Second-order Peano Arithmetic Research Articles

Jensen Δn1 Reals by Means of ZFC and Second-Order Peano Arithmetic

It was established by Jensen in 1970 that there is a generic extension L[a] of the constructible universe L by a non-constructible real a∉L, minimal over L, such that a is Δ31 in L[a]. Our first main theorem generalizes Jensen’s result by constructing, for each n≥2, a generic extension L[a] by a non-constructible real a∉L, still minimal over L, such that a is Δn+11 in L[a] but all Σn1 reals are constructible in L[a]. Jensen’s forcing construction has found a number of applications in modern set theory. A problem was recently discussed as to whether Jensen’s construction can be reproduced entirely by means of second-order Peano arithmetic PA2, or, equivalently, ZFC− (minus the power set axiom). The obstacle is that the proof of the key CCC property (whether by Jensen’s original argument or the later proof using the diamond technique) essentially involves countable elementary submodels of Lω2, which is way beyond ZFC−. We demonstrate how to circumvent this difficulty by means of killing only definable antichains in the course of a Jensen-like transfinite construction of the forcing notion, and then use this modification to define a model with a minimal Δn+11 real as required as a class-forcing extension of a model of ZFC− plus V=L.

A Model in Which Well-Orderings of the Reals First Appear at a Given Projective Level, Part III—The Case of Second-Order PA

A model of set theory ZFC is defined in our recent research, in which, for a given n≥3, (An) there exists a good lightface Δn1 well-ordering of the reals, but (Bn) no well-orderings of the reals (not necessarily good) exist in the previous class Δn−11. Therefore, the conjunction (An)∧(Bn) is consistent, modulo the consistency of ZFC itself. In this paper, we significantly clarify and strengthen this result. We prove the consistency of the conjunction (An)∧(Bn) for any given n≥3 on the basis of the consistency of PA2, second-order Peano arithmetic, which is a much weaker assumption than the consistency of ZFC used in the earlier result. This is a new result that may lead to further progress in studies of the projective hierarchy.

Something Valid This Way Comes: A Study of Neologicism and Proof-Theoretic Validity

AbstractThe interplay of philosophical ambitions and technical reality have given birth to rich and interesting approaches to explain the oft-claimed special character of mathematical and logical knowledge. Two projects stand out both for their audacity and their innovativeness. These are logicism and proof-theoretic semantics. This dissertation contains three chapters exploring the limits of these two projects. In both cases I find the formal results offer a mixed blessing to the philosophical projects.Chapter 1. Is a logicist bound to the claim that as a matter of analytic truth there is an actual infinity of objects? If Hume’s Principle is analytic then in the standard setting the answer appears to be yes. Hodes’s work pointed to a way out by offering a modal picture in which only a potential infinity was posited. However, this project was abandoned due to apparent failures of cross-world predication. I re-explore this idea and discover that in the setting of the potential infinite one can interpret first-order Peano arithmetic, but not second-order Peano arithmetic. I conclude that in order for the logicist to weaken the metaphysically loaded claim of necessary actual infinities, they must also weaken the mathematics they recover.Chapter 2. There have been several recent results bringing into focus the super-intuitionistic nature of most notions of proof-theoretic validity. But there has been very little work evaluating the consequences of these results. In this chapter, I explore the question of whether these results undermine the claim that proof-theoretic validity shows us which inferences follow from the meaning of the connectives when defined by their introduction rules. It is argued that the super-intuitionistic inferences are valid due to the correspondence between the treatment of the atomic formulas and more complex formulas. And so the goals of proof-theoretic validity are not undermined.Chapter 3. Prawitz (1971) conjectured that proof-theoretic validity offers a semantics for intuitionistic logic. This conjecture has recently been proven false by Piecha and Schroeder-Heister (2019). This chapter resolves one of the questions left open by this recent result by showing the extensional alignment of proof-theoretic validity and general inquisitive logic. General inquisitive logic is a generalisation of inquisitive semantics, a uniform semantics for questions and assertions. The chapter further defines a notion of quasi-proof-theoretic validity by restricting proof-theoretic validity to allow double negation elimination for atomic formulas and proves the extensional alignment of quasi-proof-theoretic validity and inquisitive logic.Abstract prepared by Will Stafford extracted partially from the dissertation.E-mail: stafford@flu.cas.czURL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/33c6h00c

THE POTENTIAL IN FREGE’S THEOREM

AbstractIs a logicist bound to the claim that as a matter of analytic truth there is an actual infinity of objects? If Hume’s Principle is analytic then in the standard setting the answer appears to be yes. Hodes’s work pointed to a way out by offering a modal picture in which only a potential infinity was posited. However, this project was abandoned due to apparent failures of cross-world predication. We re-explore this idea and discover that in the setting of the potential infinite one can interpret first-order Peano arithmetic, but not second-order Peano arithmetic. We conclude that in order for the logicist to weaken the metaphysically loaded claim of necessary actual infinities, they must also weaken the mathematics they recover.

GENERALIZING BOOLOS’ THEOREM

AbstractIt’s well known that it’s possible to extract, from Frege’s Grudgesetze, an interpretation of second-order Peano Arithmetic in the theory $H{P^2}$, whose sole axiom is Hume’s principle. What’s less well known is that, in Die Grundlagen Der Arithmetic §82–83 Boolos (2011), George Boolos provided a converse interpretation of $H{P^2}$ in $P{A^2}$. Boolos’ interpretation can be used to show that the Frege’s construction allows for any model of $P{A^2}$ to be recovered from some model of $H{P^2}$. So the space of possible arithmetical universes is precisely characterized by Hume’s principle.In this paper, I show that a large class of second-order theories admit characterization by an abstraction principle in this sense. The proof makes use of structural abstraction principles, a class of abstraction principles of considerable intrinsic interest, and categories of interpretations in the sense of Visser (2003).

Definiciones implícitas y unicidad en el programa neologicista

<p class='p1'>En este trabajo presento un problema que afecta al programa neologicista que han defendido en varias ocasiones Crispin Wright y Bob Hale. En particular, argumento queWright y Hale no han dado suficientes condiciones para separar las definiciones implícitas apropiadas como el principio de Hume de otras definiciones implícitas rivales como la aritmética de Peano de segundo orden. Sugiero, además, que esa tarea sólo puede realizarse adecuadamente si una de las condiciones propuestas es la condición de que toda definición implícita sea unívoca.</p>

THE STRENGTH OF ABSTRACTION WITH PREDICATIVE COMPREHENSION

AbstractFrege’s theorem says that second-order Peano arithmetic is interpretable in Hume’s Principle and full impredicative comprehension. Hume’s Principle is one example of anabstraction principle, while another paradigmatic example is Basic Law V from Frege’sGrundgesetze. In this paper we study the strength of abstraction principles in the presence of predicative restrictions on the comprehension schema, and in particular we study a predicative Fregean theory which contains all the abstraction principles whose underlying equivalence relations can be proven to be equivalence relations in a weak background second-order logic. We show that this predicative Fregean theory interprets second-order Peano arithmetic (cf. Theorem 3.2).

Axiomatizations of arithmetic and the first-order/second-order divide

It is often remarked that first-order Peano Arithmetic is non-categorical but deductively well-behaved, while second-order Peano Arithmetic is categorical but deductively ill-behaved. This suggests that, when it comes to axiomatizations of mathematical theories, expressive power and deductive power may be orthogonal, mutually exclusive desiderata. In this paper, I turn to Hintikka’s (Philos Top 17(2):69–90, 1989) distinction between descriptive and deductive approaches in the foundations of mathematics to discuss the implications of this observation for the first-order logic versus second-order logic divide. The descriptive approach is illustrated by Dedekind’s ‘discovery’ of the need for second-order concepts to ensure categoricity in his axiomatization of arithmetic; the deductive approach is illustrated by Frege’s Begriffsschrift project. I argue that, rather than suggesting that any use of logic in the foundations of mathematics is doomed to failure given the impossibility of combining the descriptive approach with the deductive approach, what this apparent predicament in fact indicates is that the first-order versus second-order divide may be too crude to investigate what an adequate axiomatization of arithmetic should look like. I also conclude that, insofar as there are different, equally legitimate projects one may engage in when working on the foundations of mathematics, there is no such thing as the One True Logic for this purpose; different logical systems may be adequate for different projects.

Comparing Peano arithmetic, Basic Law V, and Hume’s Principle

This paper presents new constructions of models of Hume’s Principle and Basic Law V with restricted amounts of comprehension. The techniques used in these constructions are drawn from hyperarithmetic theory and the model theory of fields, and formalizing these techniques within various subsystems of second-order Peano arithmetic allows one to put upper and lower bounds on the interpretability strength of these theories and hence to compare these theories to the canonical subsystems of second-order arithmetic. The main results of this paper are: (i) there is a consistent extension of the hypearithmetic fragment of Basic Law V which interprets the hyperarithmetic fragment of second-order Peano arithmetic, and (ii) the hyperarithmetic fragment of Hume’s Principle does not interpret the hyperarithmetic fragment of second-order Peano arithmetic, so that in this specific sense there is no predicative version of Frege’s Theorem.

On the Consistency of a Plural Theory of Frege’s Grundgesetze

PG (Plural Grundgesetze) is a predicative monadic second-order system which is aimed to derive second-order Peano arithmetic. It exploits the notion of plural quantification and a few Fregean devices, among which the infamous Basic Law V. In this paper, a model-theoretical consistency proof for the system PG is provided.

Plural Grundgesetze

PG (Plural Grundgesetze) is a predicative monadic second-order system which exploits the notion of plural quantification and a few Fregean devices, among which a formulation of the infamous Basic Law V. It is shown that second-order Peano arithmetic can be derived in PG. I also investigate the philosophical issue of predicativism connected to PG. In particular, as predicativism about concepts seems rather un-Fregean, I analyse whether there is a way to make predicativism compatible with Frege's logicism.

Predicative Fragments of Frege Arithmetic

AbstractFrege Arithmetic (FA) is the second-order theory whose sole non-logical axiom is Hume's Principle, which says that the number of Fs is identical to the number of Gs if and only if the Fs and the Gs can be one-to-one correlated. According to Frege's Theorem, FA and some natural definitions imply all of second-order Peano Arithmetic. This paper distinguishes two dimensions of impredicativity involved in FA—one having to do with Hume's Principle, the other, with the underlying second-order logic—and investigates how much of Frege's Theorem goes through in various partially predicative fragments of FA. Theorem 1 shows that almost everything goes through, the most important exception being the axiom that every natural number has a successor. Theorem 2 shows that the Successor Axiom cannot be proved in the theories that are predicative in either dimension.

Frege Meets Dedekind: A Neologicist Treatment of Real Analysis

This paper uses neo-Fregean-style abstraction principles to develop the integers from the natural numbers (assuming Hume's Principle), the rational numbers from the integers, and the real numbers from the rationals. The first two are first-order abstractions that treat pairs of numbers: $(\mathrm{DIF})\qquad \mathrm{INT}(a,b) = \mathrm{INT}(c,d)\equiv(a+d)=(b+c).$ $(\mathrm{QUOT}) \qquad \begin{eqnarray}\mathrm{Q}(m,n)=\mathrm{Q}(p,q)\equiv(n=0 \: \& \: q=0) \\ \qquad \vee\: (n\neq 0 \: \& \: q\neq 0 \: \& \: m \cdot q=n \cdot p).\end{eqnarray}$ The development of the real numbers is an adaption of the Dedekind program involving "cuts" of rational numbers. Let $P$ be a property (of rational numbers) and $r$ a rational number. Say that $r$ is an upper bound of $P$, written $P\leq r$, if for any rational number $s$, if $Ps$ then either $s<r$ or $s=r$. In other words, $P\leq r$ if $r$ is greater than or equal to any rational number that $P$ applies to. Consider the Cut Abstraction Principle: $(\mathrm{CP}) \qquad \forall P \forall Q(C(P)=C(Q) \equiv \forall r(P\leq r \equiv Q\leq r)).$ In other words, the cut of $P$ is identical to the cut of $Q$ if and only if $P$ and $Q$ share all of their upper bounds. The axioms of second-order real analysis can be derived from (CP), just as the axioms of second-order Peano Arithmetic can be derived from Hume's Principle. The paper raises some of the philosophical issues connected with the neo-Fregean program, using the above abstraction principles as case studies.

An infinitistic rule of proof

In this paper we consider a fonnal system of second-order Peano arithmetic with a rule of inference stronger than the ω-rule [3]. We also consider the relation to a class of models for analysis (i.e. second-order arithmetic) which lies between the class of ω-models and the class of β-models [5].The notation used is largely that of [3] and [5]. We assume that the reader has some familiarity with at least the ideas of the former. The formal system (A) of Peano arithmetic employed in [3] includes the comprehension axioms and the second-order induction axiom.