Scottish Philosophy Research Articles

The Tradition of Scottish Philosophy

Philosophical BooksVolume 33, Issue 3 p. 142-143 The Tradition of Scottish Philosophy M. A. STEWART, M. A. STEWART AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITYSearch for more papers by this author M. A. STEWART, M. A. STEWART AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITYSearch for more papers by this author First published: July 1992 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.1992.tb02338.xCitations: 1Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article.Citing Literature Volume33, Issue3July 1992Pages 142-143 RelatedInformation

The American Republic

This article explores the often neglected impact on the American political system of Scottish Common Sense Realism and an Augustinian anthropology drawn from both this Scottish philosophy and the American culture's Puritan/Presbyterian roots. Such insights help us better understand the dynamics of the American system and its possible contribution as a paradigm or model for democratization in the communist world Significant differences between America and the communist world with respect to their distinct intellectual and cultural histories seem to preclude the applicability of the American system to post-communist nations in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, Yet theological convergences among the prevailing religious traditions of these nations and America suggest that the Augustinian anthropological realism of the American system may have relevance to communist world cultures after all.

Scotland and America in the Age of the Enlightenment.

Now in paperback this book displaces the notion that 18th-century Scotland and America were mere cultural provinces of England. It shows that Scottish religious culture, philosophy, medical education, music and architecture were directly influencing British North America at this time. 16 contributors including David Daiches, Andrew Hook and Bruce Lenman, focus on 3 main topics: religion and revolution as affected by the work of John Witherspoon; the influence of Scottish philosophers such as David Hume, Adam Smith and William Robertson on the American founding fathers, and vice-versa; and Scottish thought and culture in early Philadelphia. For those new to the period there is an extensive historiographical introduction, and chapters cover all aspects of the arts and sciences, including music, rhetoric, politics, philosophy, economics, jurisprudence, medicine, architecture and literature.

Scotland and America in the Age of the Enlightenment.

Now in paperback this book displaces the notion that 18th-century Scotland and America were mere cultural provinces of England. It shows that Scottish religious culture, philosophy, medical education, music and architecture were directly influencing British North America at this time. 16 contributors including David Daiches, Andrew Hook and Bruce Lenman, focus on 3 main topics: religion and revolution as affected by the work of John Witherspoon; the influence of Scottish philosophers such as David Hume, Adam Smith and William Robertson on the American founding fathers, and vice-versa; and Scottish thought and culture in early Philadelphia. For those new to the period there is an extensive historiographical introduction, and chapters cover all aspects of the arts and sciences, including music, rhetoric, politics, philosophy, economics, jurisprudence, medicine, architecture and literature.

On the Origin of Hillʼs Causal Criteria

The rules to assess causation formulated by the eighteenth century Scottish philosopher David Hume are compared to Sir Austin Bradford Hill's causal criteria. The strength of the analogy between Hume's rules and Hill's causal criteria suggests that, irrespective of whether Hume's work was known to Hill or Hill's predecessors, Hume's thinking expresses a point of view still widely shared by contemporary epidemiologists. The lack of systematic experimental proof to causal inferences in epidemiology may explain the analogy of Hume's and Hill's, as opposed to Popper's, logic.

Impartiality and Friendship

Previous articleNext article No AccessSymposium on Impartiality and Ethical TheoryImpartiality and FriendshipMarcia BaronMarcia Baron Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 101, Number 4Jul., 1991 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/293346 Views: 46Total views on this site Citations: 38Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1991 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Ingrid V. Albrecht Rules of disengagement: a Kantian account of the relationship between former friends, Philosophical Studies 44 (Jun 2022).https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-022-01823-4Katherine Dormandy Loving truly: An epistemic approach to the doxastic norms of love, Synthese 200, no.33 (May 2022).https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03562-9Laura K. Soter, Martha K. Berg, Susan A. Gelman, Ethan Kross What we would (but shouldn't) do for those we love: Universalism versus partiality in responding to others' moral transgressions, Cognition 217 (Dec 2021): 104886.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104886Berit Brogaard Practical Identity and Duties of Love, Disputatio 13, no.6060 (Jul 2021): 27–50.https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2021-0002Marcia Baron, Taylor Rogers Patriotism and Impartiality, (Jul 2020): 409–427.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54484-7_2Almudena Rivadulla Durán El concepto de amistad en Kant, Isegoría , no.6161 (Dec 2019): 463.https://doi.org/10.3989/isegoria.2019.061.03Nina Brewer-Davis Roles and relationships: On whether social roles ground associative reasons, European Journal of Philosophy 27, no.22 (Sep 2018): 377–386.https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12401Jessica Isserow On having bad persons as friends, Philosophical Studies 175, no.1212 (Oct 2017): 3099–3116.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0996-0Samantha Vice Impartiality, partiality and privilege, (Nov 2018): 130–147.https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429438189-9Marcia Baron, Taylor Rogers Patriotism and Impartiality, (Oct 2017): 1–19.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30534-9_2-1Marcia Baron, Taylor Rogers Patriotism and Impartiality, (Apr 2018): 1–19.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30534-9_2-2Motsamai Molefe An African perspective on the partiality and impartiality debate: Insights from Kwasi Wiredu's moral philosophy, South African Journal of Philosophy 36, no.44 (Nov 2017): 470–482.https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2017.1342465Allen Wood Formulas of the Moral Law, 3 (Aug 2017).https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108332736 Bibliography, (Sep 2017): 591–675.https://doi.org/10.1002/9781405164498.biblioJoseph Walsh Commitment and Partialism in the Ethics of Care, Hypatia 32, no.44 (Jan 2020): 817–832.https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12362Katherine Hawley Partiality and prejudice in trusting, Synthese 191, no.99 (Jun 2012): 2029–2045.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0129-4 Bibliographie, (Feb 2014): 243–255.https://doi.org/10.3917/puf.bill.2014.01.0243Stephanie Collins Duties to Make Friends, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16, no.55 (Apr 2013): 907–921.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-013-9422-7Mary Healy Civic Friendship, Studies in Philosophy and Education 30, no.33 (Feb 2011): 229–240.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-011-9221-3Marilea Bramer The Importance of Personal Relationships in Kantian Moral Theory: A Reply to Care Ethics, Hypatia 25, no.11 (Mar 2020): 121–139.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2009.01087.xDan O'Brien A Feminist Interpretation of Hume on Testimony, Hypatia 25, no.33 (Mar 2020): 632–652.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2010.01100.xDan O'Brien Communication between friends, Empedocles: European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication 1, no.11 (Nov 2009): 27–41.https://doi.org/10.1386/ejpc.1.1.27/1Heidi L. Maibom, Fred Bennett Patriotic Virtue, Political Studies 57, no.33 (Oct 2009): 639–659.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2008.00755.xMARIA A. CARRASCO ADAM SMITH ON MORALITY, JUSTICE ANDTHE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY, Journal of Scottish Philosophy 6, no.22 (Sep 2008): 135–156.https://doi.org/10.3366/E1479665108000183Jon Rick Hume's and Smith's Partial Sympathies and Impartial Stances, Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5, no.22 (Sep 2007): 135–158.https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2007.5.2.135Daryl Glaser Partiality to Conationals or Solidarity with the Oppressed?, Ethnicities 5, no.44 (Jul 2016): 486–509.https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796805058097J. David Velleman Self to Self, 121 (Jul 2009).https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498862Albert W. Musschenga The Debate on Impartiality: An Introduction, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8, no.1-21-2 (Apr 2005): 1–10.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-005-3290-8Alisa L. Carse The Moral Contours of Empathy, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8, no.1-21-2 (Apr 2005): 169–195.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-005-3291-7ROBERT F. CARD CONSEQUENTIALISM, TELEOLOGY, AND THE NEW FRIENDSHIP CRITIQUE 1, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85, no.22 (May 2004): 149–172.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0279-0750.2004.00192.xKarl Hennig Morality and Selfhood, (Jan 2004): 57–77.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2552-5_4Andrew I. Cohen Examining the Bonds and Bounds of Friendship, Dialogue 42, no.22 (Apr 2010): 321–344.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300004546Raja Halwani Care Ethics and Virtue Ethics, Hypatia 18, no.33 (Mar 2020): 161–192.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2003.tb00826.xAmitai Etzioni Are Particularistic Obligations Justified? A Communitarian Examination, The Review of Politics 64, no.44 (Aug 2009): 573–598.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034670500035889Michael Gorr Justice, Self-Ownership, and Natural Assets, Social Philosophy and Policy 12, no.22 (Jun 2009): 267–291.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500004751Monique Deveaux Shifting Paradigms: Theorizing Care and Justice in Political Theory, Hypatia 10, no.22 (Mar 2020): 115–119.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1995.tb01372.xMargaret Urban Walker Feminism, Ethics, and the Question of Theory, Hypatia 7, no.33 (Mar 2020): 23–38.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1992.tb00903.xSteven R. Ratner, Lukas H. Meyer Do international organisations play favourites? An impartialist account, (): 123–162.https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511691720.005

P. G. Tait and edinburgh natural philosophy, 1860–1901

Summary Though P. G. Tait was in a seemingly perfect position to teach both William Thomson's thermodynamics and James Clerk Maxwell's electromagnetic theory of light, he did not. Tait probably first encountered the new thermodynamics in the 1850s at Queen's College, Belfast, and presented the ideas in his inaugural lecture at Edinburgh in 1860, soon making energy theory the centre-piece of his course there. The comprehensiveness of energy theory plus Thomson's opposition to Maxwell's electromagnetic theory evidently combined in causing Tait to de-emphasize Maxwell's theory. Ironically, Tait, the loyal Scot, thus inadvertently contributed to what might be termed the Anglicization of Scottish natural philosophy.

The Tradition of Scottish Philosophy.

The Tradition of Scottish Philosophy.

Possible Theological Perspectives in Thomas Reid's Common Sense Philosophy

It is well known that Thomas Reid, premier exponent of the Common Sense school of Scottish philosophy, was an ordained and active minister. Less clear is the role played by theology in the deve opment ofthat philosophy as it matured slowly under his pen, particularly in me most prominent of his works, the Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785) and the Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind (1788), works which range widely over the field of human experience and the nature of reality. When philosophy and theology assumed more distinct and separate identities in the generations which succeeded Reid, it became common for critics of the Common Sense school to base their analyses solely on philosophical foundations and to neglect the theological underpinning which is essential to a fuller and clearer grasp of Keid s position. It would be a useful contribution to more than one discipline were Thomas Reid's philosophy linked more closely to the development and extent of his theological thinking. While his philosophical writings are strewn with theological references in the way typical of the eighteenth century, there is more substance in these references than is usually the case, when divines ofthat age wrote philosophy. That they are much more than casual, conventional embellishments becomes apparent from a careful reading of his works.

Princeton and the Republic, 1768-1822: The Search for a Christian Enlightenment in the Era of Samuel Stanhope Smith.

Widely viewed during the Revolutionary period as a champion of both republicanism and evangelical Calvinism, the College of New Jersey nonetheless experienced great inner turmoil as its leaders tried to support the stability of the new nation by integrating sound principles of science and faith. Focusing on three presidencies--those of John Witherspoon, Samuel Stanhope Smith, and Ashbel Green--Mark Noll relates the dramatic institutional history of what is now Princeton University, a history closely related to the intellectual development of the early republic. Noll examines in detail the student rebellions and the trustees' disillusionment with the college, which, despite Witherspoon's and Stanhope Smith's efforts to harmonize traditional Reformed faith with a moderate Scottish enlightenment, led to the establishment of a separate Presbyterian seminary in 1812. As a cultural and intellectual history of the early United States, this book deepens our understanding of how science, religion, and politics interacted during the period. Close attention is given to the Scottish philosophy of common sense, which Stanhope Smith developed into an educational vision that he hoped would encourage a stable social order.

Naturalism and William Paley

MARK FRANCIS? I This article is an attempt to establish William Paley’s work as the source of higher political wisdom in England in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Paley’s works were texts at Cambridge University for more than half a century, and he was an author who was required reading at universities in the British ‘outback’ when they were established-Durham University and Sydney University until the middle of the nineteenth century and at the University of Manitoba even in the century’s closing decades. Paley is an English political thinker who needs to be retrieved from the flood of secondary literature on Scottish philosophers and economists. Why late eighteenthand nineteenthcentury English political theorists such as Paley have been ignored while comparatively unimportant Scottish ones have been commemorated is of interest in the same way that Byron thought English bards and Scotch reviewers were of interest. We have been too easily enticed by the strictures of the Edinburgh Review which was so seemingly modern and so open to continental influences. In addition, England in the early nineteenth century was chiefly known for its economics, and following the well-known dramatic dictum of not crowding the centre stage, English political theory was pushed out of it.’ William Paley’s The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy was the most widely used text-book on morals and political philosophy in England from 1785 until the middle of the nineteenth century. It is now one of the least understood historical texts. This obscurity is partly due to the twin foci of modern English historiography upon political philosophy as a debate engaging sixteenthand seventeenth-century minds and upon moral sense philosophy as occupying eighteenth-century ones. In comparison, the nineteenth century, especially the early part of it, is regarded as a non-reflective historical period filled with reform activities of a practical kind and with the spread of methodism and evangelical thought.2 In addition to this quite indefensible periodisation, writers who do not fall into century-long divisions, or whose thought bridges such divisions, are neglected. Paley, like the poets Cowper and Crabbe, is regarded as falling into a void between the eighteenth century and Victorian England. What critical literature there is on Paley usually reflects on the fact that he did not fit a large historical patterning. First, though he taught from Locke, he was uninterested in applying the great seventeenth-century devices of rights, social

Scepticism and Reasonable Doubt: The British Naturalist Tradition in Wilkins, Hume, Reid, and Newman by M. Jamie Ferreira

BOOK REVIEWS 531 topic which makes these weaknesses stand out. They detract from the beauty of the work as a whole. Nonetheless, the work is an opus magnum meriting serious scholarly attention and applause. PETER A. REDPATH St. Johns' University Staten Island, New York Scepticism and Reasonable Doubt: The British Naturalist Tradition in Wilkins, Hume, Reid, and Newman. By M. JAMIE FERREIRA. Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1986. Pp. xii+ 255. Professor M. Jamie Ferreira has written a major contribution to our knowledge and understanding of scepticism within British intellectual life from the late seventeenth century to the late nineteenth. Her cast of characters is at first sight an unusual, even an eclectic one: John Wilkins, an Anglican bishop and founder of the Royal Society; David Hume, himself often regarded as the chief of sceptics; Thomas Reid, the Scottish philosopher of common sense; and John Henry Newman, the most famous Viotorian convert to Roman Catholicism. In Ferreira's analysis what holds this group together is their varied attempts to re· fute scepticism through an appeal " to ' the natural '-to how we are constituted, to what we, as human beings, are and do in the arena of believing " (p. vii). In other words, the refutation of intellectually derived scepticism lies in an examination of practically lived human ex· perience. Ferreira seeks to describe three distinct modes of naturalism. The first is sceptical naturalism such as found in the clearly sceptical pass· ages of Hume. The other forms of naturalism constitute replies to this sceptical position. These anti-sceptical positions are reasonable doubt scepticism and justifying naturalism. Advocates of the former contend there is no reasonable basis for doubt about fundamental beliefs of human nature. They contend that these fundamental lieliefs are more basic than other beliefs rthart are subject to justification. They are indeed the basis of our juslf:ification of other matters. For persons of ithis outlook, rationality and justification are mallters of practice. By contrast justifying naturalism does seek to provide some kind of justification that links what is natural with what can be justified. In effect, justifying naturalism rejects the argument that only one mode of justification can be regarded as legitimate. Reasonable doubt naturalism and justifying naturalism often closely approach each other, but the latter may reject scepticism on grounds other than those of practice. 53~ BOOK REVIEWS Fundamental to Ferreira's argument is her interpretation of the position of John Locke in the anti-sceptical tradition. In contrast to Henry Van Leeuwen, she asserts that rather than standing as the culmination of an earlier liberal Anglican tradition associated with John Wilkins, Locke actually departed from that anti-sceptical position which had based itself largely on the concept of moral certainty. Locke based his rejection of scepticism on a distinction between kinds of certainty rather than upon human nature itself. Whereas Wilkins and others had seen a close and sometimes identical relationship between the highest probability and certainty, Locke distinguished ,the two. For him, cel'tainty had to achieve more than probability. Locke distinguished kinds of evidence from degrees of evidence. He also proposed categories of probability and demonstrated certainty hut no category of proof. This issue is crucial for Ferreira's interpretation of Hume. She contends that Hume understood this distinction in Locke and that he looked to the earlier anti-sceptical tradition. She argues that Hume thought it possible to offer a response to his own sceptical position that actually went beyond simply unavoidably accepting certain beliefs. Hume introduced a category of proof between Locke's categories of certainty and probability. According to Ferreira, he based this category on the previous seventeenth-century distinction between reasonable and unreasonable doubt. Ferreira does not claim a single unified interpretation of Hume, but urges the presence of tension in his thought that allows for the presence at least some of the time of a naturalist approach to scepticism. Thomas Reid was regarded in his day and during most of the nineteenth century as the major critic of Hume. However, Ferreira examines that critique largely in terms of shared concerns. Reid sought to distinguish degrees of certainty in both demonstrative and probabilistic reasoning. His key metaphor was found in the suggestion...

The Scottish Jurists (review)

492 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 26:3JULY i988 undermining his own doctrine of the autonomy of benevolence. But Butler is clear on the distinction between benevolence and virtue. Though God may be a utilitarian, conscience must be the supreme guide for men. The second part of the book (nearly two-thirds of it) is devoted to Butler's philosophy of religion, which Penelhum ranks second only to Hume. Butler's thought on religion is put in the form of an apology directed to a sophisticated Deistic audience which, although assuming a teleological universe, cannot accept Christianity because of its apparently superstitious and arbitrary doctrines of historical revelation, miracles, and a final judgment. Butler's task is to show, assuming a designing intelligence, that the evils and other features of the world make more sense if we suppose something like the Christian revelation to be true. With Humean hindsight, Penelhum admits that such an apology is of little interest today, for there is a simpler explanation of the evils of the world not available to Buder's contemporaries: atheism. The contemporary importance of Butler's apology lies elsewhere, namely as an exploration of the logic of Christian belief. Butler's analogical arguments show that, assuming the Christian revelation, we should expect the world to be pretty much as we find it. Butler succeeds in isolating Christianity as a total interpretation of experience. The standards of likelihood for weighing alternative total interpretations cannot be those of the empirical sciences. Penelhum argues that Buder succeeds in showing the Christian scheme to be more likely than its Deistic competitors, and that if we compare it to contemporary agnosticism or atheism, the problem is to match the greater depth and sensitivity of Christianity against the greater economy and scientific detachment of these positions. The result is often a deadlock with each side accusing the other of begging the question. Given such a deadlock, Buder's final move is to appeal to a prudential argument similar to Pascal's: that the serious claims of Christianity are themselves reasons to give it serious consideration over and above its theoretical likelihood . Penelhum defends a version of this argument and tries to determine how far the practical imperative of Christianity can constrain theory without loss of intellectual integrity. Penelhum observes that Butler's AnalogyofRelig'ionis the "greatest unread classic in philosophical theology." At present there is no edition of it in print. Penelhum's original and profound study of Butler's philosophy of religion, written in a style like unto Buder's own, which is open, persistently clear, and utterly realistic, will do much to revive interest in this important part of Butler's thought. DONALD LIVINGSTON EmoryUniversity David M. Walker. TheScottishJurists. Edinburgh: W. Green & Son, 1985. Pp. xvi + 49~s According to Hume it was supposed that his studious disposition suited him for the study of law, the profession of both his father and grandfather. But, he says in "My Own Life," while his family "fancyed I was poring over Voet and Vinnius, Cicero and BOOK REVIEWS 493 Virgil were the Authors which I was secretly devouring." Notwithstanding this preference , Hume was later to suggest that the revival of learning in Europe could be traced to the rediscovery, in the twelfth century, ofJustinian's Pandects. Professor Walker's book makes only brief mention of the Voets (John and Paul) and Arnold Vinnen or Vinnius, and it is concerned with Roman law only insofar as this remained an influence on Scottish theory and practice, but it does provide us with information about the important Scottishjurisprudential tradition that may have influenced Hume and other Scottish philosophers, while two of these philosophers, Henry Home, Lord Kames and John Millar, are included for discussion. The book is divided into twenty-nine chapters. Except for the first ("The Concept of a Scottish Jurist") and the last ("The Contribution of the Scottish Jurists to the Science of Law in Scotland"), the organization is essentially chronological. The minorjurists of the five centuries (sixteenth to twentieth) covered are dealt with in five summary chapters, while chapters of greatly different lengths are devoted to the more important figures of the same five-century span. As one...

Is Herbert Spencer's Law of Equal Freedom a Utilitarian or a Rights-Based Theory of Justice?

Is Herbert Spencer's Law of Equal Freedom a Utilitarian or a Rights-Based Theory of Justice? T. S. GRAY 1. INTRODUCTION THE RELATIONSHIP between utility and rights has long occupied writers on ethics and politics. These two principles appear to supply alternative and opposed foundations for political theory. Some utilitarians (such as Bentham) dismiss (natural) rights as nonsense. Some rights theorists (such as Kant and Nozick) dismiss utilitarian considerations as outside justice. But attempts have been made to bridge the gulf apparently separating utility from rights. Utilitarians such as J. S. Mill have tried to accommodate the notion of rights within the principle of utility. ~ And Rawls' A Theory of Justice may be interpreted as an attempt by a rights-theorist to accommodate the principle of utility. Herbert Spencer, who was faced in 185o like Rawls in 197o with a climate of intellectual opinion predominantly utilitarian in character, produced a political theory I am endebted to Peter Jones and Hillel Steiner for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. I am grateful to one of the anonymous referees of thisjournal for pointing out to me that "Spencer's basing the law of equal freedom on the Moral Sense suits the respect for the intuitionist Scottish philosophy in Spencer's friendship circle," and for drawing my attention to Mark Francis's unpublished dissertation, The Origim of the SpencerianPhilosophy and the New Reformation (Cambridge, i973) where these connections are explored. The following abbreviations of works by Herbert Spencer are used in this essay: SS SocialStatics(London: John Chapman, 1851). PE ThePrinciplesofEthics, ~vols. (London: Williamsand Northgate, 1879-93). A Autobiography, 2 vols. (London: Williams and Northgate, 19o4). Essays Essays:Scientific,Politicaland Speculative, 3 vols. (London: Williams and Northgate, 19ol). ' John Gray has recently described Mill's theory thus: "We may characterise his indirect utilitarian derivation of basic rights as a rights-based political theory grounded in a goal-based moral theory." "Indirect Utility and Fundamental Human Rights," in E. F. Paul, F. D. Miller, and J. Paul, eds., Human Rights (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), 89. [259] 260 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 26:2 APRIL 1988 which has been interpreted by some critics such as John Gray as a utilitarian creed of an indirect kind, in which protection of natural rights isjustified as the surest means to the greatest happiness. Other critics such as Hillel Steiner, however, have interpreted Spencer's theory as ultimately rights-based, though one that is often, if vainly, defended by him also on utilitarian grounds. It will be argued in this paper that Spencer's theory is founded upon a doctrine of Moral Sense from which intuitions concerning human rights are applied by reason to yield policy prescriptions striking a balance between utility and rights. This interpretation differs from that of Gray in that it views rights as prior to utility, and it differs from Steiner's interpretation in that it supplies a foundation for rights--a foundation which includes some utilitarian elements. In what follows I will critically examine the above two interpretations of Spencer's doctrine (as a utility-based theory and as a rights-based theory respectively ) before elaborating my own argument that it is a Moral Sense theory. 2. TWO ALTERNATIVE BASES OF SPENCER'S THEORY A. A Utility-Based Theory There is much argumentation in Spencer's Social Statics (185o) and Principles of Ethics (1879-1893) which suggests utilitarianism. The full title of the earlier book is Social Statics: or The Conditions Essential To Human Happiness Specified and the First of Them Developed. This "first condition" of happiness is the law of equal freedom (L.E.F.), which for Spencer meansjustice.~ While rejecting the Benthamite idea that the "greatest happiness should be the immediate aim of man" (SS 66), Spencer affirms that "the ultimate purpose of creation" is "the production of the greatest amount of happiness" (SS 41o) and that "... though not the immediate end, the greatest sum of happiness is the remote end" (PE 2:46). Spencer claims that "greatest happiness is the creative purpose" and that "Greatest Happiness and Morality are the face and obverse of the same fact" (SS 66). In his Principles of Ethics, forty years...

Medical Science in the Popular American Press: Beginnings

MEDICAL SCIENCE IN THE POPULAR AMERICAN PRESS: BEGINNINGS / Terra Ziporyn MEDICINE HAS A UNIQUELY IMPORTANT relationship with the public. More than a science, it has a practical side employing theory, yet distinct from it. This practical side always depends on the interaction of two parties: doctor and patient. Consequently, a patient's ideas about medicine comprise part of the practice of medicine itself. But even before becoming a patient, a person must have some conception of medical theory (science) as well. Doctors, after all, do not operate on unwiUing, inanimate objects: people go to doctors for help in certain types of problems because they believe that these problems and their solutions fall under the rubric of medicine. In this regard, the efficacy of medicine depends on the general pubUc's conception of it. Today this dependence is concrete: funding for medical research and medical services ultimately rests on public opinion. The medical system which has earned the public's trust will attract patients; the research the public deems worthy will receive funding. Even before expensive laboratory facilities, government grants, and publicly supported medical services institutionalized this dependence, however, no practicing physician could afford to ignore the view of potential customers. Throughout history, medical information has been available to the public. Often, however, popularized medicine does not involve medical science at all: it gives empirical advice on how to eat, sleep, bathe, and care for the sick. But medical science itself—the theory underlying the practice—has also been widely disseminated. Forms of popular education throughout the ages have included private talks, popular mythology, formal adult education, general lectures, sermons, health fairs and exhibits, articles, essays, and dramatics— offered by healers, elders, social workers, dieticians, and school teachers, or in television, radio, fUm, newspapers, magazines, and books. What people made of this information and how they supplemented or distorted it are valid questions but cannot be answered without first uncovering the information itself. According to historian Martin Green in Science and The SMbby Curate of Poetry: Essays about the Two Cultures, popularization is "the act of making a technical subject understandable to someone not trained in 230 · The Missouri Review that technology."1 Today, as in the past, popularization allows people without advanced scientific training the chance to participate in scientific research, provides professionally interested people with useful information, and helps society's decision-makers appreciate science's dangers and potentials. The term "popularization" has been used since about 1836, although science and medicine had been effectively popularized long before that: in fact, many intellectual historians consider Bernard le Bouvier de Fontenelle (1657-1757), who popularized the new science of the seventeenth century, as a model for aU subsequent popularizers. And probably one of the most popular health guides ever written was Luigi Cornaro's Discourses on a Sober and Temperate Life, 1558, which was translated and republished for centuries and stressed the importance of moderation in personal habits for health and longevity. Pinpointing the precise beginning of formal medical popularization is impossible, since before strict licensing and educational requirements were established there was no way to determine the professional status of either author or intended audience. Loosely, however, popularized health and medicine can be traced at least as far back as seventeenth-century newspapers. For example, Publick Occurences, regarded by some historians as the first newspaper printed in the United States, occasionally reported outbreaks of infectious diseases, and many colonial American newspapers contained advertisements for proprietary drugs. About the same time across the Atlantic anonymous "authorities" from the Athenian Society counselled on many subjects, including medicine, in the Athenian Mercury, and often quoted directly from medical works. According toJean Cormick, the advice was often laced with old wives' tales, inaccuracies, carelessness, superficiality, or blatant self-advertising. On the other hand, it provoked an interest in expanding medical knowledge among a growing middle class whose future support for science would prove important. In the eighteenth century both England and its colonies saw an unprecedented increase in popular education through both publications and lectures. Isolated physicians, influenced by Scottish philosophy, maintained that acquainting laymen with medicine would increase the growth of medical knowledge and help circumvent quackery. One result was the popular...

THE PERCEPTION OF MAN AND THE CONCEPTION OF SOCIETY: TWO APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING SOCIETY

The social sciences offer two distinct approaches to understanding society. One originated with the Scottish moral philosophers and shaped the discipline of economics. The other emerged from the French enlightenment and influenced the study of sociology. The two approaches are based on radically different perceptions of man and man's relation to society. This paper explores these alternative hypotheses and examines some major implications. It concludes that the hypothesis reaching back to the Scottish philosophers provides the basis for a unified approach in the social sciences.

The Hamann–Hume Connection

It is well known that the eighteenth century Scottish philosopher and sceptic David Hume was a severe critic of religious belief, but what may not be so familiar, and has been brought to our attention in recent years by Isaiah Berlin, is that some religious believers have found in Hume's sceptical arguments a source of nurture for their religious faith. In particular, Berlin singles out the example of Hume's contemporary, Johann Georg Hamann (17388), a devout but unconventional believer as well as one of the leaders of the German Counter-Enlightenment. Hamann's primary claim to fame, however, rests upon his influence upon the Danish theologian, Soren Kierkegaard. Although Kierkegaard never met Hamann, he was familiar with his writings, and calls Hamann ‘his only teacher.’ Kierkegaard's vast influence on modern Christianity, especially Protestantism, is, of course, a commonplace. What, though, is often overlooked, and Berlin calls our attention to, is that this man who influenced Kierkegaard was himself deeply influenced by Hume. The student of religion, as well as the philosopher, cannot help but be struck by this historical connection between Hume and believers such as Johann Hamann and thus, ultimately, between David Hume and modern Protestantism.

Pamphilus in Hume's "Dialogues"

Previous articleNext article No AccessPamphilus in Hume's "Dialogues"Jeffrey WieandJeffrey Wieand Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Religion Volume 65, Number 1Jan., 1985 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/487179 Views: 6Total views on this site Citations: 4Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1985 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:James Tarrant Hume's Pious Theist: Pamphilus, Journal of Scottish Philosophy 19, no.22 (Jun 2021): 95–113.https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2021.0296Aleksandra Davidović Who speaks for Hume: Hume's presence in the 'Dialogues concerning Natural religion', Belgrade Philosophical Annual 1, no.3434 (Jan 2021): 113–137.https://doi.org/10.5937/BPA2134113DPéter Hartl Hume and the Art of Theological Lying, Journal of Scottish Philosophy 18, no.22 (Jun 2020): 193–211.https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2020.0267C. M. Lorkowski Doxastic Naturalism and Hume's Voice in the Dialogues, Journal of Scottish Philosophy 14, no.33 (Sep 2016): 253–274.https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2016.0142

Thomas Brown's Theory of Causation

Thomas Brown's Theory of Causation JOHN A. MILLS Thomas Brown (1778--1820) has an ambiguous place in the history of philosophy.' It is natural to classify him among the Scottish common sense philosophers and yet he does not belong in that category because his position , in many important respects, differed sharply from that of Thomas Reid, the most important member of the school. He could be called an empiricist, but then one would have to be careful to distinguish him from the associationists, who are usually treated as the empiricists par excellence. In assessing his role in intellectual history he cannot be treated solely as a philosopher because he wrote eight w)lumes of verse, six of which were published while he shared the chair of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh with l)ugald Stewart. Finally, we have to ask whether Brown contributed any thoughts of his own to the history of thought or whether he did no more than produce a pastiche based entirely on the work of others: Although the present paper is concerned with Brown's theory of causation , it is necessary, before dealing with his theory in detail, to discuss the relationship between his solution to the problem of cause and effect and the way he solved other philosophical problems. From 18o6 onwards Brown was deeply concerned to show that metaphysics, like the physical sciences, was a ' I)r. George Davie and MI. Michael Barfoot gave me a great deal of hell.) in tile research which resulted in the present paper, and Mr. Michael Pakaluk made invaluable comments on tire first draft. 1 am deeply grateful to all of them. "File research was carried out while I field a I.eave Fellowship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research ('ouncil of Canada. A preliminary version of the paper was read to the Scottish Philosophy Seminar at tire University of Edinburgh in January 198e. ' That criticism is to be found m the article on Brown in James McCosh, The ScotO.~h Phtlowphy, Biograph,cal, Exposttory, C1iOcal,from Hutche.~on to Hamzlton (I.ondon: Macmillan, t875) and in Sir William I lamilton's review of Oeuvres Completes de Thomas Re,d, Chef de l'Ecole Ecossm.*, ed. Th..louffroy m Edinburgh Remea, 5:2 (183o- 3 lo): , 58-~o 7 (reprinted in Hamilton's Dtscmstons on Phdo.~ophy and L,telature, EducaOon and Umver~tty Re]o~m New York: Harper and Bros., ,858). [207] 208 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHV ~2:2 APR 1984 subject in which genuine discoveries could be made. The rules governing the search of knowledge and which guaranteed the genuineness of that knowledge once it had been attained had to be equally applicable to both, he believed. He also held that scientific and metaphysical practice resembled each other in another way. In both, he assumed without question that discovery consisted of recording the temporal relationships between events and of the use of various techniques of analysis in order to describe the ultimate constituents of substances. A complete compendium of knowledge, then, would consist of a record of all the invariable successions that actually occur in the universe. Since Brown held that causation is nothing other than the occurrence of invariable successions, the central role of that concept in all his thinking is obvious. In stressing the close relationship between metaphysics and natural philosophy Brown was not setting himself apart from other philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment. One aspect of his thought that clearly differentiates him from them is his monism. At first sight he does not seem to be a monist because, right from the time he started to develop his philosophy seriously, he asserted that neither the physical nor the mental realm had any primacy over the other. So we are, I think, obliged to call him a methodological monist. In order to understand what is meant by that term, it is necessary to bear in mind that Brown believed that the same causal principles operate in both the physical and the mental universes. Because those principles operate in different media and because of the limitations of the process of introspective analysis (the only procedure available, so Brown believed) in the...

Ellen Glasgow: Beyond Convention by Linda W. Wagner (review)

Studies in American Fiction115 the novelist there is this Janus, too. But if the 'double mental existence' Brown described to John Bernard enabled him to glimpse worlds dark and light, it failed, we shall discover, to tell him which of the two he might call home" (p. 28). Within this thesis, Axelrod argues, as the subtitle of his book suggests, that Brown manifests an "Americanness." This view ofBrown implicitly carries with it a traditional approach to American intellectual history, one that sees our major writers as wedded to their culture in such a way that the definition of one implies the definition of the other. Thus, it is conventional for theorizers of "the American mind" to look at someone, Emerson for example, and through his writings define a popular view of nature. Or conversely, through popular writings on nature to define Emerson. There is something of this in Axelrod's approach to Brown, although I clearly cannot do justice to the cogency of his argument in oversimplifying it, as space here requires. But my own disagreement with his thesis remains, primarily because I cannot accept the basic premise of Brown's "Americanness." Others, most perhaps, will not have this difficulty. More troublesome to many readers, I suspect, will be a tendency toward digression that appears from time to time. For example, in discussing "Adini," Axelrod sees the necessity of pointing to the Scottish birth of Mr. Ellen (p. 107). The relation of hard-headed Scottish philosophy to the issue under discussion is necessary, but the tour ofthe intellectual backgrounds ofScottish philosophy might be more appropriate in a footnote. In more than one case the text slips away from the main line of discourse into elaborations ofthe subject that prove distracting even if often highly interesting and valuable. None of this criticism, however, is meant to detract from the general observation that Axelrod offers a rich discussion of the issues he sees as germane to the major novels ofBrown, the primary subject ofthe book. The scholarship in this study is excellent, and the critical insights are often keen even when unnecessary quibbles with other scholars intrude into the argument. This valuable study, I expect, will become one of the basic references for future Brown scholarship. State University of New York at BinghamtonBernard Rosenthal Wagner, Linda W. Ellen Glasgow: Beyond Convention. Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1982. 150 pp. Cloth: $15.95. Finding the right category for Ellen Glasgow is a central concern ofGlasgow scholarship. Is she best understood as a regionalist, as a mainstream realist, as a romancer, or as an historian ? Linda W. Wagner answers thatGlasgow is best read as a woman writer, andthe argument of Ellen Glasgow: Beyond Convention is very persuasive. Wagner maintains that Glasgow's career was shaped by the events in her life that most touched her as a woman: the death of her mother in 1893; the end of her love-affair with the mysterious Gerald B. in the early years ofthe twentieth century; the death ofher sister Cary in 1 91 1 ; thedissolution ofherengagementto Henry Anderson in theyears just followingtheFirst World War. Grounding her analysis in biography "because all artists translate personal experience into art, in one way or another" (p. 7), Wagner explains: "What is particularly interesting in Glasgow's development is that it is often herexperience with women and women's needs that prompt her best work: the deaths ofCary and her mother, for example, gave herthe impetus for Virginia" (p. 15). Similarly, "her working through that last long fascination of the engagement with Anderson, the period which she terms 'The Years ofthe Locust,' became the prewriting period of her 1925 novel, Barren Ground. The power ofDorinda Oakley's renunciation ofthe conventional female rolecamedirectlyfrom Glasgow'sown convictions"(p. 10). The beauty ofWagner's approach is that her touch is light. She keeps her book short; she does 116Reviews not crush her subject under a mass ofbiographical detail or ofpsychoanalytic interpretation. She draws sharp parallels between biography and fiction, making her connections clear and concrete, and then moves on. Therefore an especiallyclean and compact accountofa long and complicated career emerges. Wagner argues that Glasgow found hervoice as a woman writer only after years...