Metaphysics Of Science Research Articles

Is phenomenal consciousness really a special case in science?

In the metaphysics of science, it is often held that higher-level properties are grounded in micro-physical properties. According to many philosophers, however, phenomenal consciousness resists this view. Many famous arguments in Philosophy of Mind have been given to reject this notion. In this paper, we argue that there is something odd about the idea that phenomenal consciousness is a special case in science and give a constructive proposal on how consciousness can fit in the natural world. To do so, we will first introduce a general notion of what grounding is. Then, we will briefly explain how the arguments for the specialness of phenomenal consciousness work by considering two famous examples, namely the zombie and the knowledge argument. In a further step, we will briefly discuss two cases from other areas in science, i.e., in particle physics and chemistry. We will demonstrate that the standard view about the reductive relation does not hold, even in these paradigm cases of the natural sciences. If what we argue is true, we think that most arguments from phenomenal consciousness cannot defeat physicalism per se. Finally, we will introduce an alternative way to naturalize phenomenal consciousness.

UN EXEMPLU SUBSTANȚIALIST: DESCOPERIREA AMERICII

Kant aims to achieve a scientific metaphysics; Camil Petrescu rather a metaphysical science. Neither of them will achieve anything of what they set out to do, only that, while the first one has the consciousness of failure, the second one will eventually reach a failure of conscience. But the metaphysics of failure is more than just a failed metaphysics. Here both of them are saved. Kant, the “all-destroyer”, the negator, this “Prussian Hume”, “falls” from science into faith. Camil Petrescu falls as well, but replaces faith with the successive idea of science. He falls from science to science, in the totality of science about the world or in the science of substance. Such a science, whose meaning will be realized, like that of the concrete, along the way, progressively, by addition. Camil detaches himself from the beginning and definitively from what he calls “rationalist philosophy”, by which he understands classical systems (especially Kantian and Hegelian ones). The reproach? It is a fundamental one for the future substantialist philosophy: this type of rationalist philosophy can only be suspected of being in possession of the notion of the concrete and in no way in possession of the reality of this concept. Rationalism has the “other” one in the form of abstraction; substantialism has it in the form of simultaneous reality. What Camil Petrescu wants to demonstrate is the fact that reality lacks logic or, at least, reality escapes from classic logic. Both Kant and Hegel capture reality in a scheme, ossifies it, they give it logic, thereby canceling out precisely what characterizes it essentially: the concrete. Logicism translates into a heretical infidelity to the real. The concrete thus becomes the fact of being for self, not of existing. All this I try to analyze by applying them to the theory of knowledge as it appears in an episode of the Doctrine of Substance, the episode of the discovery of America.

Scientific metaphysics and social science

Recently, philosophers have developed an extensive literature on social ontology that applies methods and concepts from analytic metaphysics. Much of this is entirely abstracted from, and unconcerned with, social science. However, Epstein (2015) argues explicitly that analytic social metaphysics, provided its account of ontological ‘grounding’ is repaired in specific ways, can rescue social science from explanatory impasses into which he thinks it has fallen. This version of analytic social ontology thus directly competes with radically naturalistic alternatives, in a way that helps to clarify what makes some metaphysics genuinely scientific (that is, part of the scientific enterprise and worldview). I consider this competition, marshal considerations against the value to social science of analytic metaphysics, and sketch a contrasting scientific metaphysics for understanding the implications of revisionist social ontology in unified scientific ontology.

Popper’s Propensity Interpretation of Quantum Physics as a form of Modal Metaphysics

With the emergence of quantum physics in the 1920s, the major philosophical question was, do the unobservables in quantum system have ontological status or are mere instruments for scientific prediction? The Copenhagen interpretation developed an instrumentalist thesis, contending that the unobservables are tools for making predictions concerning the observables. Thus, we cannot have knowledge of the quantum particles. However, Popper attempts a realist and an objective interpretation. As such, he criticizes the Copenhagen interpretation, developing the propensity view, which accords ontological status to subatomic particles. The main thrust of our argument in this paper is that by replacing probability possibilities with propensities, Popper positions himself as a proponent of the metaphysics of modality. It is then our objective to establish the parallelism between Popper’s Propensity Interpretation and Modal Metaphysics. To establish this contention we proceeded analytically: firstly by situating the seismic shift from macro to quantum physics, secondly by examining Popper’s critique of the Copenhagen Interpretation and thirdly by attempting a demonstration of the correlation between Popper’s propensity interpretation and modal metaphysics. The merit of this paper resides in its elucidation of the importance of metaphysics in science. It is a double challenge at the same time for antimetaphysical philosophy of science and for antiscientific metaphysics, to rethink the relationship between Metaphysics and science and invest in finding how both disciplines nurture each other. Finally, it is hoped that policy makers in Philosphy and science uses our findings to revamp the conceptualisation and practice of interdisciplinarity.

What analytic metaphysics can do for scientific metaphysics

AbstractThe apparent chasm between two camps in metaphysics, analytic metaphysics and scientific metaphysics, is well recognized. I argue that the relationship between them is not necessarily a rivalry; a division of labour that resembles the relationship between pure mathematics and science is possible. As a case study, I look into the metaphysical underdetermination argument for ontic structural realism, a well‐known position in scientific metaphysics, together with an argument for the position in analytic metaphysics known as ontological nihilism. I argue that we can ascribe the same schema to both arguments, which indicates that analytic metaphysics can offer an abstract model that scientific metaphysics may find useful.

Should physical symmetries guide metaphysics? Two reasons why they should maybe not

Symmetry-based inferences have permeated many discussions in philosophy of physics and metaphysics of science. It is claimed that symmetries in our physical theories would allow us to draw metaphysical conclusions about the world, a view that I call ‘symmetry inferentialism’. This paper is critical to this view. I claim that (a) it assumes a philosophically questionable characterization of the relevant validity domain of physical symmetries, and (b) it overlooks a distinction between two opposing ways through which relevant physical symmetries become established. My conclusion is that symmetry inferentialism loses persuasive force when these two points are taken into consideration.

Vstříc vědecké metafyzice

The review article reflects on Vladimír Havlík’s book Hierarchical Emergent Ontology and the Universal Principle of Emergence (Filosofia, 2021). It notes the key argumentative procedures and implications of the author’s arguments. It evaluates the various elements of hierarchical emergent ontology and compares them with classical proponents and critics of emergentism, especially Paul Humphreys and Jaegwon Kim. The study reconstructs Havlík’s universal principle of emergence and notes its application in selected scientific fields (fermions, cellular automata and neural networks). It takes a polemical approach to the advocated concept of scientific metaphysics.

Exploring the Interactions between Metaphysics and Science

The debate in Metaphysics of Science concerning the interaction between metaphysics and science has been mainly approached from the perspective of the scientificdiscipline of physics. In this paper, I address this debate from a different framework, namely that of biology. I pay attention to the recent characterization of Metaphysics of Biology and the different forms in which philosophers use metaphysics when addressing conceptual biological problems. In doing so, I argue that two main lessons can be obtained that can serve to enrich the debate in Metaphysics of Science: i) that the interaction between metaphysics and science seems to be more complex than generally considered; and ii) that the type of metaphysics that is interacting with science when characterizing the ontological status of the world is neither the a priori nor the naturalized one, but a different form of metaphysics that will be labelled here as applied metaphysics.

The Problem of Islamic Philosophy: Definitions and Origins

Islamic philosophy is the product of a complex intellectual process in which Syrians, Arabs, Persians, Turks, Berbers and others took an active part. When we speak of Islamic philosophy we mean that a philosophy which development, and modalities, are essentially linked to the religions and spiritual fact of Islam. Sometimes the researchers of Islamic philosophy had also used the term Arabic Philosophy or Muslim Philosophy rather than Islamic. Islamic philosophy presents us with a number of unresolved questions having to do with its origin and its relation to Greek philosophy. However, the term Islamic philosophy preferable to the others. For example, in Islam, it has been explained in how Islamic philosophy was internally taken by the thought of the Quran through its propagation within the first Muslim community. It must also be included in the notion of the Quranic concept 'Sunatullah' or 'natural' which means the characteristic or trait given by God ‘alluding thereby to nature as something that is created by God It should not deny the importance of the science of metaphysics because it is very close to our reality. This study attempts to elaborate the development of Islamic philosophical ideas and analyses them from the Islamic theologico-philosphical views. This study examined the terms of the Islamic philosophy, analyze the function and structure of the terminology mentioned in the Qur'an since Allah's Commandments would have explicit and implicit wisdoms. This study is a qualitative study using content analysis method, as the subject determination. The results shown the terms which are issued in history of Islamic thought from various classical schools of Islamic thought which is Islamic philosophy will be defined it with regard to its fundamental characteristics mainly in connection to its origin.

SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND CULTURE

SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND CULTURE

Popper and Agassi at Odds

Three main conflicts between Popper and Agassi are discussed. Over the ethics of hard work which in reality turns out to be over perfectionism and optimism. Over the role of metaphysics in science. Over methodological individualism where is it argued that Popper's views are contradictory and that Agassi' Institutionalism prevails.

Relations in the Metaphysics of Science

Abstract In this paper we examine the status of relations in two prominent views in metaphysics of science, i.e. dispositionalism and structuralism, and argue that the current consensus about the metaphysics of relations, according to which relations are to be viewed as internal and as constituting no addition of being over and above their relata, needs to be re-examined. After discussing what we call internalism and externalism about relations, we show that dispositionalism and structuralism lead to opposite but equally controversial accounts of the metaphysics of relations. While we criticise some widespread versions of those views, we identify versions of dispositionalism and structuralism that we deem more promising. A core feature of both of these more promising variants is an externalist view about relations. Against the current internalist consensus, we claim that a version of externalism about relations is the view that best combines metaphysical rigour with a naturalistic stance.

The Place of God in Metaphysics: A Short Analysis of Ibn Sīnā’s Critique of Aristotle

This article deals with Ibn Sīnā’s criticisms of Aristotle regarding what the place of God should be in the science of metaphysics. From Aristotle’s point of view, the existence of God is proved by the proof of motion in physics and is held as a subject matter in a science that comes after physics, which is metaphysics. According to him, metaphysics is the most sublime science because God is its subject matter. The most striking criticism against Aristotle’s conception of metaphysics was put forward by Ibn Sīnā. From Ibn Sīnā’s point of view, the most important problem encountered in Aristotle’s understanding of metaphysics is that ontology and theology are intertwined. According to him, God cannot be a subject matter in metaphysics, rather, proving the existence of God is the aim of metaphysics. The subject matter of metaphysics is being qua being, and its aim is to prove the Necessary Existent that is the principle of existence. Accordingly, for Ibn Sīnā, metaphysics is an ontological science in terms of its subject and a theological science in terms of its aim. This new conception of metaphysics, developed by Ibn Sīnā, had a profound effect not only on Islamic thought but also on Western philosophy. In a way, the ontotheological notes of Islamic and Western thought from the Middle Ages to the present have progressed through the metaphysical symphony composed by Ibn Sīnā.

Throwing the Baby out with the Bathwater: The Dangers of Global and Local Ontologies in Scientific Metaphysics

In the recent years, attempts to relate metaphysics and sciences have taken various alternative forms such as metaphysics applied to science, metaphysics of science, and scientific metaphysics. In this article, I focus on scientific metaphysics and specifically explore the challenges with developing ontologies through four arguments. The Argument from Representational Indeterminacy highlights that global ontologies fail to clearly identify their target phenomenon. The Argument from Independent Inaccessibility explores the methodological difficulty of accessing a world that is independent of specific sets of phenomena. The Argument from Conceptual Mismatch focuses on the tendency of local ontologies to pick out arbitrary scientific concepts, adapting them to study phenomena where they might not fit well. Finally, the Argument from Eliminative Prophecy details the possibility that local ontologies could eventually be rendered redundant by mature versions of scientific theories. In the end, given these challenges, I recommend an eliminativist stance toward ontology development.

Alston, Aristotle, and Epistemic Normativity

Alston (2005) argues that there is no such thing as a single concept of epistemic justification. Instead, there is an irreducible plurality of epistemically valuable features of beliefs: ‘epistemic desiderata.’ I argue that this approach is problematic for meta-epistemological reasons. How, for instance, do we characterize epistemic evaluation and do we do we go about it if there’s no theoretical unity to epistemology? Alston’s response is to ground all epistemic desiderata, thereby unifying epistemology, in truth and truth-conduciveness. I argue that this move over-unifies epistemology, in effect, giving us a single criterion for epistemology on par with the epistemology-by-justification approach he rejects. Perhaps surprisingly, we find a similar theoretical worry in Aristotle’s argument about the science of metaphysics. Aristotle’s resolution in this problem by the ‘analogy of being’ provides a parallel framework to resolve the worries with Alston’s approach. In particular, I argue that we can focus epistemic evaluation on the person of epistemic virtue: this category will be focal, unifying the disparate desiderata, without reducing to one thing all epistemic values or relations that desiderate must bear to the central value. A virtue-centric account of epistemic normativity follows: one that can remain genuinely pluralistic and yet unified as well.

»Pragmatism is not a Weltanschauung«

This essay explores the role of the German expression Weltanschauung in the philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce. Two philosophical contexts are distinguished in which the term occurs in his writings: a) the classical pragmatist’s discussion of what constitutes Pragmatism and b) the discussion of the systematic place of a »scientific philosophy«, both in terms of its relation to other sciences and in distinction from everyday beliefs. Thus, on the one hand, the essay compares Peirce’s version of pragmatism with the views of other, more subjectivist pragmatists, who used the term »Weltanschauung« to denote their philosophical enterprises: William James and F. C. S. Schiller. On the other hand, Peirce’s ideal of scientific philosophy, particularly of scientific metaphysics, is contrasted with ›non-scientific metaphysics‹ – or how Peirce calls it: Weltanschauung. The essay also shows how his conception of scientific philosophy differs from Wilhelm Wundt’s idea that philosophy should provide a »Weltanschauung« based on the special sciences.

Kant's Metaphor "Copernican turn" : its Meaning and Significance

The article analyzes the metaphor “Copernican revolution,” used by Kant to highlight the core idea of his philosophy. The author argues that Kant uses the analogies with mathematics and natural science for establishing criteria of scientific character of knowledge. These criteria include the hypothetic-deductive or a priorimethod of thinking, which determines the apodictic, i.e. necessary and objective, character of the basic laws of nature, as well as the verification of laws a priorithrough experiments.The author focuses on Kant’s idea of the possibility of scientific metaphysics based on these criteria. She claims that the structure of scientific metaphysics and the epistemological status of its statements depend on what kind of objects it deals with: with phenomena given to us by sensuality, with only conceivable “things in themselves” or with supersensitive “objects of an idea.” In the last part, the author interprets the meaning of the metaphor “Copernican turn” as the upgrading of logic, the idea of “transcendental idealism” and discusses the possibility of using the metaphor “Ptolemaic system” to characterize the practical philosophy of Kant.

What does God know? Treatise on the “divine knowledge” in the structure of natural theology by Francisco Suárez

The article is a study of the late scholastic concept of natural theology based on the works of Fr. Suárez, Metaphysical Disputations (1597) and De Deo Uno et Trino (1607), as well as the analysis of the treatise on “divine knowledge” and the demonstration of its significance in the structure of Suárez’s natural theology. First, the article explicates the concept of natural theology as the highest and most noble part of metaphysical science, since the natural theology of Suárez differs both from supernatural or revelation theology, and from the whole metaphysical knowledge about being. Second, the thematic content of natural theology is described in comparison with revelation theology, and the general method of natural theology, which is determined by the specific limitations of the natural knowledge of God in this life, is analyzed. At the same time, the most important role of the traditional scholastic concept of “perfectio simpliciter” as revealing the essence of Suárez’s method in natural theology is emphasized. Third, we point out the reasons for the special significance of the treatise on the “divine knowledge/scientia Dei” contained in section 15 of Suárez’s 30th Metaphysical disputation, and analyze the structure of this treatise, showing how Suárez’s exposition in it corresponds to the general “rule of method”. Fourth, the article thematizes the question of the objects of knowledge of the divine intellect, explains the general division of objects into three classes and explicates the complex type of connection between the cognition of the primary and secondary objects of the divine intellect, since it determines the way God knows finite possible things “in themselves”. Finally, we show a certain ambivalence in Suárez’s understanding of the reality and objectivity of the objective being (esse obiectivum) of possible finite essences as a secondary object that terminates divine knowledge.

Spectrum of metametaphysics

Scientific realism is typically associated with metaphysics. One current incarnation of such an association concerns the requirement of a metaphysical characterization of the entities one is being a realist about. This is sometimes called “Chakravartty’s Challenge”, and codifies the claim that without a metaphysical characterization, one does not have a clear picture of the realistic commitments one is engaged with. The required connection between metaphysics and science naturally raises the question of whether such a demand is appropriately fulfilled, and how metaphysics engages with science in order to produce what is called “scientific metaphysics”. Here, we map some of the options available in the literature, generating a conceptual spectrum according to how each view approximates science and metaphysics. This is done with the purpose of enlightening the current debate on the possibility of epistemic warrant that science could grant to such a metaphysics, and how different positions differently address the thorny issue concerning such a warrant.

Humean nomic essentialism

AbstractHumeanism – the idea that there are no necessary connections between distinct existences – and Nomic Essentialism – the idea that properties essentially play the nomic roles that they do – are two of the most important and influential positions in the metaphysics of science. Traditionally, it has been thought that these positions were incompatible competitors. We disagree. We argue that there is an attractive version of Humeanism that captures the idea that, for example, mass essentially plays the role that it actually does in the laws of nature. In this paper we consider the arguments that have lead many to conclude that Humeanism cannot be combined with Nomic Essentialism; we identify the weaknesses in these arguments; and we argue in detail that a version of Humeanism based on a variant of the Best System account of laws captures the key intuitions behind nomic essentialism.