Sceptical Solution Research Articles

The Factualist Interpretation of the Skeptical Solution and Semantic Primitivism

According to the factualist interpretation, the skeptical solution to the skeptic’s problem hinges on rejecting inflationary accounts of semantic facts, advocating instead for the adoption of minimal factualism. However, according to Alexander Miller, this account is unsound. Miller argues that minimal factualism represents a form of semantic primitivism, a position expressly rejected by Kripke’s Wittgenstein. Furthermore, Miller states that minimal factualism presupposes the conformity of meaning ascriptions with rules of discipline and syntax. However, he contends that this maneuver is also undermined by Kripke’s skepticism. In this paper, I demonstrate that Miller’s arguments against minimal factualism are unsound. To achieve this goal, I argue that the minimalist account of semantic facts should not be equated with semantic primitivism. Moreover, I argue that statements regarding the conformity of meaning ascriptions are either beside the criticism of Kripke’s skeptic or should be interpreted from the perspective of the account on assertibility offered by the skeptical solution. On this basis, I conclude that the factualist interpretation provides a conducive environment for solving the problem posed by Kripke’s skeptic.

Humean learning (how to learn)

David Hume’s skeptical solution to the problem of induction was grounded in his belief that we learn by means of custom . We consider here how a form of reinforcement learning like custom may allow an agent to learn how to learn in other ways as well. Specifically, an agent may learn by simple reinforcement to adopt new forms of learning that work better than simple reinforcement in the context of specific tasks . We will consider how such a bootstrapping process may lead to a system that includes trial-and-error forms of learning like win-stay/lose-shift, probe and adjust, and simple reinforcement itself together with higher-rationality inferential tools.

Non-Factualist Interpretation of the Skeptical Solution and the Self-Refutation Argument

The skeptical solution is based on two assumptions — the rejection of semantic facts and the denial of semantic nihilism. On the basis of the non-factualist interpretation of this solution, these two assumptions are reconciled by stating that meaning ascriptions possess non-descriptive function. Nonetheless, Alexander Miller argues that this position is self-refuting since, as despite its non-descriptivism, by rejecting any kind of semantic facts, it inevitably leads to semantic nihilism. In this text, I demonstrate that Miller’s argument is not sound. I argue that a coherent non-factualist way of formulating the conditions of correct use of meaning ascriptions may be performed by rejecting the closure principle of assertibility of meaning ascriptions. On this basis, I demonstrate that argument formulated against non-factualist interpretation by Miller may be refuted. What is more, I argue that rejection of the closure principle should be regarded as the central aspect of Kripke’s skeptical solution.

Unravelling Meaning in Therapeutic Conversations

This paper inspects the relationship between problem analysis—a fundamental part of many therapeutic approaches—and meaning. In the first part, I argue that problem analysis emerges from the representational theory of meaning. I introduce Wittgenstein’s version of this theory as presented in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and examine its difficulties. Later, I focus on two fundamental themes of late Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: private language and rule-following. I argue that the rule-following paradox has disproven the representational theory of meaning. I briefly describe the private language argument and rule-following paradox—a sceptical paradox. Then I provide my reading of Kripke’s sceptical solution to it. I present its implications regarding the meaning and how this is relevant to problem analysis and therapeutic conversations in general.

Kripke against Kripkenstein

What was Saul Kripke’s personal stance on the sceptical challenge that he famously attributed to Ludwig Wittgenstein? It will be argued that despite his statements to the contrary, we can, in fact, outline at least a rough sketch of Kripke’s own views on the challenge and its aftermath on the basis of the remarks he left in the text. In summary, Kripke (a) rejected the sceptical solution to the challenge and (b) leaned towards a non-sceptical primitivist solution. If this is correct, it follows that there is a way in which Kripke's view makes his causal-historical picture of reference potentially able to solve the sceptical challenge.

規則のパラドックスに対する懐疑論的解決とは何だったのか

規則のパラドックスに対する懐疑論的解決とは何だったのか

A puzzle about laws and explanation

In this paper, we argue that the popular claim that laws of nature explain their instances (explanatory laws) creates a philosophical puzzle when it is combined with the widely held requirement that explanations need to be underpinned by ‘wordly’ relations (explanatory realism). We argue that a “direct solution” to the puzzle that accounts for both explanatory laws and explanatory realism requires endorsing at least a radical metaphysics. Then, we examine the ramifications of a “skeptical solution”, i.e., dissolving it by giving up at least one of these two claims, and argue that adopting it is more favorable to Humean reductionists than to anti-reductionists about laws of nature.

Realist and antirealist interpretations of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations

The sceptical paradox which Kripke found in Wittgenstein?s rule-following considerations threatens the very notion of meaning. However, Kripke also offered a sceptical solution to it, according to which semantic sentences have no truth conditions, but their meaning is determined by assertability conditions instead. He presented Wittgenstein?s development as the abandoning of semantic realism of the Tractatus in favour of semantic antirealism, characteristic of Philosophical Investigations. Crispin Wright, although at points critical of Kripke?s interpretation, also understood the rule-following considerations as containing a crucial argument for antirealism. Contrary to Wright, John McDowell maintained that they offer a transcendental argument for realism. In this paper, I will argue that neither the realist nor the antirealist reading is faithfull to Wittgenstein, as his important conceptual distinction between criteria and symptoms is not adequately recoverable in any of them. Hence the upshot of rulefollowing considerations is that the distinction between realism and antirealism should not be articulated in terms of truth/assertability conditions.

Wittgenstein and Die Meistersinger: The Aesthetic Road to a Sceptical Solution of the Sceptical Paradox

Starting with Wittgenstein’s remark about his allegedly frequent visits to the performance of Wagner’s Die Meistersinger von Nurnberg, the paper presents Wagner’s opera – being explicitly an opera about rules and rule-following – as a possible stimulus for the later Wittgenstein’s thinking about language. Besides Wittgenstein’s systematic interests in parallels between music and language, the paper draws on the choice of terminology (such as the comparison of rules to rails) and on Wittgenstein’s own examples of rule-following. More speculatively, the phrasing as well as the solution to what Kripke called Wittgenstein’s sceptical paradox is used as a point of comparison that brings Wittgenstein’s aesthetic innuendos closer not only to mainstream philosophy of language, but due to the antithetical structure of Kripke’s argument also to the broader philosophical and aesthetical tradition, with a particular focus on the great philosophical systems of German idealism.

What is the Sceptical Solution?

In chapter 3 of Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Kripke’s Wittgenstein offers a “sceptical solution" to the sceptical paradox about meaning developed in chapter 2 (according to which there are no facts in virtue of which ascriptions of meaning such as “Jones means addition by ‘+’” can be true). Although many commentators have taken the sceptical solution to be broadly analogous to non-factualist theories in other domains, such as non-cognitivism or expressivism in metaethics, the nature of the sceptical solution has not been well-understood. The main aim of this paper is to advance our understanding of the nature of the non-factualism about meaning proposed in the sceptical solution. It attempts to outline some desiderata that should be respected by interpretations of the sceptical solution and considers two objections raised against it in Barry Stroud’s paper “Wittgenstein on Meaning, Understanding and Community". It attempts to correct misconstruals of the sceptical solution that have been promulgated by Davidson and some of his followers and suggests that the sceptical solution developed by Kripke’s Wittgenstein is best viewed as a form of quasi-realism about meaning. It ends by outlining what it takes to be the most pressing challenges facing the sceptical solution.

The Threat of Privacy in Wittgenstein’s Investigations: Kripke vs. Cavell

Abstract Most readers of the Investigations take skepticism as a target of Wittgenstein’s remarks, something to be refuted by means of a clear grasp of our criteria. Stanley Cavell was the first to challenge that consensual view by reminding us that our criteria are constantly open to skeptical repudiation, hence that privacy is a standing human possibility. In an apparently similar vein, Saul Kripke has argued that a skeptical paradox concerning rules and meaning is the central problem of the Investigations – and one that receives a skeptical solution. Following the orthodoxy, however, Kripke does not take privacy as a real threat but instead reads Wittgenstein as offering an argument against its very possibility. This paper offers a critical assessment of Kripke’s and Cavell’s readings, and concludes by delineating an understanding of our linguistic practices that acknowledges the seriousness of skepticism while avoiding the kind of evasion shared by Kripke and the orthodoxy, enabling us to see agreement and meaning as continual tasks whose failure is imbued with high existential costs.

The Rule-Following Problem and Wittgenstein’s Place in Sociology Studies

The article presents an attempt to evaluate the influence of the late Wittgenstein philosophy (by the example of the rule-following problem) on sociology and some empirical programs of sociological research. At first we give a brief overview of the rule-following problem and consider, on the one hand, a skeptical reading and a skeptical solution to the problem by S. Kripke and, on the other hand, criticism towards Kripke by some Wittgensteinians). Then we reveal the role of skeptic reading in the sociological works of D. Bloor and the role of anti-sceptic reading in ethnomethodological projects. At the end we show the paramount importance of Peter Winch – we prove the following thesis: the ideas of Peter Winch anticipated many of the points and arguments in the dispute between D. Bloor and ethnomethodology.

Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s Sceptical Paradox: A Trilemma for Davidson

Davidson’s later philosophy of language has been inspired by Wittgenstein’s Investigations, but Davidson by no means sympathizes with the sceptical problem and solution Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein. Davidson criticizes the sceptical argument for relying on the rule-following conception of meaning, which is, for him, a highly problematic view. He also casts doubt on the plausibility of the sceptical solution as unjustifiably bringing in shared practices of a speech community. According to Davidson, it is rather success in mutual interpretation that explains success in the practice of meaning something by an utterance. I will argue that Davidson’s objections to the sceptical problem and solution are misplaced as they rely on a misconstrual of Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s view. I will also argue that Davidson’s alternative solution to the sceptical problem is implausible, since it fails to block the route to the sceptical problem. I will then offer a problematic trilemma for Davidson.

Deep Disagreement and the Problem of the Criterion

My objective in this paper is to compare two philosophical problems, the problem of the criterion and the problem of deep disagreement, and note a core similarity which explains why many proposed solutions to these problems seem to fail along similar lines. From this observation, I propose a kind of skeptical solution to the problem of deep disagreement, and this skeptical program has consequences for the problem as it manifests in political epistemology and metaphilosophy.

Yet Another Skeptical Solution

The paper puts forward a new skeptical solution to Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox, a solution which revolves around the idea that human communication does not require meaning facts - at least as defined by Kripke. After a brief discussion of the paradox, I explain why I think that Kripkenstein’s solution needs revision and argue that the main goal of a skeptical solution to the rule-following paradox should be that of showing that communication does not require meaning. After that, I offer two arguments for the thesis that communication does not require meaning. The first argument instantiates a rather direct strategy and focuses on the description of a concrete case of communication without meaning. The second one is more indirect in that I start by describing a world in which, although there are meaning facts, communication does not depend on them. The paper’s last section deals with the issue of meaning talk.

Hume on the social construction of mathematical knowledge

Mathematics for Hume is the exemplary field of demonstrative knowledge. Ideally, this knowledge is a priori as it arises only from the comparison of ideas without any further empirical input; it is certain because demonstration consist of steps that are intuitively evident and infallible; and it is also necessary because the possibility of its falsity is inconceivable as it would imply a contradiction. But this is only the ideal, because demonstrative sciences are human enterprises and as such they are just as fallible as their human practitioners. According to the reading suggested here, Hume develops a radical sceptical challenge for mathematics, and thereby he undermines the knowledge claims associated with demonstrative reasoning. But Hume does not stop there: he also offers resources for a sceptical solution to this challenge, one that appeals crucially to social practices, and sketches the social genealogy of a community-wide mathematical certainty. While explaining this process, he relies on the conceptual resources of his faculty psychology that helps him to distinguish between the metaphysics and practices of mathematical knowledge. His account explains why we have reasons to be dubious about our reasoning capacities, and also how human nature and sociability offers some remedy from these epistemic adversities.

Semantic Non-factualism in Kripke’s Wittgenstein

Kripke’s Wittgenstein is standardly understood as a non-factualist about meaning ascription. Non-factualism about meaning ascription is the idea that sentences like “Joe means addition by ‘plus’” are not used to state facts about the world. Byrne and Kusch have argued that Kripke’s Wittgenstein is not a non-factualist about meaning ascription. They are aware that their interpretation is non-standard, but cite arguments from Boghossian and Wright to support their view. Boghossian argues that non-factualism about meaning ascription is incompatible with a deflationary theory of truth. Wright argues that non-factualism about meaning ascription is incoherent. To support the standard interpretation, I’ll respond to each argument in turn. To the degree that my responses are successful, Byrne and Kusch have an unmotivated interpretation of Kripke’s Wittgenstein. Wilson provides a factualist interpretation that is not based on Boghossian and Wright’s arguments. Miller argues for a non-factualist interpretation against Wilson, but I’ll show that Miller’s interpretation faces a dilemma. Miller’s argument cannot be maintained if a coherent interpretation of the skeptical solution is to be provided. I’ll show how this dilemma can be avoided and provide an independent argument against Wilson so that a non-factualist interpretation of the skeptical solution can be maintained.

Wittgenstein a problem reguł

The problem of rules and the private language argument are among the most renowned and disputable themes of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. Presumably today’s best known interpretation of the themes was presented in Saul Kripke’s famous and often commented book Wittgenstein on Rules and the Private Language, published in 1982. The interpretation, nicknamed “Kripkenstein”, became the target of numerous attacks of authors convinced that it did justice neither to Wittgenstein nor to the real way our language worked.This article begins with the examination of Wittgenstein’s problem of identification of action which may be counted as justified by the rule, that is, the problem of criteria of correctness. This is Kripke’s starting point in his binding the problem of rules with the private language argument. He believes that Wittgenstein did not question the mere possibility of such a language but the possibility of any language at all. Further, we survey the rejected solutions to the problem of criteria: the mentalistic and the dispositional. This leads us toKripke’s sceptical solution: there are no reasons of actions which occur before these actions. There are certain trained ways of doing things which “tell” us what to do in typical situations but they are not criteria of correctness. Such criteria may only be public and therefore social.In conclusion it’s argued that Kripkenstein’s view is really Wittgenstein’s view: contrary to the popular opinion Kripke did not put forward a new solution, he just gave us a different way of presenting it.

Is Kripkenstein really a skeptic about meaning?

According to the standard interpretation of position about the meaning that Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein in his study Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Kripkenstein advocates skepticism about the meaning facts, and semantic antirealism - the view that sentences of semantic discourse have assertability conditions instead of truth conditions. The aim of this paper is to show that the standard interpretation of the skeptical solution is not accurate because the sceptical conclusion implies only that Kripkenstein doubts the existence of philosophical super-facts which uniquely determine the truth conditions that the speaker has in mind when he utters a certain sentence, but not the existence of facts about meaning altogether.

Rule Following, Error Theory and Eliminativism

In this paper, I argue for three main claims. First, that there are two broad sorts of error theory about a particular region of thought and talk, eliminativist error theories and non-eliminativist error theories. Second, that an error theory about rule following can only be an eliminativist view of rule following, and therefore an eliminativist view of meaning and content on a par with Paul Churchland’s prima facie implausible eliminativism about the propositional attitudes. Third, that despite some superficial appearances to the contrary, non-eliminativist error theory does not provide a plausible vehicle for understanding the ‘sceptical solution’ to the sceptical paradox about rule-following developed in Saul Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.