Asymmetric Response of Russian Citizens toward American GoodwillIdentity formation is a key element within the broader process of human socialization. In the traditional literature, this formation begins at birth and generally finishes with the acquisition of one's first professional experience. More recent research into social development introduces noticeable amendments into this model, recognizing the fact that the socialization process is not complete after one attains a certain social position. Changes in society occur so rapidly that representatives of the same generation must repeatedly internalize new norms and identities and thereby contribute to the creation of a fundamentally new society.For the Russian case, all these dynamics were aggravated by the drastic nature of the changes undergone by Russian society from the beginning of the 1980s. The breaking of Soviet-era concepts, dividing the world into friendly and alien camps, and the territorial disintegration of the country provoked a new process of identity formation. Quite naturally, this process develops most actively among the younger generations, who must reorient themselves toward the expected challenges of their future.1A key component in the process of identity formation is the division of the world into us and them factions and the development of some perception of how Russians differ from others. From this point of view, the West as a whole, and America as the leader of the Western world, is the mirror in which Russians see themselves-both in terms of their strengths and weaknesses. To a lesser extent this view also contributes to assessments of the West, as well as the actions of Western states.According to public opinion polls administered by the Foundation for Public Opinion (hereafter, FOM) in May 2002, only one out of every four (23 percent) Russians had a positive view of the United States, about the same number (22 percent) held a negative view, and roughly half of those polled (51 percent) were indifferent (table 1). Therefore, aggregate opinion tends toward neutrality, with roughly equal amounts of pro- and anti-American sentiment and a predominance of indifferent attitudes. Moreover, within the last year, Russians' attitudes toward the United States took a turn for the worse. Less favorable indicators occurred only in March 2002-following the bitter experience of Russian athletes at the Salt Lake City Winter Olympic Games.2 At this point, negative attitudes toward America exceeded positive attitudes by approximately 9 percent (29 percent and 20 percent, correspondingly). However, attitudes toward the United States keep close to neutral: positive exceeds negative by roughly 1 percent.In May 2001, only 32 percent of the Russians polled had a positive attitude toward the United States, while 17 percent expressed negative attitudes. The tragic events in New York and Washington, DC yielded a brief increase in sympathy towards Americans. Immediately after the September 11 attacks, the share of negative attitudes decreased to only 12 percent. However, by the close of 2001, it again increased to 20 percent. The share of positive attitudes about the United States in 2001 was approximately the same (32 percent, 38 percent, 36 percent), but decreased by one third within the 2002 (20-23 percent). Thus, although in 2001 Russians generally estimated America positively (with the few exceptions cited above), in 2002 Russians' attitude toward the United States took a drastic decline.It is important to note the marked asymmetry in American and Russian attitudes toward one another and to recognize that negative perceptions are concentrated primarily on the Russian side. According to Gallup poll data, the past three years have witnessed a steady improvement in American attitudes toward Russians. To take November 1999-when just slightly more than one third (38 percent) of Americans viewed Russia positively, while more than half of the total number (58 percent) viewed it negatively-as the reference point, one clearly sees a steady improvement in attitudes over the following three years (table 2). …
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