Second-order False Belief Understanding Research Articles

Socio-cognitive correlates of primary school children's deceptive behavior toward peers in competitive settings

Competing for limited resources with peers is common among children from an early age, illustrating their propensity to use deceptive strategies to win. We focused on how primary school-age (6–8 years old) children's strategic deception toward peers is associated with their socio-cognitive development (theory of mind and executive functions). In a novel computerized competitive hide-and-seek game, we manipulated the peer opponents' familiarity (familiar vs. unfamiliar) and actions (following vs. not following children's indications), as well as the stimuli likability (liked vs. disliked cards). Our findings demonstrated that children deceived the familiar opponent less than the unfamiliar one, indicating their determination to preserve positive peer interactions. We showed that theory of mind and executive functions significantly predicted children's willingness to deceive. Notably, second-order false belief understanding and visuospatial working memory positively predicted children's use of truths to deceive, whereas inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility efficacy scores were negatively related to their deceptive performance when using the same strategy. Implications for children's competitive behavior toward peers involving lie-telling are discussed.

Individual differences in second-order false-belief understanding and executive abilities: A meta-analytic review of evidence from school-age children and adults

Theory of Mind (ToM) and Executive Functioning (EF) are two pillars of human social cognition often studied in conjunction, but rarely considered together beyond childhood. Adults routinely undertake ToM activities of higher levels, such as those that require reasoning recursively through other individuals’ presumed reasoning about others (e.g., she believes that he believes that this is difficult to grasp). Yet, the possibility of links between EF and these special kinds of representations, termed second-order ToM, has been much less studied empirically. The objective of the current pre-registered report is to provide a meta-analytic review of the extant literature linking second-order ToM and EF in school-age children and adults. Studies reporting on the relation between EF and second-order ToM were located through systematic search of published and non-published research databases. A final set of 32 studies were meta-analyzed, providing 83 effect sizes and a pooled N of over 2584 child and adult participants. The developmental literature provided evidence of moderate second-order ToM-EF linkage in children (r = .25), which resisted statistical adjustment for age, and did not differ on the basis of children’s cultural background. In contrast, the adult findings were weaker (r = .09), and only accounted for a very small percentage of the meta-analyzed literature. Important methodological gaps were identified, highlighting the need for more research on the links between second-order ToM and EF.

Relations between verb factivity and first-order and second-order false belief understanding: Evidence from Mandarin-speaking typically developing children and children with autism spectrum disorders

ABSTRACT Previous studies have shown that factivity is closely related to first-order false belief (FB). However, whether the role of factivity in first-order FB extends to second-order FB remains unclear. Investigations of verb factivity and second-order FB would contribute to our knowledge of the role of language in theory of mind (ToM) development. This study examined relations between verb factivity and first-order and second-order FB reasoning in 156 four- to seven-year-old typically developing (TD) Mandarin-speaking children, and in 17 children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and 17 TD matched controls. Children’s understanding of a factive zhīdào ‘know’, a non-factive juédé ‘think’ and a counter-factive jiǎzhuāng ‘pretend’ was assessed by a truth value judgement task. For TD children, zhīdào ‘know’ (factive) significantly predicted their first-order and second-order FB performances, and jiǎzhuāng ‘pretend’ (counter-factive) significantly predicted their first-order FB performance. For autistic children, they performed significantly poorer than their TD counterparts on complementation, verb factivity, first-order and second-order FB, and their first-order FB performance was significantly related to jiǎzhuāng ‘pretend’ (counter-factive). The findings suggest that verb factivity relates to both first-order and second-order FB, and verbs differing in factuality and mental state status contribute differently to ToM development.

Progressing from an implicit to an explicit false belief understanding: A matter of executive control?

In a longitudinal study (N = 54), we investigated the developmental relation between children’s implicit and explicit theory of mind and executive functions. We found that implicit false belief understanding at 18 months was correlated with explicit false belief understanding at 4 to 5 years of age, with the latter being closely related to second-order false belief understanding at 5 years of age. Also, replicating a number of studies, explicit first- and second-order false belief understanding, in contrast to implicit false belief understanding, were related to executive functioning. This indicates that executive functions play a role in standard explicit false belief tasks, but not in implicit false belief understanding. We argue that spontaneous, implicit false belief understanding does not require conscious control, whereas explicit false belief understanding is based on conscious, reflective processing. In sum, we suggest a developmental enrichment account of theory of mind development, with belief processing becoming increasingly reflective and controlled with advancing age.

Theory of mind and preschoolers' understanding of misdeed and politeness lies.

We told ninety-nine 4- and 5-year-olds stories in which speakers told lies and truths in two contexts: those told to deny a transgression (misdeeds) and those told to spare another's feelings (politeness). Participants identified each statement as a lie or as the truth, morally judged it as good or bad, and decided whether or not to assign punishment to the speaker. All children received measures of first- and second-order false-belief understanding. Although 4-year-olds were above chance in their identification accuracy, they did not differentiate between lies and truths in their moral judgments or punishments. Five-year-olds outperformed 4-year-olds in their identification accuracy, morally judged lies more negatively than truths, and assigned speakers of lies more punishment than those who told truths. Five-year-olds also treated lies about misdeeds more negatively than politeness lies in their moral judgments and punishments. Children's identification of both lies and truths related to their first-order false-belief understanding, while their moral judgments and punishment of lies related to their second-order false-belief understanding. These findings suggest that different considerations are made when children reason about the conceptual and moral differences between lies and truths. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Relationship between Chinese children's imaginary companions and their understanding of second-order false beliefs and emotions.

We investigated relationship between Chinese children's imaginary companions (ICs) and their understanding of second-order false beliefs and emotions in 180 children, aged 5-6 years old. We examined the potential differences in second-order false belief understanding and emotion understanding between children with and without ICs, children with egalitarian IC relationships and hierarchical IC relationships, as well as children with invisible friends and personified objects. The results revealed that children with ICs had better second-order false belief understanding and emotion understanding than children without ICs. Compared with children with hierarchical relationships, children with egalitarian relationships had better second-order false belief understanding. However, children with invisible friends and personified objects did not differ on their understanding of second-order false beliefs and emotions. The results suggest that compared with IC types, IC status and child-IC relationship qualities may be more relevant to children's theory of mind. It will be interesting for the future researchers to investigate the underlying mechanism of the differences between children with egalitarian IC relationships and hierarchical IC relationships.

Theory of Mind Development in School-Aged Left-Behind Children in Rural China.

The current study aimed to investigate differences in theory of mind between left-behind children and non-left-behind children in rural China and to examine the potential protective role of general reasoning ability in left-behind children’s theory of mind. Participants included 213 children aged 7.10–13.67 years (111 boys and 102 girls, M = 10.51 years, SD = 1.33), 101 of whom were left behind in rural areas by one or both migrating parents for at least 6 months. The Strange Stories task, a second-order false belief task, and a faux pas task were used to measure children’s theory of mind, and Sessions B and C in Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices were used to test children’s general reasoning ability. The results showed that left-behind children scored lower on both the faux pas task and Strange Stories task. Additionally, on second-order false belief understanding, left-behind boys performed worse than non-left-behind boys, while left-behind girls scored higher than non-left behind girls. Moreover, children’s general reasoning ability moderated the relationship between parental migrant status and children’s faux pas understanding: For children with high levels of general reasoning ability, left-behind children performed similarly to non-left-behind children, while for children with low levels of general reasoning ability, left-behind children scored lower than non-left-behind children, indicating that general reasoning ability buffered the negative effect of being left behind on children’s theory of mind development. The implications of these findings for training directed at left-behind children are discussed.

Children’s second-order lying: Young children can tell the truth to deceive

The current study investigated the development of second-order lying and its relation to theory of mind and executive function. Previous studies have examined only first-order lying, in which a child makes an untruthful statement to intentionally deceive an unsuspecting opponent. As opposed to first-order lying, second-order lying requires the use of both lies and truths to deceive an opponent because the opponent is fully aware of the liar’s deceptive intention. Here, we used a modified hide-and-seek task, in which children were asked to hide a coin in either one of their hands for opponents to find. In this task, the opponents did not consistently look for the coin in the location indicated by the children. Thus, children could not win the desirable reward if they only told lies to deceive; they needed to switch between telling lies and telling truths (i.e., second-order lies) to deceive opponents. The results showed that children could tell second-order lies by 4 years of age, and their ability to do so was significantly related only to the second-order ignorance scores (early second-order theory of mind understanding). The current findings suggest that second-order ignorance, but not second-order false belief understanding, contributes to children’s second-order lying.

The role of false-belief understanding in preschoolers’ development of metamemory: A training study

ABSTRACTThe study herein investigated the mechanisms that may account for the relationship between theory of mind (ToM) and metamemory, adopting a dynamic approach that combined a focus on individual differences with the rigorousness of a training design. Sixty-six 4- to 5-year-old children were recruited and assigned to one of two training conditions: a ToM and a control condition. Intervention and control groups were equivalent at pretest for age, verbal ability, working memory, ToM and metamemory. Results showed that following the intervention children in the ToM group were better than those in the control group in their first-order, second-order false belief understanding, and metamemory. Crucially, improvements in first-order false belief understanding, but not in second-order false belief understanding, mediated the positive effect of the training program on metamemory.

Theory of Mind Impairments in Women With Cocaine Addiction.

This study investigates the Theory of Mind performance of female cocaine-dependent users (CDUs) and possible associations between theory of mind performance and features of cocaine use. Sixty women controlled for age, education, individual income, and IQ participated in this study: 30 in the CDU group and 30 in the healthy control group. Participants were assessed for theory of mind with the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET), a test of understanding of first-order and second-order false beliefs, and the Hinting task. Drug use parameters, clinical symptoms, and neuropsychological functioning were also assessed. Analyses of covariance indicated Theory of Mind impairments in negative mental states within the RMET and second-order false-belief understanding of Theory of Mind stories. In addition, Theory of Mind impairment was associated with drug use characteristics, including craving and number of hospitalizations. High-demand Theory of Mind is suggested to be impaired in CDU women, and the deficits appear to be related to drug addiction severity. We found associations between Theory of Mind deficits and worse clinical and social outcomes.

"I know you don't know I know…" children use second-order false-belief reasoning for peer coordination.

Numerous studies have investigated children's abilities to attribute mental states, but few have examined their ability to recruit these abilities in social interactions. Here, 6-year-olds (N = 104) were tested on whether they can use first- and second-order false-belief understanding to coordinate with peers. Children adjusted their decisions in a coordination game in response to either their partner's erroneous belief or their partner's erroneous belief about their own belief-a result that contrasts with previous findings on the use of higher order "theory of mind" (TOM) reasoning at this age. Six-year-olds are thus able to use their higher order TOM capacities for peer coordination, which marks an important achievement in becoming competent social collaborators.

The ‘I knew it all along’ phenomenon: second-order false belief understanding and the curse of knowledge in primary school children

This study investigated two different expressions of the so-called curse of knowledge in primary school children: hindsight bias and outcome bias. Further, it explored the possible predictive function of false belief understanding in reducing these biases. Ninety-one children aged 7, 9, and 11 years (middle- to upper-middle class) were administered classical first- and second-order false belief tasks as well as hindsight and outcome bias tasks in a within-subjects design, while controlling for cognitive level. Both biases were found at all ages. Second-order false belief understanding seemed to reduce outcome bias but not hindsight bias. These findings indicate that the curse of knowledge is a multifaceted construct with potential relevant implications for learning in children.

Do social norms, false belief understanding, and metacognitive vocabulary influence irony comprehension? A study of five- and seven-year-old children

This study explores the effects of violating socially shared versus situationally defined norms on the understanding of ironic statements in 70 Italian-speaking five- and seven-year-old children. We also considered the possible relationships between irony understanding, receptive and metacognitive vocabulary, and false belief understanding. The results showed that violating socially shared norms does not benefit younger children's understanding of irony, although it does help older children's understanding. Ironic utterances that violate situationally defined norms were understood similarly across the two age groups. First- and second-order false belief understanding did not predict children's ability to interpret irony, although metacognitive vocabulary did predict interpretation for the seven-year-old group in instances of violating a situationally defined norm.

Nondecomposable idiom understanding in children: Recursive theory of mind and working memory.

Which skills are required to start understanding ambiguous, unfamiliar nondecomposable idioms in context? In this study, we examined the contributions of both second-order false-belief understanding and working memory to the understanding of unfamiliar nondecomposable idioms in children aged 6, 7 and 8 years old. We assumed that, in order to process these idioms, children would have to be able to (a) take a double perspective (Perner & Wimmer, 1985), (b) maintain both literal and figurative meanings as being different from the expression itself, and (c) take the context into account. Six-, 7- and 8-year-old children performed three, second-order false-belief tasks and three working-memory tasks, and listened to 15 nondecomposable idioms inserted into a context, before performing a multiple-choice task. Results indicated that nondecomposable idiom understanding was explained by theory-of-mind skills.

Irony and second-order false belief in children: What changes when mothers rather than siblings speak?

This study explored irony understanding in school-age children, when the irony is used in two different family relations: between a child and the child's mother and between a child and a sibling. Two irony task typologies were used to assess 6-, 8-, and 10-year-olds' understanding of the intended and expressed meanings (Study 1: N = 77; Study 2: N = 30). Results proved that the relationship with the mother, more than the relationship with a sibling, supported children's irony understanding. A predictive effect of second-order false-belief understanding on irony comprehension was also found. The findings support the hypothesis that the irony understanding, at least in the acquisition phase, depends on the relational contexts in which it is used. The predictive effect of second-order recursive thinking confirms and extends the role of theory of mind in the management of ironic communication.

Executive function and theory of mind in school‐aged children after neonatal corrective cardiac surgery for transposition of the great arteries

cardiac malformations resulting in cyanosis, such as transposition of the great arteries (TGA), have been associated with neurodevelopmental dysfunction. The purpose of this study was to assess, for the first time, theory of mind (ToM), which is a key component of social cognition and executive functions in school-aged children with TGA. twenty-one children (14 males, seven females; mean age 7y 4mo; SD 3mo) who underwent neonatal open-heart surgery for TGA using full-flow cardiopulmonary bypass were compared with 21 typically developing age-matched children (12 males, nine females; mean age 7y 6mo; SD 3.8mo) using different neuropsychological measures specifically designed to assess executive function (cognitive and response inhibition, verbal and spatial working memory, and planning). They were also given two ToM tasks (first- and second-order false belief understanding). general IQ was within the normal range in both the TGA group and the comparison group (mean IQ 113 [SD 9.3] and 118 [SD 10.1] respectively), but performance on all executive functions and on ToM (first and second level) was significantly lower in the TGA group (p values of 0.02, 0.01, and 0.004 respectively). A discriminant multivariate analysis provided evidence for cognitive and behavioural inhibition as well as performance on false belief tasks as being the most important contributors to the differentiation between the groups (p=0.03). children with TGA demonstrate great difficulties in exerting cognitive and behavioural inhibition. They also present specific deficits in false belief understanding, which were related to immature executive abilities.

Fairness and intentionality in children’s decision-making

Few studies have addressed the role of different aspects of the Theory of Mind (ToM) (intentionality and false belief understanding) in decision-making by adults playing strategic games where the importance of fairness is crucial. Even more interesting, this topic has been less investigated with children. The goal of this research was to explore the development of the decisional behavior along with the understanding of fairness, intentions and first- and second-order false belief understanding in children who are just acquiring those abilities. Multiple rounds of the ultimatum game with a human and a non-human partner (child/roulette wheel) were played by 177 children in the age range of 5–10 years, who also completed classic false belief tasks. Results confirm the key role of fairness sensibility across age groups and different degrees of the relevance of ToM according to the variability of children’s decisional behavior (stable vs. dynamic).

Comprehension of metaphor and irony in schizophrenia during remission: The role of theory of mind and IQ

The study reported herein explored the comprehension of metaphor and irony in schizophrenia during remission, and examined the role of IQ and a theory of mind. Performance of 29 Schizophrenic patients in remission and 22 healthy controls was compared on metaphor and irony comprehension tasks and first- and second-order theory of mind tasks. Participants' IQs were measured using the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised, and the symptoms of individuals with schizophrenia were assessed using the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale. The results showed that patients with schizophrenia were impaired in their comprehension of metaphor and irony as compared with healthy controls. A theory of mind deficit was found in patients with remitted schizophrenia. The comprehension of metaphor was significantly correlated with second-order false belief understanding and the comprehension of irony was not significantly related to theory of mind. IQ and verbal IQ did not explain the deficit of metaphor and irony comprehension. These findings were not explained by Happé's [Happé, F.G.E., 1993. Communication competence and theory of mind in autism: a test of relevance theory. Cognition 48, 101–119] theory and the shared semantic understanding requirement was discussed.

Theory of mind and epistemological development: the relation between children's second-order false-belief understanding and their ability to reason about evidence

The study investigates the hypothesis that children's ability to attribute second-order beliefs facilitates their understanding of evidence, as seen in the ability to distinguish between causes and reasons. Seventy-four children 5–7 yr old were given belief and evidence tests. The belief tests assessed their ability to represent and reason from second-order false-beliefs, and the evidence tests assessed their ability to distinguish between the cause of a situation and a person's reason for believing it. The relation between performance on the two tests was determined, taking into account general language and non-verbal reasoning abilities. Results show that performance on the belief test and on the evidence part of the evidence test improved significantly over the age range, and that a significant proportion of variance in the evidence test scores is accounted for by second-order false-belief understanding, over and above that accounted for by general language and non-verbal abilities. The argument is made that second-order false-belief understanding is fundamental to children's epistemological development, underlying not just their understanding of evidence, but also their understanding of inference and truth.