Search Frictions Research Articles

Home construction financing and search frictions in the housing market

This paper studies the effects of financial frictions in construction on housing market dynamics. To this end, we build a search-theoretic model of the housing market in which there is endogenous entry of buyers and developers face credit constraints. We capture credit frictions by assuming that developers must search for financing before building a home à la Wasmer and Weil (2004). Our model explores a novel channel that links credit frictions faced by developers to the housing market. We calibrate the model to quantify the size of the credit channel during the 2012–2019 housing market recovery. Through a series of counterfactuals, our model predicts that the credit channel had a large impact on housing liquidity, construction, and the vacancy rate. Furthermore, it accounts for around half of the rise in prices during the 2012-2019 housing market recovery.

A job ladder model of executive compensation

This paper examines the impact of managerial labor market competition on executive incentive contracts. I develop a dynamic contracting model that incorporates moral hazard, search frictions, and poaching offers. The model generates a job ladder along which executives can either use outside offers to renegotiate with the current firm or transition to outside firms. I show that poaching offers generate a new source of incentives, which explains a novel empirical finding whereby larger firms give executives a higher proportion of incentive compensation.

Foundations of Market Power in Monetary Economies

We study the foundations of firms' market power in a continuous-time model where agents are price-makers who interact explicitly with each other. Market power arises from the existence of rents, the size of which depends on consumers' outside options, and firms' ability to appropriate these rents through rent seeking. We study how measures of market power (e.g., markups, concentration) are affected by search frictions, monetary policy, and self-fulfilling beliefs. An increase in the nominal interest rate affects market power by changing consumers' payment capacity and the value of their outside options, and by altering firms' rent-seeking behavior.

Does the effect of employment protection depend on the composition of unemployment?

I develop an equilibrium-matching model with job rationing and endogenous layoffs in order to investigate whether the composition of unemployment (rationing versus frictional) influences the way firing costs affect employment. The model suggests that firing costs lead to a strong adverse employment effect if unemployment is mainly caused by job rationing, whereas in labor markets driven by search frictions firing costs have only a negligible impact on employment. The paper tests this hypothesis using data on the adoption of wrongful-dismissal laws adopted by U.S. state courts during the 1970s and 1980s. Results indicate that for two of the three wrongful-dismissal laws investigated, unemployment composition is crucial for the induced employment effects.

Automation, Bargaining Power, and Labor Market Fluctuations

We argue that the threat of automation weakens workers’ bargaining power in wage negotiations, dampening wage adjustments and amplifying unemployment fluctuations. We make this argument based on a business cycle model with labor market search frictions, generalized to incorporate automation decisions. In the model, procyclical automation threats create endogenous real wage rigidity that amplifies labor market fluctuations. The automation mechanism is consistent with empirical evidence. It is also quantitatively important for explaining the large volatilities of unemployment and vacancies relative to that of real wages, a puzzling observation through the lens of standard business cycle models. (JEL E13, E24, E32, J31, J63, J64)

Discussion of “Understanding the international rise and fall of inflation since 2020”

This discussion comments on the ambitious paper, “Understanding the International Rise and Fall of Inflation Since 2020,” by Mai Chi Dao, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Daniel Leigh, and Prachi Mishra. The strengths of the DGLM paper are manifest. There is much to learn from it, both about the commonalities of the inflation experiences of this large group of important countries and their differences, and I draw some lessons and policy implications. I will suggest that one could have learned even more if the authors had devoted some of their effort to comparing the recent global inflation episode to earlier experiences, and if they had related their empirical specification and results to predictions of models with search frictions.

The technological origins of the decline in labor market dynamism

In the last decades, there has been a marked decline in the job flows to and from unemployment and between employment. We ask whether and how technological change can account for his secular decline in labor market dynamism. We propose a theory that focuses on the determinants of technology broadly defined: 1. the complementarity between worker skill and firm productivity; and 2. the volatility in productivity shocks; and 3. search frictions. We derive job flows in a sorting model with search frictions and endogenous search effort both on and off the job, as well as shocks that lead to mismatch. We quantify our model using the US data and find an increase in the complementarity between labor and technology, a decline in the frequency and volatility of productivity shocks, and a decline in the match efficiency as well as an increase in the search costs. The changing nature of these features of the technology contributes to the secular decline in labor market dynamism.

Cash is King? Understanding Financing Risk in Housing Markets

Abstract In Los Angeles, all-cash home purchases quintupled during the last decade. Compared with an else-equal mortgage offer, a cash offer is associated with 29% shorter time-to-close and a 2-3.9% price discount, indicating a substantial amount of financing risk—the risk to a seller that a transaction may not close on time and may fail to occur again because a mortgage contingency fails. The estimated cash discount aligns well with a canonical model calibrated to the sample market. Our findings reveal that closing risk alone is insufficient to explain the cash discount. Rather, it turns on the possibility that a property back on the market may fail to sell, requiring a substantial risk compensation. The estimated cash discount is smaller during booms and in larger markets, highlighting the inseparability of financial frictions in the mortgage market and search frictions in the housing market.

Immigration, legal status and fiscal impact

We develop a general equilibrium model with search frictions in the labor market, wage bargaining and a welfare state, to study the impact of immigrants on the fiscal balance and welfare of natives in the host country. We distinguish immigrants by legal status and account for both their direct fiscal effects, through their tax contributions and transfer receipts, and their indirect fiscal and welfare effects, through their labor-market impact. We calibrate the model to the U.S. economy and find that legal immigrants reduce the tax burden on natives and increase natives' welfare, mainly because their tax contributions greatly exceed the transfers they receive. On the other hand, illegal immigrants' positive welfare impact stems mainly from their positive effect on job creation, which increases income to natives and in turn consumption. A legalization program leads to a fiscal gain, increases natives' welfare and is more beneficial to natives than a purely restrictive immigration policy that reduces the illegal immigrant population.

A Structural Analysis of Mental Health and Labour Market Trajectories

Abstract We analyse the joint life-cycle dynamics of labour market and mental health outcomes while allowing for two-way interactions between work and mental health. We model selection into jobs on a labour market with search frictions, accounting for the level of exposure to stress in each job using data on occupational health contents. Taking our model to British data from Understanding Society combined with information from O*NET, we estimate the impact of job characteristics on health dynamics and the effects of health and job stress contents on career choices. We use our model to quantify the effects of job loss, health shocks, or job stress shocks that propagate over the life cycle through both health and work channels. We also estimate the (large) values workers attach to health, employment, or nonstressful jobs.

Search theory of imperfect competition with decreasing returns to scale

I study a version of the search-theoretic model of imperfect competition by Burdett and Judd (1983) in which sellers operate a production technology with decreasing rather than constant returns to scale. Equilibrium exists and is unique, and its structure depends on the extent of search frictions. If search frictions are large enough, the price distribution is non-degenerate and atomless. If search frictions are neither too large nor too small, the price distribution is non-degenerate with an atom at the lowest price. If search frictions are small enough, the price distribution is degenerate. Equilibrium is efficient if and only if the price distribution is degenerate. Generically, neither the structure nor the welfare properties of equilibrium are the same as in Burdett and Judd (1983). As in Burdett and Judd (1983), however, equilibrium outcomes span the spectrum from pure monopoly to perfect competition as search frictions decline.

An Anatomy of Monopsony: Search Frictions, Amenities, and Bargaining in Concentrated Markets

An Anatomy of Monopsony: Search Frictions, Amenities, and Bargaining in Concentrated Markets

A Theory of the Term Structure of Interest Rates under Limited Household Risk Sharing

Abstract We present a theory in which the interaction between limited sharing of idiosyncratic labor income risk and labor adjustment costs (that endogenously arise through search frictions) determines interest rate dynamics. In the general equilibrium, the interaction of these two ingredients relates bond risk premiums, cross-sectional skewness of income growth, and labor market tightness. Our model rationalizes an upward-sloping average yield curve and predicts a negative relation between labor market tightness and bond risk premiums. We provide evidence for our theory’s mechanism and predictions.

The Temptation of Social Networks under Job Search Frictions

Abstract This paper presents descriptive evidence that although social networks are helpful to find jobs, the jobs found through social networks tend to be mismatched. The paper uses nationally representative matched employer–employee data in Bangladesh that include direct measures of match quality. Less educated and seemingly poorer workers are more likely to have found their jobs through social networks. Compared to workers at the same occupation level in the same firm who were matched through formal channels, those matched through social networks found their jobs quicker but have lower match quality and earn less. The mechanism, suggested by a theoretical model, is as follows: even when social networks are connected to mismatched jobs, workers can be tempted to use social networks to find mismatched jobs for fear of finding nothing. This temptation is stronger for less skilled and poorer workers, because costly formal channels are less rewarding and affordable for them.

Financial frictions and inter-firm wage dispersion: A structural estimation

Based on the stylized facts about financial frictions, this paper proposes a general equilibrium model to show that firms can transmit heterogeneous financial costs to workers through wage-bargaining in the labor market with search frictions. In the equilibrium, both financial frictions and search frictions induce inter-firm wage dispersion. Structural estimation indicates that the model accounts for 34–77% of the observed wage dispersion, in which a sizable share is attributable to financial frictions. The bargaining power and market power are important for the cost-transformation process.

Simple relational contracts and the dynamics of social capital

This article proposes a dynamic model to examine the structure of “simple” relational contracts, obeying realistic properties that can be easily understood and audited by both parties. In such relationships, the need to offer each supplier a large enough share of future business to deter cheating limits the number of relationships a buyer can sustain. Trade is thus restricted to durable relationships, a form of social capital. Nevertheless, exogenous stochastic shocks sometimes prevent suppliers from fulfilling their promises and relationships are constantly dissolving and later renewed. Moreover, the coming of a crisis, where stochastic shocks are more probable, can lead to the quick rupture of some relationships as there is less expected future business to incentivize all suppliers. New relationships can later be formed, but this takes time due to search frictions. This suggests new connections between the theory of relational contracting and the macroeconomic analysis of recessions.

Decentralized finance (DeFi) markets for startups: search frictions, intermediation, and the efficiency of the ICO market

AbstractThis paper examines the efficiency of the Initial Coin Offering (ICO) market through a search-theoretical lens. Search intensity associated with the process of identifying valuable startups is increasing in market granularity. DLT increases market granularity because asset tokenization lowers entry barriers. Lower-end entrants, however, increase aggregate search intensity but may lack search skills. The resulting search-related inefficiency creates a niche for intermediaries or institutional investors that specialize on search. Consistent with the theory, specialized crypto funds increase ICO market efficiency by reducing search frictions, inter alia, by shortening the time-to-funding and increasing the funding amount. At the same time, crypto funds extract sizable economic rents for their intermediation services. Overall, the study relates to the general trade-off between centralization and decentralization in entrepreneurial finance. It suggests that market frictions specific to early-stage crowdfunding of entrepreneurship may prevent “perfectly” Decentralized Finance (DeFi) markets from functioning efficiently.

Central bank asset purchases and lending: Impact on search frictions

We investigate the impact of two central bank policies, asset purchases and asset lending, on the search frictions in the government bond market in Japan. We build a search-theoretic model to explore the impact of a central bank’s securities lending facility (SLF) by introducing a central bank as a lender. We test model predictions using intraday data from an electronic platform for Japanese government bonds. First, we find large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) increase order imbalance in the repurchase agreement (repo) market. Threshold analysis reveals that asset purchase amounts exceeding 0.18% of the outstanding, which corresponds to 38.98% of our sample, cause a significantly higher imbalance. Second, the SLF has a floor effect on the repo rate by affecting dealers’ choices between the repo market and the SLF. Third, the novel friction measures we test show that LSAPs and the SLF have opposite influences on bargaining power in the repo market.

Contracting and search with heterogeneous principals and agents

This paper incorporates a risk-neutral principal-agent problem into a random search model to study contracting and search in general equilibrium. I introduce heterogeneity in principals' and agents' production technologies in terms of the distribution of output across states of nature. Under optimal contracting, this heterogeneity can give rise to complementarity in contracting between specific principal and agent types. In contrast to complementarity in production, complementarity in contracting affects only the division of the surplus but not its size and can induce principals to engage in overly intense search before forming a match. I show that a reduction in search frictions and contractual innovations can induce principals to engage in overly intense search.

Search Frictions in Small Business Lending Markets

Search Frictions in Small Business Lending Markets