This article discusses one of many reasons why the UK did so poorly in managing the acute phase of the Covid-19 pandemic despite having access to extensive and high-quality scientific evidence and advice: science–policy relationships. Drawing on the author’s participation in and experiences of the Scientific Advisory Group on Emergencies (SAGE) and its behavioural sub-group, it discusses the following questions: 1. Was the model (framework) for translating scientific advice to policy-makers as effective as it could have been? 2. Could more have been done to communicate science and its implications for policy and practice to the public? 3. Should scientists speak to policy-makers and the public about matters beyond their particular area of study, reflecting their multidisciplinary working and understanding? 4. Do scientists have a social responsibility to discuss policy implications of scientific evidence and challenge politicians when their statements or behaviour go against prevailing evidence? Future directions of inquiry should investigate the process by which research evidence is translated and used, applying social science and implementation science methods, evidence and theories. A question deserving attention across academe and society more generally is how scientists can best interact with, and contribute to, social good beyond their well-trodden paths of academic publications and conference presentations.