Science Court Research Articles

Fact Checking Is Needed in Science Also

The status, prestige, and authority of science rest on the belief that scientific findings are reliable and true. But scientific understanding changes over time, and scientists themselves possess all the inclinations, motivations, and sensitivities that render humans fallible. For these reasons, argues Henry Bauer, science needs to be fact-checked and adjudicated by a “Science Court.”

The development of forensic entomology in Australia and New Zealand: an overview of casework practice, quality control and standards

Forensic entomology has a rich history in Australia and New Zealand, and was first used in the region at least 90 years ago. Since then, there has been ongoing research and casework in both countries by at least 11 practitioners. Workers have been employed by universities, agricultural institutions, and forensic science providers. The forces driving the implementation of standards in the region are personal experience, regional dialogue, general forensic science standards, institutional standards, and court room conflict. The influence of these on current practice is discussed with particular reference to south-eastern Australia.

The case for establishing a board of review for resolving environmental issues: The science court in Canada.

Technology and scientific advancements are accelerating changes in society at a pace that is challenging the abilities of government regulatory agencies and legal courts to understand the benefits and costs of these changes to humans, wildlife, and their environments. The social, economic, and political facets of concern, such as the potential effects of chemicals, complicate the preparation of regulatory standards and practices intended to safeguard the public. Court judges and attorneys and, in some cases, lay juries are tasked with interpreting the data and implications underlying these new advancements, often without the technical background necessary to understand complex subjects and subsequently make informed decisions. Here, we describe the scientific-quasi-judicial process adopted in Canada under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, which could serve as a model for resolving conflicts between regulatory agencies and the regulated community. An example and process and lessons learned from the first Board of Review, which was for decamethylcyclopentasiloxane (D5; CAS# 541-02-06), are provided. Notable among these lessons are: 1) the need to apply state-of-the-science insights into the regulatory process, 2) to encourage agencies to continuously review and update their assessment processes, criteria, and models, and 3) provide these processes in guidance documents that are transparent and available to all stakeholders and generally foster closer cooperation between regulators, the academic community, industry, and nongovernment organizations (NGOs). Integr Environ Assess Manag 2016;12:572-579. © 2015 SETAC.

Institutionalizing Dissent: A Proposal for an Adversarial System of Pharmaceutical Research

There are serious problems with the way in which pharmaceutical research is currently practiced, many of which can be traced to the influence of commercial interests on research. One of the most significant is inadequate dissent, or organized skepticism. In order to ameliorate this problem, I develop a proposal that I call the "Adversarial Proceedings for the Evaluation of Pharmaceuticals," to be instituted within a regulatory agency such as the Food and Drug Administration for the evaluation of controversial new drugs and controversial drugs already in the market. This proposal is an organizational one based upon the "science court" proposal by Arthur Kantrowitz in the 1960s and 1970s. The primary benefit of this system is its ability to institutionalize dissent, thereby ensuring that one set of interests does not dominate all others.

Science and Environmental Policy: The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations

Michael Oppenheimer Science and Environmental Policy: The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations THIS PAPER ADDRESSES THE ROLE OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, or NGOs, in the science-policy nexus. I shall draw on my 21 years ofexpe­ rience working for a nongovernm ental organization, Environm ental Defense, my earlier experience as a research scientist, and my recent experience as a professor, the latter two positions at large universities. I hope this quasi-anecdotal approach is informative, but in addition, it is a necessity because there have been relatively few academic studies of nongovernm ental advocacy organizations. I shall begin by considering a question arising from the opening section of this volume: Is the special objective role of science in the policy arena, presumed by m any observers to have existed in an earlier political era, about to disappear into the dust bin of history, and if so, should we act to restore such a role? My view is consistent w ith Daniel Kevles’s paper: science in the current policy world has just as m uch to do w ith regulation of corpo­ rate activity and, to a lesser extent, people’s lives, as it does w ith the means to wage war or develop consum er goods like com puter games. This development dates to the revolution in environm ental regulation in the 1970s, as well as the expansion of regulatory attention to foods, drugs, and health care. If science formerly was viewed as a servant of social research Vol 73 : No 3 : Fall 200 6 881 people’s wants and needs, science-based decision m aking now also func­ tions as som ething of a m aster over people and companies by dictat­ ing restrictions. So it was inevitable in a free society, organized in part along the lines of special interests, some empowered by large financial resources, that a melee should ensue. And that is w hat we have today on m any issues, particularly global warm ing, aided and abetted by a related phenom enon: governm ent that is often disingenuous. I argue that there is no point trying to put the genie back in the bottle, no point trying to regain an imagined status of science operating in splendid objectivity and isolation, rendering untainted judgm ents. It probably never was so, and I doubt it ever will be. Furtherm ore, it should become apparent from this paper that proposals to create a neat division between regulation and science, resembling Alvin W einberg’s earlier notion of a science court (Jasanoff, 1990), are tinged w ith elit­ ism while satisfying neither side, and if they were proposed (and I have heard such rumblings) m any scientists, including me, would be strongly opposed. The relation of science to government has indeed worsened, and needs to be fixed, but w hether or not the good old days ever existed, we should not aspire to return to them . To deal with current problems of the environm ent, science needs to be inclusive rather than exclusion­ ary, as usually has been its tendency. We need to recognize that values and viewpoints are an inevitable part of scientific judgm ent in the zone w here science interacts w ith governm ent over m any environm ental problem s, w here systems are complex, uncertainty is endemic, and learning is slow. W hat questions are asked and how they are fram ed are a critical part o f science research and science advice in this arena. A necessary part of improving the science-govemment interface is to avoid pretending that science advice in such an arena can be built from pure natural science. Rather, as Henry Kelly has noted, “Sound policy depends on a rough m arketplace of ideas.” We m ust all get used to this new situation. Of course, this rough m arketplace has some big downsides. The problem isn’t all the voices heard. Rather, it is that some participants do 882 social research not play by the usual rules, and at the same time, have disproportionate resources to amplify their message in public (Mooney, 2005) and often have differential access to the decision process (Jasanoff, 1990). The solution I propose is...

Science court: A case study in designing discourse to manage policy controversy

Disagreement among experts is important to scientific progress, but it creates a dilemma for decision-makers who often depend on the authority those experts to render decisions. When experts disagree there seems to be no good way to incorporate expertise into decision-making. This study examines the "Science Court" proposed to facilitate the resolution of policy controversies involving expert disagreement. Science Court is examined here as a communication tool designed to (1) resolve disputes among experts so that (2) policy decision-making can proceed.The concern lies not so much in Science Court's design but with the rationale about designing communication tools to facilitate policy deliberations reflected in Science Court's design. Science Court The Science Court is an invention that makes a significant promise. It is designed to relieve decision-makers from the predicament of resolving differences in expert opinions when they are not themselves experts. Such an invention would be fortunate in an era where policy decisions are heavily dependent on expert authority but where expertise is fragmented among many competing disciplines. The Science Court, first proposed in the mid-1970s, is a procedure designed to improve the way experts and non-experts communicate in decision-making. The Science Court designers believed that the use of expertise in policy decision-making typically resulted in quarreling. This produced a"veil of disagreement" over factual matters that confused decisionmakers and invited opportunism by the powerful to influence decisions in their favor (Task Force, 1976). The court is designed to transform the escalation of expert claims and counter-claims in decision-making from quarreling that Mark Aakhus is an assistant professor of Communication at Rutgers University's School of Communication, Information, and Library Studies. His research addresses the role of communication and technology in learning, decision-making, and conflict-management. An earlier version of this article appeared in Argument and Values Proceedings of the Ninth SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation, edited by Sally Jack

The principles and practices of peer review

The principles and practices of research peer review are described. While the principles are fundamentally generic and apply to peer review across the full spectrum of performing institutions as well as to manuscript/proposal/program peer review, the focus of this paper is peer review of proposed and ongoing programs in federal agencies. The paper describes desireable characteristics and important intangible factors in successful peer review. Also presented is a heuristic protocol for the conduct of successful peer review research evaluations and impact assessments. Problems with peer review are then outlined, followed by examples of peer review of proposed and existing programs in selected federal agencies. Some peer review variants, such as the Science Court, are described, and then research requirements to improve peer review are discussed.

Procedural choices in regulatory science

Policymakers have long assumed that scientific inputs to regulatory decisions (facts) should be insulated as far as possible from political and policy considerations (values). Some have even recommended a complete institutional separation between scientific and political decisionmaking on the model of the science court. Drawing on research in the social studies of science, this paper suggests that such separatist models fail to address important differences between regulatory science and research science. Regulatory science, which provides the basis for policy, routinely operates with different goals and priorities and under different institutional and temporal constraints from science done in academic settings and without implications for policy. Four brief case studies are presented to underscore the need for negotiations between science and policy in making regulatory decisions. The paper concludes that adversarial or trial-type approaches are generally less effective than processes that promote negotiation among competing interpretations of regulatory science. This finding, in turn, has implications that should be factored into the institutional and procedural design of scientific advice in the regulatory process.

Technology and Politics ed. by Michael E. Kraft, Norman J. Vig

1082 Book Reviews TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE The authors’ backgrounds allow them to address both technical and sociopolitical issues with authority (Merton Davies is an engineer and mathematician, and William Harris is an international lawyer). Some of the book’s flaws—it is overly given to generalizations and not well organized—are, perhaps, not the fault of the authors but rather the re­ sult of the protracted security review process to which the manuscript was subjected. The authors can be faulted, however, for occasionally neglecting to make use of public information that provides insight into the way RAND was linked to other government and nongovernment organizations. As one example, the authors describe the origins of RAND but fail to point out that H. Rowan Gaither, president ofthe Ford Foundation, became a founder and director of RAND when it was in­ corporated in 1948 with an interest-free loan from the Ford Founda­ tion. Gaither later chaired the presidentially appointed Security Re­ sources Panel. Information of this type is important for understanding RAND’s influence on U.S. space technology because RAND produced concepts, not hardware, and the extent to which its research findings were implemented by other organizations as operational systems de­ pended on effective linkages to policymakers. (Such linkages are being addressed by the Smithsonian-RAND History Project at the Depart­ ment of Space History, National Air and Space Museum. The project aims to produce analytical historical studies of RAND and to organize and preserve the primary sources on which they are based.) Neverthe­ less, such shortcomings are more than offset by the excellent descrip­ tions of RAND’s technical research, which make this book, at present, the single most informative source for scholars interested in RAND’s role in the origins of U.S. satellite and balloon-borne surveillance tech­ nology. Charles A. Ziegler Dr. Ziegler, a lecturer in social anthropology at Brandeis University, holds advanced degrees in both anthropology and physics and has a special interest in the relationship between technology and other elements of culture. Recent publications include a study of the development of covert nuclear surveillance systems, “Waiting for Joe-1: Decisions Leading to the Detection of Russia’s First Atomic Bomb Test” (Social Studies of Science 18 [1988]: 197-229). Technology and Politics. Edited by Michael E. Kraft and Norman J. Vig. Durham; N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988. Pp. xv + 356; figures, notes, index. $59.75 (cloth); $17.95 (paper). The thirteen contributions to this volume range widely in analytical penetration and historical awareness. Most are light on both—not inappropriate if the collection is intended for the classroom (the editors do not make this clear). Three of the chapters have appeared elsewhere, and several others summarize past or ongoing work. Thus, TECHNOLOGY AND CUL TURE Book Reviews 1083 it seems appropriate to view the book as an introduction aimed at college students. As such, I have two criticisms. The first may seem trivial but will help convey the character of the volume as a whole: most of the chapters deal with policy analysis more than politics. That is, they discuss issues involving technologyin a ratherabstractsense, with little attemptto con­ vey the manner in which the political process shapes government de­ cision making and policy itself. The exceptions make for the more sat­ isfying chapters: W. Henry Lambright and Dianne Rahm on presidential involvement in big decisions (Star Wars, the breeder reac­ tor); Allan Mazur, with a concrete and quantitative look at media in­ fluence on public perceptions and governmentactions concerningLove Canal and nuclear power. But other selections are burdened with some­ times arid discussions of topics like environmental regulation and risk analysis (and even the “science court”), while failing to dig very deeply into the ways in which interest groups use and misuse the apparatus and tools in question. Nor do many of the chapters give a sense of in­ teragencyconflicts, the ways in which policy is setat high levels in cabinet councils, or deals struck between Congress and the executive branch; to the extent that politics is the art ofcompromise, few of the selections deal with politics. By and large—and let me emphasize that there are exceptions—this book conveys a...

Regulatory Focus: The Canadian "science court" model

Regulatory Focus: The Canadian "science court" model

Introduction: Intellectual Property and Diverse Rights of Ownership in Science

1. Mertan R K. Priorities in scientific discovery: a chapter in the sociology of science. Amer. Sociol. Rev. 22:63S-59, 1957, 2. Garfield E. Delayed recognition in scientific discove~: citation frequency analysis aids the search for case histories. Current Conrenrs (23):3-9, 5 June 1989. 3. -----------Is there room in science for self-promotion? THE SCIENTIST 1(27):9, 14 Dccemkr 1987, 4. Cosaens S E, ed. Theme section changing notions of ownership in science, Sci. Technol. Hum. Vaf, 13(1 & 2):7-63. Winter& Spring 1988. 5. ZuckermanH A. Introduction:intellectual property and dkerse rights of nwnership in science. Sci. Techrd. Hum. Val. 13(1 & 2):7-16, Winter & Spring 1988. 6. Garffeld E. Patem citation indexing and the notions of novelty, similarity, and relevame. Essays of an irforrn.arion scientiw: the awards of science and other essays. Philadelphia: 1S1Press, 1985, Vol. 7. p. 536-42. (Reprinted from J. Chem. Dec. 6:63-5, 1966,) 7. Arrdersorr G C. Utah’s “fusion” fiels heated debate. THE SCfENTIST 3(9):1-3; 8, 1 May 1989. 8. Dohm C. Utah can hardly contain its reaction to nuclear fusion. Wall Srreef Journal 31 March 1989. p, B3. 9. Garfield E. Contemplating a science court: on the question of instimtionslizing scientific facttindin8. THE SCIENTIST 1(6):9; 29, 9 Febmary 1987.

TECHNICAL DISPUTES: WHY EXPERTS DISAGREE

Disputes among scientists provide policymakers with rationalization for any course of action. These disputes are marked by divergent views of the risks involved in the development of specific technologies. This paper argues that such disagreements are epistemological in nature, which means that “technical” disputes cannot be resolved through mechanisms such as the science court. The case of the herbicide 2, 4, 5‐T illustrates the argument.

Balanced Information: The Pickering Airport Experiment

IN March of 1972, the Canadian federal government and the Ontario provincial government jointly announced that a second international airport for Toronto would be built near the town of Pickering, Ontario. Considerable controversy followed this decision in spite of the great number of governmental studies on which the decision had presumably been based. Among other criticisms it was alleged that while the government's research effort had been extensive, it had not necessarily been balanced, and the case for simply expanding the existing international airport at Toronto might have been understated. The problem faced by the Canadian government in this instance illustrates a frequent problem in the evaluation of public policy alternatives: how to provide balance in the development of information so that both the pro and con positions can be said to be adequately represented. Airport location studies provide particularly good illustrations of the problem of balance because it is impossible for the data and arguments ever to be considered complete. No matter what the expenditure of time and money, there is always room for further research. Even after the million-pound Rosskill cost-benefit study regarding the third London airport, Mishan (1970) and Flowerdew (1972) describe how differences of opinion continued to persist among economists on the commission itself. Similarly, for the Pickering Airport question, no amount of study could be expected to be definitive. In such cases the problem of how to assure that resources and talent are not overconcentrated on one side or the other is a problem of importance. The response of the Canadian government to the Pickering controversy was to appoint a three-man review board, headed by a federal judge, to serve as an Airport Inquiry Commission. The commission was assigned full responsibility for reviewing existing airport studies, holding new hearings, and presenting new summaries and recommendations regarding whether or not the new airport should be built. The procedure chosen in this instance illustrates a common approach to organizing information for decisions. A group such as an executive or legislative committee wishes to receive both balanced information and recommendations regarding some proposal, but allows the same people who are asked to make the recommendations to also summarize the information. When the group making the recommendations also summarizes the information, however, the balance in this information is subject to question. The information may be seen in part as a rationale for the recommendations, and both the information and recommendations may be considered too dependent upon the personal views of a small group. Consequently there have been suggestions for more formal information procedures for certain executive and legislative decisions. More formal information procedures, for example, have been proposed for government technology assessment. As one example, Uman (1975) outlines procedures for using science advisory panels as checks on internal government technology assessments. Other technology assessment procedures are surveyed in articles by Jones (1973) and Coates (1974). An even more formal approach to securing balance in information is the Science Court proposed by Kantrowitz and discussed in reports such as that by the Task Force of the Presidential Advisory Group in Anticipated Advances in Science and Technology (1976). The Science Court and many of the other formal procedures for balance, howReceived for publication March 20, 1978. Revision accepted for publication August 8, 1980. * York University. This study was supported by the University of TorontoYork University Joint Program in Transportation and Canada Council Grant No. 770121. The author would like to thank R. F. Boruch, H. 0. Hartley, B. L. Raktoe, and also the participants at the 1978 National Bureau of Economic Research-National Science Foundation Conference on Decision Rules and Uncertainty at Carnegie-Mellon University. The author is particularly indebted to the economists who formed the research teams for the experiment, John Evans with advisor George Hilton, and Sanford Borins with advisor Glen Jenkins. Finally the author would like to acknowledge useful suggestions from the referees.

The science court proposal in retrospect: A literature review and case study

The interface between the scientific community on the one hand and the public and its decision makers on the other hand is difficult, particularly where disagreement exists among experts over the alleged scientific “facts”; involved. It is increasingly recognized that our existing institutions are maladaptive to this interface, and several proposals have emerged for improving the means whereby disputed scientific facts are introduced into the public policy decision‐making process. The most prominent of these is the science court which would increase the “presumptive validity of the scientific input”; through a structured adversary proceeding. The science court concept was first proposed in 1967 and formally recommended in a 1976 report of a presidential advisory group. Since that time, the proposal has undergone considerable debate. However, the overall reaction both within and without the scientific community can at best be described as lukewarm. A science court, as such, has not yet been convened and in all likelihood will never be. Nonetheless, the concerns which first gave rise to the proposal are valid and are worthy of examination in the context of an institutionalized science court. To provide background, the article summarizes the court's suggested procedural guidelines and traces its history. To place the science court in better perspective, several other techniques for resolving disputed scientific facts are described. In addition, the debate is summarized over major facets of the proposal as appearing in the open literature. Finally, the one serious attempt to convene a science court is reviewed as a case study in the practical problems associated with its implementation. At question were alleged health and safety effects of a controversial high‐voltage DC transmission line crossing West Central Minnesota, an issue with which the author was heavily involved. The failure of this effort reveals major erroneous assumptions behind the science court proposal and enormous problems with its application. The paper concludes with a recommendation against the science court proposal for several reasons, most of which are related to the basic assumptions initially justifying the concept.

Authoritative Positions, Adversary Roles, and the Scientific Process: Science Court Is Not the Answer

The Bulletin of the Ecological Society of AmericaVolume 60, Issue 4 p. 186-189 CommentFree Access Authoritative Positions, Adversary Roles, and the Scientific Process: Science Court Is Not the Answer First published: 01 December 1979 https://doi.org/10.2307/20166213AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume60, Issue4December 1979Pages 186-189 RelatedInformation

The analysis of expert judgment

Expert judgment is a necessary component of technology assessment. But current methods for attempting to integrate expert judgment with social value judgments in the formation of public policy are inappropriate and ineffective. This article advocates the scientific analysis of experts' judgments. Such analysis produces quantitative, pictorial models of expert judgment, thereby providing an explicit and retraceable procedure for a) documenting and comparing reasons for differences in expert judgment, b) helping experts to resolve such differences, and c) conveying information to decision makers in a clear and useful fashion. The proposed approach provides an alternative to the ineffective method of public hearings and recently proposed adversarial approaches such as the “science court.” Two studies are described to illustrate this approach.

Spectral lines: The science court tested

When the concept of a science court to resolve disputes over “scientific fact” was endorsed in 1976 by a Presidential task force, we questioned whether it would work (November 1976, p. 29). The task force, part of the Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances in Science and Technology, suggested that an experiment be set up to test the feasibility of a science court.

In Defense of the Science Court

In Defense of the Science Court

The Science Court on Trial in Minnesota

sympathize with their position. More important, we believe the modified version of the science court the farmers have proposed is a significant advance over the original conception; they have recognized those aspects of the concept that might truly alter the politics of technology. Physicist Arthur Kantrowitz headed the White House Task Force on Anticipated Advances in Science and Technology (Science, August 20, 1976, pp. 653-56), which first developed the science court concept. The task force proposal had three stages. First, the court would identify the significant questions of science and technology associated with a controversial public policy issue; it would leave political, ethical, and other questions for subsequent consideration in the decisionmaking process. Second, a panel of impartial scientist-judges would preside over an adversary proceeding in which scientific experts would testify and scientistadvocates would cross-examine them. Third, the judges would issue their decision on the scientific facts pertaining to the disputed technical questions. When Jimmy Carter took office, the Kantrowitz task force was dissolved, and the science court was never tried.

The "Science Court"—it should be tried

The "Science Court"—it should be tried