ObjectivesData on the prevalence of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) reveal several clinical evolutions inducing new psychiatric definitions and diagnostic practices. Thus, autism has shifted from being a rare syndrome with severe clinical forms to a new paradigm: the paradigm of “ordinary” or “invisible” autism, in terms of the frequency and the intensity of the disorders. These changes incorporate new populations into our conception of autism, with new phenotypes that pose theoretical and clinical challenges to clinicians. In response, we propose the hypothesis — based on psychoanalytic theories of psychic structures — of an “ordinary autism” as a definition of a non-prototypical autistic psychic functioning that falls outside the DSM diagnostic framework. This idea seems to provide us new theoretical references that nourish our practices as well as fundamental research. MethodFirst, we will review the nosographic mutations of the DSM-5 and their implications for non-prototypical psychic modes of functioning of autistic people that may not be contained within the autism spectrum's blurry boundaries — especially for the adult population without intellectual delay and in the case of complicated differential diagnosis for clinical and societal reasons. Next, we will discuss the definition of “ordinary” or “invisible” autism in a psychoanalytic structural model, as a possible epistemological orientation for identifying and designing practice with the clinical heterogeneity of autism outside the boundaries of psychiatric ASD. ResultsThe autistic population targeted by the DSM-5 criteria is different from that previously defined by DSM-IV. This leads to two consequences: on the one hand, autistic modes of functioning are not limited to individuals who have been diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorders as defined by the DSM-5; thus individuals with autism do not have access to the diagnosis of ASD or are given other diagnoses. The alternative diagnoses proposed by the DSM-5 that attempt to correct this diagnostic exclusion — such as Social (Pragmatic) Communication Disorder — are unsatisfactory. Therefore, there is an entire segment of the autistic population that has subclinical, non-prototypic autistic manifestations or more subtle phenomena discernible in the broader autistic phenotype or sub-threshold autism spectrum that does not have access to the ASD diagnosis and raises differential diagnostic issues. On the other hand, it appears that the autism spectrum brings together extremely different entities and false positives such as schizophrenia and schizophrenic spectrum personality disorders under one diagnostic rubric. Then, the differential problem appears central: both at the theoretical level and in diagnostic practices. The recognition of these limits should encourage us to promote research and clinical applications on this subject. One solution that we envisage is to be found in an extension of Maleval's structural psychoanalytical model: we propose the notion of “ordinary autism” — an echo of ordinary psychosis — to define attenuated or compensated non-prototypical autistic phenotypes, increasingly frequent and with fewer “extraordinary” phenomenological expressions than the classic cases of autism which now call into question the relationship between the normal and the pathological. Discussion“Ordinary autism” seems to offer clinicians the opportunity to formalize the new contemporary and extensive clinical reality of autism. This term situates itself within a theoretical model whose current and future developments might help us respond to clinical and diagnostic issues, but also to therapeutic and societal ones. We propose to continue on the path of the operationalization of these theoretical models in order to identify autistic structural constants that could be found throughout the “ordinary” clinic of autism and could serve as differentiating tools for diagnosis as well as a support in developing and refining therapeutic practices. ConclusionWe conclude that there is an urgent need to conceive of “ordinary autism” to provide us with reference points to respond to new clinical issues, but also to reintroduce respect for the autistic person in his or her subjectivity to the center of our therapeutic practices.
Read full abstract