In my earlier paper, I argued against analysis by anecdote and for a careful economic analysis of the costs and benefi ts which might be associated with the possible elimination of the penny. Robert Whaples has followed this lead and offered some welcome new evidence bearing on the question. As an economy evolves, the underlying dynamics driving prices and behavior affect estimates of costs and benefi ts, implying that periodic reassessments are a necessary element of sensible policy making. Whaples points out that the surge in zinc prices, along with the fact that the penny is comprised of about 97.5 percent zinc, implies that the previous seigniorage earned by the US Mint on the penny has disappeared; indeed, for fi scal year 2006, the Mint estimates the cost of producing and distributing a penny at about 1.23 cents. Assuming that the higher level of zinc prices persists, this development, along with the ongoing decline in the purchasing power of the penny which accompanies the increases in the overall price level, could well represent a necessary but not a suffi cient condition for eliminating the penny. The distinction between necessary and suffi cient conditions is important. First, the alloys used to produce the penny could be altered to lower production costs, as was the case in 1982, when the price of copper soared and the composition of the penny was changed from 95 percent copper to 97.5 percent of the then much less expensive zinc. Second, seigniorage is but one of an array of issues one must consider in estimating the net benefi ts or net costs of eliminating the penny. More specifi cally, the effects of eliminating the penny on pricing, including my earlier discussion of a “rounding tax” and more recent research bearing on “strategic pricing,” are crucial. To sharpen the point, the Mint estimates the cost of producing and distributing the nickel, as of July 2006 [Lebryk, 3], at approximately 7 cents; is anyone ready to argue we should eliminate the nickel and round to the nearest dime?