, bureaucratic aims, and rules establish a frame for action procedures and alternatives available for agency-level collaboration.Findings– The results of this study reveal how compromise and agreement may be difficult to achieve in practice since each concerned administrative unit has its own sets of criteria concerning what constitutes valid or valuable knowledge of aspects relating to river restoration. The study illustrates how lack of knowledge affects collaboration, how the policy process is informed by sector-specific rules and norms for organizational conduct, and how the professions in their discussions and interaction concerning the issue of river restoration uphold, demarcate, and negotiate what knowledge and interests should take centre stage in the decision-making process.Originality/value– The paper contributes to policy anthropology literature and highlights how the policy process is informed politically and regulatorily but is also guided by sector-specific norms, values, and differently construed ideas of temporality and heritage. In this case, policy work exposes contrasting ideas of the past, present, and future, and mobilize diverse conceptual models and structural arrangements that are continually performed and contested in everyday policy work.

When Competition Law Meets Telecom Regulation: The Chinese Context

The liberalized telecom sector is intertwined with market force, sector-specific regulation and competition rules. While the conflict between market force and sector-specific regulation has been well studied, the conflict between sector-specific regulation and competition rules has attracted less attention in particular in China. The recent Chinese Telecom/China Unicom case, though not a successful antitrust intervention, suggests that the conflict between the two instruments has become tangible. This leads to a question whether it is better to let the two compete or complement. After carrying out a comparative study on the dramatically opposite practices of the EU and the US, this article chooses the US means and nevertheless follows the EU ends. Based on an evaluation whether antitrust intervention can bring added value to effective competition in the Chinese telecom sector, it proposes to establish the supremacy of competition rules and to allow competition rules to intervene into regulated matters.

How much nature for the consumer? Misleading advertising, trademark law and the European average consumer standard in the food sector

In Europe, the rules of unfair competition law have particular relevance for the regulation of advertising and product designation in the food sector. Apart from sector specific rules, the general framework of unfair competition law which applies is governed by the Unfair Trade Practices Directive (2008) that brought full harmonization of consumer protection laws in the unfair competition field.

Looking towards Europe: Regulation of Dominance in Nigerian Telecommunications

Nigeria is yet to enact generally applicable competition laws. However, in the telecommunications sector, sector-specific competition rules were enacted with the regulator taking steps including determination of dominance in selected markets to enforce these rules. These developments are important in Nigeria as they could provide good domestic references for future application of both general competition law in Nigeria and sector-specific application of competition rules in other network industries in the country. Furthermore, with regulatory determinations of dominance relatively rare in national communications sectors of African countries, Nigerian regulatory decisions are likely to be of interest to operators and regulators in other countries within the Sub-Saharan Africa region. This article critically analyzes regulation of dominant positions in the Nigerian telecommunications sector. It identifies the relevant legal provisions on dominant positions in Nigerian telecommunications and shows that while the Nigerian Communications Commission's (NCC) approach in this area appears to be influenced by European Union (EU) law, the Nigerian rules have developed and are applied in a way different from the application of comparable EU rules. Furthermore, the article also identifies a need for revision of the applicable regulations to stipulate the basis for market selection and refine criteria for identification of the relevant market for purposes of dominance analysis. The article further identifies specific issues with the NCC's application of criteria for single dominance assessment including; an apparent misapplication of the market shares criterion; very little of the NCC's assessment is backed by available data and supporting evidence; and the entire assessment focused on application of its six criteria to the retail aspects of the mobile markets with the wholesale market is completely ignored. With regards to International Internet Connectivity market, this article argues that NCC's decision to rely only on ex-post regulatory intervention in line with the practice in other jurisdictions failed to appreciate the differences in the legal basis for regulatory action between Nigeria and the EU for instance. The EU has separate provisions for sector-specific ex ante regulation and general ex post competition laws, while Nigeria only has sector-specific prescriptive regulations governing dominant positions. This entails that reliance only on as yet nonexistence ex post basis for regulatory intervention would leave Nigerian service providers without a remedy.

The Impact of EU Competition Law on National Healthcare Systems

Whereas the EU’s internal market rules govern market access and public intervention, its competition rules are concerned with the market conduct of private parties. When do the competition rules apply to healthcare? In principle the scope for application of the competition rules to the healthcare sector is largely defined by the Member States themselves. This is because a key criterion is whether the entities concerned act as undertakings, that is offer goods or services in a market. In pursuit of efficiency the Member States tend to rely at least partly on private undertakings for the market based provision of healthcare. Some healthcare purchasers, such as insurers, can also be classified as undertakings. Hence in many cases the competition rules will apply. Given the relevance of the competition rules to healthcare, is there still room for the pursuit of public policy objectives? As this paper illustrates the competition rules (including the state aid rules) provide for boundaries and exceptions that Member States may rely upon to continue the pursuit of public policy goals in the healthcare sector. The most important exception is that for services of general economic interest (SGEI). This allows the pursuit of both economic (efficiency) and non-economic (equity) goals, albeit only in a proportionate manner. This requirement is likely to lead to a rationalisation of public policy objectives in the healthcare sector. What is the effect of EU competition law on healthcare at the level of the Member States? Cases studies of Germany, the UK and the Netherlands show that so far the impact of EU competition law is largely indirect and works through national competition law as well as sector-specific rules. Given the lack of political support for EU level harmonisation of healthcare regulation, at the same time EU competition law forms a default regulatory framework for the sector. Because in the Member States the reliance on markets in healthcare provision is still growing the impact of EU competition law on national healthcare systems is likely to increase as well.

Trade in Goods Under the EU–Korea FTA: Market Access and Regulatory Measures

This chapter deals with the rules on trade in goods in the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement. It is organized, as follows. First, the rules on market access, that is, the EU-Korea FTA provisions related to import measures applicable at the border, will be delineated and analyzed. Subsequently, aspects of one of the most innovative parts of the agreement will be examined in detail: the section containing rules on domestic regulation, in particular, on technical regulations and standards. This paper shows two sides of the EU–Korea FTA. On the one hand, it is a very traditional trade agreement, largely based on existing WTO provisions. This is particularly the case in those parts of the agreement concerning border measures. On the other hand, in particular, concerning the sector-specific rules on technical barriers to trade, the agreement is quite innovative and breaks new grounds, with respect to the regulation of domestic instruments.Moreover, the Agreement is, to a large extent, a ‘living instrument’. Many of the remaining lacunae in the field of domestic regulation must be dealt with in the future, through cooperation and consultations within the different committees and working groups. This is the Agreement’s approach to tackle its endogenous incompleteness, which is inherent in any trade agreement. From this angle, the EU–Korea FTA may not only be understood as a static body of rules, but also as a framework for collaboration that helps to find prompt and appropriate responses to changes in real-world conditions, thus facilitating trade relations between the parties in the long run.

Looking Towards Europe: Regulation of Dominance in Nigerian Telecommunications

Nigeria is yet to enact generally applicable competition laws. However in the telecommunications sector, sector specific competition rules were enacted with the regulator taking steps including determination of dominance in selected markets to enforce these rules. These developments are important in Nigeria as they could provide good domestic references for future application of both general competition law in Nigeria and sector specific application of competition rules in other network industries in the country. Furthermore with regulatory determinations of dominance relatively rare in the national communications sectors in Africa, Nigerian regulatory decisions are likely to be of interest to operators and regulators in other countries within the West African sub-region specifically and Africa in general.This article critically analyses regulation of dominant positions in the Nigerian telecommunications sector. It identifies the relevant legal provisions on dominant positions in Nigerian telecommunications and shows that while the Nigerian Communications Commission’s (NCC) approach in this area appears to be influenced by European Union (EU) law, the Nigerian rules have developed and are applied in a way different from the application of comparable EU rules. These differences in application manifest in a number of areas. For instance, while the Nigerian Communications Commission’s (NCC) approach in this area appears to be influenced by EU law, the differences between the differentiated sources of rules applicable to market power or dominance in telecommunication markets within EU law when juxtaposed with a common source of applicable rules in Nigeria appear to create problems. This is especially so when NCC appears to be following positions laid down in ex post EU competition case law while implementing a legal framework that is substantially influenced by EU ex ante sector specific regulation. Furthermore, NCC and at least one of the leading operators appear to adopt the view that regulation of dominance should be predicated on a finding of abuse of dominant position. This article argues that a finding of anticompetitive conduct is neither required in the Nigerian legal framework nor a pre-requisite in EU sector specific regulation, for the imposition of obligations on a firm that is in a position of dominance.In addition to these, the article also identifies a need for revision of the applicable regulations to stipulate the basis for market selection and refine criteria for the related concept of identification of the relevant market for purposes of dominance analysis. These steps are necessary not simply because comparable provisions are found in the EU regulatory framework which substantially influenced the development of the Nigerian legal framework; they ensure that identification of relevant markets in Nigeria is in line with international best practice and more accurately reflects local circumstances.The article further identifies specific issues with the NCC’s application of criteria for single dominance assessment. Firstly, there appears to be a misapplication of the market shares criterion. Secondly, on the determination pertaining to the mobile telephone market, the full range of actual competitors was not utilised in the assessment, furthermore very little of the NCC’s assessment is backed by available data and supporting evidence, and the entire assessment focused on application of its six criteria to the retail aspects of the mobile markets with the wholesale market completely ignored contrary to European application of rules from which the Nigerian criteria were derived. Thirdly, the article called for the commission’s adoption of a holistic view to the application of its regulations and recognition of the fact that decisions on dominant positions have important implications for services providers’ access to each other’s networks. With regards to the International Internet Connectivity market, the article argued that the NCC’s decision to rely only on ex-post regulatory intervention in line with the practice in other jurisdictions failed to appreciate the differences in the legal basis for regulatory action between Nigeria and the EU for instance. The EU has separate provisions for sector specific ex ante regulation and general ex-post competition laws, while Nigeria only has sector specific prescriptive regulations governing dominant positions. This entails that reliance only on as yet nonexistence ex-post basis for regulatory intervention would leave Nigerian service providers without a remedy.The manuscript posted here is an author original version of an article that was published in (2013) Competition and Regulation in Network Industries 14(4) 338-364.