Second Line Of Argument Research Articles

Decolonial Language Education and Identity Realization in Africa

This paper explores the relationship between language education and identity realization and the consequences of choosing either an Indigenous or a colonial language education approach. The focus is on the African postcolonial context; however, the arguments are also substantiated by examples from other parts of the world. I argue for a decolonial-multilingual approach to language education, where our conceptualizations of language must be decolonized (freed from colonial rhetoric) so that language use can be explored for its utility. The paper juxtaposes two lines of arguments: the first is an insistence on a return to Indigenous language education as a form of decolonial resistance and warnings against intellectual control through colonial language education. The second line of argument explores the possibilities of compartmentalizing and interrogating language use as an alternative decolonial-multilingual reality, thereby redefining an individual’s relationship with language and its influence on identity realization. As the paper highlights the extent to which language and identity are correlated, I conclude by stressing the need to decolonize language if identity realization is to be decolonized.

Buddhist Governance

This paper examines the relationship between the monastic saṅgha and the Buddhist king as the dhammarājā in the context of good governance in the contemporary world, with a specific focus on the Cambodian perspective. Through an examination of the historical and philosophical foundations of Buddhist governance, it argues for the enduring relevance and applicability of these principles in today’s diverse societies. A second line of argument explores how the saṅgha assembly, as a collective entity, contributes to the establishment of a just and harmonious society.
 Keywords: Buddhist governance, Saṅgha, Dhammarājā, Dhammādhippateyya, Dhammocracy, Pāramī, Cambodia.

Should Animals Have Political Rights?

Should Animals Have Political Rights?

Reasoning and reversibility in capacity law

A key objective of the law in the assessment of decision-making capacity in clinical settings is to allow clinicians and judges to avoid making value judgements about the reasons that...

Eliminativní materialismus, lidová psychologie a jazyk myšlení

The article provides an analysis of Paul and Patricia Churchland’s eliminative materialism. I will distinguish two lines of argument in their eliminativism: one seeking to eliminate folk psychology and the second criticising Jerry Fodor’s language of thought hypothesis. Then I will closely examine the second line of argument, and show that it represents the main motive of Churchland’s work since the end of 1980s and demonstrate why the success of the argument against the language of thought hypothesis does not constitute a reason for the elimination of folk psychology. Finally, I will examine the consequences of this approach for the role of folk psychology in the study of mind and show that the weakened eliminativist position still fulfils the original aim of Churchland’s program.

Between absolutism and efficiency

The author develops two lines of argument. One line responds to specific objections advanced by his critics and seeks to show that these objections do not undermine the claim that the safety and feasibility standards are rationally justifiable alternatives to cost-justification. This Reply leads, however, with a second line of argument. We are all—consequentialists and non-consequentialists, philosophers and economists—imprisoned in the grip of the debate between utilitarianism and its critics that dominated political philosophy in the latter half of the 20th century. Classical utilitarianism fell into disfavor because its commitment to maximizing utility may justify depriving minorities of basic rights whenever such restrictions promote the greatest net happiness. The cure for this fault is to make some basic rights “absolute”— to rule out some trade-offs entirely. The legacy of this debate is the conclusion that we must choose between “absolutism” and “efficiency”. Unattractive as “efficient” trade-offs may be, the absolute prohibition of trade-offs is untenable when risks of physical harm are at issue. The safety and feasibility standards must fail because they are unacceptably absolutist. Once we shake ourselves free of this philosophical legacy we can see that these standards are standards for making trade-offs not for forbidding them and that the trade-offs they prescribe are plausible.

Between Absolutism and Efficiency: Reply to Professors Giestfeld, Grady, and Priel

This paper replies to Professor Geistfeld, Grady, and Priel’s excellent comments on my article Principles of Risk Imposition and the Priority of Avoiding Harm, 36 Revus J. for Const. Th. & Phil. of Law, 7 (2018). Both my article and Professor Geistfeld’s, Grady’s and Priel’s papers are part of the “Symposium: Risk Regulation and Tort Law, A discussion with Gregory C. Keating.” This Reply completes the Symposium. It attempts, briefly, to develop two lines of argument. One line attempts to respond to the specific criticism that Professors Geistfeld, Grady, and Priel, make in the Comments. In part, my specific replies seek to show that the safety and feasibility standards are rationally justifiable and genuine alternatives to cost-justification as a standard of precaution. Though I disagree with specific arguments of each of my critics, I believe that other claims they make are true, but do not undermine my arguments. For example, my arguments are compatible with Professor Grady’s correct observation that juries have the authority to reach verdicts inconsistent with the priority of avoiding harm — or any other theory of negligence. The merits of jury adjudication are not settled by any normative theory of reasonable care. I also agree with Professor Priel’s thesis that societies do not prioritize harm prevention. We are, I think, torn between competing moral outlooks and the standards of precaution that express those outlooks. My point is that standards of precaution which prioritize the avoidance of harm are rationally defensible, albeit in non-welfarist terms. I am likewise persuaded that Professor Geistfeld is correct to contend that welfare economics is compatible with non-welfarist normative commitments, but mistaken to think that measures such as willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept are the best ways to articulate the concrete implications of non-welfarist principles of precaution. This Reply leads, however, with a second line of argument. We are all — consequentialists and non-consequentialists, philosophers and economists — imprisoned in the grip of the debate between utilitarianism and its critics that dominated political philosophy in the latter half of the 20th century. Classical utilitarianism fell into disfavor because its commitment to maximizing utility is capable of justifying deprivations of basic rights for a minority whenever such restrictions promoted the greatest net happiness. The cure for this disease lay in making some basic rights “absolute” — in ruling out some trade-offs entirely. Applied to problems of risk imposition, the legacy of this debate is the assumption that we must choose between “absolutism” and “efficiency”. Unattractive as “efficient” trade-offs may be, the absolute prohibition of trade-offs is untenable when risks of physical harm are at issue. The safety and feasibility standards must fail because they are unacceptably absolutist. Once we shake ourselves free of this philosophical legacy we can see that this is not the case: these standards are standards for making trade-offs not for forbidding them and that the trade-offs they prescribe are perfectly plausible.

‘The past is a foreign country’: exoticism and nostalgia in contemporary transnational cinema

ABSTRACTGlobal interconnectedness has resulted in cultural homogenisation and a growing disenchantment with the perceived deficiencies of contemporary (Western) culture. This has led, on the one hand, to an elegiac longing for an idealised past and, on the other, a buoyant interest in cultural difference, specifically, the exotic. The essay aims to advance scholarly debates on exoticism in cinema by tracing its close affinities with nostalgia, attending to the concepts’ shared aesthetic and ideological trajectories. It theorises and differentiates between the ‘imperialist nostalgia film’ and the ‘exotic nostalgia film’ by using Gurinder Chadha’s Viceroy’s House (2017) and Wong Kar-wai’s In the Mood for Love (2000) as case studies. While the former evokes nostalgia for the British Empire, the latter engenders a universal longing in the spectator for a time and place when intensity of feeling was possible. In a second line of argument, the article develops a model of transnational reception which explores the hypothesis that nostalgia and exoticism evoke different aesthetic responses in local and global spectators. While nostalgia is premised on familiarity and the remembrance of shared local traditions, the exotic gaze is that of an outsider to whom the cultural Other seems enigmatic and alluring.

Resource Allocation and Firm Boundaries

In a modern economy, much of the allocation of financial and nonfinancial resources is mediated by organizations. This essay points to three general features of this mediating role of organizations in the resource allocation process. One line of argument relates to the distinct opportunities and opportunity costs that an organization faces. The set of investment opportunities for organizations differs as a result of their privileged access to different investment opportunities. The second line of argument considers the impact of differential beliefs and perspectives on the resource allocation process. The diversity of independent budgetary entities, both internal to and external to the organization, is argued to importantly influence the heterogeneity of the bases of selection among alternative investment opportunities. Lastly, this mediation of resource allocation by the firm plays a particularly important role with respect to the allocation of resources over time on a given initiative. Organizations do not simply buffer initiatives from selection but potentially provide different bases for interim selection processes.

Emotions, Cognition, and Collective Alignment: A Response to Collins

Emotions, Cognition, and Collective Alignment: A Response to Collins

Dutch Protocols for Deliberately Ending the Life of Newborns: A Defence.

The Groningen Protocol, introduced in the Netherlands in 2005 and accompanied by revised guidelines published in a report commissioned by the Royal Dutch Medical Association in 2014, specifies conditions under which the lives of severely ill newborns may be deliberately ended. Its publication came four years after the Netherlands became the first nation to legalize the voluntary active euthanasia of adults, and the Netherlands remains the only country to offer a pathway to protecting physicians who might engage in deliberately ending the life of a newborn (DELN). In this paper, I offer two lines of argument. The first is a positive argument for the Protocol, grounded in the good of the newborn as unanimously determined by those in a position to determine it. The second addresses the widely shared belief that the killing of newborns is morally prohibited, where I offer two arguments-one grounded in the fact that the kinds of cases the Protocol is meant to govern are very rare and highly unusual, and the other focused more broadly on the role of pre-theoretical beliefs in moral reasoning-meant to undermine the strong role that the critic of the Protocol affords this belief. I argue that, given this second line of argument, the beliefs underlying my positive argument for the Protocol are in fact more secure than the widely shared belief underlying the critic's position.

Evaluation study design – a pluralist approach to evidence

ABSTRACTThere is significant controversy over what counts as evidence in the evaluation of social interventions. It is increasingly common to use methodological criteria to rank evidence types in a hierarchy, with Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs) at or near the highest level. Because of numerous challenges to a hierarchical approach, this article offers a Matrix (or typology) of evaluation evidence, which is justified by the following two lines of argument. First, a pluralist approach to evidence is defended. Starting from the principle of methodological aptness, it is argued that different types of research question are best answered by different types of study. This article will address some of the key issues in the debate on RCTs (the ethical principles of duty of care and social utility, the role of random allocation, and threats to internal validity) in respect of which two opposing paradigms provide irreconcilable arguments, namely the position that RCTs are the ‘gold standard’ and the opposing position that RCTs are often if not always inappropriate in social settings. The second line of argument is that evaluations often require both experimental and non-experimental research in tandem. In a pluralist approach, non-causal evidence is seen as a vital component in order to evaluate interventions in mixed methods studies (as part of evidence-based practice [EBP]) and also is important for good practice itself (as part of practice-based evidence [PBE]). The article concludes by providing a detailed description of what an Evaluation Evidence Matrix can and cannot do.

The Bright Line of Ethical Agency

In his article The Nature, Importance, and Difficulty of Machine Ethics, James H. Moor distinguishes two lines of argument for those who wish to draw a “bright line” between full ethical agents, such as human beings, and “weaker” ethical agents, such as machines whose actions have significant moral ramifications. The first line of argument is that only full ethical agents are agents at all. The second is that no machine could have the presumed features necessary for ethical agency. This paper shows why Moor is mistaken in his refutation of the first line of argument; it also makes a positive case that “weaker” ethical agents are not agents at all. This positive case, however, allows Moor’s rejection of the second line of argument to stand: allowing that there could be moral machines, but that these machines would have to be full moral agents and not merely something that models moral behavior or can be used in morally charged ways.

Hildegard of Bingen: A Feminist Ontology

Two major lines of argument support the notion that Hildegard of Bingen’s metaphysics is peculiarly gynocentric. Contra the standard commentary on her work, the focus is not on the notion of viriditas; rather, the first line of argument presents a specific delineation of her ontology, demonstrating that it is a graded hierarchy of beings, many of which present feminine aspects of the divine, and all of which establish the metaphysical notion of interpenetrability. The second line of argument specifically contrasts her thought to that of Aquinas and Meister Eckhart, noting areas of similarity and difference. It is concluded that the visionary origins of Hildegard’s work may have to some extent precluded our understanding of it, and that her work merits consideration not only philosophically and theologically but from the standpoint of its early presentation of a gynocentric worldview.

Evaluating the tropical forest carbon sink

Evaluating the tropical forest carbon sink

Justice, Reason, and Luck in Rationing Lifesaving Medical Resources

Justice, Reason, and Luck in Rationing Lifesaving Medical Resources

Continental Drift in the Treatment of Dominant Firms: Article 102 TFEU in Contrast to § 2 Sherman Act

In this paper we compare the concepts of monopolization and abuse of dominance as in §2 of the Sherman Act and Article 102 of the TFEU, respectively. After identifying a number of distinctive features in wording and interpretation - including the special responsibility of the dominant firm, competition of the merits and protection of the competitive process - we discuss three lines of argument to explain these differences. The first builds on ordo-liberalism, with its concern for the absence of market power and for the resilience of competitive markets, which influenced EU competition law from the very beginning. The second line of argument derives from the observation that public competition law enforcement is fallible, which self-enforcement could remedy. The third argument explains some of these differences via innovation, whereby Article 102 would reflect a European perspective on innovation. We subsequently return to the underutilized EU category of exploitative abuses and argue that economic techniques developed in the context of damages litigation could open it up for future enforcement in a way that would be in line with ordo-liberal principles, properly understood.

Radioactive high level waste insight modelling for geological disposal facilities

Within this paper we present a simplified analytical model to provide insight into the key performance measures of a generic disposal system for high level waste within a geological disposal facility. The model assumes a low solubility waste matrix within a corrosion resistant disposal container surrounded by a low permeability buffer. Radionuclides migrate from the disposal area through a porous geosphere to the biosphere and give a radiological dose to a receptor. The system of equations describing the migration is transformed into Laplace space and an approximation used to determine peak values for the radionuclide mass transfer rate entering the biosphere. Results from the model are compared with those from more detailed numerical models for key radionuclides in the UK high level waste inventory. Such an insight model can provide a valuable second line of argument to assist in confirming the results of more detailed models and build confidence in the safety case for a geological disposal facility.

Invoking Experience as Evidence

Abstract: This paper uses the hundreds of private letters that women sent to the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in 1968–9 to explore women's changing interpretations of paid work in the twenty-five years after the Second World War. These working women often invoked their own experiences as evidence the commission should heed, although its staff tended to see the letters as subjective and personal, and thus less useful than official briefs. The letters offer us insight into how women negotiated and interpreted changing patterns of paid work, as the number of working mothers increased significantly in this era. An analysis of the letters revisits feminist debates about the concept of experience: while some feminist writers have become increasingly skeptical of using women's words as ‘authentic’ evidence from the past, others remain committed to the ‘retrieval of experience,’ arguing that we can use the concept in a way that does not reify experience, gloss over differences between women, or ignore the way in which it is interpreted by historical actors using the cultural resources at hand. Following from the second line of argument, the paper also suggests that the letters offer us a sense of connection to and feeling for the past, which should remain important aspects of feminist history.

The Retributive Emotions: Passions and Pains of Punishment

It is not usually morally permissible to desire the suffering of another person, or to act so as to satisfy this desire; that is, to act with the aim of bringing about suffering. If the retributive emotions, and the retributive responses of which they are a part, are morally permitted or even required, we will need to see what is distinctive about them. One line of argument in this paper is for the conclusion that a retributive desire for the suffering of the wrong-doer, and the aim to bring this about, can (contra recent arguments from Hanna 2008) be morally justified. It has been suggested that by reflecting on the role of the retributive emotions in interpersonal relationships, and the alleged legitimacy of the aim for the suffering of the wrong-doer within them, support can be garnered for retributive practices of punishment by the state (Duff 1986 and 2001, Bennett 2002 and 2003). The conclusion of the second line of argument in the paper is that whilst the retributive responses can permissibly aim at suffering, the way in which this is so in interpersonal relationships cannot provide support for retributive state punishment.